HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL HEIDEGGERIAN EXPLORATION

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Summary

This thesis addresses a fundamental incoherence in contemporary development thinking that occludes the meaning of development itself. This incoherence stems from the centrality of economics in mainstream development thinking, and has its origin in the dominance of positivism that arose in the 19th century. It shows itself in various dichotomies found in development thinking: between developed and underdeveloped; between developed*ness* and underdevelopment; and between self-developing and developing others. The mainstream conception presents an ideal of developedness that is operationalized in development practice through policies aiming to reform socio-economic structures of the underdeveloped. This abstract conception is presented as the inevitable outcome of general or universal laws governing social change, the domain of which is most often considered to be the economic.

These dichotomies also provide the basis for contemporary critiques of the mainstream, which argue that it fails to acknowledge what is at issue in development, namely the particular, historically concrete actuality of each society. The most recent trenchant critique is postdevelopment, which argues that mainstream development thinking simply attempts to universalize the experience of Western countries through the Westernization of others. The postdevelopmentalists argue that the historical specificity of the West contains no lessons for non-Western countries, which must seek their own paths to development however they conceive it.

The postdevelopmentalists reiterate arguments of 19th and early 20th century historicism, directed against both the Enlightenment legacy of universal history and post-Hegelian positivistic attempts to reduce history to the determinateness of causal laws. Historicism argued that positivism was itself a historically particular conception of knowledge, and that the attempt to explain history by general laws disregarded the uniqueness of the historical. However, historicism's historicization of history, knowledge and humanity entailed a sceptical relativism, in which there is *no* determinateness to human historical existence. Thus, both positivism and historicism problematize meaning. Positivism ultimately entails that the singular or the individual has no meaning or value, whereas historicism ultimately entails that meaning is subjectivized and historically relativized.

Heidegger's thinking addresses this same incoherence as it appeared in the philosophical debates of his time. Thus, his response suggests a way to approach development more coherently. Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutical approach to the human situation aims to show how concretely individual life can be expressed in a way that is neither objectivist nor subjectivist. In Heidegger's analytic, the singularity of the human situation shows itself primarily in being with others. Through an intertwined set of directing concepts, called "formal indications", Heidegger seeks to show how the happening of life is always grasped in and as *co*-happening, and thus how meaningfulness is always co-constituted.

This thesis seeks to show how a phenomenological-hermeneutical approach to the question of development can bring into relief the co-happening of the develop*ing* by which we are co-constituted. It aims to bring to light how we can be freed for our possibilities in becoming who and how we already are, in a way that avoids both the implication of expert trusteeship found in positivist development and the implication of cultural relativism found in historicist development.

Foreword

Looking back from the Year 2007

> In accord with the basic character of its being, philosophical research is something a "time", as long as it is not merely concerned with it as a matter of education, can never borrow from another time. Such research also is something that—and this is how it needs to understand itself and the nature of what it can possibly achieve in human being-situate—will never want to step forward with the claim that it be allowed to and is able to relieve future times of the burden of having to worry about radical questioning.
>
> —Martin Heidegger, "Phenomenological Interpretations to Aristotle"

Why a Phenomenological Hermeneutics of Development?[1]

This Foreword provides further clarification about the project undertaken in this thesis, namely, showing how Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutics is significant for understanding international development. To a large extent, it is a retrospective on the inquiry that constitutes the thesis, as it was written more than one year after the latter. As well, in the interval between the two, I was engaged in development work in Tanzania, and thus had the opportunity to experience how the situation of having enacted the previous inquiry changed my understanding of the endeavour of development. What is presented here is therefore not a summary of the thesis, but rather a subsequent consideration of how Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutics offers a way to approach the phenomenon of development that takes into account the engagement in development as itself constitutive of that phenomenon, and

1. Adapted from "A Phenomenological Hermeneutics of Development", presented at the Catholic University of Eastern Africa's Philosophy of Development Conference in Nairobi, Kenya on 14 September 2006 (to be published in *The Philosophy of Development*, eds. Paul Shimiyu, David Lutz and George Ndemo, Catholic University of Eastern Africa Publications, Nairobi, forthcoming). I am grateful for CUEA's permission to reproduce this material here.

thus suggests how such engagement can be understood as a situation of thinking the unprecedented. The analysis of Heidegger's thinking in relation to development should also be taken as an argument for the centrality of philosophical inquiry in development thinking, which the dominance of the social sciences, particularly economics, has largely obscured.

The conceptual consequences of this dominance are examined in the first part of the thesis, in the form of two predominant conceptions of development, the mainstream or "positivist" and the anti-development or "historicist", to show how neither gives an adequate account of the relationship between development and freedom, because neither properly accounts for how understanding development both constitutes, and is constituted by, development. That is, neither properly accounts for how such understanding is both immanent in its historical context yet transcends it. Positivist development negates the historical context in which, and as which, development happens, in favour of the notion of a linear, universal series of stages of history or social change, and thus holds that knowledge about development transcends every historical context. Historicist development, on the other hand, regards development as determined by the historically singular and hence incommensurable contexts in which it occurs, and thus regards understanding of development as immanent in such contexts. In both, development is theoretically objectified in a way that forestalls the possibility of transformation in the concept of development itself. Thus, both conceptions preclude the possibility of the unprecedented in development. Yet arguably it is unprecedentedness, rather than predetermined standards or given historical traditions, that constitutes the *freedom* of development.

The second part of the thesis argues that a phenomenological hermeneutic approach to development is a way to grasp how the possibility of the unprecedented is

constitutive of historical singularity, and thus to grasp how "the history we ourselves "are"" (J pg. 74) is both constituted by historical context and involves understanding it. Such understanding is an enactment of possibilities, and thus transforms the historical context. It is the possibility of transformation in how development is understood that constitutes the freedom of development. But as such transformation in thinking, it cannot be known in advance, and thus cannot be grasped as a (theoretical) object. Instead, it needs to be approached as a phenomenon in the phenomenological sense, which includes how it appears or how we have access to it. Phenomenological inquiry does not presuppose the "content" of what is to be elucidated in the inquiry, nor does it presuppose that the inquiry is separate from the phenomenon it inquires into. Rather, inquiry is understood to constitutively belong to the phenomenon and thus to disclose it in the inquiry, as a concrete enactment or actualisation of the phenomenon. Such an approach, I suggest, is a way to understand how development always involves the transformation of the concept of development itself, and thus to approach the meaning of development in a way that neither determines it in advance, nor binds it to the past.

Heidegger's aim in his phenomenological decade (1917-1927) was to elucidate the question of the meaning of being through a phenomenological hermeneutical inquiry into the being of the human situation. Of crucial significance in Heidegger's analytic is his argument that such inquiry is an *enactment* that belongs to the phenomenon of the human situation itself, and that this phenomenon is characterised by its *historical singularity*. Hence such inquiry cannot be theoretical. Nor can it directly specify the phenomenon. Instead, it can only specify it in an indirect way, through the method that Heidegger calls "formal indication". For this reason, the enactment of the inquiry *belongs* to the phenomenon, and therefore transforms the phenomenon into which it inquires. In such transformation, the concepts whereby the

phenomenon is grasped and expressed undergo transformation as well, as they are concretized in the inquiry. It is this transformation that suggests a way to think the unprecedented, so as to grasp development not as the intentional reproduction of an extant historical trajectory that for some reason has failed to manifest itself elsewhere, but as the creative reappropriation of the traditions that both constitute us and through which we understand them *as* our traditions.

A phenomenological hermeneutical approach to the phenomenon of development is more appropriate than theoretical approaches, for it neither presupposes a definition of development (e.g., by reference to values, indicators or other supposedly objective standards), nor does it isolate the inquiry from its "object". The situatedness of the inquiry itself suggests how the historically singular context can be articulated in the way it determines the inquiry that arises from it, and how such inquiry, in making that context explicit, allows for the possibility of disclosing the unprecedented.

Elucidating a phenomenon involves elucidating the access to it, which includes the foreconceptions and method by which it is elucidated. The categories in terms of which the phenomenon is understood and expressed originate in the encounter of the phenomenon, rather than pre-existing it. Furthermore, in the elucidation that makes the implicit understanding of the phenomenon explicit in concrete expression, the concepts undergo transformation. Understanding is transformed in interpretation because the realisation of the possibilities it involves transforms the situation from which understanding arises.

What neither positivism nor historicism are able to articulate is the very happening of development, because neither approach in itself involves or enacts such happening. Both conceptions theoretically objectify development as a process, whether universal (positivism) or as one arising from the particular historical context

(historicism). But this notion always involves the idea of definite start- and endpoints, and thus cannot grasp development as a happening or event in which conceptualisation itself changes. Phenomenological hermeneutics, in contrast, involves a way of access that allows the phenomenon to show itself from itself in the enactment of the elucidation, which must hence always be contextualised concretely. Nevertheless, this way of access can be formally indicated, i.e., conceptualised in a way that does not prescribe or presuppose the material or concrete content, but points to the enactment itself. Formal indication, then, holds the content in abeyance until it is enacted. In the enactment, formally indicative concepts are "deformalised" into concepts that articulate and grasp the phenomenon concretely. The phenomenon of development involves and is constituted by such concretisation itself, as the way in which the understanding of it arises from the context and yet is directed "back" towards it.

Phenomenologically elucidated, then, "development" does not mean a set of characteristics (of an object or an objective process) specifiable in advance, as the positivist and historicist conceptions entail. Approached phenomenologically, the meaning of development lies in the way the approach to it allows it to show itself, i.e., is constitutive of how it comes about, which cannot be known in advance. Such an approach suggests that "we will know it when we see it" (or even "when we are it"), not because we simply retrospectively deem whatever happens to be development, but because we have a foreconception or intuition arising from our historical situation of what development could be. We will know it when we see it, because seeing it is part of knowing it, and vice versa. How we can see it cannot be specified in advance, nor prescribed, because this depends on who we are. Yet, correlatively, being who we are depends on how we are able to understand ourselves in grasping our possibilities.

Thus, the phenomenological approach to development involves elucidating how the understanding of development belongs to development itself, and equally how development is constituted in and by such understanding. Because understanding ourselves depends on who we are, it is always historically singular. But such singularity only happens in the expression of that understanding, which transforms the situation in belonging *to* it. This is the sense of the unprecedented that positivist and historicist conceptions of development purport to articulate, but always preclude by attempting to determine it. Phenomenological hermeneutics indicates that the possibility of the unprecedented can be grasped and articulated precisely as possibility, not as some actuality either present elsewhere or in the past, because the very approach holds open the possible as the sense that we continually enact in striving to understand who we are and how we have become.

Introduction

Development as Freedom, or Freedom in Development?

> We at the World Bank believe that the disadvantaged of the world should be seen not as objects of charity but as assets in the fight against poverty.
>
> —James D. Wolfensohn, *The World Bank Annual Report 2004*

> Development is indeed a momentous engagement with freedom's possibilities.
>
> —Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*

> Human freedom now no longer means freedom as a property of man, but *man as a possibility of freedom*.
>
> —Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Human Freedom*

In this thesis, I pursue the central question about development that Cowen and Shenton pose in *Doctrines of Development*: how is free development possible in a world constrained by necessity?[1] How is it possible to develop freely if development can only be understood as a constructivist response to the conditions of the past, or if the past is appealed to as a "palliative of the present",[2] i.e., as holding the cure for the ills that development itself has wrought (DoD 168-169)? Such conceptions of development, they argue, have their origin in the positivist reinterpretation of the organic idea of development (found, for example, in Romanticism) as a counterpoint to the modern idea of progress (DoD ix-x, 6-7), a reinterpretation that sought to reconcile the two. This gave rise to a conception of development in which socioeconomic conditions are taken to be the external constraint preventing development. People are

1. Michael P. Cowen and Robert W. Shenton, *Doctrines of Development*, Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 449-450 (hereafter DoD followed by page number).
2. M.P. Cowen and R.W. Shenton, "The Renewed Search for Social Trusteeship: Cohen and Fitch on Social Justice and the City", *Journal of Historical Sociology*, vol. 11, no. 1, 1988, pg. 122.

seen as unable to develop themselves in such historically determined conditions, which do not allow them to actualize their potential for production and improvement. The positivist view holds that, for development to occur, an agent to act on such people's behalf—a trustee—is required that, by altering their conditions, can enable them to develop themselves. Yet this view manifests a contradiction, for how can such an agent's actions properly be oriented to the *self*-development of others? That is, how is the basis for such self-development to be ascertained, if not by those people themselves? And if they cannot determine this basis because of their external constraints, then in what sense is any basis for such development justifiable, since it is not determined from their own development (which has not yet occurred), but rather from elsewhere, i.e., from those who *have* developed?

Although this would suggest that the positivist conception of development is simply an imposition of concepts and values that pertain only to the developed, the positivist developer maintains that human nature is universal and thus that there are general laws governing *all* development. But with this conception, positivism implies that agency, intention, and purpose are in fact of no consequence in determining the *end* or *goal* of development, since it can be determined without reference to these. Yet without such reference, the meaning of development becomes problematic, because it ceases to be intelligible as a way in which we encounter our conditions.

Against the positivist assimilation of progress and history into development, the 19th-century historicists argued that development can only be understood as historically individual. All eras, these thinkers argued, are constituted as the eras they are *by* their own individual development, which has nothing to do with linear, universal progress. The idea of progress entails that different eras can be arranged both in a chronological-causal sequence, *and* in a hierarchically comparative classificatory

scheme, which reduces the individuality and the meaning of different eras to their instrumental role in giving rise to the present, thereby devaluing other historical eras. This in turn implied a *reductio ad absurdum*, since the present could not itself then be understood as a source of intrinsic value, since it, too, must simply be instrumental for a more advanced future era. In asserting the equal value of all historical eras, the historicists historicized both history and human being. But this led to the aporia of historical relativism, since it denied that there was any basis for judgment about the moral value of different eras, and thus of determining whether what happens or is undertaken in the name of development is in fact constitutive of a culture's individuality.

The debate between positivism and historicism should be understood as a debate about the source of possibilities for different eras, and by extension, different cultures. Yet both positions equally entail that development cannot properly be free, i.e., self-determined rather than determined by historical conditions. The question then becomes, does *free* development have any meaning? If development is constrained by general laws of history or progress, or by historical individuality, how can it ever be free? That is, can any society or country ever determine its own possibilities?

On the question of how free development can be understood as a possibility, Cowen and Shenton have little to say. One of the aims of this thesis is (paraphrasing Heidegger) to put Heidegger's works in the service of Cowen and Shenton by working out how free development might be understood in the light of our historicalness. Heidegger's phenomenological approach to the human situation, or to human "being-situate" [*Da-sein*],[3] seeks to address precisely the aporia found in development thinking, which has its roots in positivist and historicist aporias and their inflection into

3. See Appendix I for an explanation of this translation.

economic thought. Heidegger found this aporia evident in his philosophical predecessors, i.e., Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, Lask and Husserl. His phenomenological appropriation of Dilthey, as a way of expressing concrete individuality, sought to show how being-historical is a concretion of being-possible, and thus to show the relation between possibility and history (not the *past*). An examination of how Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutics articulates the relation between science, history and human existence shows how such an approach is fundamental to re-thinking international development. Both mainstream development thinking and the current critiques of it, I argue, are problematic because they rest on objectifying conceptions of development that elide how such thinking, whether positivist or historicist, belong to and are constitutive of development.

Current conceptions conflate a number of different notions, as Cowen and Shenton have argued in *Doctrines of Development*: (i) the conflation of the intent to develop with development as an immanent process; (ii) the conflation of development with progress; (iii) the conflation of the intent to develop with an agency capable of acting so as to bring development about for another; and (iv) the conflation of the immanent process with the state of developedness (or being developed) itself (DoD 3-4).

The first conflation fails to recognize that the immanent process of development is the *basis* for the intent to develop. The idea that the intent to develop can be brought to bear on a situation where development has not occurred raises the question of whether this can, in fact, *be* development. The second conflation fails to recognize the heterogeneity of the concepts of development and progress in terms of continuity and discontinuity. The pre-modern concept of development involved the biological or phusiological notion of decline and decay as inherent in the appearance of

the new, whether in organisms or in societies. Progress, in contrast, was conceived as "a linear unfolding of the universal potential for human improvement that need not be recurrent, finite or reversible" (DoD 14). Progress meant the continuous accumulation of scientific and moral knowledge, whereas development implied its loss and disappearance. Yet the social transformations brought about by industrialization were accompanied by the rapid destruction of ways of life and consequent social disorder. The increase in scientific and technical knowledge and its application to material production manifested discontinuity rather than continuity. In the face of this, development was reformulated as a *counterpoint* to progress so as to provide continuity with the past through intention, Cowen and Shenton argue. In contemporary times, however, it has come to be identified with progress, and identification that manifests the problem of the legitimacy of development that intends destruction.[4]

Whilst I agree with much of Cowen and Shenton's analysis of the positivist origins of contemporary conceptions of development, their immanent critique pays little attention to the historicist critique of both positivism and universal history that became prominent in 19th-century Germany.[5] Historicism rejected the notion of progress as a universal cumulative process, and argued that each culture and historical era had to be understood in its own terms, as a coherent unity expressing its own internal principle. For the historicists, as Ranke put it, "every epoch is immediate to God".[6] Although they acknowledged progress in the material realm, in which one thing leads to another, the historicist conception of history challenged the *necessity* at the

4. As Cowen and Shenton point out, the destructive or negative aspects of development are a necessary part of the process, as for instance with the destructiveness of capitalist development (DoD ix).
5. Herbert Schnädelbach, *Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, pg. 34.
6. Leopold von Ranke, "On the Epochs of Modern History", trans. W.A. Iggers and K. von Moltke, in *German Essays on History*, ed. R. Sältzer, Continuum, New York, 1991, pg. 84.

heart of positivism. However, the cultural and social relativism historicism implied problematized the basis on which the development of individual historical eras was to be determined *as* development.

Positivism and historicism in 19th-century Germany also challenged the discipline of philosophy, and gave rise to a number of responses from philosophers concerned to defend the autonomy of their discipline. The responses found in the work of Dilthey, Husserl, and the Baden school of neo-Kantianism (Windelband, Rickert, and Lask), were the philosophical motivation for Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutics. Heidegger's aim was to overcome both the aporias of historicism and neo-Kantian transcendental value philosophy, and the residual Cartesianism in Dilthey and Husserl, by way of a phenomenological critique of the theoretical attitude. Heidegger argued that the theoretical attitude is unable to grasp the historicalness of the human situation because it *presupposes* an ahistorical subject. Grasping the human situation in its concrete individuality, he argued, requires a hermeneutical approach that is also phenomenological, i.e., one that brings into relief the interpretative condition of human being as always situational, through phenomenological analysis—or "destruction"—itself.

Heidegger's phenomenological approach to the human situation is not anti-scientific, however. Unlike many postmodernists, Heidegger does not argue that the positive sciences are simply historically or culturally determined worldviews. His argument against the foundationalism accorded to science is that we cannot grasp the human situation through such disciplines, because they already presuppose an understanding of the human being as a theoretical knower. In positing their objects, they likewise posit the subject that investigates them. This applies equally to the human and the natural sciences. The objectification of a domain of beings, whether the

spatiotemporal entities of physics, the organic entities of biology, the collectivities of sociology or the abstract exchangers of neoclassical economics, involves a subjectification of the being that inquires into them, whether such inquiry is through experimentation, statistical data-gathering, or descriptive observation.

Nevertheless, Heidegger maintains that such inquiries are genuine and legitimate. What he questions is the notion that they are able to give an account of our way of being, because human be*ing* is not an object or an instance of something. Of course, human beings *can* be investigated as objects or instances, and this is precisely what the positive sciences do. For example, physiology investigates the human body, anthropology investigates human cultures, economics investigates the economic behaviour of humans, and so on. But in doing so, they are unable to grasp the singularity of being human, the *individuum* that has traditionally been held to be *ineffabile*. This is the question that motivates Heidegger's thinking: how to find a way to express our concrete, historical, situational singularity? His approach to the question draws from Husserl, Dilthey, Rickert and Lask, combining the insights of each into a phenomenology (Husserl) that allows the hermeneutic historicality (Dilthey) of singularity to show itself in its heterothetical situationality (Rickert) brought to expression by way of a productive logic (Lask) of originariness. In his various attempts to express this, however, he found that the language of the philosophical tradition itself was an obstacle, for it constantly elides the expression of the singular by subsuming it as a particular instance under general or formal concepts. For that reason, Heidegger sought to articulate his analytic of the human situation in a nonobjectifying way, by finding forms of expression that in themselves would prohibit their immediate identification with familiar concepts. In its most "scholastic" form, found in *Being and*

Time, he attempts this by destructing the familiar grammatical functions of words to an unprecedented degree, which makes reading that text "a strange lexical experience".[7]

Nevertheless, this is not idiosyncrasy on Heidegger's part, and even less a strategy for achieving philosophical fame (or notoriety). But all too often the temptation when reading Heidegger is to try and "translate" his "neologisms" into more familiar terms. For example, *Da-sein* is often taken simply as Heidegger's term of art for "human" (fostered, in no small part, by the failure of successive generations of English-language Heidegger scholars to translate this term[8]), being-with-one-another is taken as Heidegger's term for "the social", and so on. The desire to map Heidegger's formal indications onto concepts we are more familiar with often results in reading his texts as contributions to familiar debates, such as anti-representationalism in the philosophy of mind. This tendency, however, misconstrues the motivations for his thinking and the transformation in thinking that is involved in his approach. As is often the case with phenomenology, Heidegger's texts get read as if they were presenting a philosophical *system*, and are evaluated on that basis. For Heidegger, however, phenomenology is an approach, a "how" of research (SZ 27), that aims to bring the phenomena it investigates to light *in* the approach itself, rather than as a result of it. That is, it demonstrates what it seeks to articulate; and it must be carried out or *enacted* in order to achieve this. Thus, a phenomenological text such as *Being and Time* cannot be understood in terms of *what* it

7. Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993, pg. 397 (hereafter GBT followed by page number).
8. Thomas Sheehan, "A paradigm shift in Heidegger research", *Continental Philosophy Review*, vol. 34, 2001, pp. 193-194.

reports, because the what is not fundamental.[9] Yet this is precisely reversed when we try to interpret Heidegger's language by way of familiar concepts.

This danger is even more prevalent in an endeavour such as the one undertaken here. It is all too easy to appropriate Heidegger's concepts and "apply" them to a domain such as development by mapping them on to the usual terms of debates in that domain. For example, it is possible to read *Being and Time* as a critique of the scientifically-oriented approach to development. Much of what that text says seems in accord with the notion that development is just a form of scientism applied to the "Third World". Heidegger's fundamental ontology then gets taken as an argument for the singularity and uniqueness of different cultural forms, and thus as a repudiation of the notion that the "West" can prescribe to another culture how it should (or must) become. Reading Heidegger in this way ends up by turning his thinking into yet another postmodernist defence of cultural relativism, a position that ultimately seems sterile.[10] The issue with such readings is not that they have to disregard key aspects of Heidegger's analytic of the human situation, such as being-toward-death and conscience, as inapplicable to cultures, which are not mortal or finite in Heidegger's formally indicative sense. Rather, it is that they disregard the very sense of Heidegger's method or approach, which is intended precisely to ward off such conceptual translations and "applications".

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9. Heidegger's awareness of this is evident in his determination that his collected works not be produced as critical editions, with all the usual textual apparatus such as explanatory essays, indices, footnotes, and so on. Only by avoiding this, he felt, could the original intent of the texts (a large number of which are actually lecture-course manuscripts or transcripts) be in some way preserved, by forcing the reader to engage with the movement in thinking that was enacted in the lecture-courses themselves.
10. I speak from my own experience of having tried to pursue that approach. The aspect of development that made it untenable was the domain of economics. Unless this domain is engaged with at a fundamental level, a phenomenology of development turns into a critique of modernity, and thus becomes a postmodernist critique of modernity *in toto*. Only the constant reminder that Heidegger does leave room for the positive sciences enabled me to go beyond that critique. Cf. Robert C. Scharff, "What postmodernists don't get".

In this thesis, then, my aim is to read Heidegger in the methodological, formally indicative way that, arguably, he intends his analytic. Therefore, it centres on his articulation of the kinetic tension in our way of being, between universality and singularity, necessity and possibility, and transcendence and immanence. Heidegger argues that the "self" cannot be properly understood as a substance or a thing, but only as a way of being. At heart it is a happening of becoming our possibilities out of the apriori necessity of alreadiness. Being-a-self, or "selving" [*Selbstsein*] (SZ 41, 113), is not opposed to being-with-one-another as the individual is opposed to the social or collective. Rather, they are correlated. The concrete, existentiell moments that constitute me do not come from some "interior" dimension or realm, but from the world *around* me *in* which I am *with* others. There is no interiority to the self, because the self is not self-contained. My characteristics, habits, skills and abilities are all "generic"; they are always shared by others. The mistaken tendency found in both the positive sciences and the philosophical tradition is to take such characteristics as properties predicated of an entity which, in its difference from those properties, constitutes the true individual. In this conception, the self is hypostatized or reified as that which has properties. But such a self therefore cannot be identified or defined other than by the property of possessing properties. For Heidegger, this view of the self is central both to the modern "philosophy of consciousness" in its various forms (save that of Leibniz, perhaps) and to the natural sciences that arose concurrently with modern philosophy.

Heidegger's critique of the presuppositions of the theoretical attitude allows us to re-think the meaning of development in a non-theoretical way, and thus to bring into relief the way that developing is always a co-developing. That is, the idea that development can be done by an agent for others is shown to rest on a theoretical separation of "developer" and "developee", a separation that makes development itself

incomprehensible. A phenomenology of development, I suggest, does not provide us with a new paradigm for putting development into practice, but rather allows the praxis that "transconstitutes" us to inform our understanding of the meaning of development.

The thesis proceeds as follows. In chapter 1, I examine the positivist conception of history and the historicist response to this, the challenge these positions presented to philosophy, and the problematization of meaning implicit in them. I then look briefly at the philosophical responses to historicism and positivism from Heidegger's predecessors. In chapter 2, I examine the debate between positivism and historicism found in economic thought, particularly in the 19th century. Historicist economics was prominent in Germany until the early 20th century, although it has its roots in aspects of economic inquiry that began in the Renaissance. Positivist economics can be said to have begun with Adam Smith, and dominates present-day economics. In chapter 3, I look at the positivism of mainstream development thinking, for which I take the World Bank to be an exemplar. I also look at Amartya Sen's concept of development as freedom, to show that this, too, retains a positivistic bias against history. The chapter concludes with a brief look at postdevelopment as a historicist critique of the mainstream. In chapters 4 and 5, I examine the method and topic of Heidegger's analytic of being-situate, which seeks to show how understanding our concrete singularity itself depends on the kinetic tension between necessity and possibility that enables being-historical. The central aspect of Heidegger's argument is that being-historical is not separate from our understanding of historicalness. Rather, they are hermeneutically related. Furthermore, the discursivity of understanding entails that being-a-self is equioriginary with being-with-one-another. Thus, Heidegger destructs the traditional dichotomies of individual and society, history and the *a priori*, and transcendence and immanence, through a phenomenological demonstration of how

these belong together. Chapter 6 brings these phenomenological insights to bear upon the question of development. What I aim to show is that a phenomenological destruction of the dichotomies on which the current conception of development depends allows us to understand development not as a question of technical production of a generalized or universalized form of society, but rather as the transconstitution of historically singular ways of being-selves and being-with-one-another, whereby coming to understand who and how we are is first made possible by transcendence of our own historically singular situations. Such transcendence, or ways of being directed towards ourselves, however, is only possible insofar as we come to find ourselves in the communication and contest about the traditions we are immanent in. Development is one form of this communication and contest. Phenomenologically, then, development no longer appears as the technical transcendence of history, but rather as the provisional self-interpretation of the meaning of being developed. That is, development thinking has to be understood not as a theoretical attitude towards an objective process, but as belonging itself to the contest over historical meaning. Fundamentally, development has to be seen as a way in which the freedom to be our possibilities is understood and expressed, rather than as the application of a theoretical analysis that aims to establish a determinate historical trajectory on the basis of purported historical necessity.

Chapter 1: Philosophy between Positivism and Historicism

Introduction

This chapter looks at the intellectual situation of the 19th century in which conflicting notions arose about how history is properly investigated and accounted for, and the significance of this for the meaning of social change. The shift away from Absolute Idealism after the death of Hegel in 1831 combined with the establishment of autonomous programs of inquiry in the natural and historical sciences—particularly in Germany—posed a challenge to philosophy's claim to disciplinary autonomy, and its role in contributing to understanding human existence. This challenge brought about the "profound identity-crisis which has persisted up until the present day" for philosophical inquiry.[1]

I focus on Germany, for three main reasons. First, the issue of constructive intent in state-building was more urgent for Germans than for the French or British, because until 1871 Germany was a nation without a state. Second, and partly as a result of this situation, historical research was first systematized in Germany, through the efforts of scholars such as Niebuhr, Ranke, and Droysen, who established methods and techniques of historiographical research. These made it possible to claim that the historical sciences could achieve objectively valid knowledge, and thus to contest the claim that only the natural sciences could be objectively valid. These claims also involved contesting the status of the legitimacy of philosophy with regard to inquiry into history and nature. Third, because of its political situation until the late 19th

1. Herbert Schnädelbach, *Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933*, trans. E. Matthews, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, pg. 5.

century, "the capitalist transformation of German society itself was both a late and a rapid process directed from above".[2] Indeed, according to Berman, it was in Germany that there first arose the identification of a society as "socially, economically and politically 'underdeveloped' ".[3] For these reasons, economics in Germany had a different intent from the formal-deductive political economy dominant in Britain and France (as found in Ricardo and J.S. Mill, for example). The former was predominantly concerned with the administration of economic behaviour in the endeavour of state-making, whereas the latter was fundamentally concerned with the logic of production and distribution in increasing wealth.[4]

Thus, the question of the relation of positivism, historicism and philosophy with regard to the meaningfulness of history, development and progress was a central issue in 19th century Germany, and gave rise to ways of understanding development that have yet to be recognized in contemporary mainstream international development thinking. Heidegger's response to the "crisis of historicism" in his phenomenological decade (1919-1928) shows the confluence of these factors.[5] Heidegger is centrally concerned with the influential philosophical trends and schools of thought of the time, and therefore there is little discussion of the economic and the political in his texts of

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2. Joel S. Kahn, "Towards a History of the Critique of Economics: The Nineteenth-Century German Origin of the Ethnographer's Dilemma", *Man*, vol. 25, no. 2, 1990, pg. 235. Kahn therefore suggests that "Germany can usefully be characterized as the first of the 'Newly Industrialised Countries' rather than the last of the old" (*ibid.*).
3. Marshall Berman, *All that is Solid Melts into Air*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1988, pg. 43.
4. Cf. Keith Tribe, "Oeconomic History", *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, vol. 36, 2005, pp. 589, 593; David P. Levine, "Political Economy and the Idea of Development", *Review of Political Economy*, vol. 13, no. 4, 2001, pg. 525.
5. Alan Megill argues that the "crisis of historicism" was centrally a crisis for theology and religion in its confrontation with the critical methods of historical research ("Why was There a Crisis of Historicism?", *History and Theory*, vol. 36, no. 3, 1997, pp. 416-429). The influence of theology on Heidegger's thinking will not be examined here. For details, see Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993, ch. 2 (hereafter GBT followed by page number) and Jeffrey Andrew Barash, *Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning*, Nijhoff/Kluwer, Boston, 1988, ch. 4.

this period. Nevertheless, his hermeneutic transformation of phenomenology clarifies the conflict between positivism, historicism and philosophy in a way that is suggestive for how to understand the relation between history and social change.

This chapter focusses on the rise of positivism and historicism in the 19th century, and the challenge they posed to the autonomy of philosophy. First I give an outline of the positivist view of knowledge and history. Then I turn to the historicist critique of this conception. In order to understand historicism, it is also useful to look back at the 18th century, and Herder's critique of the Enlightenment idea of universal history. Finally, I discuss in brief the philosophical responses to the positivist and historicist challenges to philosophy that occasioned Heidegger's rethinking of the issue as a problem of "fundamental ontology", i.e., the meaningfulness of the human situation.[6]

The Challenge to Philosophy: Positivism and Historicism

The 19th century challenge to philosophy arose from empirical methods and theory-formation in the natural sciences and in the human historical sciences, which allowed these disciplines each to claim methodological priority in the search for truth.[7] Particularly with the establishment of historical science, philosophy came increasingly to be regarded as having no object-domain proper to itself, and hence its status as a discipline was called into question. I call these two main challenges to philosophy "positivism" and "historicism".[8] With regard to these positions, the demarcation of the

6. Heidegger's appropriation of Dilthey, Rickert, Lask and Husserl will be examined in chapter 4.
7. Cf. Barash, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18; Schnädelbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-51.
8. My use of these terms is explained below. It should be noted here that historicism originated in the Historical School's *positivist* critique of Enlightenment and Idealist philosophies of history (cf. Schnädelbach, *op. cit.*, pg. 35).

sciences needs to be made clear. For positivism, insofar as history was a science it had to conform to the requirements of scientific knowledge in general, i.e., as empirical and governed by general laws or causes. Thus, history was considered to be a social science, although other social sciences (such as economics) were regarded as ahistorical. For historicists, on the other hand, the social sciences (again, such as economics) were considered to be historical and historicized. For thorough-going historicists, even the natural sciences were considered to be historically contextual.

Apart from the question of whether historical science requires a methodology distinct from that of the natural and social sciences, one of the fundamental differences between the positivist and historicist approaches to history has to do with the question of social change and progress, and in particular whether there is development *of* history as well as, or instead of, development *in* history. For positivists, history was considered to be progressive, in the sense of comprising successive states of society that constitute a "trajectory" rather than a cycle or "orbit".[9] Progress was considered to be a general historical law.[10] Furthermore, through progress successive historical eras were considered to have the possibility of improving on their predecessors.[11] However, progress was not simply identified with improvement, as in the 17th and 18th century notion of progress.[12] For this reason, positivism associated development and progress by subsuming the latter under the former.[13]

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9. Cf. John Stuart Mill, *The System of Logic*, 8th edition (1872), Longman, Green, and Co., London, 1925 [1872], Bk. VI, Ch. 10, at <http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/mill/sol/sol.b06.c10.html>
10. Cf. Hajo Holborn, "The History of Ideas", *American Historical Review*, vol. 73, no.3, 1968, pp. 683-695, at <www.historians.org/info/AHA_History/hholborn.cfm?pv=y> on 20 July 2005.
11. As found in Saint-Simon's and Comte's characterization of the stages of history as theological, metaphysical, and positive.
12. Cf. J.S. Mill, *op. cit.* In this text, however, Mill is somewhat equivocal in his use of the term.
13. A view that is prominent in mainstream development thinking today (see ch. 3).

Historicists, on the other hand, agreed with the notion of development *in* history, but denied the notion of moral progress, i.e., the idea that history itself is developmental or progressive in the sense of improvement. For historicists, the idea that successive eras could be evaluated in terms of moral progress was repugnant, since it in effect denied the intrinsic value of a past era, seeing it only as instrumentally valuable in leading to the present.[14]

What both positions share, however, is the attempt to grasp the continuity of human being with the natural and the historical world, positivism by the naturalization of history and human being, historicism by the historicization of nature and human being. Both were ways in which the transcendence of reality and the immanence of the knower were to be reconciled or overcome.

Positivism

I use "positivism" in the sense it came to have in Germany, rather than the sense that was attributed to Comte (who, it should be noted, did not use the term, calling his system "positive philosophy" instead). In this sense it came to refer to

> any view that restricted knowledge to what could be attained using the methods of observation, induction, and mathematical analysis found, paradigmatically, in the empirical science of nature.[15]

In Germany, Comte's philosophy was not particularly influential, partly because of an indigenous anti-metaphysical reaction to Hegel's Absolute Idealism, and partly because

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14. Cf. Schnädelbach, *op. cit.*, pg. 43.
15. Steven Galt Crowell, "The Early Decades: Positivism, Neo-Kantianism, Dilthey" in *The Columbia History of Western Philosophy*, ed. R. Popkin, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999, pg. 668. Other terms that are often used as near synonyms are "naturalism" and "scientism" (cf. Charles E. Bambach, *Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1995, ch. 1). It should be noted here that Comte's positivism differs in several important respects from what later came to be identified as the central tenets of positivism, particularly the claim that (natural) scientific methodology has exclusive claim to objective knowledge (cf. Robert C. Scharff, "Comte, Philosophy, and the Question of Its History", *Philosophical Topics*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1991, pp. 177-204, and "Comte and Heidegger on the Historicity of Science", *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, vol. 203, no. 1, 1998, pp. 29-49).

many natural scientists and historians avoided philosophy.[16] In philosophy, there was also the movement "back to Kant" by such thinkers as Lotze, which to some extent forestalled reception of Comte.[17] Mill's *System of Logic*, however, was influential.[18] But the German political-academic climate after the failed revolution of 1848 was not conducive to the sociopolitical tendencies of positivism, either in the form of the "sociology" that Comte proposed "as a tool for predicting social developments and for controlling unruly elements in society" or in the less radical, liberal-reformist version of Mill, and thus positivism had less influence on social sciences such as economics.[19]

Thus, in Germany, "positivism" came to refer generally to positions which held that knowledge is acquired only through empirical observation of facts (often conceived in terms of sense-data) and the explanation of the relations between them in terms of laws or causes. Mathematical analysis is one of the main tools for explaining such laws and relations, and mathematics itself is considered to belong to the positive sciences. For positivists, then, there is no methodological or epistemological discontinuity between the natural and the human sciences. What is most at issue in terms of development, as we will see, is the positivist conception of the human sciences, particularly logic, economics and history. These were considered to involve the same empirical method and search for general laws as the natural sciences. For Comte and Mill, history was to be explained in terms of the laws of human nature. For example, Mill argued that history did not provide what he called a "law of nature", but only an "empirical law" (or inductive generalizations). Thus, in order to determine the

16. W.M. Simon, *European Positivism in the Nineteenth Century*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1963, pp. 238-239. See also Schnädelbach, *op. cit.*, pg. 67.
17. Simon, *op. cit.*, pg. 239; a notable exception to this was Dilthey, who in his earlier thought took an interest in Comte's thinking (*ibid.*, pg. 245). Cf. also David Sullivan, "Hermann Lotze", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2005 Edition)*, ed. E.N. Zalta, at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/hermann-lotze/>.
18. Cf. Schnädelbach, *op. cit.*, pg. 85.
19. Crowell, "The Early Decades", *op. cit.*, pp. 668-669.

law of progress, it was necessary to connect the empirical laws with the laws of psychology and ethology (or character formation).[20]

In Mill's *System of Logic* the positivist position is clearly expressed. Of all the sciences, only "those which relate to man himself" remain in the state of being "abandoned to the uncertainties of vague and popular discussion".[21] The natural or physical sciences, Mill argued, were either well established or on their way to being so, and this was particularly true of those concerning "the physical nature of man as an organised being".[22] But with the study of "the laws of Mind, and, in even greater degree, those of Society", not only had they not yet been established, there was "still a controversy whether they are capable of becoming subjects of science in the strictest sense of the term".[23] Thus, Mill's aim in Book VI, entitled "The Logic of the Moral Sciences", was to address this situation "by generalising the methods successfully followed in the former inquiries, and adapting them to the latter". It is only by doing so, he argued, that "we may hope to remove this blot on the face of science".[24]

Although the positivist approach to history received some attention, it was the reduction of the science of the mind to empirical psychology (i.e., psychologism) and the attempt to make this the foundation of all the human sciences, as Mill advocated, that provided a central motivation for Dilthey's descriptive psychology, neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy of value, and Husserl's phenomenology. Although anti-metaphysical, these philosophical positions resisted the naturalization of philosophy.[25] Yet the results of the positive sciences, particularly in applied disciplines such as optics,

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20. J.S. Mill, *op. cit.*
21. J.S. Mill, *op. cit.*, Bk. VI, Ch. 1, at <http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/mill/sol/sol.b06.c01.html>
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. Crowell, *op. cit*, pg. 668.

had undermined Hegel's claim that philosophy was the absolute, systematic science which subsumed all other forms of investigation, whether of natural or human phenomena.[26] Thus Windelband recognized that "philosophy itself can no longer establish any substantive conclusions".[27]

The development of new techniques of experimentation allowed the natural sciences to extend their knowledge through empirical research rather than purely theoretical inquiry, and thus to provide empirical bases for the development of theories. It also gave rise to the idea that, as Wilhelm von Humboldt argued,

> scientific knowledge should be treated as something which has not yet been completely discovered and which will never be entirely discovered, and that it should be unremittingly pursued as such.[28]

Research became central to the discovery of scientific truth and the determination of the laws of nature. Science came to be understood as "research-science", and was characterized in procedural terms. This also involved a change in the concept of experience that qualified as scientific, which was also understood procedurally, rather than as related to a system or body of knowledge.[29] The prominence given to research was central to Humboldt's conception of the university and, in conjunction with teaching, was to be the guiding purpose of the 19th century German university system that he helped to establish.[30]

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26. Bambach, *op. cit.*, pg. 22. Chemistry should also be mentioned here. (Cf. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, Abacus, London, 2001, pp. 341-2 and *The Age of Capital*, Abacus, London, 1999, pp. 300-301.)
27. Wilhelm Windelband, "Rectorial Address, Strasbourg, 1894", trans. G. Oakes, *History and Theory*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1980, pg. 185.
28. Quoted in Schnädelbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.
29. *Ibid.*, pg. 83. On the transformation of the concept of experience, see also Alan W. Richardson, "Conceiving, Experiencing, and Conceiving Experiencing: Neo-Kantianism and the History of the Concept of Experience", *Topoi*, vol. 22, 2003, pp. 55-67.
30. Cf. Schnädelbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-27. The Humboldt university become the international university model (Keith Tribe, *Historical Schools of Economics: German and English*, Keele Economics Research Papers, Keele University, February 2002, pg. 2).

In the human or social sciences, too, there were developments that subverted philosophy's claim to preeminence. One was the widening application of mathematical and statistical techniques to social phenomena, such as Quételet's analysis of the statistical distribution of human features, Cournot's analysis of supply and demand, the cost-benefit analyses of the engineers at the École des Ponts et Chaussées, and von Thünen's analysis of farm location as a maximization problem,[31] each of which contributed to the idea that with sufficient data and the right methods of analysis, firm predictions could be made about social and economic behaviour.

Another development was the establishment of political economy as an independent discipline, the aim of which was to determine the laws of economic behaviour, either through empirical induction or through axiomatic deduction.[32] The discoveries of political economy of great significance were the autonomous sphere of economic activity (still "economy" and not yet "*the* economy") and power as something that pervaded society.[33] In the hands of British liberal reformers, this was to result in "a society that was not subject to the laws of the state, but, on the contrary, subjected the state to its own laws".[34] Moral and political philosophy alone were no longer considered either to establish or to articulate the principles of social behaviour. Political economy also offered a way to understand social change that relied neither on purpose nor moral progress. The historical stages of social development from hunter/gatherer to

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31. Cf. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, pg. 344 and *The Age of Capitalism*, pg. 306; Roger Backhouse, *The Penguin History of Economics*, Penguin, London, 2002, pp. 143-147; Ian Hacking, "How should we do the history of statistics?", *The Foucault Effect*, ed. G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991, pp. 181-195; Martin Fichman and Edmund P. Fowler, "Scientific Paradigms and Urban Development: Alternative Models", *Cosmos and History*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2005, pg. 108.
32. Cf. Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pg. 132; Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, *op. cit.*, pg. 343; Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1957, ch. 10. However, political economy was much less prevalent in Germany than in France and Britain. See below, chapter 2.
33. Cf. Tribe, "Oeconomic History", *op. cit.*, pg. 593.
34. Polanyi, *op. cit.*, pg. 111.

capitalist market society could now be explained solely in terms of the laws of economic behaviour, in particular the idea of self-interest, or the human desire to better one's condition, combined with the logic of exchange and the division of labour. And whereas this view of human behaviour was axiomatic for the political economists, the appearance of the market society was taken to provide empirical evidence for it.

This non-teleological sense of historical evolution also appeared in disciplines, such as law and philology, the latter which was the second social science to be established.[35] However, whereas political economy purported to explain social change by reference to eternal and immutable laws of human behaviour, "those of philology were fundamentally historical, or rather evolutionary".[36] That is, language was understood to be subject to unintended change through time, a process amenable to explanation "by general linguistic laws, analogous to scientific ones".[37] As Humboldt argued, although languages appear historically, they are not human creations.[38]

The positivism of political economy, experimental psychology and other human sciences challenged philosophy's claims to areas of inquiry that had only recently begun to establish themselves as independent disciplines, such as moral philosophy and rational psychology. The basis on which they did so was the same as that on which the natural sciences challenged the claim to truth of the philosophy of nature: appeal to empirical methods over philosophical speculation.[39] Nevertheless, none of these disciplines by themselves represented the challenge to philosophy that developments in the science of history did.

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35. Cf. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, *op. cit.*, pg. 346.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*, pg. 347.
38. Cf. Robert M. Burns, "Classical Historicism:Introduction" in Robert M. Burns and Hugh Rayment-Pickard, eds., *Philosophies of History*, Blackwell, London, 2000, pg. 61.

Positivism and progress

One way of understanding the difference between the positivist and the historicist approach to cultural phenomena is in terms of continuity and change. Having determined general or universal laws of economic behaviour, say, positivism could then give an account of continuity between different historical eras. The economic history of eras prior to the discovery of these economic laws was then understood as the result of responses to economic conditions that were not properly understood. However successful such responses were, they were purely fortuitous. The discovery of economic laws, in contrast, made it possible for present-day scholars to explain that history. It also made it possible to judge contemporary policy in terms of whether it "violated" such laws. However, if laws of economic behaviour were indeed universal, then explanation of economic *change* became problematic. In particular, what needed to be explained was how the modern market-based economy had come into existence in the absence of knowledge of the laws of economic behaviour. The usual approach is by way of appeal to history as demonstrating the "natural order" of progress, i.e., the necessary stages of economic progress. For example, Adam Smith makes this explicit in *The Wealth of Nations*, Book III, Chapter I, entitled "Of the Natural Progress of

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39. Ricardo's economics was a formal-deductive rather than an empirical-inductive discipline. The empirical approach was advocated by the historical schools of economics in England and Germany (less so in France). Yet these schools did not undertake historical inquiries simply to inductively determine general laws of economic behaviour, and thus did not subscribe to the positivistic outlook of other social sciences. Instead, their aim was to try to *understand* the particular social conditions, including but not limited to economic phenomena, that had led to their contemporary situation, in order to determine what economic *policy* was appropriate for the present. Thus, historical economics is *historicist* rather than positivist, whereas classical and neoclassical economics are predominantly formalist. Only in the 1920s did the empirical analysis of economic data become widespread, eventually to develop into econometrics. This, however, has not had the result of empirical confirmation of economic theory. (Cf. Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 227, 240-243). Nevertheless, contemporary economic theory is generally regarded as positivist, in the sense that it *purports* to abstract from empirical observations so as to generate models that can then be empirically tested (cf. Lawrence A. Boland, "Current Views on Economic Positivism" in David Greenaway, Michael Bleaney and Ian Stewart, eds., *Companion to Contemporary Economic Thought*, Routledge, London, 1991, pp. 88-104).

Opulence". However, the problem with such an appeal to history is that it does not provide the kind of explanation that economics requires, i.e., it doesn't explain, in terms of economic principles themselves, *why* the modern economic system developed, nor why this system has predominantly *failed* to appear in other societies.

Historicism

Historicism was a response, in the 18th century form of Romanticism initially, to the abstract individualism and universalism of the Enlightenment, and later in its 19th century form to both the "panlogism" of Absolute Idealism and to the positivist argument that the methods of the natural sciences are the only valid scientific method. In the 18th century, Herder had argued against the Enlightenment notion of universal history in favour of cultural pluralism, and as 19th century scholars sought to make sense of past eras, they came to argue that cultural and social meanings were contextual and thus historically specific. To understand different societies, it was argued, required that they be understood in terms of their own values, meanings, etc. This was of course applied to the question of the German nation as well, thus involving historians in the issue of nation-building.

"Historicism" is a problematic term, since it has been used in a number of often contradictory ways. For instance, Karl Popper used it in *The Poverty of Historicism* "to designate 'an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim'...and which attempts to discover 'patterns' or 'laws' of historical evolution".[40] This more accurately describes positivist history, as found, for example, in the work of the English historian Henry Thomas Buckle.[41] Schnädelbach argues that "[a]t best, historicism is characterized as a position which

40. Bambach, *op. cit.*, pg. 4 n. 5. Bambach's quotation is from Karl Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, Routledge, London, 1957, pg. 3.

makes history into a principle". He distinguishes three senses of "historicism": the positivist sense of factual observation and scientific objectivity; the relativist sense that views all cultural phenomena as historically contextual and therefore rejects claims to absolute validity;[42] and the "more comprehensive" sense, which

> is the view that all cultural phenomena are to be regarded, to be understood, and to be explained as historical. It is an essentially culturalist position, which is opposed to naturalism. The world of human life, according to this view, is not nature, but the product of human action: hence it also has a history, which itself should not be conceived of as a process of merely natural development.[43]

Historicism in this sense conflicts with the naturalistic and positivistic claims to the methodological priority of the natural sciences. For historicism in this sense (which is how I will generally use the term here), science is simply another form of cultural expression, historically contextualized like all others. Historicism in this sense also poses a challenge to philosophy, because it questions the notion of the *a priori*. The response to this challenge was a major issue in the philosophical trends that informed Heidegger's thinking. It is this sense, too, that informs the postdevelopment critique of mainstream development thinking.

Iggers argues that historicism

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41. Burns, *op. cit.*, pg. 58; Eric Hobsbawm, *On History*, The New Press, New York, 1997, pg. 144; John R. Hinde, "Review of Eckhardt Fuchs, *Henry Thomas Buckle: Geschichtschreiben und Positivismus in England und Deutschland*", Cromohs, 1997, at <http://www.cromohs.unifi.it/2_97/hinde.html> on 5 May 2005. Buckle can be seen as an exemplar of positivist historiography, about whom Dilthey writes: "When Comte, John Stuart Mill, and Buckle made a new attempt to solve the riddle of the historical world by borrowing principles and methods from the natural sciences, the Historical School could only protest ineffectually against their impoverished, superficial, but analytically refined results..." (Wilhelm Dilthey, *Selected Works Vol. I: Introduction to the Human Sciences*, ed. R.A Makkreel and F. Rodi, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, pp. 48-49); "[Buckle] wants to transform history into an exact science, like natural history; he wants to demonstrate what is law-governed in historical events and thereby put himself in the position of predicting them." (Wilhelm Dilthey, "History and Science (1862)", trans. R.J. Betanzos, in *Selected Works Vol. IV: Hermeneutics and the Study of History*, ed. R.A Makkreel and F. Rodi, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996, pg. 262). Droysen takes the same view: "He purposes to raise History to a science by showing how to demonstrate historical facts out of general laws." (J.G. Droysen, "The Elevation of History to the Rank of a Science" in Droysen, *op. cit.*, pg. 63).
42. Schnädelbach, *op. cit.*, pg. 35-36.
43. *Ibid.*, pg. 36.

> signified a historical orientation which recognized individuality in its "concrete temporal-spatiality"...distinct from a fact-oriented empiricism as well as from the system-building philosophy of history in the Hegelian manner...which ignores factuality.[44]

In approaching individuality in this way, historicism is "closely bound up with a certain form of epistemological idealism" that implies "that history always deals with thought, that is with meanings, which must be understood".[45] These assumptions, he argues, were central to the theory of historical knowledge that the German Historical School developed.

Herder and the Critique of Universal History

In German thought, the culturalist sense of historicism is perhaps most clearly articulated first by Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) in the late 18th century, in response to the Enlightenment conception of universal history.[46] Herder questioned both the idea of the self as a self-contained, essentially timeless and ahistorical observer of its own historical and cultural situation, and the progressive sense of the Enlightenment idea of universal history, which viewed historical eras and different cultures as stages in the progress of humanity, which progress itself made such understanding possible. Kant, for example, had claimed that

> what appears to be complicated and accidental in individuals, may yet be understood as a steady, progressive, though slow, evolution of the original endowments of the entire species.[47]

The application of scientific methods such as statistical analysis to social and historical phenomena showed "that they occur according to stable natural laws".[48] Philosophy's

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44. George G. Iggers, "Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term", *op. cit.*, pg. 130.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131.
46. Cf. Burns, *op. cit.*, pg. 59-60. Heidegger makes the same suggestion (ZBP pp. 113-114). The work of Giambattista Vico, who had expressed such ideas earlier in the 18th century, was not widely known.
47. Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent", trans. T.M. Greene and H. Hudson, in R. Sältzer, ed., *German Essays on History*, Continuum, New York, 1991, pg. 3.
48. *Ibid.*

role was therefore "to attempt to discover an end of nature in this senseless march of human events",[49] i.e., to discover the purpose of history in the events *in* history, where such purpose was not part of individual intention. For Kant, this teleological principle of history was not something that could be known the way the laws of nature could be, yet had to be *subscribed to* in order for history to be intelligible at all.[50] On the basis of the essential characteristics of human being as determined by philosophy (which progress itself had made possible), history could be understood as the ordered unfolding of a plan that would bring about humanity's intellectual, moral, and political perfection:

> The history of mankind could be viewed on the whole as the realization of a hidden plan of nature in order to bring about an internally—and for this purpose also externally—perfect constitution; since this is the only state in which nature can develop all faculties of mankind.[51]

The task of philosophy, then, was to assist nature by writing "a general world history" that presented it as a system. This was not intended "to displace the work on true empirical history by this idea of a universal history which contains a principle a priori",[52] but to provide an ideal for making sense of the contingent events of history.

The historicists objected to this constructivist intent of the philosophy of history or universal history, for two reasons.[53] First, it implied that each historical era was just a means for history to unfold its purpose. A particular historical era had only instrumental value as the condition for the next, higher stage, a determination that

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49. *Ibid.*, pg. 4.
50. This became central in Lotze, and through him, for the Baden neo-Kantians, such as Windelband and Rickert. In the light of the development of methods of historical research in the 19th century, these thinkers argued that historical science could be put on an equal footing with natural science, in a way not possible in Kant's time. Dilthey, too, aimed at a critique of historical reason, but in order to replace Kant's critique of pure reason, not simply to supplement it. (Cf. Paul Hamilton, *Historicism*, Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 72-73.)
51. Kant, *op. cit.*, pg. 12.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.
53. Two sense of "philosophy of history" must be distinguished here. First is the attempt to unify the systematic and the historical as found, for example, in Hegel. Second is the idea that there needs to be, and can be, a total view of the object-domain and the methodologies and practices whereby it is investigated. (Cf. Schnädelbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-50.)

applied equally to the contemporary era. This entailed the same moral evaluation of the individual as the species. Second, it implied that only now, as a result of progress, had humanity developed sufficiently to comprehend the purpose of history. Although not yet perfect, humanity was thought to have evolved to a point where it could contribute to unfolding the purpose of history. Herder argued that this aspect of universal history depended on a conception of human being as transcendent to history, and thus capable of assigning to itself responsibility for itself:

> Not only has the philosopher exalted human reason to an independency on the senses and organs, and the possession of an original simple power; but even the common man imagines in the dream of life, that he has become everything that he is of himself.[54]

For Herder, as for the historicists, this contradicted the presupposition of universal history itself, i.e., that humanity is a *product* of history. Being historical is not a matter of acquiring knowledge about the past, he argued, but the fundamental condition of being who we are at present. If history is responsible for our current stage of evolution, then it is inconsistent to hold that we have now evolved so as to be completely self-determining and thus independent of history. For Herder, the notion of history itself depends on comprehending *each* individual as part of the chain whereby humanity is constituted as historical:

> In this lies the principle of the history of mankind, without which no such history could exist. Did man receive everything from himself, and develop everything independently of external circumstances, we might have a history of an individual indeed, but not of the species. But...the history of mankind is necessarily a whole, that is a chain of socialness and plastic tradition, from the first link to the last.
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> There is an education, therefore, of the human species; since everyone becomes a man only by means of education, and the whole species lives solely in this chain of individuals.[55]

Humanity's education "must spring from imitation and exercise, by means of which the model passes into the copy",[56] and the models for any particular era's

54. Johann Gottfried von Herder, "Philosophy of History", trans. T. Churchill, in Sältzer, *op. cit.*, pg. 16.
55. *Ibid.*, pg. 17.

education are embodied in history itself, as *tradition*. In the application of tradition through the "powers to receive what is communicated or communicable"[57] lies the moral value of the particular individual and era. Insofar as we realize the lessons of history by appropriating tradition, we live up to the potential of our education. And since this is equally possible for each era, culture or nation, none can be regarded as superior to another in terms of its moral evolution: "the difference between enlightened and unenlightened, cultivated and uncultivated nations, is not specific; it is only in degree".[58] That is, eras or cultures might differ in terms of *what* can be actualized or cultivated; the *way* such actualization happens is the same. Any comparison between nations can only be made on the basis of how well each appropriates the tradition that is its inheritance:

> If we take the idea of European cultivation for our standard, this is to be found only in Europe; and if we establish arbitrary distinctions between cultivation and the enlightening of the mind, neither of which, if it be genuine, can exist independently of the other, we are losing ourselves still more in the clouds.[59]

Universal history asserted the supreme value of the individual as a product of history's purpose, but such assertion itself served to devalue the individual. Only by recognizing that history is a connected whole does it become possible to recognize the worth of each individual, who both constitutes history and is constituted by it. The assertion that the contemporary era was superior in value to those that preceded it in fact *devalued* its individuality, by making it just one more link in the chain of history. Only the recognition that each era equally inherits and actualizes its tradition makes comprehensible the notion that some cultures do so to a superior degree (typically, the

56. *Ibid.*, pg. 18.
57. *Ibid.*
58. *Ibid.*, pg. 19.
59. *Ibid.*

Greeks, the Germans). In understanding that we are inheritors of tradition, Herder argued, we could come to understand that

> whatever is God's purpose with regard to the human species upon earth remains evident even in the most perplexing parts of its history. All the works of God have this property, that, although they belong to a whole, which no eye can scan, each is in itself a whole, and bears the divine characters of its destination....What every man...attains, or can attain, must be the end of the species: and what is this? Humanity and happiness, on this spot, in this degree, as this link, and no other, of the chain of improvement, that extends through the whole kind.[60]

In contrast to universal history, historicism valued and aimed to express the concrete individuality of each historical era. But this was also the *problem* of historicism. For if cultural attainment is individual, then this includes the systems of knowledge a culture or era manifests. The development of the natural and human sciences had been taken by Enlightenment philosophers as evidence of the progress of humanity and thus the purposiveness of history. But if history means the appropriation of tradition, and traditions are individual, then these sciences themselves have to be seen as particular to the traditions in which they arise. They are culturally or historically immanent, not transcendent, ways of knowing. This implies that the basis on which cultures are to be compared and evaluated are themselves culturally specific, and thus cannot be used to demonstrate that a culture or era actualizes its tradition to a greater degree than others. Historicism's aporia was the notion of cultural comparison itself.

19th century historicism

In response to the positivist conception of history, historiographers drew upon the Romantic conception of history. Historicism was first expressed in the work of Johann Gustav Droysen (1808-1884), who viewed the science of history as a science that investigates historical events and periods through interpreting and understanding them as coherent totalities.[61] Droysen followed Ranke in holding that historical inquiry

60. *Ibid.*, pg. 20.

concerns the singular and unique, rather than a particular instance of a general occurrence or event. The understanding of such singularity involves understanding its context, and is therefore hermeneutic, rather than naturalistic. Furthermore, the subject matter of the science of history properly includes every human creation. Finally, although events, societies, and eras are understood in their individuality, and thus as equal, historical inquiry must also take into account the *dynamics* of change whereby one era gives rise to another, although not general *laws* of change, which again reduce the individual to an instance.

The positivist conception of historical inquiry as "ordering" history by general laws, historicists argued, in effect made history unintelligible. What demarcates the historical *as* historical is its uniqueness or singularity, and to view historical events as *instances* of general kinds of events and thus subsumable under general laws is to ignore how the historical actually appears. History cannot be ordered, the historicists argued, but has to be understood in its singularity.

Historical understanding must also address the questions of development and progress, for two reasons. First, a historical era is constituted not just by its constant change but also by the way this involves "ascent" and "addition", as Droysen put it:

> The restless movement in the world of phenomena causes us to apprehend things as in a constant development, this transition on the part of some seeming merely to repeat itself periodically, in case of others to supplement the repetition with ascent, addition, ceaseless growth, the system continually making, so to speak, "a contribution to itself." In those phenomena in which we discover an advance of this kind, we take the successive character, the element of time, as the determining thing. These we grasp and bring together as history.[62]

History involves development, understood as individual cultural expression within history. But secondly, historical understanding also requires that we take each historical

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61. George G. Iggers, "Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 56, no. 1, 1995, pg. 132.
62. Johann Gustav Droysen, "Outline of the Principles of History", trans. E.B. Andrews, in Sältzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.

era as it is in itself, rather than as a link in the chain that has given rise to the present. Positivism seeks to *explain* the succession of historical eras up to the present (essentially in causal terms). Such eras are significant only insofar as they are precursors of the present. The historicists argued that this was to radically misconstrue the sense of the historical and thus the significance of previous historical eras. If previous eras are only significant as precursors, then there is no justification for valorizing the present, since this, too, is just a precursor of future eras. Thus all historical eras simply become *means* to an end that can never be attained. No historical era, including the present, could be taken to be an end in itself or such that "its worth...rests in its own existence".[63] Thus, the historicists denied that moral progress could simply be identified with historical progress and that such a conception enabled us to understand the historical. Although not denying moral progress, they argued that such teleological conceptions of history are unable to grasp the sense of the historical as unique and individual.

Historiography

In historiography, the 19th century saw the introduction of new methods of amassing evidence and critically evaluating it, which in some respects fit with the positivist trend, but also involved the rejection of the philosophical ideal of universal history. In 1811, Niebuhr introduced techniques of source criticism into the science of

63. Leopold Von Ranke, "On the Epochs of Modern History", trans. W.A. Iggers and K von Moltke, in R. Sältzer, *op. cit.*, pg. 84. Ranke also counts as a positivist historian because of his emphasis on facts. In *Being and Time* Heidegger quotes Count Yorck: "Ranke is a great eye-piece, for whom that which has vanished cannot turn into *actualities*" (SZ 400), suggesting that Ranke's aim was not to bring the coherence of the past to life, but merely to gaze upon it. Dilthey himself is more forgiving: "Though Ranke seems to confront things with a naive joy in narration, his historiography can, nevertheless, only be understood by tracing the various sources of systematic thought which converged in his education." (Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Construction of the Historical World in the Human Studies", *W. Dilthey Selected Writings*, ed. and trans. H.P. Rickman, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, pg. 188.)

history, through which "the historian learned how light could be extracted even from legendary material, even from scraps and survivals once rejected as simply untrue".[64] Wilhelm von Humboldt's (1767-1835) investigation of languages emphasized that they are historical and exist essentially through the reappropriation and transmission of *meaning*.[65] Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), who was a colleague of Hegel's in Berlin, introduced and developed methods and standards of source criticism that established history as an academic discipline. In the Preface to his first book, published in 1824, he wrote that "[t]he present attempt...merely wants to show how, essentially, things happened". In order to do so, "[s]trict presentation of facts...is undoubtedly the supreme law".[66] This strict adherence to the presentation of facts indicated an acceptance "of the first part of the positivist programme, the collection of facts" but "declined the second, the discovery of laws", Collingwood argued.[67] Iggers points out that the documents that were subject to source criticism "had to be examined within the historical and cultural framework of the age and nation of which they formed a part".[68] For Ranke,

> every individual as well as each of the great supraindividual institutions...constituted a concrete meaningful whole which fit into the broader economy of the divine will. The purpose of historical study was therefore not exhausted by the narrative reconstruction of a factual past but consisted in grasping the overarching coherence into which this past fit.[69]

The science of history in 19th century Germany, as it became independent from

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64. Herbert Butterfield, "Historiography", *The Dictionary of the History of Ideas Vol. 2*, ed. P.P. Wiener, Scribner, New York, 1974, pg. 491, at <etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv2-53> on 5 May 2005.
65. Cf. Burns, *op. cit.*, pg. 61.
66. Leopold von Ranke, "Preface to the First Edition of Histories of the Latin and Germanic Nations (October 1824)", trans. W.A. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke, in Sältzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.
67. Robin G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, pg. 131. However, Collingwood's view that the Historical School's emphasis on facts meant that they regarded them as "ascertained by a separate act of cognition or process of research" and that these were to be considered in isolation fails to recognize the importance of historical context to these historians.
68. George G. Iggers, "Historicism", *The Dictionary of the History of Ideas Vol. 2*, ed. P.P. Wiener, Scribner, New York, 1974, pg. 459, at <etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv2-52> on 5 May 2005.

philosophy, thus manifested two contradictory tendencies, both of which can be considered as part of "historical consciousness" (as Heidegger refers to it; cf. K 149). On the one hand, the positivist tendency argued for inductive generalization from history, i.e., the determination of *laws* of history. On the other hand, Ranke's insistence that the historian must focus on the documents and the facts stressed the singularity of the historical. The question that arose, then, was to what extent the historian could simply report on the "objective facts" of history, without interpreting how these cohered in a greater unity. The rejection of positivist generalization thus opened the way to the historicist, or historical-hermeneutical approach of Droysen, which was significant for Dilthey. But it also raised the spectre of relativism, which would be a central concern of the philosophical responses to historicism.

Hermeneutics and historical understanding

For the historicists, the question was how history can be taken as an object when we ourselves are part of it. How is historical objectivity possible? This question is intensified because not only the historian but historiography too belongs to history, which problematizes the appeal to *methodology* as a basis for objectivity. If the present belongs to the continuum of history, then so do the scientific and scholarly methods of the present. As historically contextual, how can they be shown to attain objective knowledge? What would such showing consist in?

Unlike the empiricism of the natural sciences, with the human historical sciences, the problem is precisely the effect of *theory* on what is studied. The way we

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69. *Ibid.*, pg. 131. Ranke's view of the coherence of history may have had more to do with his religious beliefs than with epistemological idealism, however. As Allan Megill points out, there is no discussion in Iggers of the importance of religion and theology to the 19th century German historians (Megill, *op. cit.*, pp. 419-420, 423 n. 19). See also Lothar Kettenacker, "Review of *Ranke. The Meaning of History*, by Leonard Kreiger", *History and Theory* vol. 17, no. 3, 1978, pg. 390; Robert M. Burns, *op. cit.*, pg. 70.

understand the present depends on our understanding of the past, and the latter depends on what we understand the correct method to be. The methodological issue, in turn, depends on the theory of historiography. The theories of the positivist and critical historians held that history is an object that we discover "out there", and can be known objectively through positive and critical methods. For the historicists, however, these theories were self-contradictory, because they denied the very basis on which we can understand history. Droysen, for example, agreed that history is an empirical science, and thus

> The data for historical investigation are not past things, for these have disappeared, but things that are still present here and now, whether recollections of what was done, or remnants of things that have existed and of events that have occurred.[70]

Nevertheless, the historical has a different character from the beings "present here and now" that the natural sciences study. Although historiography does not study past things, what it does study is present *as belonging* to the past.[71] "Still, ideally, its past character is yet present in it", existing as "quickened traces" in the mind:[72]

> The mind illuminates its present with the vision and knowledge of past events, which yet have neither existence nor duration save in and through the mind itself.[73]

Although the recollections and remnants are the past in the present, the historian is the present that *has* this past.[74] It is only on this twofold basis that the study of history is possible: the past is in the present in the form of recollections and

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70. Johann Gustav Droysen, *Outline of the Principles of History*, trans. E.B. Andrews, Howard Fertig, New York, 1967 [1893], pg. 11.
71. Heidegger repeats this point in SZ §§73, 76.
72. Droysen, *op. cit.*
73. *Ibid.*, pg. 12. The notion of the non-existence of past events or the historical, purified of its idealism, bears an obvious affinity to Lask's distinction between validities and existents. Lask argues that validities, one of which is being, do not exist, but rather "hold" or are "valid of" existents. For both Lask and Heidegger, then, being does not exist. However, whereas Lask took validity to be the ultimate category, Heidegger argues that validity can only be understood as grounded in intentionality. Cf. Steven Galt Crowell, "Emil Lask: Aletheiology as Ontology", *Kant-Studien*, vol. 87, 1996, pp. 69-88. I examine Lask's influence on Heidegger further in chapter 4.
74. Which Heidegger will thematize as the historicalness [*Geschichtlichkeit*] of being-situate.

remnants, and the present *has* the past in the existence of the historian herself. Thus, not only does history affect the present, but the present affects history. This is the basis on which historiography is possible, which neither an empirically generalizing approach nor a formal-logical approach to historiography can account for.

The method that historicists such as Droysen turned to was hermeneutics, originally a method of interpretation of scripture. Scriptural hermeneutics was concerned with understanding textual meaning, which required that words be understood in their textual context. Because words get their meaning from that context, however, texts could only be understood by seeing the whole (the meaning of the text) in terms of its parts (the meaning of words) *and* seeing the parts in terms of the whole. Neither text nor words solely determines the meaning of the other. Droysen, and later Dilthey, adopted this hermeneutical approach as a way to understand history that does not separate the knower from the known, but rather sees them as co-determining.[75] The understanding of history that the historian develops through investigation changes the historian's self-understanding, thus changing the way in which history is understood, and so on. In historical hermeneutics, history and historian form a dynamic whole. As Dilthey argued, history and the historian are continuous.

Historicism and development

In contrast to positivism, historicism gives an account of change as a consequence of human creativity. Yet, by insisting on the individuality of the historical, understanding *continuity* becomes problematic. If every cultural formation is constituted as singular, including that of the present, then how is it possible for us to understand previous eras? The historicist answer was to appeal to some kind of

75. Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Development of Hermeneutics", in *Selected Writings*, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-263.

providential or organic coherence in history, such that each cultural formation could be seen as giving rise to the next. The problem for historicism was how it can be determined that there is such an order.

Historical Stages

As an aside, there is some confusion in the literature on historicism regarding the notion of *historical stages*. This notion is in fact characteristic of positivism, rather than historicism, and can be found in precursors to positivism such as Montesquieu and the Scottish Historians such as Hume, Ferguson and Smith.[76] The matter is complicated, however, by the fact that the notion of historical stages is also found in the philosophy of history, most famously that of Hegel. Hegel's philosophy of history was rejected by Ranke because of its speculative determination of history rather than close attention to historical evidence, yet it was influential on historicists such as Droysen. However, historicists and historicist economists, like the Romantics (such as Herder) before them, did not subscribe to the teleological notion of *progress*. Thus, although they recognized and asserted the differences between historical eras and cultures, they did not see these as forming a progressive sequence giving rise to the present. Thus, Roscher's view that different economic categories and forms pertain to different historical eras was an argument *against* the view of Smith and the classical political economists, which regarded these earlier forms as precursors to, or nascent forms of, the market system of capitalism.

76. Cf. Andrew Skinner, "Introduction" in Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations Bks. I-III*, Penguin, London, 1986, pp. 29-32; Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-111.

The Response from Philosophy: The Struggle for Meaningfulness

The philosophical responses to the positivist and historicist challenge are marked by an opposite tendency from the latter, for its identity-crisis engendered reflection on philosophy itself as an integral part of 19th century German philosophy. This tendency is evident in the positions to be examined here, each of which involved a response to positivism and/or historicism. To some extent, the division is not so clear-cut, as some positions can be seen as continuous with their "opponents", for example, neo-Kantianism and positivism, and Dilthey and historicism. My aim here is simply to give a brief description of the ways in which these positions, which were influential on Heidegger, were concerned with the challenges of positivism and historicism. The Baden neo-Kantians wanted to demarcate the natural and historical sciences in a way that conceptually justified both, whilst also preserving this task for philosophy. Dilthey's aim was to establish the sciences based on a critique of historical reason. Husserl, who did not engage with the problem of historical reality until late in his career, was concerned to defend philosophy as a strict science of objective validity, against the relativism he detected in both naturalism or positivism and historicism.

Metaphilosophy

Theodore Kisiel has argued that Heidegger's earliest inquiries are best understood as metaphilosophical:

> Heidegger launched his career in 1919 not as a philosopher of being or of life, existentialist, etc. etc., but as a philosopher of philosophy, a metaphilosopher, and not only maintained but magnified that discourse from outside of philosophy to the very end.[77]

77. Theodore Kisiel, "Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask", *Heidegger's Way of Thought*, ed. A. Denker and M. Heinz, Continuum, NY, 2002, pg. 211 n. 22. Crowell points out that "the sense of 'outside' here may be problematic (what is 'outside' philosophy in Heidegger's sense is still—or better, is just—philosophy)" (Steven Galt Crowell, "Lask, Heidegger, and the Homelessness of Logic", *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, vol. 23, no. 3, October 1992, pg. 222).

This consideration of what philosophy itself is or can be, which indeed runs throughout Heidegger's entire path of thinking, is evident in the title of the lecture course Kisiel is referring to, "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview" (KNS1919). In raising the question as to "the empty possibility that no connection exists between the two [philosophy and worldview]" (ZBP 11/9), Heidegger argues that

> Worldview becomes the *problem of philosophy* in a quite new sense. But the core of the problem lies in philosophy itself—it is itself a problem. The cardinal question concerns the nature and concept of philosophy. (ZBP 12/10)

This metaphilosophical concern was not unique to Heidegger, however. It was characteristic of the situation of philosophy in Germany in the 19th century. The rise to prominence of the empirical disciplines such as chemistry and physics, both pure and applied, resulted in an "identity-crisis of philosophy".[78] The question was, what could philosophy *be* "in a post-metaphysical, post-speculative age dominated by *das Faktum der Wissenschaft*, the fact of science"?[79] What it could no longer be was a discipline with its own object-domain and methods of investigation. Nor could it be "a universal form of theoretical inquiry which, in some sense, included the other disciplines themselves in itself".[80] Another fundamental characteristic of post-Hegelian German philosophy is its anti-metaphysical tendency, in the sense of the disparagement of the supersensible. Traditional philosophical problems such as the question of universal thus became transformed into logical or epistemological problems, as with the emphasis by Lotze and the neo-Kantians on validities, and Husserl's intentionality and categorial intuition.

This crisis produced a number of different conceptions of philosophy, such as materialism and positivism, historical-philological philosophy, and worldview

78. Schnädelbach, *op. cit.*, pg. 5.
79. Carlton B. Christensen, "What Does (the Young) Heidegger Mean by the *Seinsfrage*?", *Inquiry*, vol. 42, 1999, pg. 413.
80. *Ibid.*

philosophy. It is out of this philosophical milieu that phenomenology emerges, especially with its critique of psychologism, particularly in John Stuart Mill's *System of Logic* (1843).[81]

Late 19th Century German Philosophy

As is increasingly recognized, the contours of 19th century German philosophy are often obscured by the present-day philosophical canon, in which post-Hegelian philosophy tends to be identified with Kierkegaard, Marx and Nietzsche, whereas Lotze, Dilthey, the neo-Kantians, and a host of others are less well-remembered or have even faded into almost complete obscurity.[82] To some extent this can be perhaps attributed to the identity-crisis of philosophy referred to above. In addition, the increasing influence of the social sciences has perhaps obscured the extent to which they interacted with philosophy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. For instance, today Weber is far better known than Rickert, although much of his work depended on Rickert's methodological studies.[83] These faded figures are more prominent in the work of scholars who focus on phenomenology and hermeneutics, however. Crowell points out that the phenomenological movement "arose...from Husserl's philosophical confrontations with positivists...on the one hand...and neo-Kantian philosophers...on the other", and that Dilthey's thinking between 1880 and 1911 "was largely forged in confrontation with the currents of positivism and neo-Kantianism".[84] These 19th century schools of thought are essential "[t]o understand the

81. Husserl refers to this text repeatedly in his critique of psychologism in *Logical Investigations, Vol. I* (e.g., "Prolegomena", ch. 5).
82. Crowell, *op. cit.*, pg. 667; Schnädelbach, pg. 2. This particularly true of Lotze. Sullivan states that in his day "Lotze reigned as the single most influential philosopher in Germany, perhaps in the world" (Sullivan, *op. cit.*).
83. Guy Oakes, *Weber and Rickert*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 6-10.
84. Crowell, *op. cit.*, pg. 667. See also Barash, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

phenomenological movement".[85] Historicism, too, became an issue for Husserl, but initially only in terms of Dilthey's notion of worldviews, which Husserl severely criticized in his *Logos* article of 1911.

The Baden neo-Kantians were also concerned with positivism and historicism. Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) and Heinrich Rickert (1856-1936) argued that philosophy could establish the epistemological foundations for the different empirical sciences by reference to the transcendental values involved.[86] For example, in 1908, Windelband delivered a series of lectures, the fourth of which is entitled "Positivism, Historicism, Psychologism",[87] which argued that the methods associated with these schools of thought "challenged the legitimate claim of philosophy as the science of knowledge".[88] As Windelband saw it, the task of philosophy was "the definition and justification of philosophical inquiry itself".[89] In advocating that philosophy go "back to Kant", his aim was to show that the proper task of philosophy was to "identify the limits of knowledge in *each* of the individual disciplines".[90] Thus, for the neo-Kantians, philosophy's task was to provide the validation for *both* the natural and the historical (or cultural) sciences, as well as to justify itself.

Another way of understanding the philosophical response has been put forward by Bambach. He argues that the responses to positivism, whose

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85. Crowell, *ibid.* Noticeably absent from this genealogy is historicism, perhaps because Crowell's focus is on what led to Husserl's attempt, in his *Logische Untersuchungen*, "to negotiate the impasse...concerning the proper relation between philosophy and the 'positive' (empirical and mathematical) sciences" (*ibid.*, pg. 668). In that work there is indeed little discussion, if any, of the historical sciences.
86. *Ibid.*, pg. 672.
87. Wilhelm Windelband, *Die Philosophie im deutschen Geistesleben des 19. Jahrhunderts*, J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1909, pp. 72-95, at <http://philosophiebuch.de/windel19.htm> 4 May 2005.
88. Bambach, *op. cit.*, pg. 68.
89. Guy Oakes, "Windelband on History and Natural Science", *History and Theory*, vol. 19, no.2, 1980, pg. 166.
90. Wilhelm Windelband, "History and Natural Science", trans. Guy Oakes, *History and Theory*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1980, pg. 185 (emphasis added).

"proponents...felt that metaphysical questions should be handled empirically or not at all", were first, the historical-hermeneutic response, which involved the renewed examination of the history of philosophy and critique of primary texts, in a manner similar to historical inquiry proper.[91] This antiquarian approach led to the "sheer restoration of philosophical ideas from the past" in a variety of "neo" movements, such as neo-Aristotelianism, neo-Scholasticism, neo-Hegelianism, and of course, neo-Kantianism.[92] Second, this antiquarianism was itself historicized in the theory of world-views that Dilthey, among others, offered "to reconcile the limited historical insights of individual epochs with the demand for a scientific history of thought".[93] Dilthey's thought in part motivated the attempts of the Baden neo-Kantians and the phenomenologists to turn philosophy into a strict science.[94]

Dilthey and Historical Consciousness

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) is a pivotal figure in the philosophical debates of the late 19th century, for a number of reasons. First, unlike many of his contemporaries, he studied, and was initially favourable towards, Comte's Positive philosophy, because of the insistence on the empirical:

> There was only one interpretation, he wrote, which "while acknowledging the validity of the positive sciences uproots philosophy [*in ihrer Wurzel auflöst*], the interpretation of Comte, which repudiates psychology and logic"...[95]

However, Dilthey came to reject much of Comte's programme, particularly its treatment of history by generalization, and the privilege it accorded to the natural

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91. Bambach, *op. cit.*, pg. 27.
92. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.
93. *Ibid.*, pg. 25.
94. According to Heidegger, Dilthey was so receptive to the neo-Kantian interpretation of his own inquiries that he came to misunderstand them himself (K 155).
95. Simon, *op. cit.*, pg. 245. The quotation is from Dilthey's essay "Über das Studium der Geschichte der Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der Gesellschaft, und dem Staat", published in 1875.

scientific method.[96] In later years, Dilthey's assessment of Positive philosophy and positivism was even less favourable. In *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, he argued that, with regard to the philosophical foundation for historical inquiry,

> The answers given to these questions by Comte and the positivists and by J.S. Mill and the empiricists seemed to me to truncate and mutilate historical reality in order to assimilate it to the concepts and methods of the natural sciences.[97]

In Dilthey's view, the epistemological presuppositions of positivism prevented it from grasping historical reality as it is lived and experienced. In particular, Dilthey rejected its empiricist presuppositions, i.e., the reduction of knowledge to sense-data and its associations.[98] Although he agreed that science must be based in experience and is thus antimetaphysical, he argued that positivist epistemology, like that of the empiricists and Kant, rested on an abstraction from life as it is actually lived and experienced:

> Apart from a few beginnings...previous epistemology has explained experience and cognition in terms of facts that are merely representational. No real blood flows in the veins of the knowing subject constructed by Locke, Hume, and Kant, but rather the diluted extract of reason as a mere activity of thought.[99]

Rather than sense-data, Dilthey argued that empirical inquiry must investigate the "facts of consciousness" or "inner experience", behind which we cannot go:

> All science is experiential; but all experience must be related back to and derives its validity from the conditions and context of consciousness in which it arises, i.e., the totality of our nature. We designate as "epistemological" this standpoint which consistently recognizes the impossibility of going behind these conditions...only in the facts of consciousness given in inner experience do we possess reality as it is.[100]

A second aspect of Dilthey's significance is that he actively engaged in historical research, unlike his neo-Kantian contemporaries. Whereas the neo-Kantians wrote on the history of philosophy, Dilthey's researches concerned the broader sphere

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96. *Ibid.*, pg. 246.
97. Wilhelm Dilthey, *Selecteed Works Vol. I*, *op. cit.*, pg. 49. The quotation is from the Preface to Volume I, originally published in 1883.
98. Cf. Makkreel and Rodi, "Introduction", in Dilthey, *ibid.*, pg. 8.
99. Dilthey, *ibid.*, pg. 50. Cf. Bambach, *op. cit.*, pg. 137-139.
100. Dilthey, *ibid.* Dilthey's insistence on the primordiality of inner experience or "inner perception" was one of the central points on which Windelband and Rickert criticized his approach to historical knowledge (cf. Oakes, "Introduction: Rickert's Theory of Historical Knowledge" in Rickert, *The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science*, pg. xii).

of the history of ideas.[101] This led him to an engagement with the Historical School and historicism that went beyond the transcendental value philosophy of the neo-Kantians, with its exclusive emphasis on cognitive interests. In *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, Dilthey remarks that

> It was the Historical School—taking that term in its broadest sense—that first brought about the emancipation of historical consciousness and historical scholarship.[102]

Nevertheless, in Dilthey's estimation, the approach of the Historical School remained one-sided, since it did not seek to integrate the study of the historical with the psychological study of consciousness. This meant that it remained without a proper foundation.[103] Dilthey's favourable judgment of positivism was due to its attempt to provide such a foundation. However, he disagreed with the positivist naturalization of psychology, although he considered the positivist approach and its results to be "impoverished, superficial, but analytically refined".[104]

Dilthey's philosophical aim, then, was

> to provide a philosophical foundation for the principle of the Historical School and for those modes of research into society currently dominated by that school; this should settle the conflict between the Historical School and abstract theories.[105]

For this reason, he rejected the distinction between the historical and the systematic.[106] Yet he also rejected the relativistic consequences of historicism, which sought to reduce the systematic to the historical. The critique of historial reason that Dilthey made his life's work was aimed at providing a foundation for historical consciousness that would avoid such relativism, but could still recognize and account for the historical context of

101. Cf. H.P. Rickman, "General Introduction" in H.P. Rickman, ed., *Meaning in History*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1961, pp. 16-17.
102. Dilthey, *Selected Works Vol. I*, *op. cit.*, pg. 47; cf. Bambach, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-142.
103. Dilthey, *ibid.*, pg. 48.
104. *Ibid.*, pg. 49.
105. *Ibid.*
106. *Ibid.*, pg. 47; cf. Bambach, *op. cit.*, pg. 140. Heidegger appropriates this *motif* from Dilthey, and repeats it throughout his early works (e.g., ZBP pg. 107; GA61 pp. 82-83; J pg. 97; HCT pg. 7; K pg. 176).

philosophical systems.[107]

Dilthey, like Droysen, argued that historical understanding was made possible by our *being* historical. That is, we do not come to know the historical as observers or spectators, but through living it. Therefore we are continuous with history, and thus "observe" it from within. Historical inquiry is thus also self-inquiry.[108] Historicalness as a mode of being, Dilthey argued, was the condition for the possibility of scientific knowledge of history:

> We are, first of all, historical beings and, after that, contemplators of history; only because we are the one do we become the other...
>
> The fact that the investigator of history is the same as the one who makes it is the first condition that makes scientific history possible.[109]

Dilthey's approach, then, was not to determine the ontological status of the historical *object*, as Windelband and Rickert supposed, but rather the mode of being of the historical *subject*. All objectification of history, he argued, depends on the historicalness of the historian. Although this does not result in historical relativism, it does raise the question of how to secure objective historical knowledge, a question that can only be answered by taking into account the psycho-physical totality of the individual. The critique of historical reason thus required a psychological approach, but not empirical psychology. Instead, it depended on a descriptive psychology (here Dilthey appropriated Brentano's insights, without quite arriving at phenomenology). Dilthey attempted to a develop a "theory of worldviews" that would do just this. As he explained in a letter to Husserl,

> It is the task of the theory of world views...to describe methodologically on the basis of an analysis of the historical development of religion, poetry, and metaphysics—but in contrast to relativism—the relationship of the human mind to the enigma of the world and of life.[110]

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107. Cf. Crowell, *op. cit.*, pg. 673.
108. Cf. Gabriel R. Ricci, "Metaphysics and History: The Individual and the General Reconciled", *Humanitas*, vol. X, no. 1, 1997, n. 10.
109. Wilhelm Dilthey, "Patterns and Meaning in History", in Sältzer, *op. cit.*, pg. 162.

In his own work, however, "Dilthey never really resolved the tension between the finitude of historical consciousness and the scientific demand for universality."[111]

The Neo-Kantian Account of Historical Knowledge

The neo-Kantian response to Dilthey's "struggle for a historical worldview", as Heidegger calls it (K), was to argue that Kant's critical philosophy could serve as the basis for a transcendental science of values, but that it needed to be extended to include historical or cultural science. Whereas Kant had established the critical philosophy with respect to the mathematical sciences of nature, the development of the methods of historical inquiry meant that "the historical sciences also constitute a legitimate object of philosophical critique".[112]

Windelband was the founder of the Baden School of neo-Kantianism, to which belonged his student Rickert and Rickert's student Emil Lask (1875-1915). These philosophers, like the Marburg School of Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer (among others), "promoted a transcendental, antipsychologistic reading of Kant as the basis for logical ideality and moral absolutism".[113] By returning to Kant, they aimed to provide a philosophical ground for the sciences in opposition to positivism. Their orientation was towards a transcendental epistemology, which entailed that "no prior material conceptions of the object are employed in the theory of knowledge".[114] Therefore, they took a strictly formal approach that allowed only "for the logic of concept-formation and the formation of judgments" in the theory of knowledge.[115] In this way, they aimed to establish the conditions of *validity* for

110. Quoted in Bambach, *op. cit.*, pg. 173.
111. *Ibid.*, pg. 176.
112. Oakes, *op. cit.*, pg. 167.
113. Steven Galt Crowell, "The Early Decades", *op. cit.*, pg. 670.
114. Schnädelbach, pg. 57.
115. *Ibid.*

scientific knowledge. Positivism held that "experience is a prerational, given field of sensation that provides the *explanans* for higher cognitive achievements", whereas for the neo-Kantians, "experience is the *explanandum*" that was to be explained by way of "a theory of categories".[116] The centrality of the ideas of value and validity came from Lotze, who had been Windelband's teacher.

The Baden School was also influenced by the Fichtean notion of the irrationality of "the material of knowledge", and thus "grounded the validity of logical form (ideality) in the primacy of *practical* reason".[117] For this reason, these thinkers advocated a transcendental value-philosophy (which was to be one of the main targets of Heidegger's first lecture courses (ZBP)). They were also concerned with the problem of historical knowledge, both in terms of its demarcation from the knowledge of nature, and its objective validity.

Windelband: Nomothetic and Idiographical Sciences

Windelband confronts the positivist and historicist challenge to philosophy by accepting that, in terms of their objects, philosophy cannot "establish any substantive conclusions" itself.[118] In his Rectoral Address of 1894, "History and Natural Science", he argues that the role of philosophy in relation to the empirical sciences is "to identify the limits of knowledge in each of the individual disciplines".[119] Philosophy investigates the *principles* of knowledge in the different disciplines, to define the form of their appropriate methods.[120] In this way, philosophy determines "the significance, the cognitive value, and the limits of the use of these methods".[121] To define the

116. Crowell, *op. cit.*, pg. 671.
117. *Ibid.*
118. Wilhelm Windelband, "Rectorial Address, Strasbourg, 1894", trans. G. Oakes, *History and Theory*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1980, pg. 185.
119. *Ibid.*, pg. 185.
120. *Ibid.*, pg. 169.

appropriate methods, however, depends on classification of the disciplines. Windelband argues that the distinction of "natural sciences and sciences of the mind" cannot be philosophically justified, because it rests on the "substantive dichotomy" of nature and mind, which cannot be given a philosophical foundation. Philosophy can only provide a "formal principle of classification", not a substantive or *material* principle.[122]

In formal terms, then, the sciences are distinguished by their aims, methods, and the types of judgments they aim at. Windelband argues that there are two main kinds of sciences, those that aim at general laws, and those that aim at individual phenomena. Nomological sciences such as psychology, chemistry, mechanics and biology collect and analyze facts in order to determine or discover the general laws of the phenomena they investigate. They aim at "the general apodictic judgment" concerning their objects.[123] Disciplines such as biography, history, literature and art, however, aim to describe completely and exhaustively "in its full facticity" a temporally particular "artifact of human life".[124] They aim at "the singular, assertoric proposition".[125] Windelband concludes, therefore, that

> The nomological sciences are concerned with what is invariably the case. The sciences of process are concerned with what was once the case...scientific thought is *nomothetic* in the former case, *idiographic* in the latter case.[126]

Correlatively with determining the logical forms of the different disciplines, philosophy (as theory of cognition) determines the status of the observed particular. In the natural sciences, "the single datum of observation never has any intrinsic scientific value", except as representative of a type, "a special case of a general concept".[127] The

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121. *Ibid.*, pp. 170-171.
122. *Ibid.*
123. *Ibid.*, pg. 175.
124. *Ibid.*, pg. 175.
125. *Ibid.*
126. *Ibid.*

historical sciences, however, aim to describe the particular in "all of its concrete and distinctive features".[128]

Given that both kinds of inquiry can be firmly established as scientific, the final question to be considered is whether they are equally valuable for "our general world view and philosophy of life".[129] Windelband argues that they are:

> Knowledge of general laws always has the practical value of making possible both predictions of future states and a purposeful human intervention in the course of events...All purposeful activity in human social life, however, is no less dependent upon the experience acquired as a result of historical knowledge. To employ a variation upon a classical expression, man is an historical animal.[130]

Thus, "these two cognitive moments remain independent and juxtaposed".[131] In particular, the attempt to reduce history to natural science, as found in the "so-called positivist philosophy of history",[132] simply fails to recognize that "every interest and judgment, every ascription of human value is based upon the singular and the unique".[133] The idea that the human individual could be regarded as an instance, and thus in principle duplicable, is "terrifying and inconceivable", he argues, and debases life.[134] This holds even more so for history:

> This point concerning individual human life has even more force when it is applied to the total historical process: this process has value only if it is unique.[135]

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127. *Ibid.* Richardson argues that the status of the single datum of observation as a basis for secure empirical knowledge depends on the new concept of experience that was introduced by Kant, and was articulated by the neo-Kantians, in particular in Cohen's *Kant's Theory of Experience*. The Aristotelian concept of experience consisted in the regularity of occurrence, and thus discounted singular exceptions to the general. By distinguishing between perception and experience, according to Cohen, Kant argued for an autonomous source of the concepts that constitute experience, and thus elevated the singular datum of experience into a basis upon which the constitutive concepts of experience could be determined (Alan W. Richardson, *op. cit.*).
128. Windelband, *op. cit.*, pg. 178.
129. *Ibid.*, pg. 180.
130. *Ibid.*
131. *Ibid.*, pg. 183.
132. *Ibid.*, pg. 181.
133. *Ibid.*, pg. 182.
134. *Ibid.* With respect to this point, Windelband adverts to Nietzsche's idea of eternal recurrence as a "dreadful idea".
135. *Ibid.*

The attempt to subsume life under general laws debases freedom, which can only be grasped as a temporally unique act. Such uniqueness cannot be rationally determined, and thus has to be recognized as "a residuum of incomprehensible, brute fact...an inexpressible and indefinable phenomenon."[136]

Facticity

The "residuum of incomprehensible, brute fact" is a reference to the Fichtean notion of facticity, i.e., that the material of knowledge that is conceptually ordered is ultimately irrational. Only when brought under concepts does reality become rational. Thus, there is a discontinuity between reality and knowledge. For the neo-Kantians, this discontinuity, which Lask called the *hiatus irrationalis*, was the price that had to be paid to defend the autonomy of philosophy. In recognizing that only the empirical sciences can reach substantive conclusions, the Baden neo-Kantians denied Hegelian panlogism, i.e., the idea that "individual existence emanates from the concept and realizes or embodies its content".[137] In Windelband's words, "[t]he content of the cosmic process cannot be understood as a consequence of its forms."[138] Yet they also denied that the logic of concept-formation could be ascertained by way of empirical investigation, as both positivism and historicism claimed, because the empirical sciences presuppose the formal principles that structure or constitute the givenness of the data of experience.

Rickert: Individualizing and Generalizing Sciences

Windelband's distinction of nomothetic and idiographic sciences failed to provide an adequate account of how historical knowledge is possible, i.e., how objective knowledge can arise from the "incomprehensible, brute fact" that also

136. *Ibid.*, pg. 184.
137. Guy Oakes, *Weber and Rickert*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988, pg. 50.
138. Windelband, *op. cit.*, pg. 185.

constitutes "our nature". Rickert sought to address this problem by reference to the value-relevance of the historical.[139] Like Windelband, Rickert's approach is methodological and epistemological, rather than involving an "ontological solution" in terms of the object-domains of the respective sciences. Central to Rickert's analysis is the demarcation problem between the natural and historical sciences, which could be established neither materially, in terms of the object-domains of nature and spirit, nor formally, in terms of the physical and psychical, because there are natural sciences, such as psychology, that deals with the psychical, and physical sciences, such as archeology, that deal with spirit. The essential demarcation, Rickert argues, had to be in terms of the specific interests and methods of the different sciences.[140] However, this demarcation implies that reality itself is not so differentiated, and "must be viewed as entirely uniform".[141] Thus, whereas the positivist and historicist challenges to philosophy (and to one another) maintained that there was only one type of science, Rickert argues that philosophical clarification showed that both are valid.

The validity of each had to be understood in terms of the formal distinction of nature as "the existence of things as far as it is determined according to universal laws", and history as "the *nonrepeatable event* in its particularity and individuality";[142] and the material distinction of value-relatedness, where nature is "devoid of meaning" and "culture" is "meaningful and relevant to values".[143] The values at issue are transcendental, i.e., they are not real, but rather valid. They hold of the valuable entities,

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139. Cf. Oakes, *Weber and Rickert*, pg. 48. The two main texts in which Rickert presents his theory of historical knowledge are *The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science*, trans. and ed. G. Oakes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986 [1st ed. 1902] and *Science and History*, trans. G. Reisman, ed. A. Goddard, D. Van Nostrand Company, Princeton, 1962 [1st ed. 1899]. In what follows I mainly draw upon the latter work.
140. *Ibid.*, pg. 12.
141. *Ibid.*
142. *Ibid.*, pg. 14.
143. *Ibid.*, pg. xvi, 20-21.

and obligate us to esteem them.[144] Values are different from "valuation", which involves "a *psychical* being who values [cultural phenomena]".[145]

The different kinds of sciences cognize reality in terms of their respective concepts. They reconstruct the "data of immediate experience", which in itself is "an *immeasurable manifold*".[146] Reality is infinite in two respects. First, it is infinitely divisible, and second, it is infinitely extensive. Reality is a continuum of absolute heterogeneity, because "[n]o thing and no event in the world is completely *identical* with any other; it is only more or less similar to it".[147] Therefore, reality always exceeds our ability to conceptually grasp it. As such, it is irrational. "[B]ecause it is, in its every part, an *heterogeneous continuum*, it cannot be conceptually grasped as it is."[148] Rickert therefore rejects epistemological realism, i.e., what he calls the "copy theory of knowledge" and the correspondence theory of truth.[149]

The question is then how scientific concepts *apply* to this heterogeneous continuum. How do they pick out their object?

> Only by means of a *conceptual distinction between differentiation and continuity* can reality become "rational". The continuum can be conceptually mastered as soon as it is *homogeneous*; and the heterogeneous becomes conceivable when we make incisions in it, thereby transforming the continuum into a domain of *discrete* objects.[150]

The natural sciences reconstruct reality as a homogeneous continuum, i.e., as a domain of objects that conform to general laws, whereas the cultural sciences reconstruct it as a heterogeneous discretum, i.e., as a domain of objects that are nonrepeatable, particular and individual. In such conceptual transformation, reality becomes rational. However,

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144. *Ibid.*, pg. 22.
145. *Ibid.*, pg. 26.
146. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.
147. *Ibid.*, pg. 33.
148. *Ibid.*, pg. 35.
149. *Ibid.*, pg. 31. Cf. Oakes, *Weber and Rickert*, pp. 56-57, 59-61.
150. Rickert, *Science and History*, pg. 34.

such rational transformations of the heterogeneous continuum require a formal "principle of selection" to "separate the *essential* from the *unessential* of a given material" in a process of abstraction.[151] For the natural sciences, this is the method of generalization, but Rickert rejects the positivist notion of inductive generalization or "comparative abstraction", arguing that the natural sciences can "*discover* the concept, and eventually perhaps even the law they are seeking, in a *single* object".[152] The heterogeneous continuum is transformed into a heterogeneous discretum, on the other hand, through "the *individualizing* procedure of *history*".[153] But Rickert argues that the principle of selection on which this procedure is based is not clear. The central problem is the relation between concept and individuality. "Is it at all *possible* to form *concepts* of individuals? This, essentially, is the *logical problem of the method of history.*"[154]

The neo-Kantian attempts to provide a foundation for both the natural and historical sciences, and at the same time to defend the autonomy of philosophy, ultimately proved unsuccessful, because the reference to values did not account for how these values were supposed to apply to irrational reality, nor the status of the values themselves. Furthermore, as Dilthey and other historicists argued, Rickert's exclusive focus on the logic of historical concepts ultimately excluded the notion of historical time altogether.[155]

Husserl: The Phenomenology of Consciousness

Although he had already criticized psychologism in *Logical Investigations* (LU §§25-29), in his 1911 *Logos* essay, Husserl addressed the challenge both

151. *Ibid.*, pg. 36.
152. *Ibid.*, pg. 42.
153. *Ibid.*, pg. 57.
154. *Ibid.*, pg. 71.
155. Cf. Bambach, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-121.

positivism and historicism posed to philosophy with respect to the question of objective validity.[156] Husserl's concern was to establish philosophy as a rigorous or strict science. His critique of both naturalism and historicism is that neither can attain the objective validity on which the sciences depend.

Naturalism or positivism in the form of psychologism, with its treatment of the phenomena of consciousness as natural beings, he argues, fails to recognize that psychical phenomena cannot be experienced intersubjectively or by the same subject at different times. Objective validity cannot come from the experience of natural beings, because such experience presupposes it. But the rejection of objective validity on the grounds that all knowledge develops, as historicism supposes, is self-defeating, because the determination of the historically valid already presupposes objective validity. Furthermore, objective validity is not something historical. That is, historicism questions absolute validity on the basis of the historical, but the latter concerns what has occurred, and thus cannot be the basis for what will not occur, i.e., that what is now considered to be absolutely valid will one day cease to be so.

Naturalism

The naturalistic orientation towards philosophy is a consequence of "the discovery of nature", i.e., of "nature considered as a unity of spatiotemporal being subject to exact laws of nature" (PRS 169). With this discovery, "the natural scientist has the tendency to look upon everything as nature" (PRS 169). Naturalism thus involves the naturalizing of consciousness and its data, and the naturalizing of ideas "and consequently of all absolute ideals and norms" (PRS 169). This leads to

156. Edmund Husserl, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science", trans. Q. Lauer, in *Husserl: Shorter Works*, ed. P. McCormick and F.A. Elliston, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1981, pp. 166-197 (hereafter PRS followed by page number). Heidegger subjects this text to his own phenomenological critique in GA17, §§5-16.

psychologism, in which "formal-logical principles" are interpreted as natural (i.e., causal) laws of thinking. But such an attitude denies its very presuppositions, Husserl argues, and has "sceptical consequences" (PRS 171). The problem with empirical psychology is that it is based on a concept of the nature of things that is inappropriate to its subject matter.

> Only the spatiotemporal world of bodies is nature in the significant sense of that word...In principle, only corporeal being can be experienced in a number of direct experiences, *i.e.*, perceptions, as individually identical. Hence, only this being can...be experienced by many subjects as individually identical and be described as intersubjectively the same. (PRS 178)

Thus, the objective determination of the nature of things by natural science depends on the possibility of their being experienced as identical in different experiences. This is what the substantial unity of natural things means.

Psychical things, however, are not experiences of something that has a unity throughout different experiences, but the experiences themselves:

> In the psychical sphere there is...no distinction between appearance and being, and if nature is a being that appears in appearances, still appearances themselves...do not constitute a being which itself appears by means of appearances lying behind it...there is, properly speaking, only one nature, the one that appears in the appearances of things. Everything that in the broadest sense of psychology we call a psychical phenomenon, when looked at in and for itself, is precisely a phenomenon and not nature. (PRS 179)

Therefore, to investigate psychical phenomena as natural things is to misunderstand the phenomenon that is being investigated. Whereas natural beings endure throughout different experiences,

> something psychical, a "phenomenon," comes and goes; it retains no enduring, identical being that would be objectively determinable as such in the sense of natural science... (PRS 180)

To investigate the psychical properly, there must be an inquiry into pure, not empirical, consciousness. This requires "a phenomenology of consciousness as opposed to a natural science about consciousness" (PRS 173), i.e., an inquiry that excludes all "existential positings" or positing of the existence of consciousness as a natural being

(PRS 172). In order to attain the rigorous form of theory of knowledge, presuppositions about the objects of consciousness have to be suspended, so that consciousness can be seen as it is in itself. Husserl argues that

> the investigation must be directed toward a scientific essential knowledge of consciousness, toward that which consciousness itself "is" according to its essence in all its distinguishable forms. At the same time, however, the investigation must be directed toward what consciousness "means," as well as toward the different ways in which—in accord with the essence of the aforementioned forms—it intends the objective... (PRS 173)

Only a phenomenology of pure consciousness, Husserl argues, can attain the rigour of a scientific theory of knowledge from an "analysis of consciousness itself" (PRS 175). And only in this way can the meaning of objective validity become evident.

> What it means, that objectivity is, and manifests itself cognitively as so being, must precisely become evident purely from consciousness itself, and thereby it must become completely understandable. (PRS 173)

The phenomenological method involves the intuition of *essences* rather than of natures. In this method, the intentionality of consciousness, i.e., its directedness-towards its contents, is investigated, and not the being of those contents themselves. "Intuition grasps essence as essential being, and in no way posits being-there" (PRS 182). In investigating essences rather than experiences, phenomenology does not grasp the particular, the individual, or the singular, for to do so it would have "to give it a position in a 'world' of individual being-there" (PRS 183). The only particularity that phenomenology can posit is transient phenomenality, "this disappearing perception, recollection, etc." (PRS 183). Thus Husserl argues that, "[f]or phenomenology, the singular is eternally the *apeiron*" (PRS 183).

Historicism

Historicist or *Weltanschauung* philosophy is a consequence of the "discovery of history", with which "the humanistic scientist sees everything as 'spirit,' as a historical creation" (PRS 169). "Historicism takes its position in the factual sphere of

the empirical life of the spirit" (PRS 185). As such, although it does not naturalize spirit, "there arises a relativism that has a close affinity to naturalistic psychologism and runs into similar sceptical difficulties" (PRS 185). Historical science inquires into "spiritual formations" as social, individual and cultural unities. Such formations have a structure, a typology and a "wealth of external and internal forms" that "grow and transform themselves", analogous to "the structure and typology of organic development" (PRS185-6). What endures is thus "a stream of development", that can be entered into vitally by "interior intuition" and thus "understood" (PRS 186).

> In this manner everything historical becomes for us "understandable," "explicable," in the "being" peculiar to it, which is precisely "spiritual being," a unity of interiorly self-questioning moments of a sense and at the same time a unity of intelligible structuration and development according to inner motivation. (PRS 186)

Historicism argues that spirit as historical creation is singular and yet intelligible in its structure, development, and inner motivation. The unity of such a spiritual formation is a *Weltanschauung*, a coherent way of viewing or understanding the world. Historical science thus has

> the enormous task of thoroughly investigating its morphological structure and typology as well as its developmental connections and of making historically understandable the spiritual motivations that determine its essence, by reliving them from within. (PRS 186)

Historicism differs from historical science as such because it questions the notion of the absolute validity of knowledge. The theory of development implies that knowledge too develops, and thus is relative to its historical situation. Husserl quotes Dilthey:

> In face of the view that embraces the earth and all past events, the absolute validity of any particular form of life-interpretation, of religion, and of philosophy disappears. (PRS 186)

Husserl agrees that "*Weltanschauung* and *Weltanschauung* philosophy are cultural formations that come and go in the stream of human development" (PRS 186). That is, the way the world is viewed is historically contextual. But what about the natural sciences? Are they not objectively valid, despite the fact that scientific views change?

> Does that mean that in view of this constant change in scientific views we would have no right to speak of sciences as objectively valid unities instead of merely as cultural formations? (PRS 186)

Insofar as historicism makes this claim, it "carries over into extreme sceptical subjectivism. The ideas of truth, theory, and science would then, like all ideas, lose their absolute validity" (PRS 186). But what basis does the historian have to make this claim? Inquiry into what has historically occurred, Husserl argues, gives no basis for the claim that something will not occur, because "historical reasons can produce only historical consequences. The desire either to prove or to refute ideas on the basis of facts is nonsense" (PRS 187).

> Consequently, just as historical science can advance nothing relevant against the possibility of absolute validities in general, so it can advance nothing in particular against the possibility of an absolute (*i.e.*, scientific) metaphysics or any other kind of philosophy. (PRS 187)

In other words, the critique of philosophy is always *philosophical*, and not historical, critique.

> For it is clear that philosophical criticism, too, in so far as it is really to lay claim to validity, is philosophy and that its sense implies the ideal possibility of a systematic philosophy as a strict science. (PRS 187)

Conclusion

Both positivist objectification and historicist intersubjectification subsume the moment of subjectivity in the human situation. The philosophical responses to positivism and historicism by the neo-Kantians, Dilthey and Husserl can thus be understood as attempts to defend subjectivity from this kind of subsumption, either by recourse to the transcendental subject (the neo-Kantians and Husserl) or to the historical subject (Dilthey). In doing so, however, they ended up by objectifying the subject once again. What none of these positions could clarify, then, was the genesis of *meaning*. Positivism reduces meaning to explanatory laws governing objects, which ultimately results in meaninglessness, since there can be no explanatory laws of the singular.

Historicism reduces meaning to intersubjective historico-cultural context, thereby fatally relativizing it. The philosophical responses, however, were unable to locate the genesis of meaning within the concretely individual human situation, and thus ended up by theoretically objectifying it. Heidegger's aim, then is to show how objective validity (i.e., transcendence or "ek-stasis") belongs to the human situation itself, i.e., to elucidate how facticity is itself hermeneutic, i.e., fraught with meaning.

Heidegger's critique of his predecessors was that in responding to positivism and historicism, they had failed to take into account how the human situation is determined neither purely objectively nor intersubjectively, but is always also constituted as a historical or situational 'I'. Whereas positivism objectified the 'I' by reducing it to a natural being, historicism objectified it by reducing it to a historical context. The theoretical attempts by the neo-Kantians, Dilthey, and Husserl likewise objectified the 'I' as a form of pure consciousness, and thus were unable to account for its individuality. For this reason, they were unable to give an appropriate account of how objectivity and intersubjectivity required subjectivity. Without the moment of subjectivity, there could be no account of the meaningfulness of the human situation as concretely individual or as singular. To give an appropriate account of concrete individuality, Heidegger argues, an approach is needed that does not objectify it but allows for the expression of "the unique being of life" in its historical reality (K 155). This was what Dilthey had been working towards, but had been unable to achieve because his inquiries remained determined by the theoretical objectification of consciousness that he was trying to overcome.

In a later chapter, I will investigate in more detail exactly how Heidegger's method of formal indication shows a way beyond the theoretical aporias of both positivism and historicism. In particular, it suggests how subjectivity can be thought in

a non-objectifying way, i.e., in a way that does not articulate the subject in objective terms (as found in neo-Kantianism, for example). Approaching concrete individuality in this way shows how objectivity and intersubjectivity are equioriginary with subjectivity, and thus how meaning arises in the discursive encounter with things and others.

In the chapters that follow, I explore the question of the relation between the concrete individual and historical meaning as it becomes manifest in positivistic and historicist conceptions of economics (ch. 2), and how this in turn manifests itself in mainstream development thinking and the postdevelopment critique (ch. 3). The explication of some of the key aspects of Heidegger's philosophical approach to his topic (chs. 4 and 5) will then make it possible to see how inquiry into development always places the inquirer into question, and how overlooking this fundamental relation results in the problem of meaning characteristic of development thinking and its critiques (ch. 6).

Chapter 2: Historicist and Positivist Economics

> A world was uncovered the very existence of which had not been suspected, that of the laws governing a complex society. Although the emergence of society in this new and distinctive sense happened in the economic field, its reference was universal.
>
> —Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*

Introduction

In this chapter I turn to the question of the nature of economic inquiry, for two reasons. First, economic issues are central to the subject of development, to the extent that institutions such as the World Bank have consistently maintained that economic growth is essential for development. Second, the relationship between positivist economic analysis and history is problematic, which in turn makes the economistic approach to the subject of development questionable. The abstract universalism of positivist economics is evident in the policy prescriptions and economic analyses of agencies involved in mainstream international development, such as the OECD and the World Bank. Since the issue of the concreteness or historical context of economic behaviour is central to the subject of development, then, it is useful to consider how historicist economists attempted to approach it.

Here I examine two conflicting views about economics, the historicist and the positivist, which show continuities with the debate over positivist and historicist views of history examined in the previous chapter. In fact, one of the central figures in positivism, J.S. Mill, is also a central figure in positivist economics.[1] In particular, my aim is to show how historicist economics involves the attempt to take historical

specificity and the concrete individuality of a particular context of economic behaviour into account and, by doing so, recognizes the continuity of theory (or analysis) with policy.

The historicist view was predominant in Germany from the late 17th to the early 20th century.[2] Because this view was opposed to the universal theorizing characteristic of positivist economics, it began to lose influence outside of Germany after the advent of marginalism in the late 19th century, and today comparatively little is known about it.[3] Yet many of the criticisms that historicist economists levelled against positivist economics are still germane today, and are also relevant to recent critiques of the universalist presuppositions of mainstream (or positivist) development thinking.[4] Positivist economics became predominant in Britain and France in the late 18th century and elsewhere, such as Austria, in the late 19th century. Because this view has come to determine present-day economic orthodoxy, it is generally identified with economics *per se*. It characterizes the economic inquiries of those considered to be the founding fathers of the discipline, such as Smith, Ricardo, J.S. Mill, Jevons, Walras and Menger.

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1. Dan Hausman argues that "current methodological practice closely resembles Mill's methodology, despite the fact that few economists would explicitly defend it" (Daniel M. Hausman, "Philosophy of Economics", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2003 Edition)*, ed. E.N. Zalta, at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/economics/>.
2. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, this school of economic thought is generally referred to as the German Historical School. The influence of German economic thought in other countries, particularly the United States and Institutional economics, is beyond the scope of this chapter, as is the complex relation of Marx's thought to German economics (for example, his critique of Friedrich List).
3. Cf. Erik S. Reinert and Arno Daastøl, "The Other Canon: The History of Renaissance Economics" in Erik S. Reinert, ed., *Globalization, Economic Development and Inequality: An Alternative Perspective*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2004, pp. 21-70; also available at <www.othercanon.org/papers> on 26 April 2005, pp. 1-42. The latter pagination is cited here.
4. See for example Erik S. Reinert, "Increasing Poverty in a Globalised World: *Marshall Plans* and *Morgenthau Plans* as Mechanisms of Polarisation of World Incomes", The Other Canon Foundation, Norway, 2003, at <www.othercanon.org/papers> on 19 May 2005.

In examining these two views, then, I aim to show that what the historicist economists were trying to articulate pertained fundamentally to the related questions of what economic inquiry aims to show, and how it aims to do so. Most importantly, the historicists rejected the view of positivist economists that it was possible to abstract from the economic history of certain countries, in particular Britain, so as to derive general laws determining the process of economic change elsewhere. The historicists perceived this to be an illegitimate generalization from a particular (and perhaps even aberrant) case, arguing instead that economic behaviour had to be understood in terms of the specific historical conditions of individual countries. Arguably, positivist economics has continued to deny the notion of historical specificity.[5]

A further area of contention between these two views is related to the question of historical specificity. Historicist economists criticized the positivist approach for its universalistic notions of human nature, such as the idea that human beings are motivated by self-interest or maximization of subjectively perceived utility. This issue also had to do with the relevance of economic inquiry to economic policy and politics.[6] Positivist economics maintained that because economic theory was universally applicable, the role of government was to harmonize policy with the way that economic behaviour was theoretically demonstrated to occur. Failure to do so would result in worse economic performance.[7] In contrast, the historicists argued that the way people interact economically is dependent on the historical context, and that it is the role of policy to *create* the conditions for beneficial economic behaviours. However, the historicists' rejection of *universal* economic theory did not mean that they aspired to a

5. Since the late 19th century, with the development of the marginalist approach, positivist economics has in effect divorced itself from the study of economic history. Positivist economics has even developed its own form of economic history, "cliometrics", which is essentially the retrojection of current economic theory. I discuss this further below.
6. In the Cameralist tradition of the 17th and 18th centuries, a distinction was made between internal policy and external politics, due to the nature of the political entities involved.

non-theoretical economics (as has sometimes been suggested[8]) nor that they were simply advocating inductive methods against the deductive formalism that had come, with Ricardo, to dominate positivist economics.[9] Other characteristics sometimes ascribed to historicist economics are that they espoused collectivism and constructivism against the (methodological) individualism and spontaneity of institutions advocated by positivist economics.[10]

Historicist economics was far more complex than this would suggest. Nor were all of the historicist economists completely hostile to positivist economics.[11] However, because of its attempt to incorporate diverse intellectual influences, historicist economics has often been interpreted either as an unrealized programme or as an unsystematic collection of approaches.[12] As Peukert argues,

> the historical school itself originated from diverse backgrounds and tried to integrate different intellectual and theoretical impulses...On the one hand, German romanticism, idealism, the diverse historical schools, e.g. in law, and hermeneutics (Dilthey) has a strong impact, but also mercantilist thought and the framework of the classical economists. On the other hand also French positivism, empirical and behavioural psychology and cultural anthropology as well as evolutionism in the variants of Spencer and Darwin had an impact on the historical school.[13]

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7. However, this did not mean that all positivist economists advocated *laissez-faire*. Adam Smith, for example, was well aware of the dangers of business interests colluding to their own benefit and to the detriment of others or society as a whole. In a number of passages in *The Wealth of Nations*, Smith warns of the interests of "merchants and manufacturers", "an order of men whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it" (WNI pg. 359; cf. also WNI pp. 232-233, WNIV pp. 39, 72-73). And J.S. Mill argued that distribution, unlike production, was partly dependent on institutions (John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1909 [1848] at <http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlP1.html> on 11 February 2004, Bk. I, ch. I, PR.31.
8. For example, Streissler suggests this about the Younger Historical School (Erich W. Streissler, "Rau, Hermann and Roscher: contributions of German economics around the middle of the nineteenth century". *European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, vol. 8, no. 3, 2001, pg. 312).
9. For example, Keith Tribe, *Historical Schools of Economics: German and English*, Keele Economics Research Papers, Keele University, February, 2002, pg. 1.
10. Helge Peukert, "The Multifaceted Balance of the Concept of *Staatswissenschaften* in the Tradition of the Historical School", *European Journal of Law and Economics*, vol. 12, 2001, pg. 113. Another characteristic ascribed to historicist economics, which Peukert does not mention here, is an almost slavish devotion to laws of historical development.
11. Cf. Streissler, *op. cit.*, pp. 311-331; Tribe, *Historical Schools*, *op. cit.*

Only with the advent of marginalist or neoclassical economics did the difference in approaches turn into an explicit conflict, with the *Methodenstreit* between Schmoller and Menger, but even then, the disagreement was largely at cross-purposes.

The positivist innovation: invention of economy

In the two centuries preceding the appearance in the 18th century of what I refer to here as positivist economics,[14] there had been significant discussion amongst those who came to be called "mercantilists"[15] of what would now be considered economic topics. However, what was innovative in positivist economics, i.e., the conceptualization of economic behaviour as "a discrete conceptual sphere" of human activity,[16] problematizes interpretation of earlier thought. The earlier term, "oeconomy",

> refers us to a world in which human activity directed to the physical maintenance of life is conceived in terms of a social grouping of family and servants with a head of household whose business it is to see that everyone has their fit requirements.[17]

The national economy was understood along similar lines, i.e., essentially in terms of providing for people, and was not distinguished from the domain of the sovereign. The political economists transformed this from a hierarchically to a horizontally conceived domain, analytically separable from the state.

12. Cf. Tribe, *op. cit.*, pp. 2, 5-14.
13. Peukert, *op. cit.*
14. There are various views on where the significant positivist innovation in economic thought occurs. Tribe states that "Adam Smith's *Inquiry into the nature and cause of the wealth of nations* (1776) is uncontroversially acknowledged to be the founding text of modern economics" (Keith Tribe, "Oeconomic History", *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, vol. 36, 2005, pg. 587). However, he also refers to Schumpeter, who located the "transition to a 'scientific economics' " with the Physiocrats in the mid-18th century (pg. 588), a view that Reinert and Daastøl also endorse (Erik S. Reinert and Arno Daastøl, *op. cit.*, pg. 4). Another view, that of William Letwin, holds that economic science originates in the 17th century, with Petty, Locke, and North (cf. Marc Blaug, "Economic Theory and Economic History in Great Britain, 1650-1776", *Past and Present*, no. 28, 1964, pg. 112).
15. This term, invented by Mirabeau in 1763, "has been used to describe the economic thought of the entire period from the end of the Middle Ages to the Age of Enlightenment—from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth" (Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58).
16. Tribe, "Oeconomic History", *op. cit.*, pg. 592.
17. *Ibid.*

> Since, roughly speaking, the end of the eighteenth century, concepts such as wealth, liberty, need, and happiness (or rather satisfaction) have become linked in a chain of meaning which is founded upon the economy as a constitutive moment.[18]

Prior to this conception, then, the issue of state interference in economy that is of central concern to positivist economics, particularly political economy, does not arise. For the Cameralists in 17th- and 18th-century Germany, for instance, the central concept is that of the polity, which "is not one of a zone of action nor of a kind of relation between subjects, but rather embraces the whole state through the medium of regulation" (which they called *Polizei*).[19]

The sense of economy that positivist economics focussed on was the production and distribution of wealth in the interactions between atomistic individuals according to their self-interest. Self-interest, in turn, was held to be a universal aspect of human nature, and therefore to be primary in the analysis of economy. Prior to this conception of the relation of economy and wealth, what was significant for householder and ruler alike was subsistence, of the family for the former, and of the polity for the latter.[20] The Cameralists argued that the ruler's wealth is really the "common weal", i.e., the happiness of his subjects: "a primary form of wealth for a ruler consisted in the good order of his subject population",[21] which was what *Polizei* was to accomplish.

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18. Keith Tribe, "Cameralism and the Science of Government", *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 56, no. 2, 1984, pg. 266. However, it is important to note also that the concept of "the" economy, as a term "referring to the structure or totality of relations of production, distribution and consumption of goods and services within a given country or region", is of even more recent provenance, only dating back to "the mid-twentieth century" (Timothy Mitchell, "Fixing the Economy", *Cultural Studies*, vol. 12, no. 1, 1998, pg. 84). 18th- and 19th-century texts used "economy" to refer to a type of behaviour, rather than to an object. (See also Daniel Breslau, "Economics invents the economy", *Theory and Society*, vol. 32, 2003, pp. 379-411.)
19. Tribe, "Cameralism", *op. cit.*
20. We should also note that the standard word in German for "economy" is *Wirtschaft*, which derives from *Wirt*, meaning "host" or "landlord". *Wirtschaft* thus refers to the characteristics of being a host, i.e., of providing for someone or provisioning. According to Tribe, this can refer to both the activity and the objects provided (Tribe, "Cameralism", *op. cit.*, pg. 269). The terms used for "economics" are *Volkswirtschaft* ("national provisioning") and *Wirtschaftwissenschaft* ("science of provisioning").
21. *Ibid.*, pg. 273.

Furthermore, with the innovation of economy as the domain of self-interested behaviour, civil society was discovered to have its own motivating force and thus its own laws of motion.[22] For positivist economics, the relation between state and economy became seen as an issue of restrictive interference by the state with the self-movement and (so it was postulated) the self-regulation of civil society. Prior to the positivist innovation, this issue could not arise. For the Cameralists, such as Von Sonnenfels, *regulation* of economic behaviour *is* the motivating force. "There are no laws of motion in this society except those that lead to its inevitable collapse following insufficient government."[23]

Although for historicist economics proper, the distinction between state and economy or civil society is already part of their intellectual milieu, this did not mean that it was simply accepted as a natural state of affairs. In Roscher and particularly in Schmoller, the notion of the common weal or the state as a totality is a primary motivation for their view of economics as an integrative, rather than specialized, discipline. State involvement in economy through regulation and other policy measures is the development and progress of the totality, whereas in positivist economics, economic development or progress is held to occur through the free interaction of individuals in their own interest, so as to discover and take advantage of opportunities for gain, thereby leading to technical innovation and hence progress.

Economy and Individuality

A further innovation found in positivist economics is the transformation in the concept of the individual, now no longer understood in terms of relations to others and to the location she inhabited, but instead as a self-contained agent, interacting with

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 277, 282-283.
23. *Ibid.*, pg. 277.

others, but not constituted by such interactions. Through enclosures and the introduction of machine production, those who were to become the working classes were dissevered from identity through inhabitation, community and vocation. Without these bases of identity, individuality came to be seen as residing within each person as something self-contained.

Karl Polanyi, following Henry Sumner Maine, argued that this represented the privileging of *contractus* over *status* as the constitution of society,[24] which gave rise to the commodification of labour, land and money as the necessary components for the self-regulating sphere of economy:

> A market economy must comprise all elements of industry, including labor, land, and money...But labor and land are no other than the human beings themselves of which every society consists and the natural surroundings in which it exists. To include them in the market mechanism means to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market.[25]

Central to this transformation was the notion of improvement that was used to justify the enclosures that began in the Tudor period, in which arable land, including the commons, was converted to pasture for sheep and the production of wool by lords and nobles (and later by merchants and country gentlemen) for private profit. In these movements, there was a twin displacement of the smallholders and subsistence farmers from their habitation and from their means of subsistence.[26] This could be seen as improvement only if the conversion compensated that displacement by providing new means of subsistence for such individuals, now as agricultural *labourers* and craftsmen attached to or associated with the landlord's property. But this in turn required the notion of the market economy in which labour could be exchanged for subsistence.

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24. Karl Polanyi, *The Livelihood of Man*, ed. H.W. Pearson, Academic Press, New York, 1977, pg. 48.
25. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, Beacon Press, Beacon Hill, 1957, pg. 71.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35; Robert P. Marzec, "Enclosures, Colonization, and the *Robinson Crusoe* Syndrome: A Genealogy of Land in a Global Context", *Boundary 2*, vol. 29., no. 2, 2002, pg. 140-141.

Thus there was a conflict between the ideas of habitation and improvement:

> An official document of 1607, prepared for the use of the Lords of the Realm, set out the problem of change in one powerful phrase: "The poor man shall be satisfied in his end: Habitation; and the gentleman not hindered in his desire: Improvement." This formula appears to take for granted the essence of purely economic progress, which is to achieve improvement at the price of social dislocation. But it also hints at the tragic necessity by which the poor man clings to his hovel, doomed by the rich man's desire for a public improvement which profits him privately.[27]

The displacement of the commoners had another aspect, that also pertains to the conception of the atomistic individual, namely that without some tie to the land, a person's *legal* identity could no longer be traced back to a master (i.e., a landowner).[28] Such "masterless" men were subject to legal sanctions, often for attempting to assert their customary use-rights to provide for their subsistence.

> In defense, these landless, "trespassing" laborers referred to themselves as "inhabitants" as a way of laying claim to their centuries-old rights to the land. The term *inhabitant* signaled justified cause for being present on an enclosed area of land formerly open.[29]

However, this sense of "inhabitant" was altered by a legal ruling in 1603, that restricted the rights of use to those with specific access to the land, i.e. landowners and their tenants. In this "judicial transformation", Marzec argues, the sense of the human being is transformed, from a constitutive relation with her environment, to one of self-enclosed subjectivity:

> Individuality posits selfhood as being grounded *within* the self, thereby creating the opposition of an enclosure or barrier holding together the essence of an inner self standing against another self. Inhabitancy names a relation to exteriority and as such opens a way of thinking subjectivity as standing *upon* a structure that gives it support and meaning: Land sets up humankind.[30]

Marzec argues further that this metaphysical transformation is also to be found in

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27. Polanyi, *op. cit.*, pg. 34.
28. "As more land was enclosed, more men were legally considered to be 'masterless', because they could not prove they were tied to a specific owner's land" (Marzec, *op. cit.*, pg. 140).
29. *Ibid.*, pg. 141.
30. *Ibid.*, pg. 142. The contrast between the interiority of individuality and the relation to exteriority designated by inhabitancy needs to be further destructed, however, since the notion of exteriority still depends on an independent interiority. As I aim to show in the next chapter, Heidegger's phenomenological elucidation of the human situation argues that this contrast itself is determined by the theoretical attitude of the philosophy of consciousness, and is dependent on an inadequate sense of subjectivity.

colonialism, and in particular colonial development, as a "domestication of foreign lands and peoples".[31] In this domestication, "what was once intrinsic or peculiar to a territory" is deterritorialized, thereby "placing it within the universal flow of the global economy".[32]

The laws of economic development

From the conception of economy as a distinct domain of interaction, receiving its motive force from self-interest as invariable human nature, it was then possible to investigate this domain scientifically, in order to determine the laws governing it. For Smith, these had to do with investment and rates of profit, and the determination of value by labour and exchange. What is not found in Smith's analysis, and would not become a definitive aspect of economic theory until the advent of neoclassical economics in the late 19th century, was the unifying role played by the concept of scarcity in economic analysis.[33] This was because the political economists, like their predecessors, focussed primarily on production and distribution, rather than on consumption:

> The Classicals perceived rarity to be an aberration: if goods can be *produced*—i.e., created—then there is no inherent scarcity of them....scarcity may play a role [in prices] in the short-run (when quantities are fixed), but not in the long-run.[34]

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31. *Ibid.*, pg. 131.
32. *Ibid.*, pg. 152.
33. One suggestion about how to understand the difference between classical economics and neoclassical economics is found in the Preface to the 2nd edition (1879) of William Stanley Jevons' (1835-1882) *Theory of Political Economy*, where he refers to Mill's statement on value: "John Stuart Mill tells us explicitly that 'The value of a thing means the quantity of some other thing, or of things in general, which it exchanges for.' It might of course be explained that Mill did not intend what he said; but as the statement stands it makes value into a thing, and is just as philosophic as if one were to say, 'Right Ascension means the planet Mars, or planets in general'." (pp. xi-xii). Whereas the classical economists sought to identify value with the concrete direct and indirect labour required to produce a good, the neoclassical economists turned this into a purely formal relationship of the subjective perception of scarcity or, as Jevons says, "a Calculus of Pleasure and Pain" (pg. vi). (W. Stanley Jevons, *The Theory of Political Economy*, 5th ed., Ibis, Charlottesville, 1931).
34. "Phases of the Marginalist Revolution" at <http://homepage.newschool.edu/het.essays/margrev/phases.htm> on 14 March 2003.

This is not to say that the political economists did not recognize that there were situations in which available resources might fall short of the requirements for subsistence. Indeed, this was the issue that Malthus sought to address. What did not enter into the classical conception of economy was the notion that consumption itself determined value, and that this was predicated on the notion of subjective scarcity. That is, consumption was taken to be a given.[35] There was a level of subsistence (perhaps including status goods) necessary such that labourers would be able to work, but because there was always a surplus population, wages could not for long rise above this level.[36]

Production, however, could vary and thus more could always be produced, depending on the rate of profit. As well, this determined how income was distributed (as profits, rent and wages) between the three "factors" of production (capital, land and labour) or, equivalently, the three classes (merchants or capitalists, landowners and the working class). Smith did not, of course, live to see the advent of full-scale industrialization and the attendant immiseration this caused, which gave rise to the "social question" of poverty or surplus population, i.e., the state of affairs in which the conditions of the rural and urban poor and unemployed deteriorated to such an extent that revolution threatened and on occasion erupted. This phenomenon was prevalent throughout much of the 19th century. The conditions responsible were what elicited the positivist doctrine of development.

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35. See Louis Lefeber, "Classical vs. Neoclassical Economic Thought in Historical Perspective: The Interpretation of Processes of Economic Growth and Development", *History of Political Thought*, vol. XXI, no. 3, 2000, pg. 531.
36. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 525-542.

Abstraction and Policy

The Franco-British tradition of political economy, in analytically isolating economic behaviour as an object of investigation, took it to conform to universal and immutable laws, the discovery of which was the task of economics. In this approach the principles of economic behaviour were abstracted from the specific socio-historical contexts in which they were discovered, so as to be able to make economics into a science. Historicist economists objected that this turned economics into the investigation of abstract and ideal, rather than concrete and actual, behaviour. Because it was essentially formal and deductive (despite attempts to use empirical data in the analyses), it was unsuitable for determining economic policy. As Schmoller commented,

> Once abstract economics had achieved a great system, its source of power dried up because it volatilized its results too much into abstract schemes, which no longer had any connection to reality.[37]

As a policy science rather than a purely theoretical science, argued the historicists, economics had to take into account the meaning or significance of different economic conditions and policy choices, as well as the significance of the outcomes of those choices in their specific contexts. Such choices and outcomes in turn affect the meaning of conditions. Meaning was central, in terms of both how economists understood conditions, policies, etc., and how those involved in them did, because economic interaction was *not* seen as given, mechanistically conforming to general laws, but as activity engaged in because of the significance of the actions involved and the intent of policy.

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37. Gustav von Schmoller, "Zur Methodologie der Staats- und Sozial-Wissenschaften", *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, vol. 7, no. 3, 1883, pg. 97 (quoted in Markus Haller, "Mixing economics and ethics: Carl Menger vs. Gustav von Schmoller, *Social Science Information*, vol. 4, no. 3, 2004, pg. 8).

In positivist economics, economic policy is generally seen in terms of how state regulation does or does not harmonize with the general economic laws discovered to govern civil society.[38] Where policies conflict with these laws, the resulting economic behaviour is "inefficient" or, worse, such policies become a means by which special interests (such as landowners or businesspeople) are able to distort markets to their own benefit. For example, Smith's argument was that self-regulation of economic interaction was more efficient, and that interference by the state could not make it more productive, but could make it less so (cf. WN IV pp. 30, 94).

In particular, 19th century German economists criticized positivist economics on the grounds that it was an attempt to universalize the specific economic conditions that obtained in an industrialized society such as Britain, whereas the economic conditions in Germany (and other countries) were quite different.[39] Economists in Britain might be concerned with how policies should be brought into conformity with the actual conditions of industrial production and the need for foreign trade; the problem in Germany was how to industrialize in the first place. The solution to this problem was not to be found by abstraction from the historical experience of Britain (or any other country), because it depended upon the specific historical conditions in Germany, which *included* the existence of an already industrialized and international trade-dominating Britain. What Germany required, historicist economists argued, was creative and prospective policies in order to bring about non-existent conditions, not policies that reflected those conditions.[40]

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38. Cf. Warren Samuels, "The Methodology of Economics and the Case for Policy Diffidence and Restraint" in *Essays on the Methodology and Discourse of Economics*, Macmillan, London, 1992, pp. 108-129.
39. Cf. Kahn, *op. cit.*, pg. 238; Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pg. 173.

When economics in Germany was established as an academic discipline in 1727, in the form of *Cameralwissenschaft*, it was policy science rather than political economy, largely because it was initially intended to train civil servants to be able to administer and increase government revenues. Because policy depended on understanding the conditions of the particular statelet, historical knowledge was considered to be essential. As Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, one of the mid-18th century Cameralists, wrote:

> We should have a history from the earliest times in which the chief attention would be given to the origin of realms and states, to the efforts to found them and to bring them into a flourishing condition, to the principles of government in political, financial, and police affairs, to the attempts to cultivate and people the lands, to the causes of the growth and decay of realms and states, and especially to the governmental mistakes which rulers and ministers have committed...In my opinion such a history, if it satisfied its purpose, would go far toward extending a knowledge of true governmental and financial principles upon which the happiness of peoples largely rests, and such a book could incidentally not fail to be useful to civic society.[41]

Rather than exchange, the central focus of German economics up until at least the 1930s was on *production* and administration.

In order to understand these conflicting views, it is important to see them in their historical context. In the next section, I give a brief sketch of the social and political contexts and the academic circumstances in which they appeared in Britain, France and Germany.

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40. This summary should not be taken to suggest that all German economists were of the historical school, nor that all British economists were positivists. Rather, it is meant to indicate the predominant tendencies in both countries. A further complication for this analysis is that there is a tendency to read positivist conceptions back into the historical economists, as found, for example, in Erich W. Streissler, "Rau, Hermann and Roscher: contributions of German economics around the middle of the nineteenth century". *European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, vol. 8, no. 3, 2001, pp. 311-331. Streissler claims that "the German economists treated here developed the same framework...half a century before neoclassics proper, so that I have called their main 'paradigm' the *proto-neoclassical tradition*..." (pg. 314).
41. Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, *Gesammelte Politische und Finanzschriften über wichtige Gegenstände der Staatskunst, der Kriegswissenschaften und des Cameral- und Finanzwesens, Bd. I*, 1761, quoted in Albion Small, *The Cameralists*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 2001 [1909], pg. 387.

The Historical Context of Economics

Europe in the 18th century

Throughout the 18th century, Britain experienced political stability and increasing wealth, which resulted in a growing class of property owners whose political power had increased in relation to the sovereign. This was the result of a number of factors. The 17th century had seen the end of full-scale military conflict on British soil—from the 18th century onward Britain's wars were fought overseas—and the Act of Settlement in 1701 established the rights of Parliament and the independence of the judiciary. Agriculture continued to be transformed into a capitalist enterprise through acts of enclosure.[42] British colonialism and domination of international trade became supreme after the Colonial Wars with France (1754-63), and this lent support to "mercantilist" policies such as protection of industries, laws against advanced manufacturing in the colonies, the Corn Laws that restricted the import of various grains, and the Navigation Acts that

> required trade between the colonies and Great Britain to be carried on in British ships, while certain classes of commodities were to be confined initially to the market of the mother country.[43]

Such policies not only benefited Britain's balance of trade with its colonies (the most egregious case being that of India),[44] but also favoured certain British enterprises, such as agricultural entrepreneurs and textile manufacturers. Furthermore, they kept prices for consumers high.

The political and economic conditions in Britain were in sharp contrast to those in the rest of Europe in the 18th century, which was a century of continental war.

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42. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, pg. 30.
43. Andrew Skinner, "Introduction" to Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations Books IV-V*, ed. A. Skinner, Penguin Books, London, 1999, pg. xxxiv.
44. Cf. Frédéric F. Clairmont, *The Rise and Fall of Economic Liberalism*, Southbound/Third World Network, Penang, 1996, ch. 3; Cowen and Shenton, DoD 42-56.

This was especially destabilizing for the German-speaking regions, which experienced constant territorial losses and gains, owing in part to their shifting alliances with the various major powers. At the end of the Seven Years War in 1763, Prussia had emerged as a significant political entity, but a large number of sovereign political entities still existed, and conflict with Austria over leadership in the German "nation" remained a problem until the late 19th century. France, although it remained territorially integrated, lost many of its colonies in the Colonial Wars. The economic factors that contributed to the outcomes of these conflicts (such as financial dependency on other states and the lack of resources to continue the conflict), and their economic consequences (such as British international trade supremacy), were a significant influence on the economic thinkers of the time.

Economic inquiry in the German statelets reflected these political uncertainties. The Cameralists, as we will see below, were primarily concerned with the importance of policy in increasing the power of the principality. Power depended on production in order to generate revenue for military expenditure, and thus also on maintaining the well-being of the ruler's subjects. This was distinct from the issue of *politics*, which concerned external relations with other political entities. Although politics might enter into considerations of what was economically feasible, for example, restrictions on trade, the fundamental economic issues had to do with the administration of policy and policy reforms that would contribute to material well-being.

French and British economic inquiry in the 18th century came to focus on the relationship between government and economy, or state and market. In France, which was still an absolute monarchy, the Physiocrats (chiefly Quesnay and Mirabeau) attacked state interference that created distortions in the market, although they also recognized that markets needed the state in order to function. These thinkers argued that

economic production was based on agricultural production, because only agriculture produced a surplus. For this reason, economic behaviour was understood to be essentially governed by the laws of nature, which thus constrained the activity of the state. Turgot, on the other hand, argued that policies restricting trade and commerce contradicted the principle that individuals know their own interests better than do others. Freedom in commerce would benefit competition, leading to advances in manufacturing and lower prices.[45]

Scottish Enlightenment thinkers such as Hume and Smith also questioned the effect of such policies. Their economic inquiries were scientifically oriented, but unlike their French counterparts, they were also historically oriented, and a fundamental concern was with the scientific explanation of social change. The idea of stages of history was a common theme, understood in terms of progress or improvement.[46] This involved a view of human nature as both universal and yet self-determining. Through our own actions, they argued, conditions could be changed, thus changing behaviour.[47] From their *scientific* perspective, however, these thinkers sought to explain economic behaviour by determining the motivations for individual human behaviour. The predominant view was that self-interest or "self-love", as Adam Smith put it (WN I ii, pg. 119), was the fundamental motivation.[48] The classical liberalism of the 18th century was based on the idea of atomistic individuals, driven by innate passions or interests, and motivated by gain.[49] On this basis, classical liberals argued, the drive to satisfy

45. Cf. Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-5.
46. *Ibid.*, pg. 111.
47. *Ibid.*
48. Although Smith himself maintained, like his teacher Hutcheson, that human beings are also motivated by "fellow feeling", he "criticized Hutcheson for failing to give due weight to man's selfish propensities" (Andrew Skinner, "Introduction" to Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations I-III*, ed. A. Skinner, Penguin Books, London, 1986, pg. 21). In WN, Smith's economic analyses concern only the "selfish propensities" (e.g., WN I ii pg. 119).
49. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, pp. 286-7.

wants itself produced a social order more natural than those inherited from tradition, and also led to greater material well-being.[50]

The classical liberal concern, then, was the relation between state power and individual liberty, whether the latter was understood as involving insatiable appetites (as with Hobbes) or the appropriation of nature through labour (Locke). In economic terms, this became a question of whether the state benefited or harmed individual interests by interfering in economic behaviour (e.g., restrictions on property or profession) and its conditions (e.g., mercantilist policies such as restrictions on foreign trade). This concern also presupposed a condition that was lacking in Germany, namely, a central political authority with the power to interfere economically, yet separate from civil society.

Economics as an academic discipline: Germany and Britain

The difference in approaches to economic thinking, and how the object-domain was conceived, was also a consequence of the institutionalization of the discipline, both in the academic context and with respect to the organs of government or administration. Fourcade-Gourinchas argues that economic doctrines produced in different countries owed much to the status that economists had, and suggests that "the twin questions of 'who is an economist' and 'what economic knowledge is' in different societies are more deeply intertwined than is usually acknowledged".[51]

German economics has a long academic history,[52] although the appearance of a German tradition in economic inquiry came later than in other European nations.[53] The

50. *Ibid.*, pg. 289.
51. Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas, "Politics, institutional structures, and the rise of economics: A comparative study", *Theory and Society*, vol. 30, 2001, pg. 400.
52. The first academic chair for an economist in Germany was established at the University of Halle, in 1727 (Tribe, "Cameralism", *op. cit.*, pg. 263).

establishment of chairs in Cameralist science was aimed at ensuring the training of skilled administrators, and thus the range of topics included in the discipline was extensive.[54] Cameralist concern with the management of production, population, finance and trade had the aim of "do[ing] everything to augment the productive activities of the ruler's subjects, in this way paving the way for their enhanced happiness and the ruler's income".[55] Thus, the orientation and principal interest was not abstract and theoretical, but concrete and practical.

In the United Kingdom, in contrast, academics were only appointed to positions in economics in the 19th century, Malthus at the East India College in 1805 being the first. Economic discourse thus came from government officials, businessmen, and other intellectuals, rather than from academic economists. Even in the 19th century, education in political economy was not highly regarded either by business and industry or by the Civil Service.[56] Political economy was practised largely outside of academic institutions.

> The field was organized around popular reviews, on the one hand, and learned societies and clubs, on the other...Pamphlets and newspapers remained one of the most privileged forms of communication on the subject of economics until the late part of the nineteenth century; serious economic debates took place in non-specialized and popular settings...[57]

Only towards the end of the century did academics begin to dominate economic discourse.

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53. Cf. Erik S. Reinert, "A Brief Introduction to Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff (1626-1692)", *European Journal of Law and Economics*, vol. 19, 2005, pp. 221-230. This tradition only appeared after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, whereas the Italian and French economic traditions began in the late 16th century, and the British tradition in the mid-16th century.
54. Cf. Andre Wakefield, "Books, Bureaus, and the Historiography of Cameralism", *European Journal of Law and Economics*, vol. 19, 2005, pp. 311-320.
55. Tribe, "Cameralism", *op. cit.*, pg. 272.
56. Fourcade-Gourinchas, *op. cit.*, pg. 411.
57. *Ibid.* Cf. also Tribe, *Historical Schools of Economics*, *op. cit.*, pg. 4.

Historicist Economics

Most 19th century German economists were critical of classical political economy, both for its deductivism and for its assumptions about human nature.[58] They rejected the "Ricardian vice" of the exclusive use of deductive method, and although they did not deny that self-interest was a motivation of action, they questioned the idea that such a motivation was analytically determinative for economic understanding, independently of specific historical and social circumstances. They viewed "the theories of classical political economy as both a product of the circumstances which generated them, and, hence, inapplicable elsewhere".[59] This was due to the political, economic and intellectual situations of Germany in the 19th century.

Even under the German Empire, power had been vested primarily in the statelets (principalities and kingdoms) that constituted it, rather than in the emperor. With Napoleon's re-organization of Europe, and the defeat of Prussia in 1806, there was no longer in any sense a unified German state. This contrasted markedly with both France, unified territorially in the 15th century, and Britain, in the 17th century. At the beginning of the 19th century "Germany" (i.e., the German-speaking people) was a multitude of political entities of varying size, and with divergent allegiances. For example, when the post-Napoleonic Germanic Confederation was established in 1815 it had 39 members, composed of numerous duchies, grand duchies, principalities, free cities, parts of five kingdoms, and part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thus, the form of German national consciousness was quite different from the consciousness of political nationhood that existed in France and Britain, and of necessity focussed on

58. Kahn, *op. cit.*, pg. 237.
59. *Ibid.*, pg. 238.

culture rather than on a territorially defined polity.[60] For the German-speaking people, the concept of the national was itself a question.

Thus, the German state in the 19th century has to be seen as a project in the making. The question of whether this was to include Austria or not was only resolved (in the negative) by the establishment of Prussian hegemony through its victories in wars engineered by Bismarck over Denmark in 1864, the German Confederation in 1866, and France in 1871.[61] Between 1815 and 1871 the project of unification was volatile, as a result of both internal and external factors. Internally, various German lands were affected by revolutionary movements in the 1830s and in 1848, as was the rest of Europe. The 1848 revolution led to an attempt at unification by a Constituent National Assembly, but conflict between liberals, democrats and conservatives was resolved in the favour of the latter. Nevertheless, the German Customs Union (*Zollverein*) led by Prussia was established in 1834, which provided for economic harmonization between a number of the German lands. This was united with the *Steuerverein* in central Germany between 1852-54, thus economically harmonizing what was to become the Second German Reich.

Externally, unification was complicated by the interests of the other major European powers, namely Britain, Russia, and France, who saw the establishment of a unified German state as a threat to the balance of power system that had been established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. France, in particular, was wary of the establishment of a state on the European continent of comparable strength to her own.

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60. Heide Barmeyer, "German National Thinking and the Building of a Modern National State in Germany in the 19th Century", in *Nations and Nationalities in Historical Perspective*, hrsg. von Gudmunder Halfdanarson und Ann Katherine Isaacs, Edizioni Plus, Pisa, 2001, pg. 44.
61. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital*, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-92.

The French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars had "destroyed ancient institutions, created new states, and challenged old assumptions".[62] Reinforced by the economic and social changes brought about by industrialization, this occasioned an acute historical consciousness that was reflected in the various scholarly activities aimed at preserving the past.

> Surely this widespread need to preserve and understand the past was connected with the feeling among people that they had entered an age in which, as Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, "the woof of time is ever being broken and the track of past generations lost."[63]

Many economists in Germany thus viewed their discipline in historical terms. Wilhelm Roscher, considered to be the founder of the Older Historical School, had been a student of Ranke, and had trained as a historian.

German economics in this period for the most part belongs to what Erik Reinert and Arno Daastøl have called the "Renaissance" or "Other Canon" of economics, which began to be systematized in the Renaissance with the recognition of humanity as creative and innovative.[64] In contrast to the contemporary canon of "classical/neo-classical mainstream theory", it is "dynamic and production-centered" rather than "mechanistic and barter-centered". Whereas the contemporary canon is a product of the Enlightenment and its "more materialistic understanding of human rationality and individuality", for Renaissance thinkers these aspects of human being were "based on an image of man as a spiritual being: creative and productive".[65] Creativity and productivity are taken to be the "fundamental cause of economic welfare", which when combined with capital give rise to economic growth and development. In contrast, the contemporary canon holds that capital accumulation alone

62. James J. Sheehan, "Foreword", *German Essays on History*, ed. R. Sältzer, Continuum, New York, 1991, pg. xi.
63. *Ibid.*
64. Reinert and Daastøl, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.
65. *Ibid.*, pg. 4.

is the cause of economic growth; economic development, however, remains mysterious, usually being attributed to technological innovation as a result of capital accumulation and exploitation of opportunities for gain.[66]

Unlike positivist economics, for which economic policy is a matter of politically bringing about conformity to economic "truths" for reasons of efficiency, historicist economics understands policy as essentially constructive, in the first place of economy, but ultimately of the state itself as holistic or as an organic unity.[67] Both policy and economy itself are to be understood in terms of this end.[68] The classical political economists observed institutions such as markets, banks, and organs of government; economic structures such as the differentiation between agriculture and industry; and the diverse economic roles of labourers, landholders, merchants and capitalists. They inferred from these that this system of economy was a spontaneous occurrence resulting from general laws of economic interaction, which would inevitably appear unless *prevented* by policy, and that this spontaneously occurring system was governed by its own order. Historicist economists, in contrast, observed the *absence* of such institutions, structures, and roles in the polities they inhabited, and inferred that these were human creations rather than spontaneous occurrences, which required policy to bring them into existence:

> Renaissance economics emphasises the crucial role of nation-states and the duties of 'the ruler'—i.e. government—not only to regulate in order to provide incentives for the creation of welfare (in the ancient tradition of law and economics), but also the duty of 'the ruler' to initiate projects creating a *demand* for knowledge-based production.

66. "Still today, a fundamental and unresolved problem of standard economic theory is to how deal with novelty" (*ibid.*, pg. 28).
67. See also Michael Hutter, "Organism as a metaphor in German economic thought", in P. Mirowski, ed., *Natural images in economic thought*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, ch. 11.
68. The central role given to economic policy is one of the factors responsible for the disappearance of historicist economics. Reinert and Daastøl argue that "the absence of the History of Economic Policy as a branch of Economics is responsible for bringing the alternative canon into virtual oblivion" (Reinert and Daastøl, *op. cit.*, pg. 4).

> An integral part of this nation-building strategy was a notion that a national market had to be **created**—that such a market did not appear spontaneously.[69]

The Historical Method

A standard criticism of the historicist economists, particularly of the German and English Historical Schools, is that they eschewed economic theory in favour of induction from empirical historical data.[70] This suggested to critics that the historical economists simply failed to recognize that collection of historical data itself presupposed theory. In the words of one critic,

> we ourselves consider that every economic historian, however stubborn be his convictions and genuine his intentions, does actually, though perhaps unconsciously, bring some guiding theory to the study and interpretation of facts, and that a careful inspection of works on economic history results generally, if not uniformly, in the discovery of the familiar outlines of the conceptions of traditional economic theory.[71]

Such critics failed to recognize that historicist economists neither advocated the collection of facts in order to make inductive generalizations, nor did they argue against theory *per se*, but rather against the idea that there was a *single* theory that could account for all economic phenomena throughout history. What they were interested in was *appropriate* theory. As Cunningham observes about the marginalists,

> it seems that recent English writers take a different view of the character of economic theory. They seem to believe that economic theory, as now restated, is useful as a means of investigation in any time or place, and that it can never be considered as inappropriate.[72]

Cunningham agreed that such a universal theory can be applied to all phenomena, "because it is universal *in form*; any matter can be fitted into it".[73] That is, any social interaction can be approached as if it were an exchange transaction, and by the use of

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69. Reinert and Daastøl, *op. cit.*, pg. 5.
70. Helge Peukert, "The Schmoller Renaissance", *History of Political Economy*, vol. 33, no. 1, 2001, pg. 71.
71. Quoted in William Cunningham, "Roscher's Influence in England", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 5, November 1894, pp. 327-328.
72. *Ibid.*, pg. 330.
73. *Ibid.*

some quantitative measurement, can be analysed in terms of utility-maximization.[74] However, this does not mean that such analysis is appropriate to the issue. Arguably, approaching many types of social interaction in this way construes them so as to eliminate the very meaning of the interaction involved.

> But it is a mistake to suppose on this account that it necessarily affords a suitable instrument for the investigation of any particular group of phenomena, and that it is sure to be *appropriate*.[75]

For historicist economists, what was significant was that positivist economic theory presupposed certain motivations for economic behaviour, such as self-interest, and a certain social structure of economic interaction, i.e., atomistic individualism. At best, they argued, this could hold true only for some modern forms of economy. In other historical eras

> the individual was not a very important organ of economic life; skill was cultivated, forethought was exhibited and enterprise was directed by *groups* and not by individuals.[76]

If historical investigation showed this to be the case, then individualistic economic theory was unlikely to be able to explain the economic behaviour of such periods. And economic theory that presupposed the structure of a market economy, i.e., where all economic interactions were exchange transactions mediated by the price mechanism, would be inappropriate where that structure did not exist.[77] Thus, the question of appropriate economic theory could not be analytically separated from the understanding of a society as a whole, which involves taking into account whatever information might be relevant:

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74. This approach is found in some of the work of Gary Becker, for example (Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pg. 311).
75. Cunningham, *op. cit.*, pg. 330.
76. *Ibid.*, pg. 332.
77. With regard to ancient societies, this argument is set out in Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry W. Pearson, eds., *Trade and market in the early empires; economies in history and theory*, Free Press, Glencoe, 1957.

> The historical school was deeply steeped in the German tradition of embracing *die Ganzheit*—the whole. This search for *die Ganzheit* forced the historical school to cross the boundaries into what in the English tradition were other—and to them unrelated—academic disciplines. In the German historical tradition it would be complete nonsense to exclude any information relevant to the question asked—be it from the realm of climatology, pedagogy or any other branch of human knowledge. In the German tradition economics was a science that integrated all the others.[78]

Therefore, historicist economists argued that economic behaviour can only be understood in relation to the society in which it occurs. And understanding a society requires knowledge of its history. Wilhelm Roscher adverts to the importance of the historical constitution of a nation:

> The nation is not merely the mass of individuals *now living*. He, therefore, who seeks to investigate the national economy, finds it impossible to satisfy himself with the observation of merely *contemporary* conditions.[79]

That is, historicist economics is neither Social Statics nor formal-deductive analysis of a theoretical economy. In order to understand an economy, we have to understand the significance of its institutions, types of behaviour, commodities produced, different kinds of labour involved, and so on. Because of this holistic, historical dimension, economic inquiry also had to be concerned with relationships *between* nations, both for methodological and substantive reasons.

> The difficulty of picking out the essential and normal (*das Gesetzmässige*) from the great mass of phenomena makes it obligatory upon us to compare with one another, from the economic point of view, *all* nations of which we can learn anything. Indeed, the nations of the modern world are so entwined with one another that no fundamental treatment of one is possible without a treatment of all.[80]

Thus, another fundamental conception was that nations are interconnected, such that these interconnections are constitutive of national economies. There are many forms of economy, so that what is essential cannot simply be deduced from axioms; rather, we learn about ourselves from others. Such historical understanding was especially

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78. Reinert and Daastøl, *op. cit.*, pg. 36.
79. Wilhelm Roscher, "Preface", *Outline of Lectures on Political Economy, following the Historical Method*, in W.J. Ashley, "Roscher's Programme of 1843", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 9, no. 1, October 1894, pg. 101, emphasis added.
80. *Ibid.*, pg. 102.

important with respect to the role of economy in the task of nation-building.

Historicist economics was therefore at odds with classical political economy and its marginalist successor in two senses. First, it rejected the idea that economic theory could be universal, on the grounds that economic conditions and behaviour were context-dependent. Second, it rejected the "globalization" that the economic theory of liberal capitalism entailed. In reducing economic behaviour to the interaction of atomistic individuals, classical political economy could make no clear distinction between national economies. As Hobsbawm puts it,

> Liberalism was the anarchism of the bourgeoisie and, as in revolutionary anarchism, it had no place for the state. Or rather, the state as a factor in the economy existed only as something which interfered with the autonomous and self-acting operations of 'the market'.[81]

Since according to historicist economics, the principles determined by economic inquiry are historically specific, whatever commonalities there might be between the conditions of different societies, such as the city-states of the Italian Renaissance and the German principalities of the 17th century, the principles of economy applicable depend on the particular characteristics of agriculture, education, industry, external politics, and so on. Once these are seen as integral to the development of productive forces through industrial policy, it becomes evident that such policy has to be contextual and specific for those conditions. Indeed, one of the aims of historicist economic inquiry was to determine how to transform the very conditions into which it inquires. This is clearly different from positivist economics, which seeks to describe the principles of political economy as self-contained or distinct, rather than involving transformation to any other form of economic system, even when these are recognized (as with Mill) to pertain only to one specific economic system (i.e., the system based on private property).

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81. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*, Abacus, London, 2001, pg. 40.

Canonical cases

To illustrate some of the main themes found in historicist economics, I briefly examine four thinkers from this "Other Canon", as articulated by Reinert and his colleagues. These themes are (i) the emphasis on the mutual implication of state and economy, (ii) knowledge and creativity as the motive force of social change, (iii) the ideal of the common weal or ethical state, and (iv) the hermeneutic aspects of the approach. A further theme, which becomes explicit in the texts from Roscher and Schmoller that I examine, is that the concept of the economic polity is one that is only ever partially specifiable. Unlike their positivist counterparts, the historicist economists recognized that the polity cannot be theorized in a determinate way, because it is dynamic. Thus, the historical method involves inquiry into different forms of economy that are historically available, in order to achieve an understanding of how state, economy and individual interact, and of the dynamic nature of the polity. Ultimately, as Roscher indicates, the point is not to prescribe practical rules (or, as in positivist economics, principles that determine economic behaviour), but to learn how to think practically, i.e., to think of the economic polity or ethical state *as* integrative and dynamic.

The Italian Renaissance: Antonio Serra

The 17th century Neapolitan, Antonio Serra (1580-1650), is an early advocate of the idea that economy depends on particular historical conditions.[82] In Serra's time, the Italian peninsula comprised a number of political entities, whose politics and

82. Serra's importance in this canon is due in part to his influence on List and Roscher. The *Breve trattato* has not, as yet, been translated into English. My analysis here draws on Sophus A. Reinert and Erik S. Reinert, "An Early National Innovation System: The Case of Antonio Serra's 1613 *Breve Trattato*", *Institutions and Economic Development*, vol. 1, no. 3, 2003. See also Theodore A. Sumberg, "Antonio Serra: A Neglected Herald of the Acquisitive System", *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 50, No. 3, July 1991, pp. 365-373.

commerce was subject to continuous interference by the powerful states of Europe. Nevertheless, the Venetian Republic managed to prosper because the monetary riches that accrued to Spain from its colonies in the Americas ended up in its hands.[83] Serra's *Breve trattato* of 1613 examines why this was so, and why Naples (then a Spanish Viceroyalty) was less prosperous. He argues that the accumulation of currency is a reflection of underlying economic conditions, not an independent cause of wealth. The question then is, what policies are necessary to produce wealth, which the inflow of currency would reflect?

According to Reinert and Reinert, "Serra clearly defines economics as an *Erfahrungswissenschaft*, a science based on experience rather than on a priori assumptions".[84] For this reason, he argued against the idea of a universal method, because the "subject changes across time and space".[85] In Serra's analysis, the economic condition of Naples had to be understood in terms of production, but he sees this as part of a greater whole, namely the socio-political entity. For this reason, governance is a central issue, "as a mediator between theory and practice, between the governing effort and the various levels of abstraction".[86] Governance was one factor that determined the wealth of the state, others being the level of manufacturing, the productivity of the population, and the extent of trade. Such factors, Serra argued, unlike particular factors such as the presence of resources, are common to all kingdoms and are all interconnected.[87] Nevertheless, he considered industry to be the most important, "on the grounds that it is only dependent on the labour of man".[88] He also

83. Reinert and Reinert, *op. cit.*, pg. 8.
84. *Ibid.*, pg. 13.
85. Antonio Serra, *Breve trattato*, pg. 135, quoted in Reinert and Reinert, *op. cit.*, pg. 15.
86. Reinert and Reinert, *op. cit.*, pg. 16.
87. *Ibid.*, pg. 17.
88. *Ibid.*, pg. 20.

argues that industry, unlike agriculture, exhibits increasing returns to scale and the possibility of diversification.[89] Through diversification into numerous trades, the wealth of the nation would be greatly increased by utilizing labour as fully as possible. Diversification in manufactures is, as Reinert and Reinert point out, "highly activity-specific" rather than simply involving production in general.[90] It therefore requires attention to the qualitative differentiation of labour, rather than to the quantitative equivalence of all labour.[91]

The analyses of classical political economy, in contrast, depend on such quantitative equivalence, because value is determined in exchange and what is ultimately exchanged is the labour involved in the production of the commodities exchanged. Labour itself is also conceived as an exchange transaction: "It was not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased."[92] A pure labour theory of value cannot differentiate between types of labour and the improvement in production that comes from innovation. As a result, "*knowledge* and *innovation* lose all meaning".[93]

The qualitative aspect of labour also comes to the fore in Serra's notion that manufacturing and trade mutually reinforce one another. The diversity of manufactures and the qualitative diversity of the labour involved in their production encourages people to come to the manufacturing centre, which increases the trade of the region.

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89. *Ibid.* Dependence on this abstraction has also made it extremely difficult for positivist economics to take increasing returns to scale into account, because it cannot be easily incorporated into the mathematical—i.e., quantitative—modelling that has come to dominate this approach. Cf. Paul Krugman, *Development, Geography and Economic Theory*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1995.
90. *Ibid.*, pg. 21.
91. Scott Meikle has argued that this is the meaning of Marx's analysis of "abstract labour" (Scott Meikle, "Was Marx an Economist?" at <www.psa.ac.uk/cps/1994.htm> on 14 May 2005).
92. Smith, WN I ii., pg. 133.
93. Reinert and Reinert, *op. cit.*, pg. 22.

Increased trade encourages further diversification in manufactures as well as other occupations involved in trade, thus bringing more people to the region. This is Serra's "second great innovation[] in the history of economic analysis—the idea of *cumulative causation*".[94] Another key element was the role of government, which through prudent policies could encourage the development and growth of manufacturing and trade. This, Serra argued, was how Venice had managed to become so wealthy, whereas Naples had not.

The significance of Serra's text, then, is the active and dynamic sense of economic and social development it presents. Properly directed diversification in manufacturing would result in increasing returns to scale, and cumulative or network effects, as it would attract foreign merchants, skilled labourers, etc., thereby increasing the productive capabilities of the state and so its revenue generation. To do this effectively, however, requires fostering innovation and knowledge, in order to determine which manufactures to diversify into and how to do so. As it is unlikely that such innovation and knowledge would just spontaneously appear, the state needs to play an active role. Furthermore, the determination of such advantages depends on knowledge of the specific historical conditions of the state, i.e., where its strengths and weaknesses are, in terms of its institutions (education, for example) and its relations to other states. State policies thus need to be informed by the historical context.

Cameralism: Von Seckendorff

The Cameralists were a group of academics and governmental advisors in 17th- and 18th-century Germany (and to some extent in Austria), whose interests and inquiries were about how best to obtain the revenues necessary to ensure the survival of

94. *Ibid.*, pg. 27.

the state. The state in question was the German principality, or more accurately, the principality in which the particular Cameralist worked, since their activities involved advising the prince. The Cameralists were skeptical of both the Physiocrats' insistence on the primacy of agriculture,[95] and (later) of the classical liberal economists' insistence that man's fundamental nature was to exchange.[96] "[T]he aim of all cameralist activity was directed towards Man(kind) and his needs",[97] and they recognized that the urban economic activity of manufacturing was central in providing for those needs.

Cameralist thinking arose after the Thirty Years War, in which a large number of people were killed (anywhere from 1/3 to 2/3 of the population of the German Empire) and the means of subsistence were largely destroyed.[98] The Peace of Westphalia (1648) resulted in the virtual dissolution of the German Empire into more than 300 sovereign statelets, which continued to suffer from economic and social disorder. The task of the princes was to rebuild their lands, but because large-scale armed conflict was a recurrent state of affairs in Europe until the beginning of the 19th century, these statelets were constantly under threat.

> To assure survival, these small states, each headed by an aristocrat, developed strong bureaucracies, run by officials trained in all aspects of statecraft.
>
> The object of this homegrown political science was to teach government officials "how to preserve and increase the general means" of the state.[99]

The task facing the Cameralist thinkers, then, was to determine the practical aspects of

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95. Erik S. Reinert, "Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717-1771): The Life and Times of an Economist Adventurer", The Other Canon Foundation as <www.theothercanon.org> on 10 April 2005, pg. 23.
96. Erik S. Reinert, "German Economics as Development Economics: From the Thirty Years War to World War II", *How Rich nations got Rich*, Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, pg. 4.
97. Reinert, "Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi", *op. cit.*, pg. 29.
98. Reinert, "Brief Introduction", *op. cit.*, pp. 222-223.
99. Nicholas W. Balabkins, "The Past as Prologue: An Economist's Tentative Prognosis for the New Millennium", *European Journal of Law and Economics*, vol. 12, 2001, pg. 124. The quoted text is from Small, *op. cit.*

economic management and administration that would ensure the survival of the principality in the face of such conditions. Reinert argues that

> Cameralism can...not be properly understood outside this context of a simultaneous reconstruction of a civilized society and of what would today be called 'failed states', states where economic life and basic institutions had to be built, virtually from scratch.[100]

The first book in the Cameralist tradition, von Seckendorff's *The German Principality*, appeared in 1656. It addresses the issue of effective policies for developing the principality. Although the rulers of such principalities were seen as quasi-absolute,[101] this did not mean that they were free from obligation. Echoing the Italian Renaissance concept of the "common weal", the Cameralists' aim was to "convince the kings and rulers that their right to rule a state country also entails a duty to develop the same state".[102] The policy prescriptions von Seckendorff sets out include

> the promotion of manufactures and the resettlement of artisans from the countryside in the cities, where they were likely to make much better livings...the extension of agriculture and activities adding value to the produce of the land [and] eas[ing] the mobility of labour by eliminating fees required for settlement and resettlement.[103]

In order for policy to be effective, it had to address the existing conditions of the principality. Hence, the first requirement was an accurate description of those conditions. Thus, von Seckendorff outlines the characteristics that need to be determined, which include the history, geography, agricultural productivity, make-up of the population, and bureaucracy of the principality.[104]

The Older Historical School: Wilhelm Roscher's Historical Method

Wilhelm Roscher (1817-1894) is generally considered to be the founder of the historical school of economics in Germany.[105] In his programme for historical

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100. Reinert, "German Economics as Development Economics", *op. cit.*, pg. 5.
101. Small, *op. cit.*, pp.70-73.
102. Reinert, "German Economics as Development Economics", *op. cit.*, pg. 6.
103. *Ibid.*, pg. 5.
104. Small, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

economics, he argued that the question of how to further a nation's wealth, although important, was not the main purpose, for this is "only a chrematistic, an art", whereas "Political economy [*Staatswirthschaft*]...is also a political science, whose business it is to pass judgment on and rule over *men*".[106] It is a policy or administrative science, rather than a science of business. For this reason, he argues, its aim is

> the representation of what nations have thought, willed, and discovered in the economic field, what they have striven after and attained, why they have striven after and why they have attained it.[107]

Alongside institutional structures and forms of economic management, then, it is also important to understand causes and *reasons*. Such understanding can only be acquired through comprehensive knowledge of "national life", especially historical knowledge, because "[t]he nation is not merely the mass of individuals now living". Nations, Roscher argues, are not constituted by "merely contemporary conditions".[108] The idea that economic behaviour is mechanistic and therefore can be analysed as it is at any given instant simply fails to understand the object of the inquiry.

A further consideration is "[t]he difficulty of picking out the essential and normal from the great mass of phenomena".[109] However, investigation of other nations and other eras can provide some idea of what may be important. For this reason, "[t]he historical method will not be quick either to praise or blame any economic institution absolutely";[110] their benefits or drawbacks are always contextual. The ultimate aim of this science "is the doctrine of the laws of development of the national economy",[111] i.e., not how an economic system regulates itself, but how such systems come about.

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105. W.J. Ashley, "Roscher's Programme of 1843", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 9, no. 1, 1894, pg. 99.
106. *Ibid.*, pg. 101.
107. *Ibid.*
108. *Ibid.*
109. *Ibid.*, pg. 102.
110. *Ibid.*
111. *Ibid.*, pg. 104.

Roscher's View of Political Economy

In his *System der Volkswirtschaft*, Roscher compares the different systems of political economy, which he has previously defined as "the science which has to do with the laws of the development of the economy of a nation, or with its economic national life".[112] He begins by commenting on the obsolescence of the "theological method" of the middle ages and the "juridical method of the seventeenth century".[113] He then considers whether political economy is susceptible to "a mathematical mode of treatment" involving "only a formal principle", rather than "the matter of the science".[114] A mathematical mode of treatment could be regarded as appropriate, since political economy, like mathematics, "swarms with abstractions".[115] Given that economic interactions are mediated by prices, they involve magnitudes and their relations, and thus are subject to calculation.[116] However, the complexities of "national life" and the nature of what is inquired about make such a treatement impossible, for there are non-economic motivations for interactions as well (i.e., motivations that are not self-interest):

> For, most assuredly, as our science has to do with men, it must take them and treat them as they actually are, moved at once by very different and non-economic motives, belonging to an entirely definite people, stage, etc.[117]

Abstraction may be a useful and indeed necessary heuristic, but economics, for Roscher, is about human behaviour as it actually is, and thus must be concrete, even in

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112. Wilhelm Roscher, *Principles of Political Economy*, trans. J.J. Lalor, Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1878, pg. 87.
113. *Ibid.*, pg. 102.
114. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.
115. *Ibid.*, pg. 103.
116. A view that was expressed by marginalists such as Jevons. Cf. William Stanley Jevons, "Brief Account of a General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, London, XXIX, 1866, pg. 282, at <http:// www.economics.mcmaster.ca/ugcm/3ll3/jevons/mathem.txt> on 12 April 2005, and *The Theory of Political Economy*, *op. cit.*, pp. vii, xxi-xxxi, 7-12.
117. *Ibid.*, pg. 104.

its theory. Thus, "not only in the transition to practice, but even in finished theory, we must turn to the infinite variety of real life".[118] Furthermore, inquiry into "national or social life" must keep distinct two main questions, namely (i) What is? and (ii) What should be? The contrast between these questions illuminates the distinction between the "(realistic) hysiological or historical, and the idealistic methods".[119] Most political economists, however, conflate the two.

The Idealistic Method

Commenting on Mill's postulated harmonizing of deductive and inductive explanations, the first method which obtains principles, and the second method which confirms them, Roscher argues that what also has to be taken into account is that "[e]ven the deductive explanation of economic facts is based on observation, namely, on the self-observation of the person accounting for them".[120] There is always a need for interpretation or hermeneutic re-living, even in deducing principles; such re-living takes into account the context in which the economist deduces principles. This means that the provisional nature of every explanation must be recognized. The variety of theories about what is economically desirable can be seen as due to context, such that "ideal descriptions...depart very little from the real conditions of the public economy (of the state, law, etc.) surrounding their authors".[121]

However, different people, as a result of "the growth of generations...may require different institutions",[122] depending on how their wants change. This leads Roscher to suggest that there is a dynamic of "periods of repose and of crisis" in the

118. *Ibid.*, pg. 105.
119. *Ibid.*, pg. 106.
120. *Ibid.*, pg. 106 n. 11.
121. *Ibid.*, pg. 107.
122. *Ibid.*, pg. 108.

struggle between generations, whereby institutional change is resisted or enacted, as a conflict between "existing forms" and "the real substance of things".[123] This conflict can be effected either through reform or revolution, but the latter is "an enormous evil",[124] since it is injurious to morals and encourages "infringement of the law".[125] Roscher suggests that it is better to take "Time" as a model, "whose reforms are the surest and most irresistible, but, at the same time...so gradual that they cannot be seen or observed at any one moment".[126] Carrying out reform requires (i) a constitution that is open "both to the disappearing institutions of the past and to the coming institutions of the future"; and (ii) "moral control of themselves" by "all classes of people" so that only "legal ways" of change are used.[127] Only in this way, Roscher argues, can "two of the greatest and apparently most contradictory wants of every legal or moral person" be satisfied, namely, "the want of uninterrupted continuity and that of free development".[128]

The recognition that institutional change is generational acknowledges that laws and institutions are "made for the people", not *vice versa*, and therefore "[t]heir mutability is...by no means such an evil as mankind should endeavour to remove".[129] As long as the transformation is in accord with how people and their wants have changed, it is good and desirable. For this reason, Roscher argues that different economic systems can be equally right, given their different particular historical contexts, and "the only error would be, if they should claim to be universally applicable".[130] This explicitly historicist notion is implicitly directed against the

123. *Ibid.*
124. *Ibid.*
125. *Ibid.*, pg. 109.
126. *Ibid.*
127. *Ibid.*
128. *Ibid.*
129. *Ibid.*, pg. 110.

positivist notion of *progressive* development, in which capitalism is presented as superior to previous economic forms and thus bound to supersede them. The positivist identity of development with progress fails to take different historical contexts into account, which Roscher suggests is due to the exclusion of the concrete in favour of the abstract deduction of principles. The historical method requires comparative work, such that a typology of all the ideal systems can be determined, and also a sensitivity for the contemporary which is difficult to acquire.

The Historical Method

Roscher's historical method rejects the "construction of such ideal systems" that is characteristic of positivist economics, and asks for concrete empirical inquiry instead:

> Our aim is simply to describe man's economic nature and economic wants, to investigate the laws and the character of the institutions which are adapted to the satisfaction of these wants, and the greater or less amount of success by which they have been attended.[131]

Yet this approach is not relativistic, Roscher argues, since it recognizes that there are "natural laws of Political Economy".[132] Furthermore, the historical method also mitigates the alleged superiority of the present or of more advanced civilizations, because it explicitly recognizes development, although as specific rather than universal. Economic and institutional forms can be compared, but only when "based on a correct view of the peculiar course of development followed by the people in question".[133] Not only must it be recognized that different stages (immaturity, decline) are less perfect, but also that "it is a matter of the greatest difficulty, accurately to determine the culminating point of a people's civilization".[134] Roscher himself believes in continual

130. *Ibid.*
131. *Ibid.*, pg. 111.
132. *Ibid.*, pg. 113.
133. *Ibid.*, pg. 114.

progress, yet recognizes that there can be "pauses" and "retrogressions", and thus that progress is not simply linear, as the positivists suppose.[135] Finally, he indicates that the purpose of his text is not to prescribe practical rules, "but to train our readers to be practical",[136] i.e., "to put our readers in a way to discover such rules of direction for themselves".[137] The discovery of such rules, however, depends on understanding why certain economic institutions came to be, and also on the self-understanding of the person inquiring.

With Roscher, then, we find a very different conception of the role of economic inquiry. First of all, it has to be a concrete inquiry, rather than an abstraction that imputes motives to economic agents and proceeds to construct theories on this basis. Second, it is hermeneutic, since it always involves the self-understanding of the economist. Third, there is an inherent motive force in the struggle between generations, as wants change over time and institutions fall behind. Thus, Roscher also recognizes that the subject has to be open to both the past and the future, if there is to be development with continuity. All institutions and laws have to be recognized as being provisional, rather than absolute, which means that economics provides no basis for the comparative evaluation of different economic forms.

The Younger Historical School: Gustav von Schmoller

In the late 19th century, the marginalist revolution in Britain, France and Austria brought about an increasingly formal-deductive approach to economic theory. In Germany, however, Gustav von Schmoller (1858-1917) and the "Younger Historical School" retained the focus on historical studies. Under Schmoller's influence, German

134. *Ibid.*
135. *Ibid.*, pg. 115 n. 4.
136. *Ibid.*, pg. 115.
137. *Ibid.*, pg. 116.

economics became increasingly historicist.[138] Schmoller held a university chair in Berlin from 1882 until his death in 1917, and it was his influence that kept German economics much freer of the abstraction and formalism which characterized the neoclassical schools. Although he produced detailed historical studies of various aspects and areas in 17th- and 18th-century Germany, he did not manage to develop a coherent approach that harmonized such studies with his view of the ethical state. As Tribe describes it, "the Older School was programmatic but failed to realise their vision; while the Younger School executed the programme but lost the vision".[139] Nevertheless, this does not mean that Schmoller did not have a coherent research programme. Nau describes this as an attempt to synthesize idealist, positivist and historicist elements together as the basis for "an original economic doctrine" that

> must be seen in the context of a comprehensive social theory linking an idealist statism with an ethical evolutionism against the background of a historicist world view. Schmoller wanted to force the competing idealist, positivist and historicist streams of thought and their influences among his contemporaries into a developmental model that would harmonize the radical changes of his day.[140]

The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance

In his inquiry into the mercantile system, Schmoller argued that its fundamental importance was "the connection between economic life and the essential, controlling organs of social and political life",[141] i.e., how these were brought together

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138. Streissler argues that this constituted a "decided change of paradigm in German economics, a change from theoretical studies...towards implied social philosophy, social policy and mere historical fact-finding without theory" (*op. cit.*, pg. 312). He argues that prior to this the paradigm of German economics was "proto-neoclassical", anticipating much of what came to be attributed to the marginalists (Walras, Jevons and Menger). However, although some German economists, such as Rau and Hermann, were perhaps more inclined towards classical economics, Roscher, Knies and Hildebrand certainly advocated a historical approach.
139. Tribe, *Historical Schools*, *op. cit.*, pg. 9.
140. Heino Heinrich Nau, "Gustav Schmoller's *Historico-Ethical Political Economy*: ethics, politics and economics in the younger German Historical School, 1860-1917", *European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, vol. 7, no. 4, 2000, pg. 508.
141. Gustav Schmoller, *The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1910 [1884], pg. 2.

in a coherent way. In making this claim, he was contesting the views of positivist economists that the mercantile system was fundamentally characterized by the failure to distinguish wealth from money, and that mercantilists thus advocated trade restrictions in the mistaken belief that this would make the nation wealthy.[142] This evaluation of the mercantile system, Schmoller argued, like all judgments of a historical period, "necessarily involves a comparison of it with what preceded and what followed" and thus "our understanding of it as occupying a plan in some larger movement of economic evolution".[143]

Like the historicist historians, then, Schmoller rejected the notion that explaining the mercantile system in terms of how it gave rise to the industrial era is the appropriate way to *understand* this particular historical era. Instead, he argued, it has to be seen in terms of its relation to political life, because although the political organ "is not the only factor that enters into the explanation of economic evolution", it is the "fullest in meaning" and the most influential on "the various forms of economic organization".[144] In adverting to the political in this way, Schmoller suggests that this domain of life is more expressive of the characteristic of the era, certainly more so than social life if this is thought of simply in terms of the interaction of atomistic individuals. Thus, he explicitly rejects the account of mercantilism given by the positivist economists as "[t]he idea that economic life has ever been a process mainly dependent on individual action", which is "based on the impression that it is concerned merely with methods of satisfying individual needs".[145]

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142. See for example, Adam Smith WN IV; Jean-Baptiste Say, *A Treatise on Political Economy*, ed. C.C. Biddle, trans. C.R. Prinsep, Claxton, Remsen and Hafelfinger, Philadelphia, 1880 [1821], pp. 62-67; John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, *op. cit.*, Bk. I, Ch. I at <http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlP1.html> on 30 April 2005, PR.4-9.
143. Schmoller, *op. cit.*, pg. 1.
144. *Ibid.*, pg. 2.
145. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

Although not clearly articulated, there seem to be two main ideas underlying Schmoller's argument. First, he disagrees with the notion that state and economy are antagonistic, as found in political economy. Rather, he hearkens back to the Cameralist notion of their mutual implication, which, of course, was how it was understood in the mercantilist era, in Germany at least.[146] As so implicated, the state can perform an integrative function, not only for the polity as a whole, but also for the individuals it comprises. But this is a process in which economy, too, is active. Second, he seems to suggest that individuals do not constitute the economy in the way that positivist economics presupposes, but rather that they are situated in it. Peukert has argued that for Schmoller

> the great economic miracle was not the autonomous interplay of market forces but the cooperation of human beings in social institutions (which he calls *Organe*) with common values, languages, and so on.[147]

For these reasons, Schmoller concludes that mercantilism "in its innermost kernel...is nothing but state making...state making and national-economy making at the same time".[148] Thus, unlike the analyses of Smith, Say, and Mill, in which mercantilism tends to be identified with an erroneous doctrine about specie and trade, Schmoller argues that

> The essence of the system lies...in the total transformation of society and its organisation, as well as of the state and its institutions, in the replacing of a local and territorial economic policy by that of a national state.[149]

The Idea of Justice in Political Economy

Schmoller's text from 1881 articulates the idealist, ethical and hermeneutic aspects of his approach. His main concern is the just distribution of economic goods,

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146. Cf. Tribe, "Oeconomic History", *op. cit.*, pg. 589;
147. Helge Peukert, "The Schmoller Renaissance", *op. cit.*, pg. 91. Peukert also argues that Schmoller had a *Verstehen* or hermeneutic research method (pg. 89).
148. Schmoller, *op. cit.*, pg. 50.
149. *Ibid.*, pg. 51.

and he asks why it is that "economic transactions and social phenomena so often bring forth a favorable or adverse criticism which asserts that this is just, that unjust?"[150] The justice of distribution, he argues, is "the proportionality of two opposite quantities, one of human beings and one of goods which are to be distributed" and it is an "ideal conception". Judgments of justice in distribution are based on the "psychological processes" of "comparison, classifications and valuations", and the comparison of these with an ideal.

Judgment as to the just distribution of income, Schmoller argues, is the "only psychological basis from which all demands for the right of equality have arisen. It is the basis of all individualism." Part of the psychological process has to do with the notion of a "moral community"; this is the basis of judgments about equality. Furthermore, these processes are *social* rather than individual: "every disposition of mind, every word, every idea, every conception...is the result not of an individual, but of a social process". Such processes are constituted by convention, by traditions which are given form by "customs and existing law". Thus, "[e]verywhere it is in the main traditional standards which govern our judgment". Such traditional standards therefore provide the notion of equality.

However, "modern sentiments and ideals" can arise that conflict with traditional standards, and this conflict, Schmoller argues, is what gives rise to differences about judgments of equality. Because such conflicts are never-ending, "there is...no simple, universally intelligible, familiar and applicable formula of justice". Even when reduced to a formula, there is always the possibility of conflict over

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150. All quotations are from Gustav Schmoller, "The Idea of Justice in Political Economy" [1881], trans. E. Halle and C. Schutz, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 4, 1893-4 at <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/schmoller/justice> on 30 April 2005.

its applicability, scope, and so on. Ultimately, such conflicts are not decided by logic, but by the heart.

In relation to the question of the just distribution of economic goods, Schmoller argues that positivist economics "sees in the difference between rich and poor only an occurrence of nature". This is because it "sees only...mechanical causes which influence this or that distribution of incomes", such as "demand and supply, proportions, natural phenomena" and so on. This view is basically Darwinian. However, when different distributions of income are the result of "blind forces", they do not elicit judgments of justice but of resignation. Judgments of justice only arise when there are human forces involved.

> As far as human action governs and influences the distribution of incomes, so far this action will create the psychological processes whose final result is the judgment which finds the distribution just or unjust...

Human action applies to conditions of supply and demand, too:

> Demand and supply are summary terms for the magnitudes of opposing groups of human wills. The causes and conditions of these magnitudes are partly natural, mostly however, human relations and powers, human deliberations and actions.

In this way a distinction can arise between, for example, price and just price. In the case of labour, demand influences the market price, but moral valuation influences judgment as to whether that price is just or not.

Economists, however, are more concerned with the class distribution of income rather than the individual distribution. These are mainly the result of human economic institutions, centred on the "prevailing rights of property, inheritance and contract". As the result of human feelings, thought, action, customs and laws, then, institutional outcomes can be judged as to whether they are just or not. In economic acts, "our observations discern moral communities", i.e., the moral understanding that arises between transacting parties or members of a community who act with a common purpose. And with more interactions in such communities, particular with increasing

division of labour, the "relations of those concerned necessarily exchange a merely economic for a generally moral character", which gives rise to the conceptual relation of common production and moral community.

In common production, "labor is the most obvious standard", and when there are different kinds of labour, these will be compared qualitatively, not simply quantitatively. The most highly considered qualities are those "which serve the common objects". Here Schmoller argues against the socialist notion articulated in the Gotha platform of 1875, of "individual needs as a standard of distributing justice". Needs are self-serving, he argues, whereas labour "serves mankind". In this way the distinction between economic and moral value arises. Schmoller uses this idea to argue against the positivist economists' view that economic order can appear out of the interactions of self-interested individuals. Such order does not exist; rather, "it is striven for slowly and gradually". This is the role of custom and law, to moderate self-interest so as to bring about social order or harmony.

Ultimately, just distribution depends on "just economic institutions", which means that institutions have to be questioned and tested. "We do not acknowledge any one of these institutions to be above history, as having always existed or as necessity everlasting". The testing of institutions, however, can only be done against a background of what exists. Institutions cannot all be called into question at once. Like Roscher, Schmoller is a gradualist. Institutions have to be reformed slowly, he argues, because "[e]ven the most violent revolution can not replace the mental transformation of men which is the precondition of a juster law". A struggle that precedes a change in the conception of justice is unlikely to succeed.

The notion of eternal legal and economic institutions was a failing of "the older English economists", who believed that such institutions allowed for "increased

production or consumption" through which progress could occur. That is, for positivist economics, there can be technical and individual change, but the institutions are a given, whereas historical economics shows "that the great epochs of economic progress are primarily concerned with the reform of social institutions". This is where the state comes in, because it "is the centre and the heart in which all institutions empty and unite". Thus, contrary to the minimal state conception of political economy, Schmoller's conception of the moral community of common production entails an active and responsive state that both supports institutions and is capable of reforming them. In the domain of economics, Schmoller regards the argument for *laissez-faire* as essentially regressive, because it simply accepts institutions as they actually are, and thus ends up defending the status quo in the name of progress, by arguing that what now exists must be superior to all that has come before, simply because it results from the latter.[151] Such a view, Schmoller argues, devalues life:

> The value of our own life, of our own time, does not lie so much in what was attained before us, as in the amount of strength and moral energy with which we press forward in the path of progress. Great civilized nations, great epochs and great men...are those who on the field of economics succeed in securing and carrying through greater justice.

Perfect justice, of course, remains an ideal towards which we can only strive.

Schmoller's conception of economic inquiry, then, is oriented neither towards the explanation of how the actual economic system operates, nor to an explanation of how it has arisen. Rather, it intends to understand how economy coheres with ethical and political interaction, and thus how the whole might be transformed for the better. Understanding the historical context is therefore aimed at revealing the possibilities for achieving greater justice.

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151. A similar point regarding *laissez-faire* is made by Samuels, who argues that "[w]hen a policy of non-intervention is adopted it is tantamount both logically and substantively to giving effect to the status quo" (Warren Samuels, "Economics and Theology: The Fundamental Common Problem", in *Essays on the Methodology and Discourse of Economics*, Macmillan, London, 1992, pg. 292).

In fine

For historicist economists, an ordering economics is antithetical. First, creativity does not and cannot equilibriate, since it has the effect of transforming existing economic institutions and interactions. Appeals to equilibrium outcomes as optimal, such as with the spontaneous harmony of the market, fail to recognize this. Second, such appeals suppose that the various institutions, such as the law and the market, are simply given, rather than achieved. The naturalization of institutions found in positivist economics, particularly the market, involves a failure to recognize the ethical task of improving the common weal, which requires institutional reform and thus that the state be involved in the economy, not reduced to a night watchman. Third, because of the creativity involved in economic production, the possibility of an external, detached view of "the economy" as a self-contained, closed system disappears. Consequently, knowledge of economic activity cannot be reduced to the determination of causal laws of interaction. Rather than an ordering economics, then, this "other canon" is oriented towards an understanding or "appreciative" [*verstehende*] economics.

> The other canon...is fundamentally *holistic*, organic and synthetical...in its approach...The units of analysis includes both individuals and their institutions in time and space.[152]

Only in recognizing the economic as a dynamic, open totality can it become part of the *meaning* of social development, rather than simply a constraint on it. The aim of historicist economics was not to subsume the economy under the state, but rather to see them as complementary ways in which development is achieved. The naturalization of the economy in positivist economics immunizes it from any possible reform, and thus binds us to the past, rather than recognizing that in our interactions, we are always in

152. Reinert and Daastøl, *op. cit.*, pg. 6.

the process of changing the institutions that comprise and constitute us.

Positivist Economics

As has been discussed previously, positivist economics can be characterized in terms of its universalization of theory, its assumption of the universality of human nature, its attempt to discover the laws governing the system of economy, and its abstraction from history. These characteristics have both substantive and methodological import. What becomes particularly problematic is the relationship of the positivist economist to the system of economy she theorizes about. The subsumptive (or ordering) concepts of positivist economics objectify economic interaction in such a way as to make it questionable how the theory relates to the historical situation of the theorist. In this section, then, I look at some illustrations of this in positivist economics. Adam Smith's discussion of the "natural order" of economic progress exemplifies how theory comes to trump history. John Stuart Mill's analysis of the method of political economy shows how deductive theory becomes more important than the analysis of the particular case. In neoclassical economics, economic theory becomes decisively separated from history. Yet this formalism has itself given rise to a form of economic history—cliometrics—that tries to subordinate history to formal theory. The conceptual difficulties found in this endeavour illustrate some of the problematic aspects of positivist economics.

Adam Smith

If positivist economics can be said to originate with any one thinker, then it is with Adam Smith.[153] Yet Smith's economic inquiry is complex, because it involves both historical investigation and formal analysis. Although in many respects he draws

upon the work of the Physiocrats such as Quesnay and other French thinkers such as Turgot,[154] he was also one of the Scottish Historians, who engaged in philosophical or theoretical history, with the aim of giving an account of the stages of historical development and their relation to economic forces.[155] In the *Wealth of Nations*, Smith's analysis of the "natural progress of opulence" demonstrates the way in which positivist economics subordinates history to abstract theory.[156]

Smith's Formalism

Smith analyzed the system of economic interactions on the basis of two characteristics of human nature that he argued were universal, namely exchange and self-interest. First, "the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another" (WN I ii, pg. 117) gives rise to the division of labour, which allows for "[t]he greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour" (WN I i, pg. 109). The propensity to exchange and the division of labour combined with "self-love" (WN I i, pg. 119) or the "uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition" (WN II iii, pg. 443) accounts for increase in wealth and "the natural progress of things toward

153. "It is certain that the systematic character of Smith's formal economics is of great historical importance, not merely because of the extent of his coverage but also because he in fact provided the foundation of a great edifice, which has been extended rather than destroyed by those who followed" (Skinner, "Introduction" to WN I-III, *op. cit.*, pg. 13).
154. Smith was a friend of both. Cf. Skinner, "Introduction" to WN IV-V, *op. cit.*, pp. xvii, xxvii-xxix.
155. Cf. Skinner, "Introduction" to WN I-III, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-31. See also Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-111.
156. T.E. Cliffe Leslie argued that Smith, unusually, combines both deductive and inductive approaches, "hence it is that we have two systems of political economy claiming descent from him", namely the deductive system of Ricardo and the (predominantly) inductive system of Malthus and Mill. ("The Political Economy of Adam Smith", *Fortnightly Review*, November 1, 1870 at <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/leslie/leslie01.html> on 25 April 2005.). John Neville Keynes observed about Smith that "It has been said of him that he first raised political economy to the dignity of a deductive science. But he has also been regarded as the founder of the historical-method in political economy." Keynes explained this "apparent contradiction" by "Adam Smith's freedom from excess on the side either of *a priori* or of *a posteriori* reasoning. He rejected no method of enquiry that could in any way assist him in investigating the phenomena of wealth." (John Neville Keynes, *The Scope and Method of Political Economy*, 4 ed., Batoche Books, Kitchener, 1999 [1917], pg. 11. The first edition was published in 1891.)

improvement" (WN II iii, pg. 443). From these fundamental and unchanging aspects of human nature, Smith derived his formal analysis of the system of economy as one that harmonizes, without intention, the self-interested behaviour of individuals. In this system, the accumulation of capital is what drives economic development forward. However, given the different propensities and risks associated with the main activities of production, i.e., agriculture, manufacturing and foreign trade, Smith argued that there was a "natural" order to productive investment and hence economic development.

However, Smith's formal analysis was at odds with the evidence of history, which showed quite the opposite sequence.

Productivity and accumulation

Smith's argument about the natural order of progress is related to his view that the prosperity of a nation is determined mainly by "the skill, dexterity, and judgement with which its labor is generally applied" (WN I 104).[157] This determines how well supplied a nation is with "all the necessaries and conveniences for which it has occasion", which is proportional to the ratio of productive labour to "the number of those who are to consume it". This latter ratio is "regulated by *two* different circumstances" (WN I 104, emphasis added):

> first, by the skill, dexterity, and judgement with which its labour is generally applied; and, secondly, by the proportion between the number of those who are employed in useful labour, and that of those who are not so employed. (WN I 104)[158]

Given this, productivity can only be increased in two ways, he argues: "by increasing either the number of productive labourers, or the productive powers of those labourers who had before been employed" (WN II 443). The first way involves an

157. The World Bank often cites Smith to this effect, e.g., *World Development Report 1980*, pg. 1 (hereafter WDR followed by year and page number). However, Smith's argument is somewhat more complicated than the Bank tends to recognize.

increase in the total number of labourers, and thus requires additional maintenance from the national product. The second way requires either

> some addition and improvement to those machines and instruments which facilitate and abridge labour, or of a more proper division and distribution of employment. In either case an additional capital is almost always required. (WN II 443)

That is, in order to increase productivity, there must be additional capital. This leads Smith to conclude that if a comparison of "the state of a nation at two different periods" shows that "the annual produce of its land and labour is evidently greater at the latter than at the former", this indicates that "its capital must have increased during the interval between those two periods" (WN II 443). Hence the need for capital accumulation.

The natural order of progress

In WN III, "On the Different Progress of Opulence in Different Nations", Smith begins by addressing the "natural progress" of opulence. In every civilized society, he argues, the "great commerce" is between "the inhabitants of the town and those of the country" (WN III 479), or as we would now say, between the (rural) agricultural and (urban) industrial sectors. The influence of the Physiocrats is perhaps evident here, in the argument that "[t]he town...may very properly be said to gain its whole wealth and subsistence from the country" (WN III 479). Whereas agriculture produces subsistence for both sectors, manufacturing produces it for neither. Yet this

158. "Useful labour" is explained in Bk. II ch. iii by the distinction between "productive" and "unproductive labour". The former "adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed", whereas the latter "has no such effect" (WN II 409). In the latter category Smith includes the labour of "menial servants", the sovereign and "all the officers both of justice and war who serve under him" (WN II 410), and that of "churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of letters of all kinds; players buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-dancers, etc." (WN II 411). This does not mean that such labour does not have "a certain value". However, it "produces nothing which could afterwards purchase or procure an equal quantity of labour" (WN II 411).

does not mean that the "gain of the town is the loss of the country" (WN III 479), for the division of labour leads to gains from sectoral trade:

> The inhabitants of the country purchase of the town a greater quantity of manufactured goods, with the produce of a much smaller quantity of their own labour, than they must have employed had they attempted to prepare them themselves. The town affords a market for the surplus of the country, or what is over and above the maintenance of the cultivators, and it is there that the inhabitants of the country exchange it for something else which is in demand among them. (WN III 479).

Thus, the synergy between town and country allows for increased production in both, since the market for both products is wider, and so specialization in production is possible. The benefit that the town confers on agricultural production is evident, Smith argues, in the comparison of

> the cultivation of the lands in the neighbourhood of any considerable town with that of those which lie at some distance from it...you will easily satisfy yourself how much the country is benefited by the commerce of the town. (WN III 480)

One reason for this, of course, is the cost of transport that has to be borne by more distant agricultural producers.

Because "subsistence is...prior to conveniency and luxury" (WN III 480), in the *natural* course of things

> The cultivation and improvement of the country, therefore, which affords subsistence, must, necessarily, be prior to the increase of the town, which furnishes only the means of conveniency and luxury. It is the surplus produce of the country only...that constitutes the subsistence of the town, which can therefore increase only with the increase of this surplus produce. (WN III 480).

What gives rise to the difference in "opulence" between different ages and different nations, however, is the degree of trade that the town has with *foreign* agricultural producers. In this respect, the "human institution" of trade goes against "the natural inclinations of man", which is that

> Upon equal, or nearly equal profits, most men will choose to employ their capitals rather in the improvement and cultivation of land than either in manufactures or in foreign trade. (WN III 480-81)

Smith argues that this is only natural because of the risks involved in the latter activities. "The capital of the landlord...which is fixed in the improvement of his land,

seems to be as well secured as the nature of human affairs can admit of" (WN III 481). Nevertheless, improvement in cultivation does require "the assistance of some artificers" (WN III 481). Thus, concentration on improvements in agriculture, in the natural course of affairs, is what drives economic growth and progress:

> Had human institutions...never disturbed the natural course of things, the progressive wealth and increase of the towns would, in every political society, be consequential, and in proportion to the improvement and cultivation of the territory or country. (WN III 482)

Smith finds evidence for this claim in the North American colonies, in which "uncultivated land is still to be had upon easy terms" and thus "no manufactures for distant sale have ever yet been established in any of their towns" (WN III 482).[159] For the North American colonies,

> Land is still so cheap, and, consequently, labour so dear among them, that they can import from the mother country almost all the more refined or more advanced manufactures cheaper than they could make them for themselves. (WNII 164)

This seems to contradict his analysis regarding both the beneficial effects of the proximity of agricultural production to the town and the aversion to the risk of foreign trade. Manufactures are preferred as "employment for capital...upon equal or nearly equal profits...to foreign commerce" (WN III 482). Given these considerations, Smith argues that

> According to the natural course of things...the greater part of the capital of every growing society is, first, directed to agriculture, afterwards to manufactures, and last of all to foreign commerce. This order of things is so very natural that in every society that had any territory it has always, I believe, been in some degree observed. (WN III 483)

The "unnatural" order of progress

This, then, is the natural course of economic development. Yet Smith recognizes that "in all the modern states of Europe" this order has "been, in many respects, entirely inverted" (WN III 483), such that foreign commerce has been

159. Of course, this was the result not simply of the "natural course of things" but of a deliberate trade policy Britain imposed on its colonies, as Smith recognizes in WN IV ch. vii.

responsible for the introduction of "finer manufactures" and "manufactures and foreign commerce together have given birth to the principal improvements of agriculture" (WN III 483). Smith attributes this inversion of the natural order to the "manners and customs" introduced by the "nature of their original government" (WN III 483-84), particularly the engrossment of agricultural land into huge estates, and the laws of primogeniture preventing their division. This had two consequences, Smith argues. First, there was little incentive for agricultural improvement. Second, the towns and cities were in effect shut out from trade with the agricultural sector. Therefore, those that could sought to obtain their subsistence by means of foreign, instead of domestic, trade, which also involved importing refined foreign manufactures, which could then be traded to the great landholders in return for their raw produce. In this way, Smith argues, the opulence of the cities arose through trade. The change in tastes that followed from the introduction of such refined manufactures then gave rise to domestic demand sufficient to support domestic manufactures of the same kind.

The development of the towns also helped improve the estates: (i) by providing "a great and ready market for the rude produce of the country" (WNI 507); (ii) by merchants using their wealth to purchase land that was then improved because a "merchant is accustomed to employ his money chiefly in profitable projects" (WNI 507); (iii) through the *doux commerce* effect, in which

> commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their superiors. (WNI 508)

In this way, then, the natural order of agricultural, manufacturing, and foreign commerce improvement was reversed through the "civilizing" effect of the cities and towns, in the context of the legacy of policies towards landholding and personal liberty.

Because the labour involved in manufactures is capable of greater specialisation than that of agriculture, however, it is capable of greater increases in productivity. Furthermore, Smith argues, "the revenue of a trading and manufacturing country must, other things being equal, always be greater than that of one without trade or manufactures" (WNII 263). This is because of the favourable terms of trade of manufactured goods compared with agricultural produce, which allows such a country to overcome its natural constraints (cf. WN II 263-264). Thus, according to Smith's own analysis, concentrating on agriculture at the expense of manufactures *decreases* the potential wealth of a nation, rather than increasing it. A final point is that productivity increases in agriculture are more limited than those in manufacturing, because there can be a greater division of labour in the latter:

> The most opulent nations...generally excel all their neighbours in agriculture as well as in manufactures; but they are commonly more distinguished by their superiority in the latter than in the former...In agriculture, the labour of the rich country is not always much more productive than that of the poor; or, at least, it is never so much more productive as it commonly is in manufactures. (WNI 111-12)

The implication of all these points, then, is that despite the supposed "natural order of things", in modern times economic development and growth lies predominantly in the manufacturing sector and *not* the agricultural. Thus, according to these aspects of Smith's analysis, the key to increased national prosperity should lie in the development of a *domestic* manufacturing sector. Yet in Bk. II ch. v, this is denied, based upon the "greater quantity of productive labour" that "capital puts into motion" in agriculture (WN II 462), and because of the contribution of "labouring cattle" and the free contribution of nature herself, by which

> it adds a much greater value to the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, to the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. Of all the ways in which a capital can be employed, it is by far the most advantageous to the society. (WN II 463)

That is, whereas in trade and manufacturing, some portion of the product goes to

replace the capital used up in the activity, in agriculture, because there is no return to livestock or to nature, the product is proportionally greater. Therefore, Smith argues that in cases where a country has insufficient capital to engage in agriculture, manufacturing, and trade, it should concentrate on agriculture first, then manufacturing, and finally "trade of exportation" which "has the least effect of any of the three" (WN II 465).[160] In this way, the greatest amount of productive labour can be put into motion, and the greatest value added to the wealth of society.

One of Smith's reasons for drawing this conclusion was that

> The course of human prosperity...seems scarce ever to have been of so long continuance as to enable any great country to acquire capital sufficient for all those three purposes. (WNI 467)

Given this situation, he argues, the attempt to engage in all three activities (or in the first two with even less capital) would simply divert capital away from the most productive activity, to activities that were less productive, and thereby "obstruct instead of promoting the progress of [the] country towards real wealth and greatness" (WNI 466). Given these considerations, it then makes sense why Smith (for the most part) argues against restrictions on trade. If trade is the least profitable activity to engage in, then it would be highly beneficial for a poorer country to have access to the trading services of richer countries. But there seems to be a contradiction in Smith's analysis when it comes to manufacturing, since the terms of trade between raw agricultural produce and manufactured goods is highly favourable to the latter (according to Smith himself). If a country specializes in agriculture entirely, far more of its domestic product will have to be traded for the manufactures desired than would be needed to support the same amount of domestic production.[161] Smith's conclusion, however, is that a poor country *should* specialize in agriculture, which it can then export in exchange for imports of

160. An argument often used by the World Bank.
161. As the mercantilists knew full well.

foreign manufactures carried by foreign shipping and handled by foreign merchants. In this way, Smith argues for a return to the "natural order of things", as opposed to the "inverted order" that he observed actually prevailed.[162]

The question of method

The fundamental orientation of positivist economics is towards explaining economic behaviour as a system of interactions governed by general laws, with which economic policy should harmonize. For example, in the late 19th century Carl Menger argued that

> Economic theory is related to the practical activities of economizing men [*wirtschaftender Mensch*] in much the same way that chemistry is related to the operations of the practical chemist.

Just as the free will of the practical chemist cannot affect the laws of chemistry,

> freedom of the human will...can never have force as a denial of the conformity to definite laws of phenomena that condition the outcome of the economic activity of men and are entirely independent of the human will.[163]

The task of the economist, according to Menger, is to discover "a scientific foundation for economic affairs"[164] through the observation of economic objects and the attempt "to discover their *causal connections* and the laws to which they are subject".[165] The

162. Cf. Robert A. Blecker, "The 'Unnatural and Retrograde Order': Adam Smith's Theories of Trade and Development Reconsidered", *Economica*, vol. 64, no. 255, 1997, pp. 527-537. This contradiction was one of the focusses of Friedrich List, who argued that Smith's analysis rested upon the "cosmopolitical idea", rather than on the idea of a world of nation states. List argues that the cosmopolitical idea is first found in Quesnay, who "was the first who extended his investigations to the whole human race, without taking into consideration the idea of the nation" (Friedrich List, *The National System of Political Economy*, trans. S.S. Lloyd, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1909 [1844], pg. 97). Political economy referred to "that science which limits its teaching to the inquiry how a given nation can obtain (under the existing conditions of the world) prosperity, civilisation, and power, by means of agriculture, industry, and commerce" (*ibid.*). Quesnay, List argues, "undoubtedly speaks of cosmopolitical economy, i.e. of that science which teaches how the entire human race may attain prosperity" (*ibid.*). And Smith, too, he argues, "treats his doctrine in a similarly extended sense, by making it his task to indicate the cosmopolitical idea of the absolute freedom of the commerce of the whole world... Adam Smith concerned himself as little as Quesnay did with true political economy, i.e. that policy which each separate nation had to obey in order to make progress in its economical conditions" (*ibid.*, pp. 97-98).
163. Carl Menger, *Principles of Economics*, trans. J. Dingwall and B.F. Hoselitz, Ludwig von Mises Institute, electronic online edition, 2004 [1871], pg. 48.
164. *Ibid.*, pg. 45.

fundamental elements are determined by abstraction from the complexities of actual economic behaviour, such that the system of interactions can be deductively established.

Mill and the method of political economy

John Stuart Mill's inquiry into the method of political economy contributed significantly to its codification. In *Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy*, Mill argues that

> Like other sciences, Political Economy has remained destitute of a definition framed on strictly logical principles, or even of, what is more easily to be had, a definition exactly co-extensive with the thing defined.[166]

The definition of a science "almost invariably" follows "the creation of the science itself" (V.2), and is "the result of the last stage of generalization...to which the particular truths of the science can be subjected" (V.4). The problem with the current definitions of political economy, he argues, is that they do not strictly separate science and art, i.e., the "collection of *truths*" from the "body of *rules*, or directions for conduct" (V.8). This is evident in the view that political economy is concerned with how a nation can increase its wealth, which Mill notes is suggested by the title of Smith's work (V.7, V.9). A science, however, has to be concerned with the laws governing phenomena.

Therefore, Mill argues that the science of political economy is concerned with "[t]he laws of the production of objects which constitute wealth", insofar as these concern "laws of the human mind" rather than those which concern purely physical phenomena (V.28). However, the phenomena that political economy is concerned with do not include consumption, but only production and distribution, of those objects.

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165. *Ibid.*, pg. 56.
166. John Stuart Mill, *Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy*, 2nd ed., Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer Co., London, 1874 [1844], par. V.5, at <www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlUQP5.html> on 12 August 2005. Subsequent references are indicated by paragraph number.

Consumption, Mill argues, is not a proper object for political economy, because "[w]e know not of any *laws* of the *consumption* of wealth as the subject of a distinct science: they can be no other than the laws of human enjoyment". Political economy only treats of consumption as it relates to production and distribution, and not as an independent aspect (V.29 n.8). Thus, political economy concerns a branch of the science concerned with the "*laws* of society, or the laws of human nature in the social state" (V.35), the branch concerned with the individual "solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end...Political economy considers mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and consuming wealth" (V.38).

The method of inquiry in Political Economy is "a mixed method of induction and ratiocination", which Mill calls "the method *à priori*", which is distinguished from direct induction or "the method *à posteriori*" because it involves "reasoning from an assumed hypothesis" (V.45). Whereas direct induction is the approach of practical men, the mixed method is that of theorists, who

> aim at embracing a wider field of experience, and, having argued upwards from particular facts to a general principle including a much wider range than that of the question under discussion, then argue *downwards* from that general principle to a variety of specific conclusions. (V.43)

Moreover, Mill argues, verification or confirmation of the hypothesis or general principle "is no part of the business of science at all, but of the *application* of science". The general reasoning of science does not involve the examination "whether the facts of any actual case are in accordance with it" (V.45). Political economy is

> essentially an *abstract* science...The conclusions of Political Economy...are only true...*in the abstract*; that is, they are only true under certain suppositions, in which none but general causes—causes common to the *whole class* of cases under consideration—are taken into account. (V.46)

Political economy can only use the method *à priori*, because it is not experimental. The observations on which it is based are "the limited number of experiments which take

place...of their own accord, without any preparation or management of ours". Such "experiments" are furthermore "of great complexity" such that we can never perfectly know their circumstances (V.51). Nor can we find a "crucial experiment", in Bacon's sense, by which to isolate specific circumstances so as to determine their effects, since the number of different factors involved mitigates finding a sufficient degree of similarity. For example, in the "experiments" that occur of their own accord in political economy, i.e., the existing conditions of different nations, there are too many differences between their circumstances to allow for the attribution to one specific difference (e.g., commercial policy) the difference in observed effects (V.54).

Although direct induction is not possible, political economy can arrive at truths about the laws governing the social production and distribution of wealth, because we can observe the *causes* on which these depend, which are "laws of human nature, and external circumstances capable of exciting the human will to action". Such knowledge

> every one can principally collect within himself; with reasonable consideration of the differences, of which experience discloses to him the existence, between himself and other people. (V.56)

Such causes can be abstracted from so as to deduce "abstract truth". The abstract truth that political economy establishes can then be applied to particular cases by taking into account circumstances specific to the case that act as "disturbing causes". But since our knowledge of such causes is always imperfect, the abstract science cannot be relied on to predict what will occur in specific cases (V.63-64, V.72).

In his later *Principles of Political Economy*, Mill argued that "Writers on Political Economy profess to teach, or to investigate, the nature of Wealth, and the laws of its production and distribution".[167] Wealth refers to

> all useful or agreeable things which possess exchangeable value; or, in other words, all useful or agreeable things except those which can be obtained, in the quantity desired, without labour or sacrifice.[168]

The production of wealth "has its necessary conditions", which comprise both physical conditions and those that pertain to human nature. Only the latter are of concern to political economy.[169] Unlike his predecessors, however, Mill argued that the laws of *distribution* "are partly of human institution: since the manner in which wealth is distributed in any given society, depends on the statutes or usages therein obtaining".[170] In making this distinction, Mill allowed for greater government involvement in economic matters than is found in his predecessors. Nevertheless, even though government can determine the institutions of distribution, "they cannot arbitrarily determine how those institutions shall work", which depends on "conditions" that "are as much a subject for scientific enquiry as any of the physical laws of nature".[171] The task of political economy is to investigate the laws of production and distribution "and some of the practical consequences deducible from them".[172]

John Neville Keynes advocated a similar view of the method of political economy. Pointing out that "[e]xperiment is...a resource from which the economist is debarred", he concluded that

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167. John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, *op. cit.*, at <http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlP0.html> on 30 April 2005, PR.2.
168. *Ibid.*, PR.14.
169. *Ibid.*, PR. 30.
170. *Ibid.*, PR. 31.
171. *Ibid.*
172. *Ibid.*, PR. 32.

> we ought not to take as our starting point the analysis of concrete industrial facts. The right method of procedure is, on the contrary, deductive, or, as Mill puts it, *a priori*.[173]

The inductive method, he argued, "is inadequate to yield more than empirical generalizations of uncertain validity",[174] and thus could not be the basis for economics as a science. The deductive method, in turn, was possible because its premises were "limited in number" and were based on "a few simple and indisputable facts of human nature—as for example, that in their economic dealings men are influenced by the desire for wealth".[175] Only this motive was important for a *science* of economic behaviour, even though "other motives...do operate on various occasions in determining men's economic activities", because the influence of the latter is "irregular, uncertain, and capricious".[176]

For positivist economics, then, the determinants of economic behaviour are held to be independent of the economic conditions in which they are observed. The scientific approach to economic behaviour depended on a view of society constituted by atomistic individuals, whose interactions are mechanistic and governed by laws that could be determined by observation alone.

State and Market

Once economic behaviour was conceptualized as a self-regulating system of interaction of atomistic individuals, the relation between state and economic behaviour came to be seen as antagonistic. Positivist economics has generally argued that the state's role in economic activity should be restricted as much as possible to providing the minimal conditions necessary for economic interaction to occur. The state is thus

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173. J.N. Keynes, *op. cit.*, pg. 13.
174. *Ibid.*
175. *Ibid.*
176. *Ibid.*, pg. 14.

charged to restrain itself from interference in the economy, on the grounds of efficiency.[177] For example, Smith argued that

> No regulation of commerce can increase the quantity of industry in any society beyond what its capital can maintain. It can only divert a part of it into a direction into which it might not otherwise have gone; and it is by no means certain that this artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the society than that into which it would have gone of its own accord. (WN IV ii, pg. 30)

Once state and economy (or civil society) had been analytically separated, a further distinction between society and the *market* was seen as necessary, for two reasons. First, the construction of economics as a *scientific* inquiry entails the exclusion of social activities not productive of objects or services entering into exchange transactions, even though such activities might be economic in the broader sense (e.g., housework), because if they were not produced for and exchanged on the market, then they did not enter into the production of wealth. Second, social institutions and practices that had economic aspects but were seen to conflict with the functioning of the economic system, such as welfare provisions, traditional land-use rights, and artisans organisations, needed to be reconceptualized *as* market activities in order to show their inefficiency. This required separating them from their social context and meaning.[178] In this way, the social and the economic (in the form of the market) were made analytically distinct.[179]

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177. Establishing this is one of the central aims of *The Wealth of Nations*, although Smith's view on the role of the state goes beyond the minimal state conception. Cf. Skinner, "Introduction" to WN I-III, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-82, and WN V. So too does Mill's, as discussed previously.
178. The conceptual distinction between society and market has a long history, although outside of the contemporary canon, this distinction has usually been made to severely circumscribe the market, or to critique it. In the *Politics*, Aristotle distinguishes between economics as the art of estate management and chrematistics as the art of getting wealth, and considers the latter to be an improper activity because of its social consequences. In a number of his writings, Marx analyses the transformation of human activity into abstract labour as a commodity . Karl Polanyi examines how 19th-century classical liberal economics constructed labour, land and money as elements in the market system and how this conception of the market economy was realised in policy, in *The Great Transformation*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1957.

Although societies were recognized as historically specific, the market was conceptualized as a context-independent, universal institution. In 19th-century Britain this conception led the classical liberal economists to advocate "disembedding" the market from society, and ordering society to conform with market imperatives. As Polanyi argued,

> the control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming consequence to the whole organization of society: it means no less than the running of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system.[180]

When economy comes to be understood solely on an individualistic, atomistic market pattern, there is a strong tendency towards policies that both construe and construct society in accordance with this pattern. That is, the primacy accorded to the market economy leads to advocacy of the market *society*, because only in such a society can the market function properly (i.e., efficiently). Eighteenth-century social institutions and practices such as the putting-out system of manufacturing, smallholding, and subsistence farming came to be seen as atavistic hindrances to the flourishing of the economy.[181]

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179. The recent appearance of the concept of 'social capital' in economics could be seen as yet another subsumption of social relations by market relations, as with the earlier concept of 'human capital'. These concepts are ambiguous, since they are used to refer either to attributes of individuals or to attributes of societies or nations, although it is not clear how social capital *can* be an attribute of individuals. Cf. Ben Fine, "The developmental state is dead—long live social capital?", *Development and Change*, 1999, vol. 30 no. 1, pp. 1-19; and Michael Cowen, "Trust in Development", *IDS Working Paper 10/98*, at <http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/kmi/Julkais/WPt/1998/WP1198.HTM> on 10 May 2005.
180. Karl Polanyi, *op. cit.*, pg. 57. Levine argues that the notion of "disembedding" is somewhat "problematic since it assumes that the economy has always been present" (David P. Levine, "Political Economy and the Idea of Development", *Review of Political Economy*, vol. 13, no. 4, 2001, pg. 524). As has been suggested above, this assumption is debatable. Thus, just as Polanyi objected to the idea of the market as the universal form of the economy, Levine adverts to the objection that Polanyi posits (the) economy as a universal form of work and subsistence. Arguably, *pace* Marshall Sahlins, the Bushmen have *no* economy, "stone age" or otherwise.
181. In the late 20th century, through the concerted efforts of neoliberals to roll back the welfare state, this conception again became influential in policy-making, as is particularly evident in the prescriptions of the Bretton Woods institutions to their low- and middle-income "clients". This set of policy prescriptions has come to be known, somewhat inaccurately, as the "Washington Consensus".

The positivist conception of the laws of economic behaviour as universal and context-independent entailed that the scope of government involvement in economic affairs be severely restricted. Since these laws are immutable, no intervention by government can counteract their operation. "Sovereigns, as well as their subjects, must bow to their authority, and never can violate them with impunity."[182] Only if the market were free to function in conformity with those laws could economic growth be assured. Government or state intervention in the economic behavior of individuals, based on the erroneous assumption that the state could know better than each person what her true interests are, only creates distortions. That is, although state intervention might result in the same level of wealth production as the market, it could not exceed this level, and was much more likely to reduce national wealth (as well as enriching certain interest groups). Because the market was seen to co-ordinate the interests of each individual as he himself determines them, it was held to be far less likely to lead to such distortions. As J.B. Say argued, "every government which interferes, every system calculated to influence production, can only do mischief".[183]

Neoclassical economics

Marginalism and the Theory of Value

Classical economics took as its domain of inquiry the economic behaviour of individuals in a society where production and distribution came about through exchange. Yet at the heart of classical economics is a theory of value that does not depend on exchange, i.e., the labour theory of value, which holds that the natural price of a good is determined by the labour costs of its production. The relative prices of different goods were therefore explained by the different amounts of labour required to

182. Say, *op. cit.*, pg. 13.
183. *Ibid.*, pg. 45.

produce them. Scarcity was not a theoretically important issue, because goods can always be produced. The labour theory of value was refined by David Ricardo, and was also a central component of Marx's analysis of capitalism.[184]

Not all economists agreed with the Ricardian school, but not until the "marginalist revolution" of 1871-74, through the independent theoretical innovations of Jevons, Walras and Menger, was the labour theory of value replaced with a strictly market-based theory of value.

> The essence of [the] Marginalist Revolution, then, was the novel idea that the "natural value" of a good is determined *only* by its *subjective scarcity*, i.e., the degree to which people's desire for that good exceeds its availability.[185]

As Menger put it,

> Value is...nothing inherent in goods, no property of them, nor an independent thing existing by itself. It is a judgment economizing men make about the importance of the goods at their disposal for the maintenance of their lives and well-being. Hence value does not exist outside the consciousness of men.[186]

If the values of goods do not depend on the cost of their production (i.e., labour) but rather on demand for them, then their relative values (i.e., their price) are determined solely by demand, which depends on their relative scarcity as *subjectively* perceived (i.e., in terms of the desire for them). This subjective value is a result of the satisfaction of needs obtained from the consumption of a good. Furthermore, the marginalists argued, the value of a good or a service is dependent not on the satisfaction obtained from the total quantity demanded or available, but rather on the satisfaction that each additional unit provides. Menger illustrates this with reference to the consumption of food:

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184. Cf. David Ricardo, *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 2001 [1817 (3rd ed. 1821)], ch. 1; Karl Marx, *Capital Vol. I*, ed. F. Engels, trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1887 at <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/index.htm> on 11 April 2004. For a critique of the labour theory of value, see Steve Keen, *Debunking Economics*, Pluto Press, Annandale, 2002, ch. 13.
185. "The Marginalist Revolution of 1871-74" at <http://homepage.newschool.edu/het/essays/margrev/ncintro.htm> on 14 March 2003.
186. Menger, *op. cit.*, pg. 120.

> The satisfaction of every man's need for food up to the point where his life is thereby assured has the full importance of the maintenance of his life. Consumption exceeding this amount, again up to a certain point, has the importance of preserving his health (that is, his continuing well-being). Consumption extending beyond even this point has merely the importance—as observation shows—of a progressively weaker pleasure, until it finally reaches a certain limit at which satisfaction of the need for food is so complete that every further intake of food contributes neither to the maintenance of life nor to the preservation of health—nor does it even give pleasure to the consumer, becoming first a matter of indifference to him, eventually a cause of pain, a danger to health, and finally a danger to life itself.[187]

A basic assumption of marginalism, then, is that the satisfaction derived from each additional unit of a good beyond a certain point will decrease, as particular wants or needs become satiated.[188] Thus, the determination of the relative prices of goods is a function of the comparative *marginal* satisfactions afforded by different goods. And given that the basis for economic interaction was taken to be the maximization of individuals' satisfaction, this allowed for the mathematical determination of the equilibrium prices of goods, and hence the equilibrium level of output of economic production.

There are two important consequences of this change in the theory of value. First, it allowed for the construction of economic theories based entirely on exchange. Economics thus became the science of exchange, rather than the science of the production and distribution of wealth. Issues of production and distribution could now be addressed as exchange phenomena mediated by prices, just as consumption was. Thus, with fewer assumptions, the theoretical models could incorporate more phenomena. Second, in locating value entirely in subjective desire, analysis of economic behaviour did not need to take into account the social relations of production,

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187. *Ibid.*, pg. 124.

188. Although this seems to agree with common sense (how many bananas can a person really enjoy at one sitting?), it disregards the social relations of possession, in which simply owning or having command over an additional unit can afford equal satisfaction. Imelda Marcos's predilection for shoes is one example.

nor how the pursuit of self-interest contributes to the satisfaction of the needs of all. As Regenia Gagnier puts it:

> The object of classical political economy as Adam Smith perceived it in *The Wealth of Nations* was to fulfil "the needs and desires of the people"...The object of neo-classical economics under the Marginal Revolution after 1870 was to maximize individual choice and preference without comparing or ranking needs intersubjectively.[189]

Because the satisfaction of desires is subjective, the only legitimate ranking is a purely individual one. Intersubjective comparisons are held to be impossible in principle. Thus, marginalism and neoclassical economics alike are confronted with a logical inconsistency: only individual preferences count, yet these cannot be aggregated in any determinate way so as to arrive at a social demand function.[190] And despite some periods of retreat, the marginalist approach has become the dominant form of economics today, in the form of neoclassical economics.

Thus, there is no requirement for the neoclassical economist to take into account what the subjective interests of economic actors are, since it is sufficient to postulate just that there are such interests. In this way, positivist economics gradually became separated from historical inquiry, since such inquiry could only reveal particular disturbances in the operation of the general laws of the economy. Positivist economics is thus an ordering or organising [*ordnende*] economics,[191] i.e., it orders economic behaviour in terms of the relations between production, distribution, accumulation, consumption, etc., into a mechanical system of interactions for which equilibrium is the ideal. From this conception of economic behaviour comes the construction of *the* economy as a separate and self-contained object of study.[192]

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189. Regenia Gagnier, "The Law of Progress and the Ironies of Individualism in the Nineteenth Century", *New Literary History*, vol. 31, 2000, pp. 328-329.
190. Cf. Steve Keen, *op. cit.*, ch. 2.
191. Reinert and Daastøl, *op. cit.*, pg. 3. The term comes Werner Sombart's *Drei Nationalökonomien*.

General equilibrium

The present-day form of positivist economics is neoclassical economics.[193] As the mainstream economics of the last four decades or so, it has been central in 20th-century development theory and practice.[194] Here I briefly discuss some of the central components of neoclassical economics that will indicate its relation to the positions of positivism, historicism and abstract theoreticism. Neoclassical economics, like all positivistic economics, is predicated on certain assumptions about human nature, although these are formal assumptions, in the sense that they characterize functions in economic models. Assumptions fundamental to neoclassical economics include the following:

> 1. People have rational preferences among outcomes. 2. Individuals maximize utility and firms maximize profits. 3. People act independently on the basis of full and relevant information.[195]

What is not included in the assumptions of neoclassical economics is consideration of the nature of the institutions that might possibly accommodate them. Apart from the asymmetry implied by assumptions 2 and 3 (do firms "act independently"? Even in an ideal world it is not obvious that collusive behaviour on the part of firms—oligopoly—does not satisfy neoclassical assumptions.), the question is, what kind of institution allows for both utility-maximization *and* independent action? If we think of the possible ways in which individuals can act so as to secure their own gain (i.e., maximize their utility), we might come up with a list such as: reciprocity, co-operation, competition,

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192. See Timothy Mitchell, "Fixing the Economy", *Cultural Studies*, vol. 12, no. 1, 1998, pp. 82-101; Daniel Breslau, "Economics invents the economy", *Theory and Society*, vol. 32, 2003, pp. 379-411.
193. Strictly speaking, "neoclassical economics" refers to marginalism and equilibrium analysis. However, following the period when Keynesian economics was dominant (from around 1940 to the mid-1960s), there was a synthesis of Keynesian macroeconomic ideas with general equilibrium analysis, which was known as the "neoclassical synthesis". Hence, the dominant or "orthodox" school of economic thought today is generally referred to as neoclassical economics, to distinguish it from the Austrian, Marxian, post-Keynesian, evolutionary, etc. schools of "heterodox" economics. Cf. Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-316, 323-326; Keen, *op. cit.*, ch. 14.

collusion, domination, etc. Not all of those allow for independent action, however. In fact, neoclassical economists would argue, the only situation in which people *can* act independently is if their actions take place in an institutional context in which they are essentially anonymous. That is, since economic action is measured by prices, and thus is mediated by monetary values, independence of action requires a situation in which no individual is able to determine prices.

> The characterization of economics in general as the "science of exchange" is somewhat of an exaggeration, but as a characterization of *Neoclassical* economics, it is no exaggeration at all. *The* quintessential feature of Neoclassical economics, above everything else, is that it addresses all economic phenomena in the same manner: it first *reduces* the problem to one of pure exchange, and then searches for the *equilibrium exchange ratio*.[196]

What distinguishes neoclassical economics from classical economics, then, is not simply the focus on exchange, but rather the conceptualization of all such exchange within the equilibrium framework. In 1832, Richard Whately advocated "catallactics" as a more suitable name for the discipline than "political economy". He disagreed with Smith that the discipline could be characterized by reference to the "Wealth of Nations", since "this supplies a name only for the *subject-matter*, not for the *science*

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194. Economics is, of course, a diverse endeavour. There are a number of different schools of contemporary economic thought, including post-Keynesian, Austrian, New Institutionalism, evolutionary economics, and so on, just as there are a number of different branches of inquiry, such as microeconomics, macroeconomics, applied economics, econometrics, etc. However, there is a mainstream theoretical core, namely "the theory of the equilibria resulting from constrained rational individual choice" (Daniel H. Hausman, "Philosophy of Economics", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2003 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/economics/ > on 14 January 2006). I do not have the space here to explore the various differences. Nor do I discuss Keynes, despite his importance both for 20th century economic thought and for development economics. In the last three decades, interventionist ideas often associated with Keynes have been discarded in the name of neoliberal policies, such as reducing the role of government in economic interaction (e.g., deregulation, privatization), lifting controls on foreign investment, rolling back labour legislation, and so on.
195. E. Roy Weintraub, "Neoclassical Economics", Library of Economics and Liberty, at <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/NeoclassicalEconomics.html> on 15 March 2003.
196. "Markets and Exchange", *op. cit.*

itself".[197] Whately goes on to explain his preference, in terms of his understanding of man as *homo catallacticus*:

> Man might be defined, "An animal that makes Exchanges;" no other, even of those animals which in other points make the nearest approach to rationality, having, to all appearance, the least notion of bartering, or in any way exchanging one thing for another. And it is in this point of view alone that Man is contemplated by Political-Economy. This view does not essentially differ from that of A. Smith; since in this science the term Wealth is limited to exchangeable commodities; and it treats of them so far forth only as they are, or are designed to be, the subjects of exchange. But for this very reason it is perhaps the more convenient to describe Political-Economy as the science of Exchanges, rather than as the science of national Wealth.[198]

Whately indicates that the market concept was already more determinative for 19th-century positive economists than for their predecessors (at least in their own eyes). The split between history and theory, and the increasing technicalization and formalization of the discipline that the marginalist revolution presages, implied a rethinking of the role of economics as a discipline, and of its goals as well. Despite the inclinations towards social reform that characterized many of the late 19th-century economists, there was a marked tendency to approach the discipline as a pure science, concerned chiefly to determine truths about the functioning of (industrial) economies, rather than to provide prescriptions for policy designed to bring about such an economy.[199] In this way the discipline became more abstract, and the emphasis on equilibrium theory resulted in a much narrower view of the scope of economics, which had less to do with real economies and more to do with idealized *models* of economies. Whatever the differences between the varieties of neoclassical economic thought today, they are all characterized by exchange:

> All branches of Neoclassical economics feed into or stem from this central procedure. They can all be classified according to whether they seek to (1) characterize the agents that will be involved in the exchange; (2) characterize the process of exchange itself; (3) characterize the results of the equilibrium exchange. Thus, we

197. Richard Whately, *Introductory Lectures on Political Economy*, at <http://www.econlib.org/library/Whately/whtPE.html> on 15 March 2003.
198. *Ibid.*
199. Although Marshall, for one, held otherwise. See Backhouse, pg. 181.

> see that consumer theory and producer theory fall into category (1). General equilibrium theory, the theory of the core, etc. fall into category (2); capital theory, distribution theory, growth theory, etc. all fall into category (3). Exchange is the Neoclassical forest, the rest of Neoclassical economics is but trees. Equilibrium exchange, then, becomes the Procrustean bed of Neoclassicism: if a particular phenomenon is to be considered "economics", it must be reducible to equilibrium exchange; if it is not thus reducible, it is not economics.[200]

The neoclassical economics problematic, then, was to give an account of the interaction of utility and supply as mediated through the price mechanism. In the market system, it was argued, first by Léon Walras (1834-1910), equations could be derived to express quantities demanded, quantities supplied, and the prices at which these would equilibrate, for all goods in the economy. Thus, the set of equations could be solved to show that there is a determinate solution—a general equilibrium—in which demand and supply are balanced. That is, the prices of goods could be given determinate values based on demand and supply. This was a new vision of the economy as a self-regulating system, which added mathematical rigour to the claim that only the free market would produce the most optimal outcome, for it could be shown that interference in the operation of the market so conceived would only result in lower equilibrium prices and hence lower quantities demanded and supplied, and thus less output for the economy as a whole.[201]

However, with this vision came a problem that had not faced classical economics, namely, the question of growth. For if economies are always in equilibrium,

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200. "Market Exchange", 14 March 2003 at <http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/essays/margrev/markets.htm>

201. However, as Louis Lefeber points out, the analytic framework of neoclassical economics is essentially silent on institutions, *including* the market. The equilibration of the economy need not depend on market interactions: "Western practitioners of neoclassicism implicitly take the existence of capitalist institutions and the ethos of private enterprise for granted...But with a different concept of the state or set of institutions, neoclassical economic theory can also be employed as a planning tool for centrally controlled economies" (Lefeber, *op. cit.*, pg. 528 n. 10). The institutions so taken for granted are, of course, the historical aspect of any system of economic behaviour, from which neoclassical economics abstracts. The "new institutional economics" of Douglass C. North and others is an attempt to use the neoclassical framework to explain institutions in terms of transaction costs, i.e., frictions or inefficiencies in the market. Thus, it attempts to endogenize institutions—save for the market itself, of course.

or only ever temporarily disequilibriated, then this suggests a steady state, rather than dynamic progress. In classical economics, the theory was that profits would be invested in productive labour, thereby increasing capital accumulation and so leading to growth. Economic growth also involved development in that, for Smith at least, growth and capital accumulation were the preconditions for the division of labour.[202] Growth was thus endogenous or internal to the theoretical system of the economy. In neoclassical economics, in contrast, the economic system is theorized to be always either in, or moving back towards, its equilibrium state, in which payments to factors are balanced out. There is no endogenous explanation of growth. Thus, it has generally been ascribed to exogenous or external factors, such as technological change, although the attempt has been made to link such change to rates of savings and investment. However, the neoclassical theory considers the motivating factors for saving and investment, i.e., the rate of interest, as determined by the market, and thus excludes (or simply ignores) the role of government, both in its role of providing demand, and as a determinant of investment.

Economic History

The complexity of the relation between the theory of history and the history of theory can perhaps best be illustrated with reference to economic history. Economic history is both a subject and a discipline; the latter was hived off (or banished) from economics proper with the neoclassical revolution (the shift from political economy to marginalism).[203] The formalism and abstract deductivism of neoclassical economics

202. Cf. Roger Backhouse, *The Penguin History of Economics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-127.
203. Cf. Carlo Cipolla, *Between History and Economics*, trans. C. Woodall, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, pp. 3-4; Margaret Schabas, "Parmenides and the Cliometricians", in D. Little, ed., *On the Reliability of Economic Models: Essays in the Philosophy of Economics*, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1995, pg. 184; Hobsbawm, *On History*, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-99; Sidney Pollard, "Economic History—A Science of Society?" in N.B. Harte, ed., *The Study of Economic History*, Frank Cass, London, 1971, pg. 292.

and its emphasis on equilibrium analysis did not allow for historical factors to enter into the theory. The universal and (literally) timeless economy, dependent on universal and timeless human nature, could be "observed" and studied without reference to historical occurrences and empirical evidence. This paradigm shift also resulted in a disavowal of the history of economic thought, thereby eliding (or explicitly denying) the historical context that gave rise to neoclassicism itself, both materially and intellectually.[204] In keeping with the positivist conception of science, but in an even more thorough-going way, neoclassical economics came to represent itself as the science of an object, "the" economy. This could be regarded as a rather peculiar, even somewhat theological or metaphysical, approach to an undeniably human phenomenon, i.e., that we are so constituted as to need material sustenance.[205] However, it has become the dominant form of economic thought to such an extent that it has, perversely, given rise to a form of economic history itself, called "cliometrics", that aims to show that ahistorical neoclassical economic theory is substantiated *by* history.[206] But to claim that this theory is universally and timelessly applicable is only to claim that its object has always had the features the theory claims to describe, not that the theory is itself somehow eternal.

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204. Cf. Charles M.A. Clarke, *Economic Theory and Natural Philosophy*, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1992, pp. 4-7.
205. Cf. Joan Robinson, *Economic Philosophy*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1974, ch. 1. I say "human phenomenon" here to draw attention to the implication of what has become the standard definition of economics in introductory texts (as well as more advanced ones), i.e., that of Lionel Robbins: "Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses." (Lionel Robbins, *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science*, 2nd ed., Macmillan, London, 1935, pg. 16, quoted in Backhouse, *The Penguin History of Economics*, *op. cit.*, pg. 3). This definition, when taken to apply to concrete human behaviour, evidences what Karl Polanyi called the "economistic fallacy", namely, identifying the logic of choice with the process of satisfying material needs (cf. Polanyi, *The Livelihood of Man*, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-34). Geoffrey Hodgson expresses this in another way, as the confusion of production and consumption with supply and demand. As he points out, the "curse of Adam" is not the universality of supply and demand, i.e., the need to exchange under conditions of scarcity, but the need to work (Geoffrey Hodgson, *How Economics Forgot History*, Routledge, London, 2001, pg. 276).
206. Cf. Schabas, *op. cit.*, pg. 198.

Thus, if it must be recognized that the "discovery" of the theory was an historical occurrence, then this should at least be recognized. But does this mean that the historical specificity of the origination of the theory needs to be incorporated into the theory itself? Does economic theory need to be hermeneutic?[207]

The point about the self-understanding of individuals engaged in economic activity is not merely a question about the particular attributes that neoclassical economics ascribes to people. Rather, it is a question about the notion of invariable, universal human nature. This objectified notion is a 3rd-person description which does not allow room for subjectivity. In denying subjectivity, however, the possibility of history is denied, since the variations in occurrences can all be reduced to laws governing interactions.[208] Without modification in human nature, i.e., without the *historical* subject, how can change in economic and social structures be properly understood?

Neoclassical economists and cliometricians apply concepts and theoretical explanations to historical phenomena which could not have been part of the understanding of those phenomena of the actors involved in them. Insofar as such phenomena involved intentional undertakings—reform of economic policies, for example—they were motivated by different purposes and meanings. Abstraction from these "subjective" aspects the way that neoclassical economics postulates means that these phenomena are no longer analyzed *as* historical. There is a further complication, in that the structures that neoclassical economics theoretically posits simply did not exist in earlier historical periods, regardless of whether hypothetical "as-if" constructions can give an explanation of such historical phenomena.[209] For example,

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207. Cf. Warren Samuels, *op. cit.*
208. Cf. Paul Bairoch, *Economics and World History*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1993, pg. 176.

the market-oriented analysis of a predominantly non-market (or pre-capitalist) society cannot hold if it depends on individuals interacting in anonymous economic transactions so as to rationally maximize their utility. And unfortunately, the test of the methodology of positive economics proposed by Milton Friedman, i.e., that its predictive power and not the realism of its assumptions is all that matters,[210] cannot be used in this case, since the outcomes are already known and thus determine the model.[211]

Finally, it must also be recognized that economic theory has policy consequences, or at least is brought into discussions of policy. (German economists, as discussed previously, always understood this to be the aim of economic inquiry.) As such, theory cannot be disentangled from policy and thus from historical phenomena, even if only in the less direct sense that economists train civil servants (e.g., Malthus at the East India College). This is one of the reasons historicist economists argued that the discipline has to be an *understanding*, and not *ordering*, discipline. Policy brings about economic phenomena, which economics then analyzes, so as to be able to recommend policy or to pronounce on the probability of future occurrences (e.g., giving warnings of a stockmarket bubble or a balance-of-payments problem).[212]

This inextricable relationship between the history of ideas and ideas of history is even more pronounced in the case of development. Whereas neoclassical economics

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209. Cf. Hobsbawm, *On History*, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-116.
210. Milton Friedman, "The methodology of positive economics", in D. M. Hausman, ed., *The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, pp. 210-244.
211. This problem has to do with econometric method, since the data used to estimate the coefficients of parameters, i.e., the relationship of economic variables, cannot then be used to confirm those coefficients. Cf. Schabas, *op. cit.*, pg. 186; Hobsbawm, *On History*, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-118.
212. Cf. Hobsbawm, *On History*, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-98. Again, the abstract theoreticism of neoclassical economics, when taken to assume the market as a given, fails to recognize that the market is a policy *choice*, and not a "natural" object.

is essentially static and has no convincing theory of growth,[213] let alone development, classical economics explicitly did, as *The Wealth of Nations* clearly demonstrates.[214] That is, classical economics was concerned with explaining how it was that the capitalist economy had come to appear, and what the determining factors were for its future behaviour. Smith and other political economists recognized the distinction between previous forms of economic behaviour and how these might have evolved, as well as the difference in how these were understood in their various historical contexts.[215] In the 19th century, then, positivistic economic inquiry tended to be concerned with historical economic development, although in its methodology it abstracted from history to determine general laws that could then be used to justify policies. However, as we have seen, development was not the province of economists alone. With the establishment of methods of historical investigation, particularly in Germany, the historical context of individual events could be made intelligible in terms of how they both expressed and were determined by their historical context, i.e., the individuality of an era or culture. Likewise, Comte's Sociology was a developmental science. And to this was added the Darwinian theory of evolution,[216] suitably adapted by Herbert Spencer to defend a *laissez faire* view of social evolution in which some classes were naturally bound to go to the wall.

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213. Cf. Roger Backhouse, *Economists and the Economy*, Transaction, London, 1994, pp. 47, 59-60.
214. Cf. Alexander Gerschenkron, "History of Economic Doctrines and Economic History", *The American Economic Review*, vol. 59, no. 2, 1969, pp. 4-5; Lefeber, *op. cit.*, pp. 525-526.
215. Although when formalized and used for policy reforms, as Polanyi pointed out, such historical inquiry tended to be overshadowed by the conviction that the market society was somehow natural or inevitable (Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-127).
216. Although whether this was as influenced by the social sciences as is sometimes claimed is debatable. See for instance Donald Winch, "Darwin Fallen Among Political Economists", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. 145, no. 4, 2001, pp. 415-437.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined some of the fundamental tenets of two "canons" in economics, in order to highlight the relationship of economic thinking to its historical context. Positivist economics has its roots in the Enlightenment and its emphasis on individualism. In the analysis that emerges from the capitalist system of production at the beginning of industrialization in Britain, the economic behaviour of individuals is defined by *exchange* motivated by *self-interest*. The individual as an economic agent is conceptualized as seeking to satisfy his wants, desires, or passions through exchange interactions with others. The system of economic behaviour as a whole then comes to be seen as a mechanism that works so as to harmonize individual interests through exchange. As such a mechanism, it is understood to be governed by "immutable and eternal" laws that can be determined either through the scientific method of Newton and Galileo or, in the Ricardian school, through a deductive analysis from axioms that are rationally established. Therefore, it was unnecessary to inquire into the *history* of particular contemporary economic issues in order to understand them; the only requirement for *policy* purposes is knowledge of the current state or condition of the system. The history of the system becomes irrelevant, except for the purposes of object-lessons.

This description should not, of course, be taken to suggest that positivist economics has been entirely averse to history. Indeed, Hume was known to his contemporaries as a historian, rather than a philosopher (or economist),[217] and his essays contain much historical detail, as does *The Wealth of Nations*. For subsequent thinkers, however, economic history came to be interpreted according to the universal

217. Backhouse, *op. cit.*, pg. 114.

and immutable principles of economic behaviour discovered by this canon itself. The observation that Leslie makes about Smith is all the more appropriate to his epigones:

> What he did not see was, that his own system, in its turn, was the product of a particular history; that what he regarded as the System of Nature was a descendant of the System of Nature as conceived by the ancients, in a form fashioned by the ideas and circumstances of his own time, and coloured by his own disposition and course of life.[218]

From the conviction that modern political economy had *discovered* the principles of economic behaviour, the successful economic policies of earlier eras could only be seen as the result of chance. Say was particularly dismissive of earlier knowledge of economic principles, as we have seen. For Say, it was self-evident that "[t]he principles of political economy are eternal and immutable; but one nation is acquainted with them, and another not".[219] This was thanks to Smith, who "caused us to perceive the fallaciousness of all the previous systems of political economy".[220] Mill expresses the same view of political economy, although at first in a less triumphalist tone:

> The conception, accordingly, of Political Economy as a branch of science is extremely modern; but the subject with which its enquiries are conversant has in all ages necessarily constituted one of the chief practical interests of mankind...[221]

Subsequently, however, he pronounces that

> The false theories of political economy which have done so much mischief in times past, are entirely discredited among all who have not lagged behind the general progress of opinion.[222]

The development of political economy itself was, of course, taken to indicate that the eternal principles of economic behaviour had been discovered and thus that humanity had progressed. This meant that past economic events could now be fully understood in terms of these principles alone; it was unnecessary to know how events were understood by economists (or other thinkers) at the time. After the marginalist

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218. Leslie, *op. cit.*
219. *Ibid.*, pp. 144-145.
220. *Ibid.*, pg. 19.
221. John Stuart Mill, *op. cit.*, PR.1.
222. *Ibid.*, V.10.3.

revolution, with the mathematization of the discipline, the history of economic thought ceased to be integral to the study of economics. The increasing use of techniques of mathematical analysis drove a further wedge between economics and history. Not only did economics "forget history", it also forgot its own disciplinary history.[223]

Once it was believed that the "eternal and immutable" laws of economic behaviour had been determined, it then became possible to justify certain economic policies on the basis of their accordance with those laws. On the basis of scientific inquiry, the assumptions behind certain policies could be shown to be erroneous.

> The grand mischiefs of authoritative interference proceed not from occasional exceptions to established maxims, but from false ideas of the nature of things, and the false maxims built upon them.[224]

Thus, in commercial policy, trade restrictions were criticized because it could be shown that they only benefited a narrow class of producers or merchants at a cost to consumers that outweighed the benefit.[225] In industrial policy, the creation of monopolies and the award of subsidies to favoured industries were rejected because it could be shown that they allocated capital inefficiently (among other disadvantages).[226] Entails and other traditional rights of inheritance or land-use were criticized because it could be shown that they hindered the improvement of agricultural production. And market regulations that restricted the rights of merchants to engross or forestall and required them to sell through fairs were rejected because it could be shown that they led to inefficient distribution.[227] Indeed, as discussed above, for Smith the historical progression of economic growth driven by manufacturing and trade, rather than by agriculture, was contrary to the natural order of progression.

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223. The expression is taken from the title of Geoffrey Hodgson's book, *How Economics Forgot History*, Routledge, London, 2000.
224. Say, *op. cit.*, pg. 60.
225. Smith, WN IV viii, pp. 245-246; Ricardo, *op. cit.*, pg. 89; Say, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.
226. Smith, WN IV ii, pg. 30;
227. Say, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-82.

In contrast, the central idea of historicist economics is that human beings are fundamentally creative. The combination of creativity and productive resources is what gives rise to wealth. In this canon, wealth is understood not as a given stock of resources or productive capacities, but as the "common weal". The common weal is an inclusive concept that implies the ongoing transformation of the community through innovation and context-dependent policies. As such, the task of economics is seen to involve understanding historical conditions so as to be able to transform them, in the process transforming the understanding of economic behaviour. Historicist economics was fundamentally *hermeneutic*, in recognizing that its disciplinary findings were also historically contextual.

The conception of human beings as fundamentally creative and productive is central to historicism. Creativity is an *explanans* of economic progress, whereas for positivism, it is an *explanandum*. The latter's insistence on the atomistic notion of human beings as self-interested agents who only seek to better their condition (in their economic behaviour, at least), and the static equilibrium implied by the conception of the economic system as a mechanism, makes it difficult to account for innovation. Positivist economic principles seek to explain how the system works to equilibrate production and consumption through the price mechanism. Oriented to explaining equilibrium, they do not explain in a convincing way how the economic system comes to be transformed, whether intentionally or by its own internal logic. Essentially, the explanation offered is that this happens through technological innovations in production.[228] In order for capital to be productive, i.e., to earn a return, it must be invested. However, the return on capital in industries with mature production technologies tends to be constant (save for external "shocks" such as disruptions in the

228. "Technological" is used here in a broad sense to include management processes, organizational structures, and so on, as well as production, i.e., machine-technologies.

supply of primary commodities), and may even decrease over time. In the face of this, self-interested capitalists, seeking to better their conditions, are motivated to innovate and therefore direct some of their capital investment into research and development. Successful innovations allow for returns to capital beyond “normal profits”. This leads other producers to adopt such innovations, whereby the new technology matures and profits return to normal.

As a result of this process, the economic system changes to some degree, whether within a single industry (such as with the introduction of robotics into automobile manufacturing) or more broadly (such as the development of internet-based sales systems). Nevertheless, the economic system as a whole is still conceived as equilibrating production and consumption. Innovation is “endogenized” in this explanation (i.e., it is incorporated into the system), and thus cannot be understood as transformative of the economic system as a whole. Because this system is analytically divorced from its social and political context, there is an inherent conservatism to positivist economic theory. This is particularly evident in relation to the issue of development, where such economic theory is used to recommend policies that depend on conditions that obtain in leisured countries, such as the privatization of industry and services, the deregulation of markets, the liberalization of trade regimes, etc. However, the problem for hard-working countries is not that those conditions obtain but policies are lacking. Rather, it is that those conditions do not obtain in the first place. The policy advice suggested to (or often imposed upon) hard-working countries says, in effect, “be like us”, whereas the problem that has occasioned such advice in the first place is that “they” are not “like us”.

The classical political economy of Ricardo, Say, Mill, and others was essentially concerned with the economic conditions of politically unified and

economically dominant nations, such as Britain and France. However much the analyses might have accurately represented such conditions, they did not address the very different conditions facing other Europeans, such as the Germans and Italians. As has been pointed out, it is unlikely that policies that work well for price-makers (i.e., those with the economic power to determine market prices, such as through monopolies on production or control of shipping) can work as well for price-takers (i.e., those without such power).

Positivist economics provided the conceptual and theoretical basis for development thinking, as is evident in mainstream development thinking today. This basis includes the following ideas: economies are comparable, because they all involve the interaction of human beings who have an invariable, universal nature (whether defined in terms of self-interest, wants, basic needs, capabilities, etc.); there is a natural progression to all economies, which is governed by laws that are universal and can be objectively determined (arguably, Smith's "natural order" is still a guiding principle for stages-theory, which is still influential in current positivist development, e.g., the World Bank); economies can be analyzed and explained in isolation, independently of their interactions with other economies and international conditions (a view that has been referred to as "methodological nationalism"[229]); an economy is essentially self-moving and self-regulating (in the era of development economics (the 1950s and 1960s), it was generally held that this was a stage that could be achieved, if the state directed investment and provided infrastructure to bring about the transition); the aim or goal of (economic) development is already known; history provides the "object-lessons" of the universal trajectory of development (when examined in a sufficiently abstract way so as

229. See Charles Gore, "The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries", *World Development*, vol. 28, no. 5, 2000, pp. 789-804, and "Methodological Nationalism and the Misunderstanding of East Asian Industrialisation", *European Journal of Development Research*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1996, pp. 77-122.

to determine the laws of progress); these theoretically determined laws are more determinative than any individual historical case (i.e., actual history cannot disconfirm the laws of progress).

Finally, the aim of development as an intentional undertaking is to bring about the "natural" conditions that have historically failed to appear. Although the specification of those conditions may vary, they depend in general on the notion of a universal human nature; a significant problem has been, then, to get people to *recognize* their nature, i.e., that they *are* rational maximisers, self-interested, etc. This is another feature that positivist development inherits from positivist economics: the idea that human nature can be determined objectively, and thus override the self-understanding individuals have of, and the meaning they ascribe to, their interactions and encounters. Thus Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) could argue that

> the economist...follows indeed in a more patient and thoughtful way, and with greater precautions, what everybody is always doing every day in ordinary life...He estimates the incentives to action by their effects just in the same way as people do in common life.[230]

Yet he also argued that

> Economic language seems technical and less real than that of common life. But in truth it is more real, because it is more careful and takes more account of differences and difficulties.[231]

For Marshall, as for other economists, the greater insight that economics has into ordinary life is not from ignoring subjective aspects of action, but precisely by taking them into account. But economics does so in a rather unusual way, at least for a discipline that claims exactitude as one of its chief virtues. For the subjective aspects are not themselves investigated, but rather are observed externally, so to speak.

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230. Alfred Marshall, *Principles of Economics*, 8th edition, Library of Economics and Liberty, Bk. I. ch. II at <http://www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP1.html#Bk.I,Ch.II> on 14 March 2003.
231. *Ibid.*, Appendix B, at <http://www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP57.html> on 14 June 2005.

> It concerns itself chiefly with those desires, aspirations and other affections of human nature, the outward manifestations of which appear as incentives to action in such a form that the force or quantity of the incentives can be estimated and measured with some approach to accuracy; and which therefore are in some degree amenable to treatment by scientific machinery...
>
> It is essential to note that the economist does not claim to measure any affection of the mind in itself, or directly; but only indirectly through its effect. No one can compare and measure accurately against one another even his own mental states at different times...[232]

Thus economics does not study the subjective *per se*, but only its outward and *objective* manifestation. From these it infers the preferences, wants, desires, etc., which are then used to explain value. The objectivity of economics is what justifies this authority, since it can compare the indirect effects of the subjective more accurately than the individual can compare her own subjective states.

232. *Ibid.*, Bk. I, ch. I.

Chapter 3: Positivist and Historicist International Development

Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss two related topics: first, how positivism manifests itself in mainstream development thinking; and second, postdevelopment's historicist critique of the mainstream. I aim to show that both positivist and historicist conceptions of development are problematic in terms of meaning, because both alienate the meaning of, and in development, from the subject of development. This problem of meaning concerns the way that history and progress are understood, on the one hand, and the relation between knowledge, agency and self-understanding, on the other.

This chapter does not examine in detail the history of international development in the UN era (i.e., post-1945),[1] or the various contemporary schools of development thinking, such as people-centered development, participatory action research, or world-system analysis. In part, this is simply for reasons of space. Another reason is that in recent years, positivist development has become syncretic (at least rhetorically), incorporating aspects of different theoretical approaches.[2] Despite this syncretism, these approaches share a theoretical attitude towards development, whether this is understood as an objective, unintended process, or as an intentional, subjective (and often imperialistic) process. This attitude is antithetical to grasping and expressing concrete individuality in its historicalness, and yet such historical individuality is essential to development. In the relation posited between the theorist and the theorized,

1. Such surveys can easily be found in standard texts on development, for example, John Martinussen, *Society, State and Market*, Zed Books, London, 1997; Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith, *Economic Development*, 8th ed., Addison-Wesley, Boston, 2003.
2. Cf. Todaro and Smith, *op. cit.*, pg. 111.

the possibility of grasping the concrete individuality of both is denied, yet it is the concrete individuality of the hard-working country that is postulated as the *problem* of development. Thus, the aporia of development thinking is found in the problem of expressing concrete individuality and what this entails for the genesis of meaning. In both positivist and historicist development thinking, the meaning of development is made incoherent.

Defining Development?

The difficulty of defining development is well-recognised, and arises not only from the conflation of the process of develop*ing* with the goal or end-state of developed*ness*,[3] where the former itself is problematized in relation to the latter (i.e., how can we know that this process *is* a process of developing until, and unless, developedness is reached?). There is also the conflation of the intention to develop and the immanent process of development that first appeared in the 19th century with the positivism of the Saint-Simonians and Comte, as Cowen and Shenton argue (DoD ix-x). These thinkers introduced the notion that an intention to develop could be brought to bear upon the immanent process of development, so as to bring about progress with order, rather than the disorderly progress that the technical, economic and political revolutions of the 18th century manifested. This was a reconceptualization of the 17th- and 18th-century concept of progress, so as to connect it with order in the immanent process of development. It was also a reconceptualization of the earlier, phusiological or "organic" notion of development, which involved the idea of the expression of what was latent in a society or culture (i.e., its individual principle), but not the notion of

3. Cf. DoD 3; Barbara Ingham, "The Meaning of Development", *World Development*, vol. 21, no. 11, 1993, pg. 1803.

advancement or *improvement*. Yet it did involve, also, the notion of destruction or decay, because development (as φύσις) was understood to be cyclical.

Although the 17th- and 18th- century notion of progress consisted in improvement and the destruction of (or liberation from) superstitions and traditions, it was not thought of as an immanent process, but rather as a consequence of reason and, in particular, rational inquiry into nature. The 19th-century idea of development introduced the distinction between intention and immanent process, but this then raised the question of how the former was to be brought to bear on the latter, for intention requires knowing what to intend, i.e., knowing the end (developedness) in advance. If the immanent process has *not* occurred, how can this be known? And then how can development be brought about? The answer of 19th-century positivism was to argue for the notion of *trusteeship*, i.e., some agency capable of embodying the intention, so as to bring it to bear on the immanent process latent in society. The notion of trusteeship, which constitutes development as a *doctrine*, Cowen and Shenton argue, is the modern idea of development that has determined development thinking into the present.[4] They find it operative not just in the mainstream, but also in (historicist) critiques of development, which they find invoke equally a trustee to act on behalf of those unable to reject positivist development and find their own indigenous alternative to it.[5]

What is important here, in the light of the previous chapter, is to look at the conditions that allowed for this invention, and that have continued to be invoked in attempts to define development, construct development theories, and justify practices. As has often been pointed out, the idea and practice of development originated in Europe, in particular in Britain and France, and is therefore often criticized as

4. "An intention to develop becomes a doctrine of development when it is attached, or when it is pleaded that it be attached, to the agency of the state to become an expression of state policy" (DoD viii).
5. I examine this point in more detail below.

Eurocentric.[6] What is less often noted is that in its 19th-century form, this idea was not directed primarily, if at all, at non-European nations or peoples, but at the North Atlantic nations themselves.[7] "The idea of intentional development, through the state practice of development, had arisen in Europe to deal with the problem of a surplus population in Europe" (DoD 174). This is clear in Comte, who specifically rejects the idea that anything is to be learnt from less advanced areas as regards social statics and social dynamics, and thus that their development is of anything but secondary concern.

History and Development

In the U.N. era, the aim of positivist development has been to bring about the conditions and institutions (although, in practice, almost exclusively the market) that will allow the economy to equilibriate at a higher level than it presently does, so enabling economic growth to occur. These conditions and institutions are deemed by assumption not to be present in the underdeveloped economies, since if they were, capital accumulation, rates of profit, etc., would all have already occurred so as to bring about such growth. The historically contextual institutions that may be present in a country or society are simply irrelevant, for they fail, again by assumption, to instantiate the idealized institutions of neoclassical economic analysis.[8]

The disparity between such purportedly "natural" conditions and actual history makes positivist development conceptually problematic. What is aimed at—developedness—is determined from the historical context of the developed countries,

6. See for example Björn Hettne, *Development Theory and the Three Worlds*, Longman, Harlow, 1995, ch. 1. Cf. DoD 470-472.
7. Arguably, Colbert's attempt in the 17th century to bind the various French colonies and France into a trade group had the same kind of trusteeship and constructive intent as 19th-century development doctrine, a point Cowen and Shenton do not discuss. Nevertheless, these were settler colonies of Europeans, not colonies of non-Europeans.
8. See for example Alice Sindzingre and Howard Stein, "Institutions, Development, and Global Integration: A Theoretical Contribution", at <http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar/erc2002/pdf/i017.pdf> on 14 January 2006.

suitably abstracted through theoretical analysis to appear as the ideal for all societies. But abstraction from history cannot establish this *as* an ideal, for the process of development simply cannot be mimetic. The events that constitute the history of the leisured countries are unrepeatable. Yet the *individuality* of such historical occurrences is inessential to the abstract history of positivist development. The histories of the hard-working countries are similarly abstracted from, often with regard to the very same events, in positivist explanations of why they are *not* developed. But if their own history does not explain their lack of development, then it is difficult to specify what does. That is, it is difficult to specify how an abstract occurrence is responsible for a concretely individual condition. It is even more problematic to claim that their development involves the *same* immanent process that occurred in the leisured countries, a process which for some reason has simply failed to occur.

The fundamental difficulty for any concept of progressive development is how to justify what is to count *as* the desirable end-state of developedness. That is, unlike with progress, in which the new supersedes the old, whether destructively or inclusively, in development the new is identified as somehow latent *in* the old. When this is turned into a constructivist conception (and undertaking), the difficulty is how to determine what is latent in the actual, i.e., in present conditions. How, exactly, is the present supposed to manifest the latent *as* latent, i.e., in its latency? The political economists, in one respect, were not troubled by this, since the universality of human nature they presupposed showed how the optimal economic structure ought to be so as to enable its own progress. Yet this view still encounters the hermeneutic problem of how to recognize—and allow for—the provisionality of these conceptions themselves.

A significant complication in discussing development, one that we have also encountered in the discussion of economics, is the mutual implication of theory and

practice. The history of development thinking not only reflects the history of development, but also *in*flects it. Changes in development thinking have affected what has been undertaken in the name of development, and also how previous intentional development has come to be understood. For example, the neoliberal approach predominant at the World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s (the "Washington Consensus"[9]) consisted predominantly of policy prescriptions aimed at minimizing government involvement in economic matters. The ensuing deterioration in conditions in the hard-working countries affected has since become further "data" for theoretical analysis of development. Yet these "data" are often treated as if they had simply occurred, rather than having resulted from inentional action.

Dependency Theory

The attempt to link such historical practices and policies to the twin phenomena of development and underdevelopment was the aim of dependency theorists such as Baran, dos Santos, Frank and others, who argued that Marx's analysis of capitalist exploitation of labour could be applied to the relation between "centre" and "periphery" countries (i.e., developed and underdeveloped). The economic conditions of the centre, and its historical role in colonizing the periphery, allowed it to accumulate the surplus generated in the periphery, for example, through the deteriorating terms of trade that producers of primary commodities faced. In this way the development of the

9. The term was invented by John Williamson. Cf. John Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform", in John Williamson, ed., *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?*, Institute for International Economics, Washington, 1990; "Democracy and the 'Washington Consensus' ", *World Development*, vol. 21, no. 8, 1993, pp. 1329-1336; "What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington Consensus?", *The World Bank Research Observer*, vol. 15, no. 2, 2000, pp. 251-264; and "The Strange History of the Washington Consensus", *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics*, vol. 27, no. 2, Winter 2004-05, pp. 195-206. For critiques see Charles Gore, "The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries", *World Development*, vol. 28, no. 5, 2000, pp. 789-804; and Ha-Joon Chang and Ilene Grabel, "Reclaiming development from the Washington consensus", *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics*, vol. 27, no. 2, Winter 2004-05, pp. 273-291.

developed countries was predicated on the *under*development of the underdeveloped.[10] The situation of underdevelopment was neither simply that of not yet having reached the conditions of "take-off", nor a result of a failure to modernize. Rather, the countries of the periphery were actively and transitively underdeveloped by the more advanced countries, to effect the latters' own development. Given that there were few, if any, opportunities for the underdeveloped to emulate this practice, and that they were faced with an international order dominated by the developed, some dependency theorists, such as Frank, argued that the only solution lay in "de-linking" from this systemic exploitation.[11] However, few underdeveloped countries were capable of such a radical rejection of the world order, and attempts at autarky since the end of the 19th century have been limited to exceptional cases, such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and, perhaps, the Kingdom of Bhutan.

Nor is it evident that de-linking could have had the developmental effects suggested. First of all, as some neo-Marxist critics pointed out, the idea of de-linking seemed to involve not some alternative to capitalist exploitation, but rather the replacement of external exploitation by internal exploitation. If the point of de-linking was simply to accumulate capital domestically, rather than allowing it to be siphoned off, then this hardly represented an improvement in the conditions of the working class.[12] The second problem is more fundamental: what was supposed to be an alternative to underdevelopment was yet another form of bringing to bear on an

10. Cf. Andre Gundar Frank, "The Underdevelopment of Development," in S.C. Chew and R.A. Denemark, eds. *The Underdevelopment of Development*, SAGE, London, 1996, pp. 17-55; Todaro and Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-127; Martinussen, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40, 85-100; Hettne, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-104; DoD 61-63.
11. Myrdal makes the same point in *Asian Drama* with respect to trade. Cf. Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, Pelican Books, Harmondsworth, 1977, pg. 52.
12. Cf. DoD 78.

immanent process an intention to develop that could not originate in the underdeveloped country itself.

Development as Doctrine

As Cowen and Shenton point out, the aim of the intention to develop is not simply to *install* certain conditions (such as markets, rule of law and property rights, or health care, education and employment), but to bring about a situation in which such conditions are sought after by the underdeveloped themselves (DoD 3-4). The intention is to bring about the process that will result in people being able to intend their own development. There are two problems with this. First, the very basis for what is supposed to be intended—i.e., the process whereby the now-developed became so—was *not* itself intended. It *was* an immanent process and only as such could the intention first appear. Second, it follows that the intention to develop cannot do what positivist development posits, i.e., bring about that intention in others where the basis for it is lacking.

The origin of positivist development thinking in the 19th century has been examined in detail by Cowen and Shenton, to show the conceptual conflations that inform contemporary development thinking. Of particular importance is the positivist articulation of development as a *counterpoint* to progress. Cowen and Shenton argue that the contradictions in positivist development come from conflations of concepts of progress, development, intention and process. These conflations stem from the conflict between two sets of concepts. First, there is a contradiction between the association of destruction with creation in the concept of development and the idea of improvement in the concept of progress.[13] This is further complicated by the difference between the

13. It should be noted, however, that the phusiological concept of development on which historicism rests does not involve destruction, because cyclical decline is *part* of what it means to be a totality.

classical notion of development, which involved sequential creation and destruction, and the modern, technical notion that these are simultaneous. Such simultaneity then implies that *discontinuity*, rather than continuity, is inherent to development.

> In its classical origin, and not only in ancient Greece, development was understood as a natural process in which phases of renewal, expansion, contraction and decomposition followed each other sequentially according to a perpetually recurrent cycle. In the modern world, a world in which it is artifice rather than nature that provides the analogue for the understanding of movement, development has increasingly come to refer to a discontinuous process in which destruction and renewal are simultaneous, as much as sequential. (DoD viii)

Second, there is the conflict between the concept of order as natural and order as a result of intentional activity. The naturally immanent process of development involves disorder as much as order, yet disorder mitigates improvement, particularly when improvement is understood as the new that encompasses rather than replaces the old.[14] In the classical, cyclical conception of development, in which there was no idea of improvement, there was no contradiction between development and order: the natural order of things necessarily involved decay. When order is located in intention, however, it becomes opposed to the natural order of decay.

> Logically...it is difficult to understand how it is possible for development to be intended without the belief that destruction will create improvement, the purpose of the intent to develop. Belief in making development happen can only be grounded in the process of development, in that it is the process of development, and not the intention to develop, which makes destruction a necessary part of development. (DoD ix)

When these contradictions are considered in relation to history, a discordance appears between the *transcendence* of history in the intention to develop, and *immanence* in it in the process of development, which also gets elided in positivist development. The intention to develop transcends history in arising from, and being directed towards, historical conditions. “Indeed, most intentions to develop are themselves responses to what are deemed to be the undesirable effect—unemployment, impoverishment—of

14. As can be found, for example, in the arguments of Fontenelle and others in the battle of the Ancients and Moderns (cf. Robert Nisbet, *Social Change and History*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1970, pp. 104-110).

processes of development" (DoD ix).

The modern idea of development as a counterpoint to progress arose in response to the effects of the social upheavals of the late 18th and 19th centuries in Europe, resulting from political and economic transformations. It therefore referred to those countries undergoing social changes, such as industrialization, that were considered to be progressive. The intention to order progress was itself a result of progress, so transcending the historical context. In the U.N. era of *international* development, the notion of the transcendence of history is similarly evident, but now related to *lack* of progress, i.e., stagnation in a state of "un-" or "underdevelopedness". The intent to develop thus takes on the additional sense of bringing progress about as a response to its *failure* to occur. Some condition (e.g., lack of capital accumulation, the lack of an industrial sector, the domination of "traditional" values and ways of thinking) is posited as preventing the immanent process from occurring. However, in U.N.-era development, those who are to develop are no longer the same as those capable of developing. The transcendence of positivist development thinking to its own historical situation is brought to bear by some agency or other (e.g., the World Bank, bilateral development agencies, NGOs), on behalf of those considered to be incapable of doing so themselves because of their historical immanence.

This endeavour, which Cowen and Shenton characterize as "trusteeship" (DoD ix), is thus riven by the contradiction between the situation of the "trustees" (i.e., the development experts) and that of the "underdeveloped", because the intention to develop that motivates the trustees does not originate in the situation of underdevelopedness. Yet what it aims to bring about is the situation that the *developed* are in, based on the belief that the present situation of underdevelopedness (in the hard-working countries) is an earlier stage of the present situation of developedness (in the

leisured countries). Operative in this belief, then, is the *comparative method*, in which history is linearized into necessary stages that all societies pass through.[15] The idea of linear stages of social evolution, in which the leisured countries represent more advanced stages, denies their coevalness with the hard-working countries, because it represents them as existing in "another time".[16] Coevalness problematizes the notion of stages because it entails that societies cannot be regarded as atomistic or self-contained, and thus comparable across space *and* time. Only through such a denial does the doctrine of development have credibility, because the coexistence or coevalness of developedness and underdevelopedness contradicts the necessity ascribed to social evolution (or history) upon which this doctrine rests.

Comte

The developmental solution, which can be traced back to Comte, is the Comparative Method, i.e., the notion that coeval societies or cultures can be compared so as to determine the different stages of development they have reached.[17] Here, taxonomy is conflated with temporality.[18] But this conflation by itself cannot establish what it aims to, since there is no way to determine whether the "after" state posited is an improvement. For this, a third concept is required, i.e., the necessary continuity of the temporal order. Comte's argument was that historical continuity is shown by social

15. Cf. Robert Nisbet, "Developmentalism: A Critical Analysis" in *The Making of Modern Society*, Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, 1986, pp. 33-69.
16. Johannes Fabian argues that the denial of coevalness (or "allochronism") is characteristic of anthropology. It is "a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than that of the producer of anthropological discourse" (Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How anthropology makes its object*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1983, pg. 31). Development and anthropology, of course, arise from the same intellectual milieu.
17. Cf. Robert Nisbet, *Social Change and History*, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-197 and *The Making of Modern Society*, Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, 1986, pp. 54-57.
18. Temporality being one way to reconcile freedom and order. Cf. Leonard Binder, "The Natural History of Development Theory", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 28, no. 1, 1986, pp. 3-5.

advancement *in* history, for this is what allows for the explanation of *itself*, i.e., how it is that we can now grasp that society has advanced. As Nisbet describes the Comparative Method,

> It is a synchronization of three distinguishable orders of fact: (1) the relationships of a coexisting logico-spatial series, (2) the relationships of a selected temporal series with emphasis on before-and-after in time, and (3) an evolutionary or developmental series that is held to mark 'normal' or 'true' development of a type.[19]

For Comte, progress was indeed improvement, but it came at a cost, namely disorder in the social fabric that threatened to overwhelm the new society that was beginning to emerge. However, progress was also a saviour, since it involved increase in the scope of knowledge and increasing sophistication in research, particularly in the natural sciences and in economics. Comte, following Saint-Simon, argued that scientific method had developed to a point where it was now possible to scientifically investigate society itself. The study of history could be put on firm scientific foundations, so as to determine the laws governing progress, thus allowing it to be directed so as to preserve order. This was Comte's notion of development, in which there could be progress with order, so long as social change was scientifically managed.

The concept of development was thus elided into progress. With development, as opposed to progress alone, the improvement of society could be brought about in a way that corresponded to tendencies held to be latent in society. In this way, continuity between the old and the new could be ensured. The intentional undertaking to direct society by a managerial class (the "trustee") could ensure that change and continuity would be balanced, rather than one becoming dominant over the other, which would lead either to social breakdown or social stagnation. The important feature of Comte's conception of development, then, is that it is an intentional undertaking, yet one that seeks to bring about only what is deemed to be already latent in society itself. Thus,

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19. Nisbet, *The Making of Modern Society*, *op. cit.*, pg. 54.

development depends on prior knowledge of the goal that is intended. That is, it depends on the analysis of society so as to determine what tendencies are latent in it. But such analysis has itself been made possible not by *development*, but by *progress*. In other words, it is progress that has made development possible, yet in Comte's conception (as with colonial and post-colonial development), development is now to make progress possible—at least, progress that does not engender a radical discontinuity with the past.

Comte's conception of development, and the analysis it required, was directed in the first instance to the "most advanced nations" (i.e., those of Western Europe), rather than to those that have "from any cause whatsoever, been arrested, and left in an imperfect state".[20] Furthermore, the analysis involves a "scientific treatment" of history that is an "abstract inquiry into the laws of society", because the stage of advancement which society had reached, Comte argued, did not allow for a "concrete Sociology".[21] The primary aim of development was to address "the problem of moral regeneration" and "the social regeneration of Western Europe", which Comte perceived to be in crisis. Once this was achieved, it was to be followed by "political reorganization", or the "reorganization of society".[22]

Comte's concept of development has a number of aspects. First, it depends on the objective scientific analysis of "abstract history", by which Comte means the history of Western European nations according to the various stages these have passed through, and not the concrete history of events, which are too complex for analysis (at least at present, according to Comte). Second, it involves the notion that lack of

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20. Auguste Comte, *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte Vol. III*, trans. H. Martineau, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 2000 [1896], pg. 5.
21. *Ibid.*, pg. 6.
22. Auguste Comte, *A General View of Positivism*, Paris, 1848.

progress means imperfection. Third, development can bring about advancement without the destruction of the past, because it can bring out what is latent in society, unlike progress on its own. Whereas progress resulted in disorder, development was to result in *re*generation. Fourth, development is to order progress, although it itself is a result of (disordered) progress. Finally, this concept was not oriented towards the advancement of a particular polity or nation-state, but the advancement of humanity, although, as Comte argued, this had to start with the more advanced nations.[23]

Cowen and Shenton argue for an end to *doctrines* of development, which suppose that the development of one people can be entrusted to another, yet their immanent critique does not suggest how "free development" might be understood when it is "contained within a world of necessity and actual relative scarcity" (DoD 450). Part of the reason for this, I suggest, is that they pay little attention to historicism and its influence on German development thinking in the 19th century.[24] This is an important intellectual source of present-day critiques of positivist development, such as institutionalism and postdevelopment. The latter are often dismissed as dependent on postmodernism and the relativism it entails, expressed in terms of the "West" and its "other". The significance of historicism, however, was its emphasis on historical *immanence* and the inadequacy of universalist causal explanations for articulating that situation intelligibly. For historicist development thinking, no cultural comparison can tell us what we should do or become (although this does not mean that we cannot learn

23. "...practice requires as imperatively as theory that we should concentrate our view upon the most advanced social progression. When we have learned what to look for from the elite of humanity, we shall know how the superior portion should intervene for the advantage of the inferior; and we cannot understand the fact, or the consequent function, in any other way: for the view of co-existing states of inequality could not help us. Our first limit then is that we are to concentrate our sociological analysis on the historical estimate of the most advanced social development." (Comte, *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte Vol. III*, *op. cit.*, pg. 6).
24. Except for Friedrich List. Cf. DoD 158-165.

from others). There is no universal blueprint for social life, but only the individual development of each era or culture. At issue in historicism is the *actuality* that constitutes the meaningfulness of each individual historical era, rather than the *necessity* of causal laws. However, historicism, too, is aporetic with respect to the possibility of freedom in development, as the freedom *of* possibility.

Positivist Development

A wide range of actors are involved in positivist development, such as the multilateral and bilateral development agencies, non-governmental organizations, academics in various disciplines, and development workers. This range makes the subject of development heterogeneous. In calling them positivist or mainstream, I do not mean to imply that there is necessarily a shared set of ideas or beliefs about the subject, save perhaps the idea that development can be brought about. Nor is there necessarily theoretical agreement as to what constitutes development. There are disagreements about factors, causality, the roles played or functions performed by different institutions, and so on. Given such heterogeneity, it has been argued in recent years that development has become predominantly identified with practice, and is thus coming to mean "whatever is done in the name of development".[25] Since practices depend on practitioners, "[d]evelopment thus comes to be defined in a multiplicity of ways because there are a multitude of 'developers' who are entrusted with the task of development" (DoD 4). Yet there is general agreement on *how* development might be explained (or defined), i.e., through the theoretical analysis of its *causes* that accompanies such practice, whether implicitly or explicitly.

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25. Alan Thomas, "Development as Practice", *Journal of International Development*, vol. 12, 2000, pg. 775.

There is also general agreement about how development is conceptualized, i.e., as a process that can be observed and explained. Disagreements about development are not about how we *conceive* of development, nor how we *investigate* it, but rather about how it is to be *achieved*, and thus the adequacy of accounts of the empirical (or historical) evidence. In categorizing all of these positions as mainstream development thinking, then, I am not claiming that there is substantive agreement on the subject of development. Rather, I am claiming that they share a *conception* of development that informs the particular factors that are focussed on.

Meaning

The central problem of the subject of development is one of *meaning*.[26] Hard-working people are posited as unable to grasp the meaning of their own development, precisely *because* they are hard-working, and therefore it has to be determined for them by those who can. Determined in this way, however, it cannot *be* the meaning of development for them, because it is not something they themselves have had any part in. It might be understood as an abstract description of a theoretical process or end-state and therefore meaningful as an *abstraction*, but it cannot be understood as the meaning of *their* development, because this does not—and cannot—include the way they come to determine it as meaningful. The point here is not that positivist development supplies the *wrong* meaning of development for the hard-working, and that it should instead find out from them what the right meaning is, as historicist development thinkers suppose.

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26. The centrality of this problem should be evident from the difficulty encountered in defining development. In order to be an object of positivist inquiry, it must already be defined. The elisions, abstractions, equivocations and caveats encountered in attempts to clearly identify the subject of development, and the use of proxies by those who are engaged at a more "practical" level, all indicate how deep this problem runs. Even the postdevelopment critics fall foul of the same type of essentialising that they decry in positivist development, thus establishing it as the "other" by which their critiques are ultimately determined. I take this to be yet another indication of the need for a phenomenological approach.

Rather, the point is that the meaning of development cannot be determined in this way at all, because it is not an object. Positivist development determines the end or aim of development theoretically, and then seeks to implement this. But implementation cannot transform this theoretical end into an end that people have determined for themselves, and therefore it cannot become theirs. The hard-working are posited as always outside their own development, a situation that no amount of technical implementation by others can overcome. If this is the case for the hard-working, then it would seem to apply equally to the leisured countries. Yet positivist development denies this, because it identifies the meaning of development with the *conditions* of the leisured countries that they have attained or achieved themselves.

Positivist development makes the meaningfulness of the subject of development problematic, because it posits development as an objective process governed by general or universal laws. Development is only meaningful as the instantiation of *progress*, determined with reference to those countries or societies considered to have advanced forms of economic interaction, and to have solved the problem of absolute poverty. The meaning of progress is taken to be given or self-evident. Positivist development depends implicitly on the Enlightenment idea of universal history, in which the historical experience of different societies is linearized into a single historical trajectory for humankind. This linearization abstracts from historical specificity by treating each historical context as an instantiation of a stage of progressive transformation. The meaning of historical contexts is thus taken to lie not in their concrete individuality, but only in the way they instantiate what can be objectively measured. The historical is subsumed under general laws, which, as we have seen, destroys the meaning of the historical as singular and unique.

The idea of progress thus determines the significance of development as an intentional undertaking: development is to bring about progress where it has not yet occurred. Seen in this way, development becomes the realization of socioeconomic conditions that already exist elsewhere and which are taken to represent progress. Knowledge of progress is possible because we can observe and compare socioeconomic conditions to determine what gave rise to them, i.e., the causes or laws that governed their appearance. Development depends, therefore, on the positivistic concept of knowledge, in which the analysis of historical change is aimed at determining the general laws that govern it, for the purposes of prediction and control.[27] Development involves *prediction*, because the intention must be implemented in such a way as to bring about what is intended, in light of the laws governing the immanent process. As Cowen and Shenton point out,

> to intend to develop does not necessarily mean that development will result from any particular action undertaken in the name of development. However, the existence of an intent to develop does mean that it is believed that it is possible to act in the name of development and that it is believed that development will follow from actions deemed desirable to realise an intention of development. (DoD viii)

Development involves *control* because it is meant to counter the *destructive* effects of progress, e.g., the immiseration caused by the technological transformation of industrial production, particularly the problem of surplus population, unemployment, or poverty, a problem that finds its first modern expression in the work of Malthus.[28] Yet positivist development draws *ahistorical* conclusions from its analysis of history, because it naturalizes the historical conditions so analysed. History, in effect, becomes meaningless.

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27. This positivistic view of science can be found in John Stuart Mill, *Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy*, *op. cit.*, pg. 98.
28. Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, London, 1798 at <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/malthus/popu.txt> on 30 April 2005.

Development is seen as the intention to bring about progress on the basis of knowledge of the general laws of progress. Thus, progress itself is a necessary condition for development to be undertaken. The study by development experts of (unintentional) progress, e.g., in the early industrializing countries, is posited to provide the knowledge that can then be operationalized. For example, socioeconomic progress is often seen in terms of stages, such as primitive, feudal, and capitalist.[29] The investigation of the transitions between such stages is taken to reveal the general laws governing their occurrence, the knowledge of which can then be applied to the conditions of those who have not yet made the transition to capitalism, industrialization, the knowledge society, etc. And this then raises a further question about what has *prevented* such transitions from occurring. Yet what is less often asked is what makes such knowledge itself possible. How is it possible to inquire into the laws of progress, given that such inquiry is a prerequisite for intending development?

The problematization of meaning arises because development is objectified as a process to be explained. Individuals are separated from involvement in, and constitution of, their own historical context in the explanation of historical occurrences. Furthermore, the significance of historical context is denied as constitutive in development since, on the one hand, historical immanence is seen as what prevents development, whereas, on the other, historical transcendence is thought to be possible only on the basis of developedness. For this reason, as Cowen and Shenton argue, the notion of trusteeship is brought in as a bridge. The trustee—the developmental state, the development agency, the Bank, etc.—is held to be capable of acting on behalf of those held incapable of acting on their own behalf. The situation of the developer is absolutely distinct from the situation of the developee, a heterogeneity that cannot be

29. As found in Turgot, the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, Marx and, in its U.N.-era form, in W.W. Rostow, in which the stages are characterized in terms of consumption.

overcome by appeal to transcendence, universality, etc., because such appeal already presupposes that the meaning is identical for developer and developee alike.

The meaning of developedness is presupposed as objectively given by the existence of the leisured countries. This meaning is not contestable; only the *explanation* of development is, and this requires expert knowledge. Positivist development entertains no dispute about the meaning of developedness, because this is objectively demonstrated in the indicators which signify it and by which it is measured. Contention over the meaning of development is therefore taken to indicate a lack of knowledge and expertise, which is equated with lack of developedness itself. Furthermore, in regarding development as an objective process, the idea that inquiry into development is itself *part* of development cannot enter into the analysis. This makes development into a process already given, and thus ultimately static.

My principal aim here is to show how positivist development, although appearing to recognize that the subject of development is far more complex than positivist *economics* can account for, reformulates notions that pose a challenge to this predominantly economic framework in a way that assimilates them to it. Positivist development thinking takes development as an *object* that can be studied, learnt about, and operationalized, but cannot itself call this approach into question, nor the analytic tools used to study it. Positivist development is unable to consider that the subject of development might be complex because it is not an object at all. By objectifying development, it removes development thinking itself from the subject of development. That is, such thinking is *about* development, but is not seen as constituting it in any way. Thus, the role of the development expert is viewed as that of an objective, scientific *observer* of the socioeconomic situation, and not as a co-constituter of the meaning of the particular phenomenon concerned.

The Development Problematic

Surplus population and poverty

In positivist development, poverty is generally regarded as a defining characteristic of underdevelopedness. For example, the World Bank's mission statement says that "[o]ur dream is a world *free of poverty.*"[30] The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) says that, "CIDA supports sustainable development activities *in order to reduce poverty* and to contribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world."[31] The vision of CARE Canada is: "[w]e seek a world of hope, tolerance and social justice, where *poverty has been overcome* and people live in dignity and security."[32] The Agence française de Développement Group (AfD), in its operations on its own behalf, "finances projects in nearly all sectors of the economy. Their goal is to *struggle against poverty* and improve living conditions".[33] The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) defines development cooperation by its "aim to *alleviate poverty* by helping people in partner countries to help themselves."[34] The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has as its goal "[a] world *without poverty*, fear and ecological destruction".[35] Oxfam Canada is "dedicated to *fighting poverty* and injustice around the world" and Oxfam UK's purpose is "to *overcome poverty* and suffering".[36] Norway's development agency NORAD states that its "most important task is to contribute in the international

30. At <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040565~menuPK:34563~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
31. At <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/whatwedo.htm> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
32. At <http://care.ca/about/about_e.shtm#mission> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
33. At <http://www.afd.fr/jahia/Jahia/op/edit/pid/180> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
34. At <http://www.sdc.admin.ch/index.php?userhash=29146280&navID=396&lID=1> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
35. At <http://www.bmz.de/de/ziele/index.html> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
36. At <http://www.oxfam.ca/what_we_do/index.htm> and <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/about_us/mission.htm>, respectively, on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.

cooperation to *fight poverty*"[37] and sees one of the main goals of development cooperation as "[t]o *combat poverty* and contribute towards lasting improvements in living standards and quality of life".[38] The mission of South Africa's National Development Agency (NDA) is to "contribute[] towards the *eradication of poverty* and its causes".[39] The goal of the work of Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) "is to improve the standard of living of poor people and, in the long term, to *eradicate poverty*".[40] These, of course, are just a fraction of the organizations involved in development activities, whether at the community, regional, national or international level.[41]

Development thinkers, too, have focussed on poverty. In *Asian Drama*, first published in 1968, Gunnar Myrdal wrote that "'[d]evelopment' means the process of moving away from 'underdevelopment', of rising out of poverty."[42] More recently, Joseph Stiglitz, although purportedly arguing for "a new paradigm for development", has claimed that

> The experience of the past 50 years has demonstrated that development is possible, but not inevitable. While a few countries have succeeded in rapid economic growth...bringing millions of their citizens *out of poverty*, many more countries have actually seen...*poverty increase*.[43]

Amartya Sen, too, ultimately couches his conception of "development as freedom" in terms of poverty.[44] Development addresses "the more inclusive idea of capability

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37. At <http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=1139&V_LANG_ID=0> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
38. At <http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=1284> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
39. At <http://www.nda.org.za/ndaVm.htm> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
40. At <http://www.sida.se/Sida/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=160> on 12 July 2005, emphasis added.
41. Devdir's *Directory of Development Organizations 2005* lists 43,500 organizations worldwide that are involved in development in one way or another, and warns that "[t]he database is not exhaustive and there may be other relevant organizations in your country." Downloadable at <www.devdir.org>.
42. Myrdal, *op. cit.*, pg. 355.
43. Joseph Stiglitz, "Towards a New Paradigm for Development," UNCTAD, Geneva, 1998, pg. 5 (my emphasis).

deprivation" (DaF 20), which he then reformulates as "capability-poverty": "poverty must be seen as the deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely as lowness of incomes" (DaF 87).

Because poverty is *demonstrable* (through the use of statistical measurements, research projects, and anecdotal observation), it is taken as a given. It is taken to be so self-evident that it is difficult to clarify whether leisured and hard-working countries are differentiated in other respects, and how this functions as the basis of positivist development thinking. The only difference that counts is that leisured countries have "solved" the problem of (absolute) poverty (at least for themselves), as is evident in its minimal levels according to whatever the baseline is for poverty in a particular country. Hard-working countries have failed to solve this problem, and so remained immersed in widespread poverty and destitution.

Although it is now usually argued that development is about more than just economic growth, development experts still maintain that economic growth is an important factor, since a certain level of production in a society provides the resources with which to *address* poverty.[45] The problem for the poor is not simply that they *are* poor but that their poverty, as a lack of productive resources, is what makes them unable to affect their situation. The argument is that the situation of the poor denies them the ability to take the steps necessary to address their own poverty.[46] For example, the

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44. Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1999. Hereafter DaF followed by page number.
45. An argument which can be found in Adam Smith. Cf. WN I 104.
46. A situation that has been called a "poverty trap". See UNCTAD, *The Least Developed Countries Report 2002: Escaping the Poverty Trap*, United Nations, Geneva, 2002; Jeffrey D. Sachs, John W. McArthur, Guido Schmidt-Traub, Margaret Kruk, Chandrika Bahadur, Michael Faye and Gordon McCord, "Ending Africa's poverty trap", *Brookings papers on economic activity*, vol. 1, 2004: 117–240; Charles Gore, "Globalization, the International Poverty Trap and Chronic Poverty in the Least Developed Countries", CPRC Working Paper No. 30, Manchester, 2003; Alice Sindzingre, "Explaining Threshold Effects of Globalisation on Poverty: An Institutional Perspective", UNU-WIDER Conference, Helsinki, October 29-30, 2004.

accumulation of capital is spread too thin to allow it to be productively invested; government revenues per capita are so low that they do not allow for investment in productive public goods. Leisured countries, in contrast, have the resources both for all sorts of social programmes to be possible and for their different economic sectors to be able to exploit opportunities. And despite the persistence of poverty (on some measure, at least) in rich societies, their resources enable them to undertake ameliorative programs (e.g., income support, free or inexpensive education, health-care provision, etc.) that can enable the poor to climb out of poverty (at least in principle).

For this reason, the development goal is to provide the means not present in the underdeveloped society itself whereby that society can come to be the agent of its own development. Foreign aid and technical co-operation (whether for infrastructure projects such as building dams and roads, or for targetted projects such as vaccination) are a means to bridge the developmental gap. But this gap is not merely one of income level. Therefore, foreign aid is not *redistributive*, but is intended as a catalyst for change, from poor (because of traditional and contextual constraints) to increasing wealth (by becoming modern[ised]). This view is characteristic of the various positivist development theories found throughout the U.N. era: modernisation theorists who focussed on economic growth, industrialization, and the sequence of stages that countries must go through;[47] structuralist theorists who focussed on unemployment and structural imbalances between agricultural ("traditional") and industrial ("modern") sectors;[48] dependency theorists who focussed on the international environment and its

47. For example, Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse, Hirschman and Rostow (cf. Martinussen, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-72; Todaro and Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-115). Rostow's stages theory can be found in W.W. Rostow, "The Take-off into Self-sustained Growth", *The Economic Journal*, vol. 66, no. 261, March 1956, pp. 25-48, and "The Stages of Economic Growth", *The Economic History Review*, New Series, vol. 12, no. 1, 1959, pp. 1-16.
48. For example, Lewis, Prebisch, and Myrdal (cf. Martinussen, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-84; Todaro and Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-123).

effects on capital accumulation in the "periphery";[49] neoliberal theorists who argued for privatization and deregulation, and "market-friendly" policies;[50] and recent (and somewhat more nuanced) development thinkers who argue that industrialisation needs to be accompanied by social transformation (almost always in terms of the connected domains of marketization and institution- or capacity-building, the latter creating the conditions for the former, which itself involves a change in attitudes).[51] For these theorists, development assistance is ostensibly aimed at supplying the conditions for development through the action of the "trustee" (e.g., the Bank or the "developmental state"), which on the basis of its own experience and resources is able to provide the knowledge and capacity necessary.

The centrality of poverty in positivist development reflects the 19th century concern about the "social question", i.e., the appearance of large numbers of unemployed, particularly in urban areas, as a consequence of the industrialization or mechanization of agricultural and manufacturing production. In this way, a "surplus population" was created that had neither its own means of subsistence, nor access to the means of production (cf. DoD 151-153). Yet this state of affairs, despite the social immiseration, was also recognized to be progressive. The 19th-century development problematic thus concerned the social immiseration and revolutionary consequences of such progress.[52] The positivist conception of intentional development arose in response to this situation.[53] For example, the issue for the Saint-Simonians, was "the creation of

49. As discussed above.
50. For example, Bauer, Lal, Bhagwati, and Krueger (cf. Todaro and Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-131). This was the view of the IMF and World Bank view throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s, often called the "Washington Consensus".
51. For example, Stiglitz.
52. Revolutions broke out across Europe in the 1820s, 1830s and, most seriously, in 1848. Cf. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, *op. cit.*, ch. 6; *The Age of Capital*, *op. cit.*, ch. 1.
53. As we have seen in the previous chapter, economic development as understood by the early political economists was *not* an intentional undertaking.

order in a society undergoing radical transformation and the nature of that transformation itself" (DoD 22).

Objectification by quantification and classification

Positivist development in the U.N. era elides the conceptual difficulties through objectification of the subject of development, i.e., by data-gathering, quantification and measurement, and increasing reliance on sophisticated analytical techniques to show what the significant variables are, how they relate to one another, and how these can be operationalized. The underdeveloped are considered to be incapable of doing this on their own behalf. Therefore, they cannot determine their own development, and thus the development that is posited for them as what *should* occur cannot be binding for them, in the sense that they recognize it *as* the meaning of their development. If they could recognize it as the meaning of their own development, they would already have the basis for the intention, and therefore intentional development would be unnecessary.

In U.N.-era development, the nation-state has primacy, despite various attempts to recognize both supra- and sub-national regionality (particularly in the European Union). Therefore, social change is generally articulated in terms of national entities. The problematic of development involves the classification of countries, as developed and underdeveloped, modern and traditional, high-, middle- and low-income, etc., as is evident in the tables and indices produced annually by the World Bank and the UNDP.

The modern idea of development is a result of the particular histories of the leisured countries, not those of the hard-working countries. The measure of developedness is therefore based on these histories. Yet this measure is supposed to be applicable outside of those countries. More precisely, the standards and values used to

determine stages of development are supposed to transcend the societies in which they arise. But how can they be transcendent or universal, when the very notion of development as an intentional activity rests on the fact that such standards are *not* present in "underdeveloped" societies?

These contradictions were resolved in positivist economics, as we have seen, in its discovery of the "natural laws" governing economic interaction. Because such laws also determined economic progress, the latter was held to be latent in the economic system. In Marx's view, this made development inevitable:

> Intrinsically, it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the social antagonisms that result from the natural laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results. The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.[54]

The naturalization of economic behaviour made it feasible to propose and implement policies designed to harmonize society with these laws. The "iron necessity" provided the basis for the classical liberal program of "the running of society as an adjunct to the market",[55] a program that involved, as Karl Polanyi expressed it, "a mystical readiness to accept the social consequences of economic improvement, whatever they might be".[56] Nevertheless, whatever the economic improvement, the *social* improvement predicted in instituting the market society proved to be illusory.

Although naturalistic economic laws provide a theoretical basis for the intention to develop, there is still a need for universal, objective standards of the *improvement* that this intention is to bring about. Without such standards, the claim that the leisured countries are more developed or advanced than, rather than simply different from, the hard-working countries would be unsupportable. Thus, in the U.N. era the

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54. Karl Marx, Preface to the First Edition, *Capital Vol. I*, *op. cit.*.
55. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, *op. cit.*, pg. 57.
56. *Ibid.*, pg. 33.

determination of developedness has involved data-collection and the construction of indices to quantify social and economic achievement, such as GNP, mortality and morbidity rates, education rates, etc. Such measurement and use of indices objectifies and thus abstracts from the lived reality that constitutes the situations measured.

Social change and transformation

The second aspect that characterizes the development problematic is the nature of social change and transformation. There are four aspects to this: (i) whether social change is mechanistic, involving the interaction of independently existing "atomic-like entities" (DoD 211) that are not affected by such change themselves, or whether it is organic, involving the interdependence of entities which themselves change along with the changes in society; (ii) whether such change is the result of external forces such as general laws of history, or of internal tendencies; (iii) whether the very idea of social change can itself change; (iv) the role of agency (intention or purpose), i.e., whether social change can be directed or whether the domain of agency is subordinated to it, and also how such change itself affects both the understanding of this role and the purposes themselves.

One conceptual basis for classification of countries that is not usually clearly articulated is the *source* of social change or movement ascribed: developed countries are considered to have an internal source of social movement or self-transformation as a consequence of their history or the process of development, whereas underdeveloped countries are considered to lack this source, and thus to be unmoving or immobile, or "stagnant", precisely because development has not occurred. With this classification, the development problematic is seen to be concerned with how to transform hard-working countries so as to be the motive source of their own development.

This view is evident in the modernisation paradigm, which maintains that

tradition only properly pertains to hard-working countries, because they remain determined by their traditional ways of being, which prevent them from recognizing their own agency (i.e., that they are the creators of their own history). Leisured countries, on the other hand, are seen as being free from determination by tradition.[57] However, this serves to occlude the significance of tradition in leisured countries, i.e., that their ability to change themselves is a result of their history and thus is part of their tradition. The modernisation view of hard-working countries as "not yet self-moving" is correlative to the failure to recognize that "being had" by tradition is a way of *having* tradition, i.e., of being a society. Tradition is not the "no longer" of the past, nor is modernity the "not yet" of the future. Traditions are only such in the way they are had, i.e., in the significance they have for members of a society, however implicit or latent this might be. Tradition is not a possession, but is constituted in the relation a society has towards its history.

Positivist development problematizes this by attempting to quantify and measure all aspects of social being, thereby making them amenable to technical intervention. It holds that the state of self-producing or self-moving can be achieved by means of technical production. But in order to achieve this the society in question would *already* have to be self-determining, which cannot therefore be the aim or end-state. That is, *being* produced cannot be equated with *self*-producing. A society cannot be "modern" in the sense that positivist development supposes without being had by its traditions. Correlatively, a society cannot be "traditional" without having its traditions.

57. For example, Rostow, "Take-Off", *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28 and "Stages", *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5; Stiglitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 12-13, 16. Myrdal articulates a similar view, but also attempts to locate this in the developing countries themselves (Myrdal, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21, 27-33, 36-38).

Illustrations of Positivist Development

The positivist conception of development is primarily due to the central role of positivist economics and its theoretical models. Since this is most evident in the World Bank's conception of, and approach to, development, I draw on the Bank's publications to illustrate the tenets of positivist development. A variant of positivist development is found in Amartya Sen's concept of development as the expansion of capabilities ("development as freedom") and its operationalization by the UNDP. Although this variant appears to go beyond the positivism of economics, in many ways it actually furthers this tendency by broadening quantificational analysis to include *quality* of life. Although it goes beyond the narrow focus on income and growth that until recently typified mainstream development thinking, it does so in a similarly positivist way. The capabilities or capacities deemed significant are those which can be measured, and so made quantitatively comparable. This leaves no scope for consideration of the meaning of such capabilities, and thus how they are qualitatively distinct, which would require historical contextualization.

The World Bank

> The World Bank has always been the premier development institution. In providing loans and expertise, it has exerted considerable influence over domestic development policy.[58]

In order to provide some evidence for my analysis of positivist development, I examine the World Bank. Although only one institution among many, the Bank is highly influential in positivist development thinking, for a number of reasons, including its membership structure, the scope of its involvement, its knowledge production, and

58. Philip McMichael, *Development and Social Change*, Pine Forge, Thousand Oaks, 2000, pg. 50.

its institutional links. Thus, despite the wide criticism of many of its policy prescriptions in recent years, its conception of development is not idiosyncratic.

Almost all countries belong to the Bank, and are shareholders in it. They contribute to the capital that it uses for its operations, which means that borrowing countries are also owners of the institution from which they are borrowing.

> The World Bank is a major actor in the material and discursive fields of development—something that cannot be overlooked in any overview of the sector. It possesses unparalleled economic and institutional resources with which to implement projects and programmes around the world.[59]

The Bank is involved in a large number of projects in almost every sector and underdeveloped country and is considered to be "a conveyor belt of ideas about development to the borrowing countries".[60]

In addition, the Bank has extensive data-gathering and research capacities,[61] and produces numerous reports, policy papers, technical papers, etc., on a wide variety of development issues, and regularly produces reports on individual countries. Through such avenues, it has contributed extensively to development thinking and played a "major role...as a source of ideas on economic and social development".[62] It has links to other international institutions (e.g., the International Monetary Fund (IMF), other development institutions and agencies, and non-governmental organizations). The Bank also works in partnership with other development institutions and agencies, such as the regional development banks (most of which were modelled on the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)[63]), bilateral aid agencies, and non-

59. Emma Mawdsley and Jonathan Rigg, "A survey of the World Development Reports I: discursive strategies", *Progress in Development Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2002, pg. 16.
60. Michael Gavin and Dani Rodrik, "The World Bank in Historical Perspective", *American Economic Review*, vol. 85, no. 2, 1995, pg. 332.
61. The Bank's administrative budget for fiscal 2004 was $1.87 billion (*Annual Report 2004*, pg. 7) and it employs "[s]ome 10,000 development professionals" worldwide, according to the Bank's website ("What is the World Bank" at <www.worldbank.org>)..
62. Gavin and Rodrik, *op. cit.*, pg. 329.
63. UNITAR/DFM, "Lesson 3", *Online Course in the Negotiation of Financial Transactions*, 2003, pg. 18.

governmental organizations (NGOs). Finally, as is evident in its publications, the Bank is concerned to present itself not just as an opinion leader, but as responsive to ideas from other sources.

> Where the Bank's strength lies is in its tremendous powers to spread and popularize ideas that it latches on to. Once the Bank gets hold of an idea, its financial clout ensures that the idea will gain wide currency.[64]

The World Bank's Conception of Development

An examination of some of the Bank's reports can make its theoretical attitude to development evident. My aim is to show the following. First, the Bank views development as an immanent or natural process evident in the history of North Atlantic countries in the 19th century and certain East Asian countries in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Studying the history of the leisured countries, as well as the recent history of the hard-working countries, is considered sufficient to show experts how development occurs or fails to occur and thus how development agencies and experts can assist or intervene to speed it up or bring it about. Second, development is objectified as a linear process that holds good for all societies. This process is seen fundamentally as an *economic* process, to be explained predominantly with the analytical framework of neoclassical economics, as a matter of allowing markets to function properly so as to bring about growth.[65] The experts who study this process and learn about it are not considered to be part of the process itself. Rather, they stand outside of it, purely as observers. What is observed does not include the conceptualization and action of such observers. Nor are development interventions properly considered to be a part of the process, since what they aim to bring about is an objective, "natural" process. In this conception, then, the relationship between the leisured and hard-working countries is

64. Gavin and Rodrik, *op. cit.*, pg. 333.
65. As is evident in the Bank's constant reiteration of the necessity of economic growth.

treated as inessential. Development is a process that can be instantiated by *any* country, regardless of conditions in other countries.

In World Bank publications, we find all of the central aspects of positivist development: (i) the objectification of the subject of development, both concretely as "the poor" and abstractly as "poverty"; (ii) theoretical abstraction from history; (iii) the identification of knowledge with development; and (iv) the disjunction between development as the implementation of objectively determined policy, and as a form of self-understanding that arises *through* determination of policy.

The Reification of Poverty

> The *Report* draws on years of World Bank experience—in the analysis of projects, sectors and national economies, and in research—to examine the *causes and effects of progress in human development* and what it takes to implement successful programs in this area.[66]

The first *Report* to focus on poverty[67] characterizes the situation of hard-working countries as involving "two major challenges", which are "to continue their social and economic development" in an increasingly difficult international environment, and to "tackle the plight of the 800 million people living in absolute poverty, who have benefited much too little from past progress" (WDR80:1). In its examination of these challenges, the Report takes as "[o]ne of its central themes...the importance of people in development", citing Adam Smith's observation "that the

66. World Bank, *World Development Report 1980*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980, pg. iii (hereafter WDR followed by year and page number). Note that every WDR carries a disclaimer, such as "This volume is a product of the staff of the World Bank, and the judgments made herein do not necessarily reflect the views of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent" (e.g., WDR98/99:ii). Thus, as Mawdsley and Rigg point out, "[t]hey are officially not documents of the Executive Board of the World Bank, and so do not represent formal policy papers" (*op. cit.*, pg. 9). The status of the WDRs is complex, as the case of the Kanbur Report (WDR00/01) evinced. For this reason, I also make some reference to the *Annual Reports* (referred to by AR with year and page number following), which are official documents. These documents cover the whole history of the Bank, whereas the WDRs only began in 1978.
67. The others are WDR90 and WDR00/01.

prosperity of a nation is determined mainly 'by the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which its labor is generally applied' " (WDR80:1).

As with other WDRs (particularly WDR00/01), WDR80 characterizes development as "attacking absolute poverty" (WDR80:2), which is to be accomplished by accelerating growth and taking measures "to raise the incomes specifically of poorer groups" (WDR80:2). Development is understood primarily as concerned with poverty, thus involving distinctions between groups of people.[68] This restricted sense of development raises the question of why development should be of general concern, a question which cannot be answered by appeal to positivist economic analyses. Several reasons are suggested, such as basic moral considerations, the self-interest of the more well-off in terms of economic opportunities and interconnections (such as trade and investment) and, more recently, the issue of security, since extremely poor countries are viewed as likely to become "failed states" (i.e., those in which central government has collapsed, such as Somalia) and thus breeding grounds for extremists of one type or another.[69]

Objectification of "the poor"

An element common to all the WDRs is the objectification of "the poor". WDR80 states that

> The poor are a mixed group. Some cope reasonably well; others are on the margin of survival. Their well-being can fluctuate widely...
>
> The poor have other things in common, apart from their extremely low incomes... (WDR80:33)

In such objectification, people are completely identified with their conditions, which

68. Arguably, this has now become central to the positivist conception of development (as the Bank likes to say, "a consensus has been reached"), as the mission statements of various bilateral development agencies and the recent campaign to "Make Poverty History" show.
69. Thus the "war on terror" is the correlative to "attacking poverty". The symmetry is evident in the martial language and abstract target of both.

could be called (after Marx) "poverty fetishism", i.e., turning people into predicates of poverty, rather than poverty being a predicate of people. This monodimensional characterization is in stark contrast to the characterization of the non-poor (who are only infrequently mentioned in the Reports) and, presumably, with the way that the authors of the Report and the experts whose views they rely on would characterize themselves. Poverty supplies the "absolute constraint", such that people are reduced to passive recipients of external forces (natural, political, social and—less often mentioned—developmental). They are represented in a way that makes them tractable to intentional planning done on their behalf by agencies and governments, through "strategies" aiming to transform them from poor to "less poor", a process they are not capable of themselves. Indeed, the lack of such ability or capacity is itself identified with poverty:

> Unable to read a road sign, let alone a newspaper, their knowledge and understanding remain severely circumscribed. Yet they learn about the possibility of a better life from direct observation, from friends and relatives, and perhaps from small improvements in their own circumstances; and they hope that their children will somehow be able to climb out of poverty. (WDR80:33)

This characterization of "the poor" denies their agency, i.e., that these are people who, like others, are striving to survive and living their lives, no matter what their conditions may be. These conditions do not determine them as human beings, any more than is the case with others.

The positivist presupposition here is that the human situation is a matter of "facts" and the acquisition of knowledge that the expert can have about "the poor". Development expertise is considered to be sufficient for *understanding* the lives of others, but only in such a way that these lives are objectified. The absolute distinction made between the experts and the poor (or even the better off and the poor), implies that only those who are knowledgeable live their lives, and do so only by effecting improvements in their conditions. This suggests that the ability to understand our

situation is a function of having the ability to change it through technical knowledge about it, rather than being a constitutive aspect of *living* it. The poor are regarded as lived *by* their conditions, or rather, as not living at all in this sense. We find here the conflation of two different notions of "a better life": on the one hand, the notion of an objectively demonstrable improvement that "the poor" cannot understand; on the other, the notion of the *capability* to understand improvement, i.e., the ability to make evaluative judgments about conditions of life. This conflation is essential to the objectification of the subject of development, because it allows for external determination of what is "better" even when the people concerned do not recognize it as such or even disagree with it. Such objectification also allows for the quantification of poverty, and its measurement through data-gathering activities, although there are *technical* difficulties encountered:

> It is difficult to measure the extent of poverty. To begin with, absolute poverty means more than low income...There is also room for disagreement about where to draw the line between the poor and the rest, and about the correct way to calculate and compare incomes and living standards at different times and in different places.
>
> To compound these difficulties, the data are inadequate...Nor is direct observation necessarily a reliable basis for generalization... (WDR80:33)

Although such difficulties might suggest that this concept of poverty is overly determinate, the positivist explanation is that "[n]or is there any serious disagreement about who the poor are" (WDR80:35). "The poor" is an objective, natural category that can be observed and thus theorized about. Positivist development is not concerned with understanding the situation of the subject of development, but rather with ordering it into categories that then allow solutions to be sought and implemented.

Despite the adoption of elements from the "human development" approach of Amartya Sen and the UNDP, the WDRs retain a predominantly economic focus, and thus seek to *explain* development in terms of the policies and practises that may have an impact on the *quantitative* dimensions of poverty (such as rates of infant mortality,

morbidity, educational attainment, etc.). Development is not understood as a situation of human existence, but is treated as an object—a process—discovered in the world, and thus analyzable positivistically. WDR80 displays a rather uneasy compromise between its neoclassical economics basis and the notion of "human development" (as the Bank understands it):

> The case for human development is not only, or even primarily, an economic one. Less hunger, fewer child deaths and a better chance of primary education are almost universally accepted as important ends in themselves. But in a world of tight budgetary and manpower constraints, the governments of developing countries must ask what these gains would cost—and what the best balance is between direct and indirect ways of achieving them. (WDR80:32)

The point of human development, at least as the UNDP formulated it, was of course that it *encompassed* the economic. By enclosing it in a logic of cost-benefit analysis (a logic which is always normative and *not* positive, despite the apparent neutrality of the language), the primacy of the economic is once again reasserted.

Abstraction from History

Positivist development also objectifies through abstraction from history. For example, in its discussion of how oil-importing countries adjust to conditions of high oil prices, WDR80 argues from the "earlier experience" of "a similar adjustment in 1974-78" that

> The adjustment process has two stages. First, when there is a sudden increase in the cost of imports relative to export earnings, countries squeeze imports—and so growth slows sharply. Because too sharp a fall is disruptive, both economically and politically, countries accept large current account deficits and finance them from borrowing or aid. (WDR80:3)

This description of *the* adjustment process abstracts from the concrete situations in question. There is no consideration given as to *why* these countries followed this process. Rather, the implication is that this process simply occurs naturally, rather than that it was intentionally undertaken (perhaps even with advice from agencies such as the Bank). The way that these countries are theorized to have responded to the previous

situation is presented as an objective process. The Report continues:

> The second stage is to reduce these current account deficits to levels that can be financed over the medium term. At the same time output and trade must be restructured to meet the new circumstances. This structural change requires heavy investment. (WDR80:3)

Notably, this description purports to describe what historically occurred between 1974-78, but it presents it as a universal description of "the adjustment process", as if this were what would always occur in such conditions. There is no reflection here that, having gone through a previous adjustment, such countries might actually pursue *different* policies, perhaps because they have learnt *from* the past. That is, there is no consideration given to the fact that such countries are no longer the same as they were in the previous period, having lived through and experienced that period. The analysis dehistoricizes the history it purports to describe.

WDR90 gives a clear example of how positivist development interprets history to conform with its presuppositions:

> A review of development experience shows that the most effective way of achieving rapid and politically sustainable improvements in the quality of life for the poor has been through a two-part strategy. The first element of the strategy is the pursuit of a pattern of growth that ensures productive use of the poor's most abundant asset—labor. The second element is widespread provision to the poor of basic social services, especially primary education, primary health care, and family planning. (WDR 90:iii)

Which "development experience" is being referred to here is not clear, nor whose experience of it. It does not appear to include the experience of the 19th-century industrializing countries, in which capital-intensive production replaced labor-intensive production, resulting in widespread immiseration amongst the poor. Some countries, such as Germany, did enact measures to provide social services to the poor, but others, notably Britain, did not. Further on in the Report (Box 3.4), this is actually referred to, but without acknowledging that this strategy is not what the Bank prescribes. In discussing the industrial revolution in the U.K. and the U.S.A., it states that

> In both countries development in the early phase of the revolution was capital-intensive. Since at the same time the labor supply was increasing, the real wages of unskilled workers grew slowly, and economic growth had only a small effect on poverty. After about 1820 in the United Kingdom and 1880 in the United States, however, real wages began to rise, and poverty began to decline. (WDR90:50)[70]

Only later did "the labor-saving bias of early industrialization [give] way to a neutral or labor-intensive bias" (WDR90:50). This could be seen as supporting the Bank's view of the correct strategy for development (i.e., concentration on labor-intensive production), since the focus of its policy recommendations is on reducing poverty. But this would be precisely to *disregard* the development experience of the early industrializers. The "development experience" that the Bank refers to seems to be that of "three East Asian countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand", which achieved high growth that was "relatively labor-intensive, with agriculture to the fore". This growth "generated demand for the factors of production owned by the poor" (i.e., their labour) (WDR90:51).[71]

Furthermore, the strategies of the East Asian tiger economies were not oriented towards labor-intensive activities *per se*, but rather towards sectors that showed potential for productivity increases. Thus, in Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea, the initial focus was on textile and clothing production, guided by strategic industrial policy and the direction of financial resources by the government. Later, as this sector matured, the focus shifted to other industries, including the production of capital goods, heavy industry, and finally high technology.[72] China, too,

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70. No reference is given for this claim. In fact, real wages did *not* substantially improve in Britain until the middle of the 19th century. Cf. Backhouse, *Economists and the Economy*, *op. cit.*, pg. 39.
71. However, subsequent events, such as the financial crisis of 1997, would suggest that this development strategy had a number of problems.
72. See, for example, Charles Gore, "Methodological Nationalism...", *op. cit.*; Alice H. Amsden, "Why Isn't the Whole World Experimenting with the East Asian Model to Develop?: Review of *The East Asian Miracle*", *World Development*, vol. 22, no. 4, 1994, pp. 627-633.

has followed a different approach from the one that WDR90 recommends, yet has reduced the incidence of poverty substantially (although not across all regions).

The technocratic view is evident in WDR90's analysis of the "politics of poverty", which argues that "policies to reduce poverty involve a tradeoff", principally "between the interests of the poor and those of the nonpoor" (WDR90:3). Policies that favour the poor, such as "[s]witching to an efficient, labor-intensive pattern of development and investing more in the human capital of the poor", are part of a development strategy that is "more likely to be adopted in countries where the poor have a say in political and economic decision-making" (WDR90:3). That is, where the poor have such a say, they will tend to support those policies that favour them. However, this does not entail that they have a say in *determining* policies, for example, by contributing to debate and discussion in order to determine what is appropriate and feasible. The Bank's conception of development is a technocratic one, in which experts who have knowledge gained through observation of the "development experience" are in a position to present policies for endorsement. Here, then, the determination of policies is not considered to be part of the "development process", which instead is what occurs when policies are implemented. Nor is the *acquisition* of knowledge about development considered to be a part of development itself. For example, the Report's emphasis on education is at the primary level, which is instrumentally valuable in that it "increases the capacity of the poor to take advantage of...opportunities" for productive employment. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr has criticized this notion as a "human resource development approach" that "stresses how education and health enhance productivity, and have important value for promoting economic growth".[73]

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73. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, "Rescuing the Human Development Concept from the HDI: Reflections on a New Agenda", pg. 2, n.d., at <http://hder.undp.org/docs/training/oxford/readings/fukuda-parr_Rescuing.pdf> on 10 June 2005.

The Bank's view of the significance of history is also problematic. For example, WDR02 states that it "emphasizes the importance of historical context". But what is meant here is not the historical context that gave rise to present development conditions. Rather, it is the effect that decisions and choices in the present will have for the future: "where countries are today affects where they can go" (WDR02:iii). This is consistent with neoclassical economics, for which present conditions are simply taken as given, rather than as the outcome of previous decisions and choices. The failure to recognize this leads to the simplistic assertion that sources of "interference" in the operation of markets should be reduced or eliminated. Yet this is to *naturalize* present conditions, by treating them as objects or objective occurrences encountered in the world, rather than as meaningful contexts of socioeconomic life. In neoclassical economic model-building, such policy contexts are treated as natural objects that constrain the freedom of economic interaction.

Knowledge as Development

Leisured and hard-working countries are characterized by their ability, or lack thereof, to transcend their history. This contrast is expressed in terms of the contrast between the global and the local or, in their nominalized forms, globalization and localization.[74] In WDR98, this is expressed in terms of knowledge and information, and is used to characterize the difference between poor and rich countries and people. Hence it is seen as an aspect of the meaning of poverty:

> Poor countries—and poor people—differ from rich ones not only because they have less capital but because they have less knowledge. Knowledge is often costly to create, and that is why much of it is created in industrial countries. (WDR98:1)

Such lack of knowledge, as is evident in WDR80, is also considered to be lack of *self-*

74. See also Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Scan Globally, Reinvent Locally", Keynote Address, Global Development Network Conference, December, 1999.

knowledge, or at least lack of the kind of scientific and universal knowledge that can explain the particular situations that poor countries and poor people are in.

In WDR99, the twin poles of globalization and localization are recognized "as forces that bring new opportunities but also raise new or greater challenges in terms of economic and political instability" (WDR99:iii-iv). That is, they are regarded as impersonal, external forces to which we can only respond, rather than as aspects of how we organize our political and economic systems. They are regarded as *givens*, rather than as the outcomes of particular choices that we have made (or have imposed on others, or had imposed on us). The development response suggested is based on

> insights rooted in pragmatic judgements about how the existing conditions of society will affect which policy choices make sense, or how one sequence of policies is preferable to another, or how certain policies can complement and sustain each other. (WDR99:iv)

The Policy Problematic

As with the lessons learnt from experience, however, it is evident here that policy choices are *not* considered to have an effect on "the existing conditions of society", but simply to be responsive to them. The "pragmatic" view recommended here is one that accepts "the forces of globalisation and localization" as they are, rather than encourages attempts to direct them.[75] This corresponds to the central notion in positivist economics that, as we have seen, economic interaction is governed by laws that policy cannot alter.

Furthermore, the situation in which development policy is to be implemented is subject to "many forces" that will "reshape" it (WDR99:1). These forces are the unintended consequences of individual and social actions, such as "innovations in

75. It is interesting to note that in the 9th Raúl Prebisch Lecture to UNCTAD, the World Bank's then Chief Economist, Joseph Stiglitz, argued that development was concerned with the movement from "traditional ways of thinking" that are characterized by "the acceptance of the world as it is" to "the modern perspective" that "recognizes change", i.e., that we can take actions to change our world ("Towards a New Paradigm for Development", October, 1998). Yet here in WDR99, the view is that the forces of globalisation and localization are external and given, because "[t]hey are driven by powerful underlying forces" (WDR99:iv).

technology, the spread of knowledge...the financial integration of the world and rising demands for political and human rights" (WDR99:1). Although not referred to in WDR99 as "progress", it is clear that these "forces" are considered to have potentially beneficial effects, despite their capacity to destabilize society.

> If they are managed well, these forces could revolutionize the prospects for development and human welfare. However, the same forces are also capable of generating instability and human suffering that are beyond the ability of individual nation-states to remedy. (WDR99:1)

This corresponds precisely to the 19th century positivist conception of progress, as found for example, in Comte.

I have argued above that a central tenet of positivist development is the universality of development, although not necessarily its inevitability (cf. WDR99:14). Whether this is thought of in terms of "linear stages of growth", as was the case with modernization theory in the 1950s and 1960s,[76] or in terms of social objectives, as WDR99 argues, the fundamental idea is one of *convergence* in socioeconomic terms. Even though the consensus in mainstream development thinking is no longer that there is "a single, overarching policy prescription" that can bring about progress, this does not mean pluralism in the concept of development. The particular policies that can achieve the goals that constitute development may vary from one country to another, whereas the goals or objectives themselves are universal, comprising aspects such as "[r]aising per capita income", having "better health services and educational opportunities, greater participation in public life, a clean environment, intergenerational equity, and more" (WDR99:2). Furthermore, the policy diffidence that WDR99 appears to suggest is limited by constraints on governments:

> Governments play a vital role in development, but there is no simple set of rules that tells them what to do. Beyond *generally accepted rules*, the role of government in the economy varies, depending on capacity, capabilities, the country's level of

76. Cf. Todaro and Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-116; Martinussen, *op. cit.*, ch. 5; Hettne, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-66; Rostow, *op. cit.*

> development, external conditions, and a host of other factors. (WDR99:2-3, emphasis altered)

By "generally accepted rules", the Bank means "policy fundamentals" (WDR99:11) that ensure the "macroeconomic stability" that "is a necessary condition for the success of development initiatives" (WDR99:3). Unlike other aspects of the mainstream consensus on development, however, this does not "depend[] on time and place" (WDR99:3). "[M]acroeconomic stability is an essential prerequisite for achieving the growth needed for development" (WDR99:1). That is, macroeconomic stability is a *universal* requirement, rather than a contextually specific one.

The Knowledge Bank

The Bank's capacity for the production of knowledge about development has inspired it, since 1996, to argue that it is a "knowledge bank" as well.[77] As Wolfensohn stated,

> The Bank Group's relationships with governments and institutions all over the world, and our unique reservoir of development experience across sectors and countries, position us to play a leading role in this new global knowledge partnership.
>
> We have been in the business of researching and disseminating the lessons of development for a long time. But the revolution in information technology increases the potential value of these efforts by vastly extending their reach. To capture this potential, we need to invest in the necessary systems, in Washington and worldwide, that will enhance our ability to gather development information and experience, and share it with our clients. We need to become, in effect, the Knowledge Bank.[78]

This role for the Bank was later justified on the basis of the relationship between poverty and lack of knowledge. Seeing poverty in terms of knowledge allows for the articulation of the development problem to also include "knowledge gaps" and "information problems", and the suggestion that "developing countries must institute policies that will enable them to narrow the knowledge gaps that separate them from

77. This was announced by then-President James Wolfensohn in his address to the Annual Meetings of the Bank and the International Monetary Fund (James D. Wolfensohn, "People and Development", World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings Address, 1 October 1996).
78. *Ibid.*

rich countries" (WDR98/99:iii). Stiglitz, too, endorsed this view of the Bank, arguing that

> one of its central tasks [is] to help countries to close the knowledge gap. It can provide the cross-country experience that, when melded with local knowledge, makes possible effective choices of development policies, programmes and projects.[79]

In many respects, this announcement represents the culmination of a trend that was evident in the Bank in the first decade of its existence. In 1955, the Bank indicated how its role had changed during that first decade: "At first regarded only as a source of loans, today it is often looked to by its members as a source of advice on many different aspects of economic development" (AR54/55:29). At that time, the Bank's knowledge and expertise were being called upon by its members. Forty years later, the intention is to become a central directorate of development knowledge for the entire world. The question is whether positing lack of knowledge as a component of poverty is a coherent shift in the Bank's conception of development, or whether it represents a shift at all.

Knowledge and Policy: The Comprehensive Development Framework

The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), the new approach to development launched by the Bank in 1999, is intended to allow countries to determine their own development policies. "It advocates: a holistic long-term strategy; the country in the lead, both 'owning' and directing the development agenda, with the Bank and other partners each defining their support in their respective business plans..."[80] Presented in this way, it suggests an approach that is determined by individual countries, and therefore is not universalistic in the technocratic way that development assistance has hitherto been practised.

> The CDF is essentially a process: it is not a blueprint to be applied to all countries in a uniform manner.[81]

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79. Stiglitz, "New Paradigm", *op. cit.*, pg. 21.
80. World Bank, "What is CDF" at <www.worldbank.org> on 14 June 2005.

As such, this might suggest that mainstream development thinking has embraced a different paradigm, one in which it is recognized that development is a singular undertaking rather than the reproduction of the policies and institutions that are found in leisured countries. It could be argued that with the CDF, the Bank has recognized the limitations of its previous ahistorical, positivist approach to development, and now views development as historically contextualized.

However, a closer look at the CDF indicates that this is not, in fact, the case. One reason is that, as the Bank's website says,

> The CDF principles have been widely and explicitly accepted by the international community, as a basis for achieving greater poverty reduction and sustainable development.[82]

That is, although perhaps particular policy recommendations are no longer determined by the Bank (or development experts from other agencies), the *principles* that are to guide the determination of policies are. Thus, countries are expected to conform to principles, rather than policy recommendations, that have been determined for them by outside experts. As a report on the CDF from 2001 states,

> Countries need to develop both the long-term vision and a medium-term strategy—such as PRSP [Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper]—in a well-concerted manner. The long-term vision must focus on country-determined development goals, and their sequencing and prioritization. Medium-term strategies should derive from the long-term vision, and care should be taken that they are not driven solely by short-term concerns.[83]

With the CDF, then, the Bank no longer determines *what* hard-working countries should do, but rather the *process* whereby they themselves work out what to do. Just as with policy recommendations previously, the implication is that the determination of this process is not itself a part of development. Whereas in the earlier approach hard-working countries were considered unable to determine development policies precisely

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81. *Ibid.*
82. *Ibid.*
83. CDF Secretariat, Preface to "Comprehensive Development Framework: Meeting the Promise?", World Bank, September 17, 2001 at <www.worldbank.org> on 14 June 2005.

because they are *not* developed, so in the new approach such countries are considered unable to determine the process of determining their own policies. The positivist, universalistic attitude reappears, only now at a higher level of abstraction.

Another reason why the CDF remains a universalistic approach to development is because it is seen to require adherence to the same economic policies that the Bank has always prescribed:[84]

> A stable macroeconomy, shaped by prudent fiscal and monetary policies, is an essential backdrop to the development efforts the CDF proposes. This stable macroeconomic environment occupies the "other half of the balance sheet," complementing the CDF. (WDR99:21, Box 4)

Against this "other half of the balance sheet", the notion of "country ownership" is drained of content.

And just as hard-working countries had problems implementing the Bank's policy recommendations (or prescriptions, depending on the conditions under which Bank expertise was involved), so too are they having problems with implementing the principles. The same 2001 report examined 46 countries that were attempting to implement CDF and concluded that

> implementation of the principles has been difficult and uneven among these countries, not least because most of them are among the poorest countries of the world...Considerable persistence will be required to realize *our* long-term goal of improving the effectiveness of the development process through application of the CDF principles.[85]

Furthermore, the Bank retains authority over the implementation of the CDF because it has tied it to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which are the response of Bank and the IMF to their member governments' direction to find new ways in which to address the problem of indebtedness.[86] This approach required hard-working country

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84. Cf. World Development Movement, *One size for all*, September 2005, available at <www.wdm.org.uk/onesize.pdf>).
85. *Ibid.*, pg. 2, emphasis added.
86. Cf. Ann Pettifor, "Introduction" in Alan Whaites, ed., *Masters of their own development?*, World Vision International, Monrovia CA, 2002, pg. 4.

governments to make a commitment to spend the savings from debt-relief on health and education.[87] The PRSPs thus put the Bank and the IMF in a position of authority over those governments, at least insofar as debt relief is concerned. Whaites argues that

> The fact that PRSPs were a new instrument of conditionality was sometimes downplayed amidst the talk of participation and pro-poor policy. Yet this was a significant evolution in the lineage of conditions that have been laid down for borrowing states since the early 1980s.[88]

Thus, by building in PRSPs, the Bank retains control over policy. The Bank sees itself in the position of the expert in development thinking. This attitude is continuous with that expressed previously by the Bank in WDR 98, entitled *Knowledge for Development*, which argues that international development institutions (such as the Bank itself) can reduce the "knowledge gaps" and "information problems" that hard-working countries suffer from, by

> creating new knowledge, transferring and adapting knowledge to the needs of developing countries, and managing knowledge so that it is kept accessible and constantly refreshed. (WDR98:6)

Further on in the same Report, the last role of such institutions is qualified as "to manage the rapidly growing body of knowledge about development" (WDR98:6). In other words, international institutions are considered to be capable both of producing knowledge that is relevant to hard-working countries' situations and of adapting it to their needs. And part of the knowledge to be produced, adapted and managed is knowledge about development, i.e., about the conditions in hard-working countries themselves. As with the CDF, there is an assumption of the need for trusteeship, since the hard-working countries lack the capacity to produce and manage knowledge about their own development (or in the case of the CDF, to implement their own processes of policy determination). Thus, despite the claim that the CDF represents a new approach in which hard-working countries "own" their policies, in reality it simply reproduces, at

87. Alan Whaites, "Making PRSPs Work", in Whaites, ed, *op. cit.*, pg. 9
88. *Ibid.*, pg. 10.

a more abstract level, the need for an external agent that can embody the intention to develop.

Another admission in the 2001 report on the CDF is particularly revealing:

> Of the four main principles of the CDF, the focus on and accountability for development results is the area where the least progress has been made. There are a number of reasons for this. *There is still much to learn about how the linkages between policy actions and development results are operationalized.*[89]

It is surprising to see the Bank making this particular claim, given that its approach to development over the preceding half-century had involved making policy recommendations/prescriptions on the basis that they would produce the development results that the Bank predicted. If the Bank actually means what it says here, it would suggest that its own capacity in development is far less authoritative than sometimes presented. It would also suggest that the Bank might have more to learn from the hard-working countries about "operationalising" their own development "results" than they themselves have. WDR99 sometimes comes close to saying this:

> The twists and turns of development policy and the nature of the successes and failures around the world illustrate the difficulty of interpreting the development drama. The situations in which success and failure occur differ so much that it is sometimes not apparent which lessons should be extracted or whether they can be applied to other countries. (WDR99:17)

However, this near admission of the singularity of development and the limitations of positivist development thinking is quickly discounted:

> Despite the difficulty of drawing clearly applicable lessons from development history, current development thinking has been able to draw on country experiences to suggest a range of complementary policies. These policies, if implemented together and in a way that takes into account the situations of individual countries, are likely to encourage development. (WDR99:17)

In fact, the emphasis on the complexity of development and the difficulty in drawing lessons from it could be interpreted as a tacit self-justification for the Bank's existence, which has the expertise and resources lacking in hard-working countries to investigate this complex object and draw the appropriate conclusions. WDR98, as we have seen,

89. CDF Secretariat, *op. cit.*, pg. 5 (emphasis added).

makes just such an argument.

Thus, despite its adoption of this new approach, WDR99 still argues that the "recommendations for improving the provision of structural, physical, human and sectoral services" that have been made in "a number of *World Development Reports*" since 1990 (and thus guided by the previous conceptual frameworks) are still relevant.

> While some details may have changed in light of recent experiences, the tried and effective mechanisms for removing development bottlenecks presented in these reports remain a useful starting point. (WDR99:20)

The "bottlenecks" referred to here are "the economic or governmental weaknesses that stand in the way of a wide range of development objectives" (WDR99:20).[90] The claim that mainstream development thinking has been able to determine "tried and effective mechanisms" to address these "weaknesses" suggests that it already knows how to bring development about, yet the recognition of "the failure of many development efforts" (WDR99:14) makes that claim doubtful. If the complexity of development is such that it requires a new approach (e.g., the CDF), are the mechanisms that have previously been recommended really so effective? And if so, why has "development success" been so limited? Does the problem actually lie in implementation of policies by hard-working countries, or might it perhaps lie in the conception of development?

Development Goals

Further inquiry could, and should, be made into the way that "development goals" have come to replace policy prescriptions, particularly the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which are an internationally agreed upon set of targets to be achieved by 2015. The effect of the MDGs in mainstream development thinking has been to shift the focus from policy recommendations, which by their own standards

90. Note that these "bottlenecks" are considered to be *obstacles* to development, not what is supposed to *be* developed.

(except the counterfactuals of "what would have happened unless...") have proven to be less effective than those who prescribed them believed. Indeed, the Bank's own claim in WDR99 that there have been "frequent enough" successes is belied by its recognition that

> In fact, rich countries have been growing faster than poor countries since the Industrial Revolution in the mid-19th century. A recent estimate suggests that the ratio of per capita income between the richest and the poorest countries increased sixfold between 1870 and 1985. (WDR99:14)

The period under consideration here predates the U.N. era of development. Therefore, it is important to also take into account the fact that between 1980 and 2000, most hard-working countries have experienced a decline in real per capita GDP growth, whereas most leisured countries have experienced an increase. As the authors of a CPER Briefing Paper note,

> this evidence does not prove that the policies associated with globalization were responsible for the deterioration in performance. But it does present a very strong *prima facie* case that some structural and policy changes implemented during the last two decades are responsible for these declines.[91]

Even if such policies were not responsible for the declines, they did not result in the increase in economic performance that was the reason why they were recommended. Of course, such policy recommendations cannot take into account unforeseen exogenous factors. But it is indicative that the Bank notes that "[s]tandard economic theories predict that, other things being equal, poor countries should grow faster than rich ones" (WDR99:14). Since this has not occurred over the past century, it could be argued that standard economic theories are not very robust. However, the Bank argues instead that the problem lies with the hard-working countries themselves:

> Both past and present development thinking has devoted much effort to uncovering *explanations* for why low-income countries have difficulty in following this pattern. A number of studies show that low-income countries *can* grow faster than high-income countries...*if they implement an appropriate mix of growth-enhancing poli-*

91. Mark Wiesbrot, Dean Baker, Egor Kraev and Judy Chen, "The Scorecard on Globalization 1980-2000: Twenty Years of Diminished Progress", CEPR Briefing Paper, July 11, 2001, pg. 15.

> *cies*. *And increasing experience with development outcomes is providing insight into the complexity of the process and the multifaceted approach needed to achieve this growth*. (WDR99:15, emphasis added)

Such assertions indicate that the historical evidence is of less consequence than economic theory. The historical evidence is that the prediction of standard economic theories that hard-working countries will grow faster than leisured countries has been wrong. Nevertheless, studies that can only be based on theory rather than history show that they *can* grow faster. Therefore, hard-working countries are at fault because they have failed to implement the appropriate policies. What gets no mention here is why these countries implemented the policies that they did. Given that they have been Bank "clients" over the past decades, and (for the most highly indebted) in more recent times subject to onerous conditionality from both the Bank and the IMF, it is reasonable to suppose that the policy prescriptions that such countries implemented (however effectively) were those originating from the Bretton Woods institutions themselves.[92] Assuming that these institutions have no good reason for prescribing deliberately inappropriate policies, and that (more contentiously) these policies are based on the "standard economic theories" that predict the outcomes that did not, in fact, occur, it is reasonable to think that such theories might be wrong. As has been discussed previously, with regard to Adam Smith's objection to the "inversion" of the "natural order of things" in the economic sphere, the disparity between theory and history in positivist economics tends to get resolved in favour of the former, because it cannot account for the contingency and uniqueness of the latter. This, too, is an aspect of the theoretical attitude of positivism in the human historical sciences.

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92. This is not to deny that what may be recommended or prescribed in the way of policy may not in fact be what is implemented. But there is a difference between inadequate implementation and inappropriate policy that goes unrecognized here.

Amartya Sen and the UNDP

Development as Freedom

Amartya Sen's "capabilities approach" to development is another version of positivist development, one which combines economic with philosophical analysis. Sen's view of development is that it is "a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy" (DaF 3). Such real freedoms are those that allow people the choice and the opportunity of "exercising their reasoned agency" (DaF xii). Development, then, involves overcoming or removing constraints on "instrumental freedoms" such as "economic opportunities, political freedoms, social facilities, transparency guarantees, and protective security" (DaF xii). However, Sen is careful to point out that it is not just the removal of these constraints that is important, but also how it is done. It needs to involve "individual agency", or "intrinsic" human freedom.

With Sen, we find a broader view of development than one that focusses just on GDP or individual income growth. Focussing on the expansion of real freedoms, or capabilities, is important for two reasons: (i) the "evaluative reason", whereby development (or "progress", as Sen actually says) is assessed "primarily in terms of whether the freedoms that people have are enhanced"; and (ii) the "effectiveness reason", i.e., that "achievement of development is thoroughly dependent on the free agency of people" (DaF 4). Thus development depends on the exercise of that which it aims at (i.e., freedoms). Sen distinguishes between "free and sustainable agency" and "the strengthening of free agencies of other kinds" (DaF 4), although not always consistently. He also relates the expansion of individual freedom to "social development", arguing that

> What people can positively achieve is influenced by economic opportunities, political liberties, social powers, and the enabling conditions of good health, basic education, and the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives. (DaF 5)

The "institutional arrangements" for such opportunities are affected in turn by "the exercise of people's freedoms" in participating in "social choice and in the making of public decisions" (DaF 5). The exercise of individual agency affects the institutional environment, thereby affecting the social opportunities available for the exercise of further individual agency, in a positive feedback arrangement.

In focusing on capabilities, rather than on the degree to which objectified needs are met, Sen emphasises the qualitative aspects of development both as a process and as a result. As well, he calls for an ethical approach that takes into account both rights and the quality of life (or agency and well-being[93]).

Poverty as Capability Deprivation

Sen argues that the narrow focus on income growth and other purely economic indicators fails to recognize that poverty is "the deprivation of basic capabilities, rather than merely lowness of incomes" (DaF 87). Although income deprivation may indeed be a capability deprivation, it might not be the most significant one for development to address. The narrow focus on economic growth obscures the fact that "economic growth cannot sensibly be treated as an end in itself" (DaF 14).[94] Therefore, development must be about expanding people's capability sets, i.e., giving them more opportunities to pursue things that "they have reason to value". It "has to be concerned with enhancing the lives we lead and the freedoms we enjoy" (DaF 14) or, as he expresses it elsewhere, "what people can or cannot do".[95] This in turn means that "[t]he removal of substantial unfreedoms...is *constitutive* of development" (DaF xii). This seems like a plausibly expanded view of development, given that it seeks not to impose

93. Sen articulates this in "Well-being, Agency and Freedom", *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 82, no. 4, 1985, pp. 169-221.
94. Cf. also Amartya Sen, "Development: Which Way Now?", *The Economic Journal*, vol. 93, no. 372, 1983, pg. 753.
95. *Ibid.*, pg. 754.

values, but only to expand capabilities, thus allowing people the freedom to choose those functionings they "have reason to value". Of course, there must be constraints on functionings that negatively affect those of others, but this is a question of justice rather than development *per se*.

For Sen, substantive freedoms are *intrinsically* valuable, and therefore are vindicated "over and above the directly constitutive role of those freedoms in development" (DaF 5). As instrumentally valuable, however, they are also interrelated, with expansion of freedoms or opportunities in one area, such as market transactions, affecting those in another, such as political participation. Furthermore, these different freedoms all combine in the "general capability of a person" (DaF 10). Sen has elaborated his view of capabilities over a number of years in many publications. Here I simply present it in rough outline. The essential distinction that Sen makes in order to evaluate well-being is between "functionings" and "capability", the former being "various doings and beings that come into this assessment".[96] They are "the various things a person may value doing or being", whereas the latter "refers to the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible for her to achieve" (DaF 75). "A person's *capability set* can be defined as the set of functioning vectors within his or her reach."[97] Thus, functionings are what we actually do or are, whereas the capability set is the opportunities or possibilities we have of doing or being otherwise. The expansion of functionings may or may not be an expansion of a capability set. In contrast, expansion of a capability set by definition involves the expansion of functionings.

The general capability an individual has (her "capability set") has two dimensions, which are (i) "the *processes* that allow freedom of actions and decisions",

96. "Well-being, Agency and Freedom", *op. cit.*, pg. 197.
97. *Ibid.*, pp. 200-201.

and (ii) "the actual *opportunities* that people have, given their personal and social circumstances" (DaF 17). Individual freedom can be constrained either at the process level (e.g., political processes such as an inadequate electoral system) and at the opportunity level (e.g., preventing someone from casting her vote).

The example Sen uses repeatedly to illustrate his approach is the difference between starving and choosing to fast.[98] Although they may be identical in terms of caloric intake and thus "have the same functioning achievement" (DaF 75), the person starving has a restricted capability set that does not include the functioning of eating. So the capability set is a set of possible, but not necessarily realized, combination of functionings. For example, my capability set includes the functioning of fasting, although I may rarely realize it.

> While the combination of a person's functionings reflects her actual *achievements*, the capability set represents the *freedom* to achieve: the alternative functioning combinations from which this person can choose. (DaF 75)

The "freedom to achieve" is the intrinsic value of freedom, rather than an instrumental value. This maps on to Sen's distinction between processes that allow for freedom of action and actual opportunities to act. Thus, development can be understood either as expanding realized functionings or as expanding opportunities to realize functionings. Furthermore, Sen argues, it allows for a more robust evaluative role of freedom,

> since the value of a set need not invariably be identified with the value of the best—or the chosen—element of it. It is possible to attach importance to having opportunities that are *not* taken up. (DaF 76)

This latter aspect—having opportunities that are *not* taken up—is crucial, since without such opportunities the value or importance of choice would be problematic, and there would be no way to distinguish btween the fasting and the starving person. "The

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98. For example, "Freedom of Choice", pg. 292; "Well-being, Agency and Freedom", *op. cit.*, pp. 201-202. This is related to Sen's extensive and well-known work on famines and food policy. See for example "Food and Freedom", *World Development*, vol. 17, no. 6, 1989, pp. 769-781.

freedom to choose between alternative functioning bundles reflects a person's 'advantage'—his or her 'capability' to function."[99]

Individualism and Universalism

Sen's view, as is clear in *Development as Freedom*, is individualistic, for it "treats the freedoms of individuals as the basic building blocks" and argues that "the success of a society is to be evaluated...primarily by the substantive freedoms that the members of that society enjoy" (DaF 18). However, there is a difference between focussing on individuals in terms of their "substantive freedoms" and specifying that this is what development is concerned with. That is, Sen's argument is not that individuals *themselves* need to understand or engage in development in these terms, but that they should be seen as *having* their capabilities expanded by the *process* of development. The central question that Sen repeatedly evades is, who exactly is it that is supposed to do the evaluating?

Sen's view is universalistic, as well, "informed by a belief in the ability of different people from different cultures to share many common values and to agree on some common commitments" (DaF 244).[100] The social dimension of human existence allows for exercise of reasoned agency. "Individual freedom is quintessentially a social product", he states (DaF 31), but this does not mean that freedom is construed intersubjectively. Although "[i]ndividual capabilities crucially depend on, among other things, economic, social, and political arrangements" (DaF 53), but such arrangements do not *constitute* freedoms, but only allow for their *exercise*. Thus,

> there is a two-way relation between (1) social arrangements to expand individual freedoms and (2) the use of individual freedoms not only to improve the respective

99. "Freedom of Choice", pg. 279.
100. Cf. Stuart Corbridge, "Development as freedom: the spaces of Amartya Sen", *Progress in Development Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3, 2002, pp. 200-202.

> lives but also to make the social arrangements more appropriate and effective. (DaF 31)

Nevertheless, there is social *influence* on "individual conceptions of justice and propriety", which "depend on social associations" (DaF 31).

Values and meanings

Sen seeks to link value to choice, so that he can defend freedom as an intrinsic, rather than just instrumental, value. For this reason, he argues that value comes from the possibility of choosing or acting in accordance with values for which a person has reasons. However, Sen does not consider the issue of *meaning* in choice. Arguably, the difference between fasting and starving is not just one that concerns other possibilities that I could realize (or functionings that I could achieve, in Sen's terminology), but also involves my understanding of the act or condition. That is, a functioning may be meaningful even if it is not something that I can choose (either because it is not available to me or because no other possibility is available). My starving condition could be meaningful and therefore valuable to me, perhaps because it represents a refusal to bend to the will of well-provisioned but corrupt officials. For Sen, however, only fasting can be valuable because it can be chosen over some other possibility available to me. Starving is not valuable, because I cannot choose it. Similarly, in the case of tradition, Sen argues that insofar as I simply inherit it, it cannot be valuable. For Sen, then, value is subjective, inasmuch as values cannot be chosen *for* me. That is, I cannot be *provided* with functionings, because these are not choices I have made. We cannot force a fasting person to eat and also claim that this is valuable for her. Paternalism is not an option for development, in Sen's view.

Sen makes two claims with regard to values and choice that, taken together, are problematic. First, he indicates that *choosing* may well be a functioning, or "can be

seen" as one. For example, simply being given a higher income without my own active participation and choice in the matter may, in fact, result in a lower-value capability set, perhaps because my previous form of livelihood is taken away and replaced by a welfare cheque that provides me with more income. Second, on the question of *values* and what functionings and capabilities should be given higher value, he argues that determining "the weights [that] are to be selected" in trying to order combinations of functionings is a "judgemental exercise" that "can be resolved only through reasoned evaluation" (DaF 78). What is left unclarified is the basis on which such choices and values can be *mine*, i.e., can be those that I identify as *my* possibilities. Is "reasoned evaluation" itself a value to be evaluated, and if so, by whom and on what basis?

The point of the distinction between functionings and capabilities is to allow for the intrinsic value of freedom. Sen argues that

> If freedom is only instrumentally valued, then the valuation of the person's capability to function would be no different from evaluating the chosen functioning bundle in the respective capability set, i.e., the person's actual functionings.[101]

Without the notion of the capability set, the value of identical functionings will be the same regardless of whether these are constrained, coerced or freely chosen. The intrinsic value of freedom, i.e., freedom to choose, is only possible as a *separate* value if "the valuation of the capability set does not coincide with the evaluation of the chosen element of it".[102] Arguably, then, the functionings-capability distinction is the way Sen makes *meaning* evaluative.

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101. "Freedom of Choice", *op. cit.*, pp. 289-290.
102. *Ibid.*, pg. 290.

Human Development Report 1990

HDR90 introduced the concept of 'human development' and the UNDP's way of measuring this, the Human Development Indicators (HDI), as an operationalization of Sen's capability approach.[103] In explaining the concept, HDR90 argues that

> people must be at the centre of all development. The purpose of development is to offer people more options. One of their options is access to income—not as an end in itself but as a means to acquiring human well-being. But there are other options as well...People cannot be reduced to a single dimension as economic creatures. (HDR90:iii)

Like the WDRs, HDR90 insists that "growth in national production (GDP) is absolutely necessary to meet all essential human objectives", yet it goes on to say that "what is important is to study how this growth translates—or fails to translate—into human development in various societies" (HDR90: iii). The "options" that constitute human development include "access to income...long life, knowledge, political freedom, personal security, community participation and guaranteed human rights" (HDR90:iii).[104] This does not mean that these options are to be imposed or provided, however. Development is supposed to enable people to realize these conditions themselves. Indeed, the ability to choose *how* they develop is central to the concept of human development: "The basic objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy, and creative lives" (HDR90:9). Here, as in other passages in the Report, development is considered as an intentional process. However, unlike in the Bank's concept of development, HDR90 explicitly

103. This is discussed in Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, "The Human Development Paradigm: Operationalizing Sen's Ideas on Capabilities", *Feminist Economics*, vol. 9, no. 2-3, 2003, pp. 301-317.

104. The question might be raised as to whether these are in fact "options", as the HDR suggests. For example, although people do commit suicide, it is somewhat unusual to consider long life as an *option*, i.e., as something that people *choose* from among alternatives. Similar arguments can be made about the other aspects the HDR mentions. It is perhaps more usual (and arguably makes more sense) to consider these as *conditions* rather than options. The source of this notion that such conditions should be treated as options is Sen's capabilities approach. Viewing conditions as options is an attempt to counter the idea that development could be achieved without freedom. However, in "optionalizing" every aspect of the human situation, Sen commits himself to a rather extreme version of the theoretical attitude.

identifies development with an achieved state as well: "The term *human development* here denotes both the *process* of widening people's choices and the *level* of their achieved well-being" (HDR90:10).

HDR90 is explicit about the objectification involved in development thinking: "What makes [people] and the study of the development process fascinating is the entire spectrum through which human capabilities are expanded and utilised" (HDR90:iii). Reference to "*the* development process" makes it evident that development is understood here as a universal process. Human development, like economic or socioeconomic development, is a comparative conception, that allows for the comparison of different societies in terms of the "levels" of human development they have achieved. As such, it is positivist development, differing only in the identification of the purpose of development with the expansion of options, rather than economic growth or reduction of poverty.

The HDR claims that its "orientation...is practical and pragmatic", aiming "to analyse country experience to distill practical insights" so as to "make relevant experience available to all policymakers" rather than "to recommend any particular model of development" (HDR90:iii). Thus, the "study of the development process" in the Report aims to "make[] a contribution to the definition, measurement and policy analysis of human development" (HDR90:iii). Human development, like economic and socioeconomic development, is viewed as an object to be investigated, the investigation of which is external to that object. And the way this process is objectified is typically positivist, i.e., through quantification and comparison. The UNDP has therefore constructed the HDI, a system of quantification and measurement, "which assemble all available social and human data for each country in a comparable form" (HDR90:iii).

Tradition and History

Both Sen's individualism and the privilege he accords to reason are evident in his discussion of tradition, and his response to those such as postdevelopment thinkers who view development as (potentially) inimical to traditional ways of life. The real issue here, Sen argues, "concerns the source of authority and legitimacy" (DaF 31). If economic development may alleviate poverty at the cost of "a traditional way of life", "then it is the people directly involved who must have the opportunity to participate in deciding what should be chosen" (DaF 31). That is, such decisions should not be taken by "secular or religious authorities that enforce traditions" (DaF 32), but by individuals who "must be allowed to decide freely what traditions they wish or not wish to follow" (DaF 32). For Sen, then, reasoned agency (or the freedom to decide) trumps consideration of traditions. But this view is problematic. First of all, he posits an opposition between *freedom to choose* traditions and *enforcement* of traditions, as a question of who chooses, i.e., all those concerned or some elite authority. Although this may characterize *some* situations (such as with the issues in some societies of honour killings or gay marriage), it is not the fundamental question, which concerns how values and reasoning themselves are determined.

Sen's view of tradition is evident in the chapter he contributed to HDR04, entitled "Cultural liberty and human development". HDR04 states at the outset that

> Human development is first and foremost about allowing people to lead the kind of life they choose—and providing them with the tools and opportunities to make those choices...this is as much a question of politics as economics... (HDR04:v)

Here Sen argues that cultural diversity "is not itself a characteristic of human freedoms", and should only be taken as significant insofar as it has "causal connections to human freedom" (HDR04:16). For Sen, the cultural values that constitute cultural diversity are fundamentally individual values, and diversity arises "if individuals are

allowed and encouraged to live as they would value living" (HDR04:16). What is important is cultural *liberty*, which is characterized elsewhere in the report as "being able to choose one's identity—who one is—without losing the respect of others or being excluded from other choices" (HDR04:1). Thus, *choosing* one's identity, not the fact that one *has* a cultural identity that is *different* from others, is "what is ultimately important" for Sen (HDR04:16). Values are constituted by reasoned agency, and thus it is only *what* we choose that is important.[105]

But this is a problematic view of culture and tradition, because these are what they are precisely in being not chosen, but inherited or grown up in. Nobody chooses the culture she is born into, just as nobody can choose the tradition she inherits. We grow up in a culture (or even cultures, in the case of mixed marriages or culturally mixed communities) and inherit our traditions. Although we may well recognize the traditions of others *as* traditions, we cannot recognize them as possibly our *own* traditions. Sen makes it seem as if these were objects of free, rational choice from the outset, and he interprets the argument against development (or modernization) that it might destroy culture or tradition as an argument that such free rational choice should be denied. Again, in HDR04, he states that

> the reasons for being sceptical of giving automatic priority to inherited culture can be seen in terms of who makes what choices. Being born in a particular cultural milieu is not an exercise of freedom—quite the contrary. It becomes aligned to cultural liberty *only if the person chooses to continue to live within the terms of that culture, and does so having had the opportunity of considering other alternatives*. (HDR04:16-17, emphasis added)

This argument equates the lack of choice over the culture we are born into (i.e., what we always already are) as being "contrary" to the exercise of freedom, either as the failure to exercise such freedom or as a constraint upon it (e.g., by some third party). But this is an incoherent way of understanding the human situation. It supposes that individuals

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105. And, as we have seen, not even the *reasons* why we value whatever we do.

are fundamentally *acultural*, such that they can stand outside of *any* culture and evaluate it on its merits. This is simply a theoretical abstraction of culture and tradition. I may try to *imagine* not belonging to the culture I do, but this is still done from the situation of belonging to a culture. Sen simply fails to recognize that we are historically situated beings, no matter what choices we might make.[106] He does not see that his argument belongs to a particular culture too, say, the culture of rationalistic individualist economist-philosophers.

In critiquing certain communitarian views of the importance of "discovery of identity", Sen argues that it is less than clear "how identity can be a matter of just discovering something about oneself, rather than, explicitly or by implication, exercising a choice" (HDR04 17). Ignoring the unwarranted qualification of "just" here, the question this raises is, if identity is *always* a matter of "exercising a choice", *who* is it that is doing the choosing? Sen takes the position of the "view from nowhere",[107] as if we could step outside the culture or tradition that we find ourselves born into and evaluate our "cultural" or "traditional selves" from an acultural or atraditional viewpoint. But then what constitutes the evaluator? What is it to *be* an evaluator? And what standards are to be used to evaluate?

Sen's approach to culture and tradition, then, is a kind of "commodity approach", which he uses to justify cultural diversity and to establish the value of cultural liberty. Without diversity, I cannot exercise my liberty, because I have nothing

106. Cf. Séverine Deneulin, "A freedom-centred view of development in Ricoeur's ethics", Conference Proceedings, "Transforming Unjust Structures: Capabilities and Justice", 26-27 June 2003, at <http://www.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/vhi/ricoeur/papers/deneulin.pdf>.

107. In "Positional Objectivity", Sen argues that it is possible to evaluate cultural views as objective, from an internal as well as an external standpoint. However, as is the case elsewhere, Sen is not concerned here with the evaluator, but only with what is being evaluated. (Amartya Sen, "Positional Objectivity", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 22, no. 2, 1993, pp. 126-145). Sen's view is critiqued in Lawrence Hamilton, "A Theory of True Interests in the Work of Amartya Sen: A Political Critique", Conference Proceedings, "Justice and Poverty: examining Sen's Capability Approach", 5-7 June 2001, at <http://www.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/vhi/sen/papers/hamilton.pdf>.

to choose from. If there are a plurality of cultures somehow available to me, then I am able to make a more reasoned and informed "choice" of the culture to which I want to belong, just as having a wider range of brands of soap allows me an opportunity to exercise my "soap liberty". But cultures are not like commodities. We cannot just *decide* to be Singapore Malays, Toronto Greeks or Boston Irish, etc. I may spend all my time with my Indian or Italian friends, imitate their behaviour, learn their languages, and change my name, but none of these "choices" can make me an Indian or an Italian.[108]

Reason and Choice

Reasoned choice is central to Sen's analysis of poverty as capability deprivation. For those aspects that cannot be chosen, such as culture and tradition, the implication is that there *is* no basis on which to say that the functioning is valuable, or even, properly, a functioning at all. It is not something I can do or be, but rather it constitutes me as I always already am. In such cases, the requirement for *reasoned* (e)valuation becomes problematic, because development is concerned with expanding the range of possible functionings, which are only valuable insofar as there is reason to value them. Insofar as culture or tradition cannot be a functioning, it falls out of the "evaluative space"[109] of the capability set. Strictly speaking, such aspects of the human situation cannot enter into Sen's ahistorical, abstract liberalism.

A further question might be raised about the capacity to reason and hence to value. If I am incapable of this (because I have not had the opportunity to learn how to evaluate, say), then how am I to evaluate the expansion of my capabilities that

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108. Or, to be more precise, such choices do not make me a person whose inherited tradition is Indian, Italian, etc.
109. Cf. Deneulin, *op. cit.* Corbridge notes that "space" is "a word found repeatedly in [Sen's] work" (*op. cit.*, n. 1).

development is to bring about? Sen evades the question by appeal to values such as "the capability to live really long...and to have a good life while alive...things that would be strongly valued by nearly all of us" (DaF 14), but this is far too weak to constitute a foundation for the edifice of valuations and substantive freedoms that Sen constructs. First, we should note the use of the conditional here. Sen's claim is not that nearly all of us *do* strongly value and desire these things, but rather that we "would". But the conditions are not specified. However, we can infer that the condition Sen has in mind is some form of reasoned agency, as his constant reference to "what people have reason to value" indicates. Once again, this seems to suggest either that the choices of those who do not have "reason to value" do not count, or that their choices can be evaluated *for* them by those in a position to impute to them the values they *would* have had if they had had the ability to make reasoned evaluations. As Cowen and Shenton point out, this is simply another doctrine of development, couched in the language of values and reasoned agency (cf. DoD 442-452).

The apparent reluctance to pronounce on substantive values is evident throughout Sen's work, and allows him to claim that the evaluative space is left open for the deliberation about valuations, since the capabilities approach does not provide a complete ranking or weighting of the various functionings in the capability set. Thus Sen can claim that

> In focusing on freedoms in evaluating development, it is not being suggested that there is some unique and precise "criterion" of development in terms of which the different development experiences can always be compared and ranked. (DaF 33)

Nevertheless, Sen gives an extensive list of substantive freedoms and their correlative unfreedoms: poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities, systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities, intolerance, overactivity of repressive states; "economic poverty, which robs people of the freedom to satisfy hunger, or to achieve

sufficient nutrition, or to obtain remedies for treatable illnesses, or the opportunity to be adequately clothed or sheltered, or to enjoy clean water or sanitary facilities"; "lack of public facilities and social care...absence of epidemiological programs, or of organized arrangements for health care or educational facilities, or of effective institutions for the maintenance of local peace and order"; "denial of political and civil liberties by authoritarian regimes" (DaF 3-4). The substantive freedoms include: "being able to avoid such deprivations as starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality"; "the freedoms associated with being literate and numerate, enjoying political participation and uncensored speech" (DaF 36). Arguably, these lists represent the values predominantly identified with liberal market democracy. Sen thus does in fact severely circumscribe alternative conceptions of the good.

More importantly, Sen's analysis does not actually support his argument that forcing someone into a situation of choice she is not capable of choosing herself can be seen as an expansion of real freedoms. As Cowen and Shenton point out

> To be able to decide upon policy, to have the desire, knowledge and capability to do so, is to have achieved what are routinely stated to be the central goals of development. (DoD 443)

With Sen, then, the stated goal of development is the expansion of the real freedoms that people enjoy, but the reality and enjoyment of those freedoms depends on the ability to rationally evaluate them, and this may be precisely what is held to be lacking. In such cases, appeal to the value of freedom as reasoned choice to justify development intervention once again simply *states* the problem of development.

The problem of values

With the concept of capabilities, Sen seeks to articulate the different instrumental freedoms that constitute human freedom as "an *intrinsic* value of development" (DoD 450; cf. DaF xii, 37). The freedom to decide what one *considers* to

be valuable, rather than a particular level of attainment, he argues, is the proper end of the process of development.[110] "The objective of development relates to the valuation of the actual freedoms enjoyed by the people involved" (DaF 53).[111] However, this does not include the determination of what development itself is, which is a matter for policy analysts and experts such as Sen. Although he argues that valuations (i.e., the weights assigned to different functionings in the capability set) have to be made explicit and be subjected to deliberation by those concerned, the conceptualization of development as freedom is not itself open to valuation. The substantive freedoms that development *must* concern are all delineated in advance. The question then becomes, what is the source or basis for these substantive freedoms? Is it anything other than the theoretical abstraction from the history of the leisured countries?

A fundamental issue is a process "to favour the creation of conditions in which people have real opportunities of judging the kind of lives they would like to lead" (DaF 63), but this process has already been determined. In achieving this end, particular values will change, as capabilities are expanded. As Cowen and Shenton put it,

> Intrinsic valuation, whereby one person has the freedom to choose to do something or be somebody different from another, Sen makes it clear, will be changed by the process of development itself...what he calls 'value endogeneity' will, in the actual course of development, change what is 'regarded as valuable and what weights are attached to these objects' of choice. (DoD 450).

Different capabilities thus represent not just different ways of being and doing, but also the different values attached to these. Capability in general, then, becomes "the absolute criterion for an acceptable standard of living" (*ibid.*). Nevertheless, when

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110. Cf. Amartya Sen, "Freedom of Choice: Concept and Content", *European Economic Review*, vol. 32, 1988, pg. 290.
111. Sen's distinction between *value* on the one hand, and *valuation* or *evaluation* on the other (Sen is not entirely consistent in his usage) seems to echo the same distinction in Rickert. Whereas the problem for Rickert was to explain the relation between transcendental values and valuations, Sen refuses to address the issue. But his attempt to leave the specification of values open is disingenuous, since his characterization of the process of development is in effect a description of contemporary liberal democracy.

operationalized, this approach too turns out to be a matter of quantification and comparison, because the *level* of capability reached indicates whether or not the process of development is successful.

> It is the extent of capability, the absolute value of development, which serves as both a goal of state policy and criterion for the evaluation of the process of development itself. (DoD 451)

As Cowen and Shenton argue, what constrains development is "a world of necessity" in which "the freedom to choose is different from that of the freedom to do" (i.e., the capability set is different from the functionings achieved). Expanding people's capabilities is the goal of development (or state policy), but it is also "the criterion for the evaluation of the process of development itself" (DoD 451). Where does this criterion come from to inform state policy? It comes from the necessity of the present to produce more.

> Values of development are shot through with ambiguity because they are presented as an abstraction of history. They are treated as if they were absolute standards. The values posit a definitive prospect of improvement through stating what improvement might mean but they also rest upon an historical condition of poverty which has made one population, or one part of it, relatively poorer than another. As such, these values, though necessarily relative, are presented as if they were an absolute standpoint from which to gauge the extent of the rapid, large-scale improvement of development. (DoD 452).

Historicist Development

The most radical alternative to positivist development in the last two decades is perhaps postdevelopment. This designation covers a number of different authors, many of whom were involved in mainstream development at one time themselves. Although postdevelopment critiques of the mainstream have largely been ignored by official development institutions such as the Bank, they have occasioned some response from academics and other development thinkers. The significance of postdevelopment lies in its critique of the epistemological and methodological basis of positivist development. Rather than its interpretation of the empirical evidence, these thinkers

seek to question the positivist conception of development, which they regard as a pervasive category of thought that originates in the West, but has come to colonize the worldwide understanding of our historical situation.The argument is that positivist development theory and practice is predicated on a particular worldview.

> The development discourse is made up of a web of key concepts...such as poverty, production, the notion of the state, or equality...Each of them crystallizes a set of tacit assumptions which reinforce the Occidental worldview. Development has so pervasively spread these assumptions that people everywhere have been caught up in a Western perception of reality.[112]

Because the "Western perception of reality" is fundamentally constituted by these development concepts, postdevelopment thinkers argue that it cannot correct itself. The only possibility that they see for freeing ourselves from the "Occidental worldview" is for other worldviews to challenge it.

> If 'development' itself has become a problem, and has sowed the seeds of discontent and ethnic conflict, a corrective to development can only come from other worldviews, other visions.[113]

Postdevelopment reiterates the historicist critique of both positivism and universal history. The worldview of development is seen as inimical to the existence of other worldviews, and its extension by the process of "Westernization" involves conflict with, and destruction of, other cultures, traditional knowledge and alternative worldviews as competitors in a global marketplace of ideas.

The historicism of postdevelopment is not explicitly connected to 19th century historicism, finding its inspiration instead in the work of Ivan Illich and Michel Foucault, among others. However, the postdevelopment critique of positivist development frequently involves a genealogy of the term that tries to demonstrate its

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112. Wolfgang Sachs, "Introduction" in Wolfgang Sachs, ed., *The Development Dictionary*, Zed Books, London, 1995, pg. 5.
113. Rajni Kothari, *Rethinking Development. In Search of Human Alternatives*, Ajanta, Delhi, 1988, pg. 216. Quoted in Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "Dilemmas of Development Discourse: The Crisis of Developmentalism and the Comparative Method", *Development and Change*, vol. 22, 1991, pg. 23.

historical relativism.[114] Development, this critique claims, is "a specifically Western cultural concern".[115] Rather than universal and hence, in some sense, necessary and inevitable, the postdevelopment view is that "the development ideal, and the practices in pursuit of this goal, are products of a particular time and place; they are inventions of Western culture".[116] In this way, the positivist concept of development is historicized and relativized. The postdevelopment critique reiterates many of the points that were raised against positivist conceptions of history, economics and the human studies by 19th century historicists. Positivist development, it is argued, simply universalizes the historical experience and contemporary conditions of North Atlantic countries, thus failing to recognize the "otherness" of different countries or societies.[117] Positivist development depends on the notion that history is a single, linear, and progressive process, and thus fails to see that history is plural, i.e., that there are only ever *histories*.[118] Postdevelopment reiterates the notion of historical individuality that has its origin in Romanticism, particularly in Herder, and that was itself historicized by the 19th century historicists. Thus, even though it proposes "alternatives to development" rather than "alternative development", which is seen as positivist development refashioned,[119] postdevelopment itself rests on an *implicit* concept of historicist

114. For example, in Gustavo Esteva, "Development", in W. Sachs, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 6-25; Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995; and Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith*, trans. P. Camiller, Zed Books, London, 1997.
115. Martin O'Connor and Rosemary Arnoux, "Translators' Introduction" to Serge Latouche, *In the Wake of the Affluent Society*, trans. M. O'Connor and R. Arnoux, Zed Books, London, 1993, pg. 6.
116. *Ibid.*, pg. 7.
117. As Joel Kahn points out, in the 19th century "for many German writers Germany itself was the other" (Kahn, *op. cit.*, pg. 242).
118. Or even that history itself is a hegemonic category of Enlightenment rationality, in which "the historical past stands for all of the past because it is presumed to be the only past", as Ashis Nandy argues (Ashis Nandy, "History's Forgotten Doubles", *History and Theory*, vol. 34, no. 2, pg. 48). For Nandy, overcoming universal history requires abandoning the notion that the only access to the past is through history, and thus even the idea of plural histories.
119. See for example Latouche, *Affluent Society*, *op. cit.*, ch. 5.

development. The opposition to positivist development as universalistic and hegemonic is not, ultimately, non-developmental.

Postdevelopment rejects the concept of development, which is seen as a Western construct that repeats and reinforces the hegemony of the Western perception of the world. In this perception there exist those who have advanced or caught up and those who are lagging behind.[120] The categorization inherent in the positivist concept of development denies the diversity and multiplicity of peoples, cultures and perceptions of reality, seeking instead to impose "a unilinear way of social evolution".[121] And through its discursive hegemony, it has succeeded (to some extent) in colonizing (or "developmentising") other minds:

> Development occupies the centre of an incredibly powerful semantic constellation. There is nothing in modern mentality comparable to it as a force guiding thought and behaviour. At the same time, very few words are as feeble, as fragile and as incapable of giving substance and meaning to thought and behaviour as this one.[122]

In rejecting this categorization, the postdevelopment thinkers shift the locus of the debate away from the interpretation of the empirical data, and consequent debates about causal factors, to the categories of thinking involved. In this way, they call into question the methodological commitment to "[p]lacing the world under a single standard of measurement" that "destroys the possibility" of recognizing different cultures as equally valuable.

> If it could be recognized that different cultures really have their own standards of value, which cannot be subsumed into one another or rank-ordered on some supra-cultural scale, it would make sense to give each equal respect and equal voice. The contrary notion, and the one that prevails today, that all the world's cultures can be measured against a single 'standard of living' measure...renders all those cultures commeasurable, and hence unequal.[123]

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120. Cf. Latouche, *ibid.*, pg. 101; Wolfgang Sachs, "Development: The Rise and Decline of an Ideal", Wuppertal Papers, no. 108, August 2000, pp. 6-7.
121. Gustavo Esteva, "Development" in Sachs, *The Development Dictionary*, *op. cit.*, pg. 9.
122. *Ibid.*, pg. 8.
123. C. Douglas Lummis, "Equality" in Sachs, *The Development Dictionary*, *op. cit.*, pg. 48.

This linear and universal conception of history and humanity has become a way in which the world and its various cultures or societies are ordered. In contrast to the positivist conception of development as an objective process that can be scientifically investigated, for postdevelopment thinkers this is rather a way of making intelligible and systematizing knowledge of the hard-working countries for the West, and thus also systematizing the hard-working themselves.

> Like 'civilisation' in the nineteenth century, 'development' is the name not only for a value, but also for a dominant problematic or interpretive grid through which the impoverished regions of the world are known to us. Within this interpretive grid, a host of everyday observations are rendered intelligible and meaningful.[124]

Because of its discursive hegemony, positivist development is "dominating knowledge", i.e., it both dominates what can be known about the underdeveloped world and is itself a knowledge that dominates.[125] Serge Latouche characterises the West as "a vast social machine anchored inside our heads", [126] which operates through development as "one kind of planned Westernization" that involves "a reform of society as a whole".[127] But this project of Westernization has failed, Latouche argues, which shows up the weakness in the Western development model. Not only is the Western model not universalisable, it cannot even give a coherent account of itself, because it depends on two processes that are contradictory:

> Westernization is a two-pronged economic and cultural process: *universal* in its expansion and its history, *reproducible* through the West's capacity to act as a model and through its identity as a 'machine'.[128]

The contradiction arises because the Western model of "technological society...with all its attributes from mass consumption to liberal democracy" is an expansionist model.

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124. James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development', Depoliticisation, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pg. xiii.
125. As the title of one collection of essays calls it (S. A. Marglin and F.A. Marglin, *Dominating Knowledge: development, culture and resistance*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990).
126. Serge Latouche, *The Westernization of the World*, trans. R. Morris, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, pg. 53.
127. *Ibid.*, pg. 69.
128. *Ibid.*, pg. 50.

Historically, the West sustained itself by expanding its sphere of interests, to encompass non-European regions. The process continues today, with geographic colonisation replaced by economic colonisation in the search for profits from low-wage labour, from captive markets, and from trade restrictions. Successful reproduction of this model, as in East Asia, leads to economic conflict between different instantiations of the model. Thus, it is far from universalisable in the economic sphere. Nor, however, is it fully reproducible, because to reproduce it means to engage in the kind of expansionism just mentioned. And "[t]he more it touches on the hard core of the system, the more difficult, conflictive and limited it becomes".[129] This shows up the essential weakness of the West, which

> may seem to steamroller everything in its path, but while it may flatten other cultures, it cannot actually grind them to dust: the ground is elastic and gives beneath them.[130]

It is in this very weakness of development that the postdevelopment thinkers find hope. The West's *inability* to reproduce itself by way of its model of development involves not just contradictory dynamic forces, but also a level of commitment from the underdeveloped that they are in principle incapable of giving, because they do not (yet) share the values that would enable such commitment to be total. Whether colonised or underdeveloped, non-Western societies have always engaged in resistance because of the need to *engage* in commitment. As a result, cultures subject to colonisation and development have become hybrid, displaying moments of resistance in their dereliction:

> ...alongside the failure of Westernization which is shown by general dereliction, there are many consistent signs of resistance, survival and endurance. They bear witness to the vitality and creativity of these cultures: cultures which show themselves in the emergence of syncretic forms, appropriations, counter-cultures.[131]

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129. *Ibid.*, pg. 51.
130. *Ibid.*, pg. 100.
131. *Ibid.*, pg. 103.

In Latouche's interpretation of the global sweep of development, Western culture becomes a monolithic "anticulture", that destroys the cultural specificity of everything that it encounters. Not that Latouche sees nothing of value in the West, but he sees its essential characteristic as a kind of negativity that seeks to reduce all relations to market interactions, and all cultural forms to an ahistorical universalism.

> Westernization is *first and foremost* a vast worldwide economic transformation, even if the most noticeable result is a uniformity of methods and models rather than the successful acquisition of the means of conforming to them.[132]

The decline of the West, or of Westernization as an ideal, is due to its own internal contradictions rather than any failing in the means or will to implement it.

> If the Westernization of the world is currently failing, this is not because the disseminators of information are insufficiently powerful, but more simply because, on the one hand, the 'basis of culture', the economy, does not follow, and on the other, the 'social system' which bears the weight of change is in the process of collapse. The developmental model cannot be generalized: rather it is an instrument of worldwide domination whose complex dynamic is always enlarging, or re-creating, rents in the 'infrastructure', insofar as the meaning of the latter is derived from the spectacular power system which accompanies it. The crisis of development will inevitably be a cultural crisis.[133]

In such a disenchanted world, hope and salvation can no longer come from the West, collapsing as it is under the strains of its own self-contradiction. In the radically dichotomized view of the West and "the Rest" that characterises postdevelopment, the future of the planet is to be found in the indigenous perspectives of the Rest, who have managed to create a hybrid culture of survival in the face of the self- and other-consuming Western culture. Having pushed to the limit its scientistic and formal models of social change and progress, the West, it seems, has nothing to contribute to the debate about the future.

> Western societies were able to export their contradictions and put off the day of reckoning by a perpetual flight into the future. However, if my analysis is correct, the very heart of the stabilizing mechanism is now under attack. It is no longer possible to produce a creative reaction at the heart of a decomposing body; it can only come from outside it, and in a way, be directed against it.[134]

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132. *Ibid.*, pg. 75.
133. *Ibid.*

With the positivist concept of development, as we have seen, there is an intrinsic alienation of individuals from active involvement in the meaning of the social change that concerns them. The meaning of development is a matter for experts who have the technical proficiency necessary to understand it, and thus are the only ones in a position to determine such meaning. There is an inherent asymmetry in the relation between experts and those who are to develop, which can be characterized in terms of who has the power to define. The postdevelopment critique focusses on this asymmetry, and asks how it is that subjective agency is only possible for those considered to be developed, and more particularly, for those with expertise, whereas those whose lives are the subject of development thinking are denied such agency and thus the power to determine the meaning of their own history.[135] In contrast to the objective determination of historical meaning involved in the positivist concept of development, postdevelopment suggests that historical meaning can only be determined *intersubjectively*, i.e., by those actively involved in creating the conditions of their social change.

As a counterconcept to the positivist notion of scientific objectivity, historicist critiques of development appeal to concepts of community, social networks, social ties, and so on.[136] But there are problems with this counterconcept, as is evident in N'Dione *et al.*:

> Changing human beings means changing their way of seeing the world and especially the way they see the world *in* which and *off* which they live. We must not

134. *Ibid.*, pg. 113.
135. Cf. Arturo Escobar, *op. cit.*, pg. 8.
136. For example, Geoff Mulgan argues for the primacy of small communities in self-determination: "Bookchin, Illich and Schumacher have reasserted the primacy of small communities taking responsibility for their own condition of life" (Geoff Mulgan, "Reasserting the Primacy of Small Communities", in M. Rahnema with V. Bawtree, *op. cit.*, pg. 382); N'Dione *et al*. discuss the recreation of social ties in Senegal (Emmanuel Seni N'Dione, Philippe de Leener, Jean-Pierre Perier, Mamadou Ndiaye and Pierre Jacolin, "Reinventing the Present: The Chodak Experience in Senegal", in Rahnema and Bawtree, *op. cit.*, pp. 364-376).

> impose our own ways of seeing; instead we must be able to recognize the meaning that people give to what they do or to their own lives, and enable them to rediscover their capacity to make sense of it all.[137]

Two problems are evident in this passage, which are characteristic of historicist (anti-) development. First, we might wonder who is involved in "changing human beings". Is this an inclusive sense of "human beings", i.e., does it include the authors and the readers, and all those to be "changed"? Second, what is the motivation for such change and how does it arise? This is a far more significant problem, for if it arises from some dissatisfaction with the current way the world is seen, then the ability to see the world in a different way is already present and, therefore, there is little need for the historicist to articulate it. This is the same logical problem found in positivist development.

Thus it is hard to see this as the articulation of a different concept of development or social change, rather than merely a different set of *values*. The difference is supposed to reside in the call to abstain from imposing "our own ways of seeing", in favour of recognizing the meaning that others find in their lives. Yet there is also the supposition that "we" (whoever we are) are able to help others rediscover their own meanings and ways of seeing. But how is it that we can see in a way that is not one of our "own" ways of seeing, at least latently or implicitly? In addition, if this were not the case, how would it be possible to help someone else "rediscover *their* capacity to make sense of it all"? Surely the sense "they" make of it must make sense to us, at least in principle (i.e., they must be able to make sense *for* us of their capacity to make sense, if we do not at first understand it ourselves). Otherwise, we wouldn't be able to understand their "rediscovery" as being such. The fundamental point is that meaning must already be shared in principle, if this type of engagement is to be possible. But then how does this differ from positivist development, which also supposes that

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137. N'Dione *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pg. 370.

underdeveloped people can come to understand how the developed see the world? In the case of positivist development, of course, such meaning is taken to be already explicit, embodied in the various systems of knowledge production taken to represent developedness and justified by the standards of objectivity that constitute positivism.[138]

The historicist argument is that the difference lies in the recognition that there are different sources of meaning, which therefore changes the nature of the interaction between the hard-working and those who are to help them. The helpers may explicitly recognize their *own* "capacity to make sense of it all", but they are not supposed to impose this on the hard-working. Rather, such capacity is regarded only as formal, i.e., in the sense that notions of communication, helping, and so forth involve the presupposition that there *is* a capacity to make sense of it all, whether explicit or implicit, but the sense that is actually made will differ from context to context, people to people, community to community, and so on. On the material level, then, those who help must remain silent and receptive to whatever sense may be rediscovered.

But this is problematic in relation to the historicist critique of positivist development. Because it is *critical*, historicist (anti-)development entails a detachment or disseverance of the critic from her context (i.e., the encounter with development), yet this is exactly what the historicist criticizes positivist development for, i.e., the idea that it is possible to stand outside of, or to abstract from, history so as to determine the meaning of development. The historicist critique of positivist development itself is at odds with what it proposes would take the place of positivist development. That is, the historicist's critical stance is predominantly, if not entirely, a theoretical stance that therefore shares a kinship with positivism.[139] Historicism is, above all, founded on the

138. The question of the presupposition of such standards, as well as the purported explicitness of meaning, is raised in the exploration of Heidegger's notion of formal indication in chs. 4-6.

notion that history can be studied as objectively as nature but requires methods suitable to its object-domain. Yet historicist (anti-)development thinking draws a distinction between the cultivation of its theoretical approach and the genuine or authentic development that might be occasioned were positivist development to be dispensed with. Indeed, it can be argued that in many ways the primary texts of the historicist critique are concerned not so much with articulating a different approach to thinking the subject of development as they are with critique. Thus, the difference between such critics and those they purport to speak for is all too close to the difference between positivist development experts and those to whom they give the benefit of their expert advice. How, then, can one speak against the concept of development, when the ability to do so depends on the culture *of* development? This problem is one that the historicist critics are aware of. As the translators of Latouche's *In the Wake of the Affluent Society* say of an earlier text:

> Might one not riposte that this is still a Western voice, and speaking still from a position of unique privilege? In some ways this is true. How does one avoid the cynicisms allowed by a privileged position on the one hand, and the bad faith of White man's guilt on the other? While it is cynical (or perhaps, in certain contexts, naive) to suppose that true respect for the other can come at no cost to oneself, is it *a priori* true that martyrdom through self-destitution or armed revolutionary zeal is a more meaningful gesture?[140]

Alternatives to development

Historicist development thinking holds that the meaning of social change or evolution cannot be determined in the abstract, but only by each particular society. The meaning that positivism ascribes to "development", and which it universalizes as a technical activity, is considered an unwarranted universalization of the history of the North Atlantic nations.[141] That is, although historicists may agree that "the West"

139. A situation also found in the cross-fertilization between positivism and historicism found in the German Historical School of historians.
140. Martin O'Connor and Rosemary Arnoux, "Translator's Introduction" in Serge Latouche, *Affluent Society*, *op. cit.*, pg. 16. It should be noted that both of these authors were academics in New Zealand at the time of the translation.

developed in the way that positivist development thinking characterizes it, they argue that despite its universalistic tendencies, it does not represent a general law of social evolution. Instead, it only represents the cultural evolution of the West, as a culture that is a sort of "anti-culture", i.e., is inimical to other cultures.[142] The universalization of North Atlantic history represents one interpretation of history, called "development", which denies that other interpretations of history are even possible. Historicists reject this notion, and argue that there is no objective process of development to be operationalized. In particular, the historicist critique is concerned with how the concept of progress and its interpretation in economic terms are used to construct this linearized universal history.[143] The counterconcept to progress and universal history is to be found in *culture*, but this cannot simply be assimilated into the progressive view as development agencies in recent years have argued.[144] Rather, as with historicism proper, historicist development thinking argues that the progressive, economistic concept of development simply valorizes one particular culture.

> The economic, this domain or dimension of calculating rationality, is not a natural reality. On the contrary, it is an historical and cultural invention, which in the modern West has been given an unprecedented pre-eminence.[145]

Although these thinkers reject the totalizing economic conception of history, they still hold that theorists have a role to play in articulating social or cultural change as an alternative to development, and they have numerous suggestions about what

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141. For historicists, the social evolutions in East Asia are ambiguous. They cannot be properly assimilated to the positivist notion of development, since to some extent they were socially determined. The case of Japan is even more ambiguous. For example, see Latouche, *Westernization*, *op. cit.*, pp. 27, 51, 75, 93; *Affluent Society*, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53, 150, 169-170.
142. Latouche, *Westernization*, pp. 43-46.
143. See for example, Escobar, *op. cit.*, pg. 216; Latouche, *Affluent Society*, pp. 22-25; José Maria Sbert, "Progress", in W. Sachs, *The Development Dictionary*, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-205.
144. For example, HDR04.
145. Latouche, *Affluent Society*, *op. cit,*, pg. 25.

needs to be done.[146] Thus, they are as willing to theorize about cultural change as positivism is about development.

Escobar and Social Movements

Arturo Escobar argues that the "theory of social movements" found in recent reconsiderations of "resistance and political practice" can be brought to bear on the question of how to imagine a post-development era.[147]

> Social movements constitute an analytical and political terrain in which the weakening of development and the displacement of certain categories of modernity (for example, progress and the economy), can be defined and explored.[148]

The "critique of the discourse and practice of development can help to clear the ground for a more radical imagining of alternative futures".[149] But it turns out to involve the same kind of theoretical attitude and gaze of the expert that Escobar finds objectionable in mainstream development:

> The emergence of a powerful alternative social movement discourse raises further questions: how do popular actions become objects of knowledge in social movement discourse?...Who can 'know,' according to what rules, and what are the pertinent objects?[150]

Once again, then, we find the theoretical objectification of life being valorized as a central aspect of the demand to think beyond the

> seeming inability to imagine a new domain which finally leaves behind the imaginary of development, and transcends development's dependence on Western modernity and historicity...[151]

Is this anything more than a suggestion to replace one form of theoretical expertise (the economists') with another (the social theorists')? If the theoreticism of the former is

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146. See for example, Esteva, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-23; W. Sachs, "One World", *The Development Dictionary*, *op. cit.*, pg. 113 and *Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development*, Fernwood, Halifax, 1999, pp. 86-89; Rahnema, "Afterword" in *The Postdevelopment Reader*, *op. cit.*, pp. 391-402.
147. Escobar, *op. cit.*, pg. 211.
148. *Ibid.*, pg. 216.
149. *Ibid.*, pg. 212.
150. *Ibid.*
151. *Ibid.*

problematic, how does that of the latter avoid the same difficulty, i.e., of constructing the subject of development in a way that hard-working people themselves cannot? Central to the postdevelopment critique is that development "links forms of knowledge about the Third World with the deployment of forms of power and intervention", such that the Third World is constructed "silently, without our noticing it".[152] The nexus of post-war "research and knowledge to provide a reliable picture of a country's social and economic problems"[153] has been essential to positivist development, as we have seen with the World Bank. Only through the acquisition of such information could these countries become targets for development interventions, whether or not these are best understood as "new mechanisms of power embodied in endless programmes and 'strategies'".[154] Escobar's central criticism, like that of other postdevelopment thinkers, is the way such knowledge is put in the service of power. But how does social theory avoid the dilemma of "experts studying development problems and producing theories *ad nauseam*"?[155] The critique of discourse is Escobar's favoured approach, as such critique is always historically contextual:

> Philosophers have made us aware that we cannot describe exhaustively the period in which we happen to live, since it is from within its rules that we speak and think, and since it provides the basis for our descriptions and our own history...only a certain distance from [our era] will enable us to attempt the critical description of its totality as an era which has ceased to be ours.[156]

Yet although this distance may not be possible for theorists with respect to their own situation, the suggestion is that they can perform this function for the hard-working:

> Critical thought...will also help in visualizing some possible paths along which communities can move away from development into a different domain, yet unknown...in which they can experiment with different ways of organizing societies and economies and of dealing with the ravages of four decades of development.[157]

152. *Ibid.*, pg. 213.
153. *Ibid.*
154. *Ibid.*, pg. 214.
155. *Ibid.*
156. *Ibid.*, pg. 215.
157. *Ibid.*

This raises two questions. First, how can such critical thought, determined as it is by its "other" (i.e., positivist development), possibly indicate this "different domain, yet unknown"? Second, do such communities really need this "help", or is it yet another normalizing discourse?

The desire for imagining "alternative futures" betrays the way in which postdevelopment finds itself bound by the past. But instead of the economists' past of the market society, with its own ineluctable logic inevitably leading towards "convergence", we have the anthropologists' and social theorists' past, a past of heterogeneous cultures or societies. In this respect, the postdevelopment thinkers show their debt to historicism:

> ...to think about 'alternatives to development' requires a theoretical and practical transformation in existing notions of development, modernity and the economy. This can best be achieved by building upon the practices of the social movements, especially those in the Third World. These movements are essential to the creation of alternative visions of democracy, economy and society.[158]

Cultural change involves "the ongoing work of social movements", understood to comprise "daily life and its practices" in which people produce their own meanings in resistance, transformation and subversion of "structures of domination".[159] Escobar argues that these need to be studied by social science in order to "make visible the domain of popular practices and the inter-subjective meanings that underlie them".[160] Whatever potential social movements themselves may have for thinking in terms of cultural change rather than development, they still need to be theorized, although "the belief that theory is produced in one place and applied in another is no longer acceptable practice".[161] Rather, "critical thought must be 'situated' ".[162] Only in

158. *Ibid.*, pg. 212
159. *Ibid.*, pp. 216-217.
160. *Ibid.*
161. *Ibid.*, pg. 221.
162. *Ibid.*, pg. 216.

this way, Escobar argues, can "the centrality of popular practices" as the locus of "meaning production" be restored, rather than "reducing the movements to something else", i.e., economic or political categories.[163]

Whilst acknowledging that there may be a problem with the theoretical attitude itself, the argument is that the production of theory becomes polyvalent or pluralized with the "multiple sites of production and multiple mediations in the generation and production of theory".[164] This multiplicity, which Escobar argues can be thought of as "nomadic" and responsive to the fluidity and variability of "the everyday", is thus counterposed to the uniformity and linearity of development thinking.[165] However, there remains a tension between the theoretical attitude itself and the concreteness of social movements:

> In the process, the West is partly reproduced as the site of enunciation, but also displaced and resisted. In important ways Third World intellectuals, while trying to extricate themselves from the West, remain bound to it in complex ways, sharing, to a greater or lesser extent, the theoretical imaginary of the West. Yet theoretical production cannot be seen in simple terms, as produced in one part and applied in another, but rather as a process of multiple conversations in a discontinuous terrain.[166]

Latouche and the Informal

Serge Latouche offers another form of this post-economistic yet theoretical attitude. He designates the subject of development as "the archipelago of the informal", and seeks to describe how the informal, as a new form of solidarity and sociality, escapes economistic attempts to draw it into the formal. Because of its polymorphism and concreteness, it "can be considered as a possible prefiguring of an *other* society",[167] which, "as a form of social life" is "an authentic culture of poverty".[168]

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163. *Ibid.*, pg. 217.
164. *Ibid.*, pg. 221.
165. *Ibid.*, pg. 223.
166. *Ibid.*
167. Latouche, *Affluent Society*, *op. cit.*, pg. 125.
168. *Ibid.*, pg. 127.

This domain, in which people find their social existence on the periphery or in the interstices of the "grand society" that positivist development theory maintains is possible for all, is conceptualized by the mainstream for the most part in negative terms. Thus, the informal economy "appears to the economist as *a*-typical, bereft of its own logic or identity other than can be indicated by this displacement away from, or even effacement of, the 'normal' ".[169] What characterizes this domain or form of social existence, and therefore makes it resistant to attempts to normalize it, is that "[t]hese are people torn between lost tradition and impossible modernity".[170] Neither the one nor the other, the informal cannot be reduced to the categories of 'traditional' or 'modern', either in economic or cultural terms.

Latouche argues, therefore, that to understand the informal society requires different approaches and ways of thinking that do not attempt to reduce it to the usual concept of economic rationality, and thus domesticate it to the various narratives of progress, economic development, or even 'alternative' development.[171] As with Escobar's focus on social movements, Latouche's notion of the informal is an attempt to articulate the concrete historical specificity of social groups.

> The informal, properly understood, cannot be dissociated from the *whole of the social context*...The informal covers the whole ensemble of daily practices...
>
> If one apprehends the informal in its totality, one sees that it has to do with a whole different *form of activity* which obeys a social rationality (or rationalities) not reducible to pure economic logic and hence not reducible to the terms of analysis emanating from the West.[172]

This raises the question of how theorizing the informal differs in principle from the "terms of analysis" identified with development. The notion of having a "total view", whether of the formal or the informal, and thus grasping the whole of its context, is

169. *Ibid.*, pg. 129.
170. *Ibid.*, pg. 134.
171. *Ibid.*, pp. 139-145.
172. *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

characteristic of the theoretical attitude, whatever the categories are whereby this is to be achieved. There is a tension between the rejected theoreticism of positivist development, and the articulation of this other form of sociality.

> Even if theoreticians, scientists and philosophers cannot see how to achieve a synthesis between tradition and modernity, between the West and its other, development's castaways may succeed in practice in inventing a life, in reconstructing a *sociality* through a more or less happy fusing together of the different elements.[173]

In rejecting the notion that the informal can simply be coopted into an alternative pathway to development, Latouche argues that

> The paradigm (concept and model) of development is profoundly unidimensional; it excludes cultural pluralism and difference, whereas the informal rests on their existence and is nourished by them. The paradox of the normalisation of the informal and equally of the 'alternative' development whose very name is suggestive of its difficulties, stems from the following double bind: either one is in the different dynamism characteristic of the informal, or one sacrifices this dynamism for normalisation.[174]

The difficulty that faces postdevelopment, as with historicism, is how a *non*-normalising "paradigm" could be possible and, correlatively, what this implies for the practices of intellectuals and theorists.[175] In the *Development Dictionary*, Sachs refers to the various authors as "[d]eprofessionalized intellectuals", but it is hard to distinguish how their theoretical approaches differ from those of positivist development in terms of *form*, as opposed to content.[176] Latouche argues that postdevelopment inquiry is decentering and anti-totalizing,[177] but it is unclear how the categories used to articulate the informal arise out of the informal itself, rather than being theoretically imposed on it. And without such specification, this approach can appear simply to be culturalist conservatism. In Nederveen Pieterse's view, "[t]o post-development there are romantic and nostalgic strands: reverence for community, *Gemeinschaft*, the tradition".[178] But Latouche argues that the informal represents a "rupture" in

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173. *Ibid.*, pg. 216.
174. *Ibid.*, pg. 158, emphasis altered.

modernity, "through the *re-embedding* of the economic within the social totality".[179]

What is at issue here is the relation of the theoretical to the social totality that is theorized about. How does theorizing itself belong to the social totality? Does theorizing about difference give rise to different ways of understanding self and others, or does it simply give rise to different theory? The historicist critique relies on the same dichotomies as positivist development, which gives it the appearance of atavism or conservatism. In analyzing the informal as a new form of sociality, Latouche argues that it involves an "impossible synthesis of holism with individualism" that calls into question these categories.[180] Whereas individualism, despite its fictional representation as "natural", involves "emancipatory virtues" that are "undeniable",[181] their abstractness and formalism bring them into conflict with the "concrete liberties of non-Westerners" as "freedoms valued in holistic communities".[182] Yet Latouche also recognizes that the latter may be highly restrictive. "Hierarchies are very severe, and indeed become intolerable, unacceptable and unjust once the belief in their

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175. Postdevelopment thinkers are more aware of this difficulty than is usually recognized by their critics. Nederveen Pieterse's argument against postdevelopment is that it itself arises out of modernization, and yet refuses to articulate a paradigm or programme, and thus remains paradoxical. However, his recommendation of pluralism or polycentrism as the way forward, rather than universalism or relativism, ignores the difficulty. (Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "Dilemmas of Development Discourse: The Crisis of Developmentalism and the Comparative Method", *Development and Change*, vol. 22, 1991, pp. 5-29; "My Paradigm or Yours? Alternative Development, Post-Development, Reflexive Development", *Development and Change*, vol. 29, 1998, pp. 343-373; and "After post-development", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 2, 2000, pp. 175-191.) From the perspective of anthropology, Grillo's critique is that postdevelopment operates with an overly monolithic concept of development. What needs to be asked, he suggests, is whether postdevelopment rests on a failure to recognize that meaning is already contested, and that there is no single discourse of development. Postdevelopment seems to accept all too easily positivist development's self-representation. (R.D. Grillo, "Discourses of Development: The View from Anthropology" in R.D. Grillo and R.L. Stirrat, *Discourses of Development: Anthropological Perspectives*, Berg, Oxford, 1997, pp. 1-33). Morgan Brigg argues that the use of Foucault in postdevelopment is superficial, and that a more thorough engagement with Foucault would show the strengths of the postdevelopment position, particularly in its critiques of the institutionalised practices of the UN and World Bank. (Morgan Brigg, "Post-development, Foucault and the colonisation metaphor", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 3, 2002, pp. 421-436.)

transcendental foundation—the belief that ensures their legitimacy—breaks down."[183] Such conflict cannot be theoretically reconciled, Latouche suggests:

> In the practical life of the informal society...the fusion sometimes happens naturally. The entrepreneurs of the informal sector are *individuals* in their own right *at the same time* as members of a community.[184]

It thus remains unclear exactly what the status of theory is supposed to be, and whether it has a role to play in the construction of these new forms of sociality, or whether it is simply all that is left for Western(ized) intellectuals to do.

Conclusion

The fundamental aporia of positivist (i.e., mainstream) development thinking is the discontinuity between the objectification of the historical and the historicalness of such objectification. The idea of history as an object is that it manifests the general laws governing economic interaction and thus the telic ideal for development theory and practice. Yet this idea itself originated in a specific historical context. This means that the laws of economic interaction are considered to hold whether or not they have been determined, such that these laws themselves gave rise to the specific historical conditions that allowed for their character and existence to be determined. This is aporetic because the outcome was therefore the unintended and unforeseen result of economic interactions, the *intention* of which was entirely different (e.g., the "mercantilist" pursuit of specie). Having reached the stage of intellectual advancement

176. W. Sachs, *The Development Dictionary, op. cit.*, pg. 5.
177. Cf. Latouche, *Affluent Society*, *op. cit.*, pg. 187.
178. Nederveen Pieterse, "My Paradigm or Yours?", *op. cit.*, pg. 361.
179. Latouche, *Affluent Society*, *op. cit.*, pg. 188. The notion of the (dis-) embedding of the economy is central to Polanyi's analysis of 19th century economic liberalism.
180. *Ibid.*, pg. 225.
181. *Ibid.*, pg. 226.
182. *Ibid.*, pg. 227.
183. *Ibid.*, pg. 228.
184. *Ibid.*

necessary to determine the laws governing this outcome, we can now *know* the consequences of our (unintended) economic interactions, and thus we can no longer act in the way that gave rise to the conditions of developedness (or modernity) as it first appeared in late 18th-century Europe. From the 19th century onwards, then, positivist economics was oriented towards the reformation of political and economic institutions to harmonize with these laws, but now with the outcome fully *intended*.

My aim has been, first, to outline the positivist conception of the development problematic, and illustrate it with reference to two main sources of development thinking, namely the World Bank and the UNDP. The keystone of positivist development is the assumption that it transcends its own historical context (i.e., the situation of the leisured countries) such that it can prescribe policies or principles to hard-working countries on the basis of this transcendence. The problem with this attitude is the contradiction involved, which is that the positivist attitude itself arises from its particular historical context and is thus determined by it (as historicist economists argued against their positivist counterparts). To put this another way, the positivist attitude is based on the notion that the historical situation from which it arose, and to which it was a response, is identical with the historical situation in the hard-working countries, which it is supposed to be capable of addressing by way of the intention to develop these countries. However, by the positivist standard itself, this cannot be the case, because if it were, the hard-working countries *would be* in a position to develop themselves. In the positivist claim to have discovered the "natural laws" by which progress occurs lies the contradiction of history: such progress has not occurred in the hard-working countries. Furthermore, neither did it occur historically in the leisured countries *as a result* of the positivistic intention to develop. Positivist

development is thus always other-directed, yet is predicated on the notion that it corresponds to self-directedness.

Although historicists reject the positivist notion that development is inevitable and thus an activity that can be transitively operationalized in the relations between different countries or cultures, they do accept the idea that cultural evolution or change can be theoretically conceptualised. Cultural evolution is as much a theoretical object for historicists as development is for positivists. However, because there are different cultural evolutions, it can only be theorized in terms of form. Despite not being cross-culturally applicable in the sense that positivist development is, cultural evolution is equally regarded as something that can be brought about. What is at issue here is whether it can be thought of as a transitive activity at all. That is, can cultural change, any more than development, be appropriately conceptualized as intent married to process by means of practice? It is the dissevering of history into intent and process that is problematic here.

The fundamental problem has to do with the ascription of intent to one set of people, i.e., the "development experts" or postdevelopment's "deprofessionalized intellectuals", and the process (of what is supposed to happen) to another. The presumption is, as Cowen and Shenton show, that development practice can be transitive because it is the operationalization of that which does not change, i.e., the ideal of development, however articulated, for those unable to recognize it. Development expertise is predicated upon this differentiation. What is not adequately recognized is the *relation* to what is objectified (as intent and process). That is, the development expert is never simply a theoretical observer. The very requirement of expertise entails an involvement with the underdeveloped, and thus a pretheoretical relation. Yet the development ideal involves a distancing mechanism such that this

relation does not, and cannot, figure theoretically.[185] Development always involves coming to grasp development itself, and insofar as this is denied of the underdeveloped, the only development possible is that of the developed, who are in no need of it. Abstracted from history, development proves illusory. Yet when *identified* with history, there is no development, because there is no possible way of specifying it as a process.

The positivist claim to a transcendent understanding of human social existence is undermined. This is not, however, to deny the possibility of such a transcendent understanding, but only that it can be based on having discovered the "natural laws" of economic interaction, progress, development, history, etc., as the positivist attitude claims. Such an attitude is equally immanent in its own historical context. This does not mean, however, that all understanding is culturally or historically relative. Rather, my argument is that the transcendence of understanding the human situation *is* its immanence to its historical site. The mutual implication of transcendence and immanence (or objectivity and subjectivity) depends on individuation, i.e., on objectivity *for* subjectivity, which is how we have our history in being it. And although this takes place in contention with others over the meaning of our traditions and history, it cannot be reduced to intersubjectivity, either. It cannot properly be understood simply as convention or inherited norms, because the validity or normativity of these depends on their being subjectively identificatied *as* valid or normative.

The peculiarity of the human situation, i.e., that our transcendence belongs to, is based on, and is directed towards our immanence, is what makes a phenomenological approach to development important. Unless we are able to grasp that we belong to, and are constituted by, that which we purport to be able to study objectively, we run the risk of simply lapsing into the theoretical attitude, in which we regard ourselves and our

185. This is analogous to Fabian's "denial of coevalness" and "allochronism".

historical contexts as objects produced according to universal natural laws. This attitude, which I have argued is characteristic of positivist development, not only occludes how we can come to have an understanding of others and their concrete individuality, but also occludes our *self*-understanding, because it tempts us into thinking that we already know who we are.

What is evident in the technocratic prescriptions for, and positivistic explanations of, progress and development is the denial of the very history that has constituted this approach. The *question* of the subject of development, which is to say, *how* it is that we are able to transcend the immanent process (i.e., our particular history) that constitutes us as who we are, cannot be approached by way of the kind of thinking that *presupposes* such transcendence as the very basis for thinking itself. This is not an epistemological issue of how we can *know* anything about development, but rather an ontological issue of how we *are* the way we ontically, phenomenally are.

Chapter 4: Heidegger's Appropriation of the Tradition

The formal indication of concrete individuality

> But whatever the plight of this communication may be, its claims must be restricted to *calling something to the attention of others*. This is ultimately the predicament of all philosophizing regarding its intention of having an effect in the world of others.
>
> — Martin Heidegger, "Comments on Karl Jaspers' *Psychology of Worldviews*

Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss some of the important influences on Heidegger's early thought. My focus is on how he appropriates various ideas in his project of destructing the theoretical attitude as a way of inquiring about, and expressing the dynamic incompleteness of, the human situation (or being human) in its concrete individuality. This project is most fully articulated in *Being and Time*, which will be examined in detail in the next chapter.

The aspects of *what* is to be shown and *how* to show it in this project are mutually implicated. Heidegger argues that we cannot approach such an inquiry theoretically, because the human situation manifests aspects that cannot pertain to objects, whereas the theoretical attitude objectifies what it inquires into.[1] In particular, it is the constitution of the human situation by an *a priori* relatedness to what it is *not*, or in other words its constitution by its finitude and incompleteness, that outstrips objectification. The human situation is incomplete because it is constituted only in the encounter with beings that, despite belonging to the human situation, are not reducible

1. Of course, *human beings* can be objectified. Indeed, this is what the positive human sciences do. Heidegger argues, however, that such sciences cannot get at what it *means* to be human, which is a fundamental characteristic of the human situation. Only philosophy (as a science) is able to do so, because only philosophy has the right kind of concepts.

to it. Without such beings, Heidegger suggests, the human situation could not possibly be the way it phenomenally is. The theoretical attitude is inadequate because it presupposes that the human situation can be comprehended as a self-contained entity in isolation from any other being, i.e., as subject, ego, consciousness, etc. In modern philosophy—the philosophy of consciousness—this is widely held to originate with Descartes' skeptical reduction of everything that differs from consciousness to a moment of it, which Descartes argued shows the independence and self-containment of the human situation as *res cogitans*, the thinking thing.

The second aspect of the incompleteness of the human situation is its relatedness to what it is "not yet", i.e., to what and how it is becoming. Heidegger's phenomenological clarification of the temporal incompleteness of the human situation—the meaning of our "timeliness" [*Zeitlichkeit*]—involves a reinterpretation of the meaning of the historical. In articulating this, he appropriates Dilthey's insight that history *constitutes* the human situation, rather than being a *property* of it.[2] This insight rests on a distinction between history as an object (of historiography, say) and history as a way of being, i.e., between the "object-historical" and "being-historical". Heidegger's phenomenological approach transforms the aspect of history that becomes problematic in theoretical conceptualization, i.e., that this "object" is historical precisely in *no longer being there*. This is problematic, because theoretical objectification seems to depend on the self-presence of the object, whereas history involves a kind of self-*absence*. Heidegger draws upon Dilthey's insights to show that this paradox originates with the theoretical attitude itself, in the way it objectifies time. In his phenomenological destruction of this attitude, then, Heidegger seeks to show that the timeliness of the human situation is not *tensed*, but rather *aspective*. It involves the

2. Heidegger argues that this was Dilthey's fundamental motivation, yet one he was unable to find a way to express. Cf. K 159, 162, 172-173.

perfective aspect of having-come-to-be, the imperfective aspect of coming-to-be, and their relatedness. In his approach to the historical as a fundamental character of life, Dilthey opposed the epistemologically-oriented approach, which took the issue of history to be a problem of the objectivity of historical *knowledge*. With such an oppositional approach, Heidegger argues, Dilthey was unable to free his thinking from the strictures that the theoretical attitude itself imposes.[3] Dilthey was unable to investigate *how* the human situation is historical, i.e., its historical*ness*, because his approach to the issue remained determined by the theoretical attitude itself.

Thus, there are two aspects to the incompleteness of the human situation that Heidegger is concerned with, which correspond to the question of the being of beings and the relation of this to time, respectively (hence being *and* time). In terms of the phenomenological description of the incompleteness of the human situation in BT, this can be expressed as *mortal finitude*.[4] Finitude is phenomenologically clarified in Division I of BT, mortality in Division II. In what follows, I articulate these aspects in terms of *structural* incompleteness (finitude) and *dynamic* incompleteness (mortality). One of Heidegger's aims in BT, I argue, is to show how structural incompleteness arises

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3. Cf. Robert C. Scharff, "Heidegger's 'Appropriation' of Dilthey before *Being and Time*", *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol. 35, no. 1, 1997, pp. 105-128.
4. The debate about the continuity of and/or discontinuities in Heidegger's thoughtpath is ongoing. In the last two decades, publication of the early lecture-courses and private monographs such as *Contributions to Philosophy* (GA65), that date from Heidegger's middle period (the 1930s) has shed new light on the issue. Some scholars, such as Sheehan, Kisiel and Van Buren, argue that the continuity has now been made evident, and the radical discontinuity between "Heidegger I" and "Heidegger II" is simply a misunderstanding of what Heidegger meant by the "turn" [*die Kehre*]. Sheehan argues that with *Contributions*, Heidegger "gets things right" (Sheehan, "A Paradigm Shift...", *op. cit.*, pg. 187). Kisiel asks suggestively whether "the hermeneutic breakthrough of 1919 already contains *in ovo* everything essential that came to light in the later Heidegger's thought" (GBT 458). Van Buren suggests that there are "three traits" found in the later Heidegger that "were first inscribed in his youthful thought: namely, the end of philosophy, a new beginning, and indeed a constant beginning or being on the way" (John Van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994, pg. 29). For these scholars, BT thus stands out as somewhat of an aberration, in the "failed project" (GBT 3, 458) of the attempt to interpret time as a Kantian transcendental schematic horizon for being (articulated in SZ §69c; cf. GBT 444-451). Space does not permit further consideration of this issue here.

in and for dynamic incompleteness, such that they are mutually implicated.

Heidegger's phenomenological description of the incompleteness of the human situation suggests a way to approach the subject of development that avoids both the theoretical objectification of positivist development and the anti-positivistic, yet equally theoretical, historicization of development. A phenomenological approach allows for the clarification of how these objectifications belong to the dynamic tension between historical necessity, on the one hand, and the possibility that constitutes *being* our history rather than merely having it, on the other. That is, it allows us to clarify the mutual implication of historical *immanence* and historical *transcendence*. This clarification involves reconsideration of subjectivity in the genesis of meaning, i.e., not as the origin of meaning, nor as simply the recipient of it, but rather, along with objectivity and intersubjectivity, co-implicated in its constitution.

Despite this, my approach should not be thought of as an *application* of Heidegger's thinking to the subject of development. That is, my aim is not (nor can it be) to take the *results* of Heidegger's inquiries as a system to be used in propounding a new theory of development, because another of Heidegger's fundamental aims is to show that such results are not themselves the *topic* of the inquiry. In this sense, he is faithful to the (appropriately interpreted) maxim of phenomenology: "To the matters themselves!" (SZ 34). The matter of BT is not so much *what* it shows, but *how* it shows what it does. But this matter becomes convoluted because the "what" and the "how" are mutually implicated.[5] The how of philosophical inquiry is one of the ways of being of

5. For this reason, Heidegger can easily come to appear primarily as a methodologist or a metaphilosopher. For example, see Steven Galt Crowell, "Heidegger's Phenomenological Decade", *Man and World*, vol. 28, 1995, pp. 436 and "Lask, Heidegger, and the Homelessness of Logic", *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, vol. 23, no. 3, 1992, pg. 222; Theodore Kisiel, "Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask", in *Heidegger's Way of Thought*, ed. A. Denker and M. Heinz, Continuum, New York, 2002, n. 22.

the human situation, but equally, the human situation and its ways of being is what philosophy inquires about. This recursiveness itself, Heidegger argues, is what makes such inquiry possible, i.e., what makes it possible for philosophy to "repeat" or "retrieve" life. For this reason, phenomenology must also be hermeneutic, in a double sense. First, in being a part of the whole it seeks to describe or clarify, it must proceed hermeneutically. Second, it must show how the human situation *itself* is hermeneutical.

Consequently, phenomenological clarification (which for Heidegger is what all philosophical inquiry properly is) can only ever be provisional (cf. SZ 436). This is another way in which it differs from the theoretical attitude. There can be no complete and final presentation of the human situation, precisely because the human situation is itself fundamentally incomplete and unfinished. Whenever philosophical results are presented as a complete system, the very phenomenon we are seeking to clarify is occluded. Likewise, if phenomenological results are taken as theoretical assertions, their intention is missed.[6] In clarifying the incompleteness of the human situation, then, we must be careful to avoid theoretically completing it. The showing or indicating has to be incomplete, so as to allow the full concreteness or facticity of the human situation to show *itself*. As Heidegger puts it in BT, "[p]henomenology then means:...Letting see what shows itself from itself, just as it shows itself from itself" (SZ 34). In order not to complete or to construct the matter to be seen, such letting see can only be *formal*, so as to leave the seeing open to the matter itself. And if this applies to such formal indications, *a fortiori* it applies to BT itself (or any of Heidegger's other texts, for that matter). In this respect, BT "is an 'empty' book", requiring an enactment on the part of the reader.[7]

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6. John Van Buren relates how Heidegger sought to avoid this happening with his own formally indicative approach, for example, telling a student "There will be no heideggerizing here! We want to get at the topic." (John Van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994, pg. 45.)

In the context of inquiry about the subject of development, such an approach allows for the inclusion of such incompleteness and its deformalization in the inquiry itself, by recognizing that the subject of development itself has to include such incompleteness.

Theoretical Completeness and the Concrete Individual

The theoretical legacy

In the *Logos* essay Husserl sets out an idea of philosophy as a strict science that is epistemological, universalistic, and ahistorical. It is this idea of philosophy that Heidegger critiques, in his transformation of phenomenology into fundamental ontology that occupies him throughout the 1920s, an endeavour strongly influenced by Dilthey's thinking.[8] In seeking to "cultivate the spirit of Count Yorck in order to serve Dilthey's *work*" (SZ 404), Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutics aims to express the singular in its being-historical, an endeavour almost diametrically opposite to Husserl's. In doing so, Heidegger argues that the naturalization of history in positivism and the historicization of nature in historicism belong together in the happening of the human situation. The concrete individuality of the human situation, he argues, is the transcendence of history *in* immanence to it. That is, our way of being is both to have history and to be "had" by it. But this can only be elucidated through a phenomenological inquiry that recognizes the hermeneutical aspect of the human situation, i.e., that we both *belong* to our history, and yet transcend it in being-historical, i.e., in being *towards* that history. The challenge to philosophy that both positivism and

7. Ryan Streeter, "Heidegger's formal indication: A question of method in *Being and Time*", *Man and World*, vol. 30, 1997, pg. 426.
8. Cf. Scharff, "Heidegger's 'Appropriation' ", *op. cit.*; Theodore R. Schatzki, "Living Out of the Past: Dilthey and Heidegger on Life and History", *Inquiry*, vol. 46, 2003, pp. 301-323.

historicism pose, Heidegger argues, is based on the theoretical attitude towards the human situation. The fundamental presupposition of this attitude is that the knowing consciousness stands outside of that which it knows about. For positivism, this meant that consciousness was a natural object that could be observed and studied so as to determine the natural laws by which it operates. For historicism, on the other hand, this meant that the historical formations of spirit could be observed and typologized in terms of their inner motivations, but only insofar as these appear to *us*.

Heidegger rejects Husserl's shift towards the transcendental-ideal constitution of consciousness, because it once again reverts to the theoretical attitude. Such an attitude grasps experience as a happening that happens *to* me, as if I were somehow outside of or constituted independently from my experience. But the fundamental characteristic of experience, Heidegger argues, is that it "befalls me". It happens, and my "I" happens right along with it (ZBP 73-76/62-4).[9] The theoretical attitude cannot express this, because its insistence on the formal-logical cuts off access to singularizing and properizing befalling. The irreducible belonging together of experience and "I" means that any theoretical attempt to conceptualize it is already compromised by the presupposition of the difference between consciousness and its object. For this reason, neither formal-logical concepts nor empirical generalizations can hope to grasp and express the befalling in which and out of which (and indeed, *as* which) the "I" occurs.

The central issue for Heidegger, then, is the question of historical meaning, its relation to the *a priori*, and whether historicism expresses this in an adequate way. Of equal concern, however, is positivist reductionism, which denies the originary meaningfulness of the world, maintaining instead that only law-like regularity can satisfy the requirements of objective knowledge. For many 19th-century German

9. "Happen along" is one suitable translation for *sich er-eignis*; "befalling", according to the OED, is an archaic verbal substantive, which could therefore translate *Ereignis*.

philosophers, positivism drew implicitly on Kant's critical philosophy, which was understood as delineating the regulative conditions for objective knowledge of *nature*. This prompted the question of whether it was necessary to "go beyond Kant" (in Windelband's words) in order to provide a "critique of historical reason" (as Dilthey argued), so as to provide a foundation for objective knowledge of history. Heidegger, however, argues that neither epistemologically- nor methodologically-oriented philosophical inquiry (exemplified in neo-Kantianism) could address the twin crises of historicism *and* positivism (or scientism). The "crisis of the sciences" arises because of their theoretical inability "to reclaim their particular domain of objects originally" (HCT pp. 2-3). The question of the *meaningfulness* of history and nature cannot start with either of these domains, nor with the demarcation between them, because these arise with the sciences themselves (HCT pg. 2). The theoretical attitude objectifies what is encountered, and as objectified, such beings are denuded of the context of meaningfulness. For Heidegger, this is a fundamental characteristic of the sciences, which shows their positivistic character:

> All the scientific disciplines are dominated by *positivism*, the tendency toward the *positive*, where "positive" is understood in terms of *facts*, and facts are understood in terms of a particular interpretation of *reality*. (HCT pg. 15)

Epistemologically- and methodologically-oriented philosophy is also determined by the theoretical attitude, Heidegger argues, for example, in the neo-Kantian attempts to solve the demarcation problem of the domains of empirical knowledge. In taking these object-domains as given, such inquiries conform to "traditional philosophy of science, which proceeds after the fact of an accidental, historically given science in order to investigate its structure" (HCT pg. 2). In doing so, this kind of philosophy fails to take into account not only the context of meaningfulness of what is encountered, but also the situation of the inquirer. Such a focus on objects, or *things*, Heidegger argues, results in

"absolute reification" as an "abyss" of meaninglessness or "nothingness" (KNS §13).

Heidegger's argument is that meaningfulness cannot be properly expressed without an appropriate account of subjectivity, which neither positivism nor historicism could provide. Yet the epistemologically-oriented philosophy that was prevalent in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was also inadequate. Positivism holds that subjectivity can be assimilated to objectivity, as with psychologism or, today, neurobiology and cognitive science, for example. Historicism denied that positivism could give an adequate account of historical meaning, because of its intersubjective constitution. The philosophical responses to these positions can be understood as attempts to argue for the autonomy of subjectivity. However, their epistemological bias, Heidegger argues, results in a theoretical objectification of subjectivity, whether as practical reason, life, or pure consciousness. In Heidegger's view, the only one to see that the theoretical attitude was in principle incapable of giving an adequate account of historical meaning was Dilthey. However, Dilthey's commitment to empirical psychology meant that his inquiries, too, remained epistemologically determined, despite his intent to establish a "special root-discipline of psychology" in contrast to the naturalistic psychology of his day. Yet his hermeneutic approach suggested the proper context of the issue by collapsing the distinction between knower and known in regarding the historian as continuous with the history she investigates.[10] For Heidegger, then, this very contrast itself showed that Dilthey's researches remained determined by that which he struggled against. The philosophical issue that Dilthey was unable to express, Heidegger argues, is how the questioner stands in relation to that which is in question. Once we recognize this as the originary source of *all* inquiry, we can come to understand this relation in a way that is neither objective, intersubjective, nor

10. Robert C. Scharff, "Non-Analytical, Unspeculative Philosophy of History: The Legacy of Wilhelm Dilthey", *Cultural Hermeneutics*, vol. 3, 1976, pg. 296.

subjective, but rather involves all three moments equally, in their equioriginariness. That is, we can come to understand it as an inquiry in which the inquirer herself stands in question. Husserl's anti-psychologistic phenomenology provided a way in which to express the concrete individuality of human being as a historical-hermeneutic situation, and thus to make evident how lived experience can be understood as "meaningful, not thing-like" (ZBP 69/58).

In effect, Heidegger's innovation in addressing the aporias of positivism, historicism and theoretical philosophy was to approach the inquiry into historical meaning by elucidating inquiring itself. Only this approach, he argues, can give an adequate account of the equioriginariness of subjectivity, by taking it into account in the inquiry itself. Positivism and theoretical philosophy presuppose the objectification of subjectivity in the very form of their inquiries, in which subjectivity is taken to be something available or on hand to be investigated. Although historicism avoided objectifying subjectivity in this way, by arguing for the continuity of inquirer and what is inquired about, in the historicization of history and human being, it reduced subjectivity to intersubjectivity. Neither form of reductionism, Heidegger argues, can give an appropriate account of how the history that intersubjectively constitutes me can also be objectively valid as the history that I have. Ultimately, Heidegger argues, this is a question about meaningfulness. The focus of Heidegger's phenomenological inquiries, then, is how inquiring itself can be understood as meaningful.

Heidegger transforms Dilthey's notion of hermeneutics into the fundamental understanding of *all* experience (in the double genitive sense). Phenomenology aims "to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself" (SZ 34). A phenomenon, unlike an object, is constituted by its mode of showing itself in itself.[11]

11. I.e., it is unlike a theoretical object, which shows itself according to general or formal-logical categories.

Such showing also involves the one to whom it shows. When the phenomenon is experience, however, the "letting show" is part of the phenomenon itself. That is, the articulation of appearance belongs to what is to be described. Phenomenological description is a description of the describing (the phenomenon). Thus, the attitudinal requirement for such description is intensified. What Heidegger is after is not so much a description of the describing, but a description of what makes such describing *possible*. In this sense, then, hermeneutics belongs to phenomenology in the double genitive sense (i.e., phenomenological hermeneutics is hermeneutical phenomenology).

Thus, the possibility of expressing the singularity of being rests on our *belonging* to, or *immanence* in, it. Understanding is only possible because *what* we understand is what we already are.[12] Yet, at the same time, understanding our situation (having the whole) *transcends* it. Thus, Heidegger's inquiry concerns how such immanence and transcendence (facticity and logicity, or history and the *a priori*) can belong together without reducing one to the other. Heidegger's phenomenological-hermeneutical approach to grasping this is the method of *formal indication*, which is exemplified most fully (although not explained) in *Being and Time*.

Concrete individuality

The philosophical responses of Windelband, Rickert and Husserl turned on the question of what constitutes objectivity. The priority they accorded to epistemology led them to argue that concrete individuality is incomprehensible or irrational, because it cannot be conceptualized or intuited. Heidegger argues that this would mean that although I could *be* the concrete individual I am, this would be both ungraspable and

12. Consequently, the "results" of the analytic can only ever be provisional, since such an analytic itself affects our self-understanding, and thus who and how we are. Heidegger adverts to the significance this has for the analytic in the final section of BT: "The presentation of the constitution of being of being-situate remains however but *one way.*" (SZ 436)

inexpressible. The very notion of *being* it then becomes problematic. Thus, in order to address the question of concrete individuality, a clarification of the meaning of being is necessary. But, as mentioned previously, this question has to be approached in a way appropriate to the issue, which the epistemologically-oriented approaches of his predecessors were unable to do.

Heidegger argues that the problem lies in the *theoretical attitude*. This attitude, characteristic of both epistemologically-oriented philosophy and of the positive sciences, presupposes that knowledge of objects is achieved by contemplating them in isolation from one another. For Rickert, this meant that an object is a conceptual abstraction from the heterogeneous continuum of reality. For Husserl, it involved bracketing the existential commitments of the natural attitude. In the positive sciences, it involves the notion that it investigates objects that are "on hand" or "just there", waiting to be discovered through scientific inquiry. In each case, what is problematic is the *givenness* of the object, i.e., *how* it is given for the inquiry. The theoretical attitude decontextualizes phenomena, such that they are no longer the experience of a historically constituted individual, but rather the objects of an ahistorical, worldless subject. By construing all experience as immanent to consciousness or as "facts of consciousness", the theoretical attitude thus results in an inability to give any account of the object whatsoever. Heidegger refers to this as "absolute reification" (ZBP 63/53).

The theoretical attitude is unable to grasp the structural incompleteness of the human situation because it takes this to be independent, self-contained and hence complete in itself. This is the legacy of substantialist ontology, Heidegger argues: what truly is, is that which remains the same throughout change (cf. SZ 95-96). Theoretical inquiry thus regards beings in terms of what is unchanging in them. The human situation, however, cannot be grasped in this way, because one of its fundamental

characteristics is that it is *timely*. It flows, and in such flowing, the relations it evinces to other beings, and to itself as well, undergo change and transformation. Consequently, this holds for any kind of inquiry as well. The theoretical attitude presupposes that inquiry does not change the object, nor does it change the inquirer in any essential way. In asking about the movement of the planets, for instance, we may come to *know* more about them, but neither they nor we become different beings. Yet if such inquiry is about that which doesn't change, what does it entail for the relation between the knower and the known, or between consciousness and its contents? If neither are essentially changed by the inquiry, then what is inquiry supposed to consist of? This is the aspect that the theoretical attitude fails to take into account.

Neo-Kantianism and the Irrational

Rickert: Valid values and the heterothesis

As discussed in chapter 1, Rickert argued that the heterogeneous continuum of reality is irrational, because in order to become an object of knowledge, it must be brought under concepts, and thus ceases either to be heterogeneous or to be a continuum. In the generalizing concepts of the natural sciences, the heterogeneity of reality is transformed into a homogeneity; in the individualizing concepts of the cultural sciences, the continuum is transformed into a discretum. Only by way of one or the other is knowledge possible. The fundamental characteristic of these types of inquiry, Rickert argued, is their value-relevance or value-relatedness [*Wertbeziehung*], i.e., the values in terms of which the heterogeneous continuum is individuated or generalized.[13] Such values, Rickert argued, are not value-judgments or valuations, but rather were entirely theoretical. "Values are not realities...Their nature consists entirely in their

13. Rickert, *Science and History*, *op. cit.*, pg. 21.

acceptance as valid."[14] And although cultural values are the distinguishing element for the science of history, this discipline itself does not address the validity of values.[15] However, this raised the question as to the status of such values, and how they are supposed to be normative in experience, i.e., how they are supposed to be valid for the material which they form. As Heidegger argued, the relation between value-judgment and its fulfilment is the relation between a norm and being [*Sein*], or the ideal and the material, of which it holds or is valid for (ZBP 54/45). But how is such a norm or value, which does not exist but is only valid, supposed to hold of an existent? Heidegger suggests, following Lask, that "the material as such refers beyond itself" (ZBP 55/46).

I cannot explore this question further here. The significance of Rickert's distinction between validities and existents is that it is elaborated by Lask into the principle of the material determination of form, as a way of articulating how validities are valid for existents, which principle is appropriated by Heidegger as the ontological difference between being and beings. I turn to this in the next section.

One aspect of Rickert's thinking that Heidegger does, however, appropriate is the notion of the *heterothesis*. This notion, Kisiel explains, is "that a One cannot even be thought of without the Other, that being identical with itself and being different from something else are equally primordial", a notion which appears in GA64 and later in BT as "equioriginality" [*Gleichursprünglichkeit*] (GBT 332-333). In his *Habilitationsschrift*, Heidegger refers to this notion in relation to the question about the "something" [*Etwas*]:[16]

> In what way is the something *a* something? Because it is not an other. It is a something and in being-something the not-being-the-other...The one and the other are given equally immediately with the object in general; not the one or even one [*Eins*]

14. *Ibid.*, pg. 88.
15. *Ibid.*, pg. 89.
16. According to Kisiel, Heidegger adopts this term and also the impersonal "it" [*es*] "from the neo-Kantians...as an alternative way of talking about 'being' " (GBT 23).

> in contrast to two, but rather the one *and* the other, the "*heterothesis*", is the true origin of thinking as taking hold of the object. (FS 218)

He also mentions it in connection with the convertibility of the transcendental *unum* and *ens*, as the "true 'origin' of the thinking of the object" (FS 230-231). Quoting from Rickert, Heidegger points out "that there is no object [*Gegenstand*] if the one and the other are not given" (FS 231).

Lask: The material determination of form

Emil Lask was another philosopher who attempted "on the basis of a theory of meaning, to determine a concept of autonomous philosophy distinct from both empirical science and metaphysics".[17] A student of Rickert's, Lask had a significant influence on Heidegger at an early stage, particularly with respect to the issue of meaning, the status of the categories, and the question of concreteness.[18] Lask rejected Rickert's normative conception of validity in favour of a strictly objective conception, yet he agrees with the rejection of the metaphysical distinction between sensisble and supersensible beings, in favour of a transcendental distinction "between objects of *any* kind and the logical forms which render such objects intelligible".[19] It is validity [*Geltung*] that characterizes logical form, as opposed to the actuality, occurrence or existence of objects.

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17. Crowell, "Emil Lask", *op. cit.*, pg. 69.
18. There is relatively little available in the secondary literature regarding Lask. Apart from the essays by Crowell and Kisiel already referred to, see Gabriel Motzkin, "Emil Lask and the Crisis of Neo-Kantianism", *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, no. 2, 1989, pp. 171-190; Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, "Neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology: The Case of Emil Lask and Johannes Daubert", *Kanti-Studien*, vol. 81, 1991, pp. 303-318 and "Two Idealisms: Lask and Husserl", *Kant-Studien*, vol. 83, 1993, pp. 448-466; Theodore Kisiel, "Heidegger-Lask-Fichte" in Tom Rockmore, ed., *Heidegger, German Idealism, and Neo-Kantianism*, Humanity Books, Amherst, 2000, pp. 239-270; and Craig Brandist, "Two Routes 'to Concreteness' in the Work of the Bakhtin Circle", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 63, no. 3, 2002, 521-537.
19. Crowell, "Homelessness", *op. cit.*, pg. 226.

> Logical form cannot be said in any sense to "exist." Rather, it "holds" or "is valid" of objects. *Seiendes* and *Geltendes*: this is the basic duality within the "universe of the thinkable" (*All des Denkbaren*).[20]

Thus, validities [*Geltende*] are not existents [*Seiende*], and therefore cannot be said to be real. 'Being', in Lask's analysis, is not an existent but a validity, and therefore, there is an *ontological difference* between being and existents. For the early Heidegger, then, this is the incipient location of the ontological difference, between beings and their being, or between beings and their *meaning*. Insofar as the positive sciences investigate beings as "existents", they cannot inquire into the meaning of such beings, because (contrary to positivism and psychologism) such meaning is not to be found in beings themselves. In Lask's formulation, "[t]he being of entities [*Sein des Seienden*] belongs to the realm of validity, and thus to the non-entitative [*Nicht-Seienden*]."[21] The task of transcendental logic thus becomes to "specify the character of the relation between non-entitative validity and the objects (or entities) themselves".[22]

In explicating how validities hold, or are valid for, existents, Lask proposed the "principle of the material determination of form", i.e., that the relation of validities to existents is one of *implication* [*Bewandtnis*].[23] According to this principle, "the moment which differentiates form does not lie within the realm of validity itself but must be chalked up to that which is engaged by the form...to the material".[24] Because validity can only be *for* something, the logical forms do not form the material, but are rather implicated in it.[25] "There is no validity that would not be a validity-with-regard-to, a validity-in-respect-of, a validity-of [*Hingelten*]."[26] For this reason, Lask argues,

20. *Ibid.*
21. Emil Lask, *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. II, ed. Eugen Herrigel, J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1923, pg. 46, quoted in Crowell, *ibid.*, pg. 226.
22. Crowell, *ibid.*, pg. 227.
23. Another notion that Heidegger appropriates. Cf. Crowell, *ibid.*, pg. 228;
24. Lask, *op. cit.*, pg. 58, cited in Crowell, *ibid.*, pg. 228.
25. Crowell, *ibid.*

the forms or categories have no separate existence from the material they are implicated in, and therefore neither do they "synthesize material since they are nothing but a certain way of being *of* material".[27] In ordinary contexts, objects are encountered as meaningful, but without their meaning being brought to clarity, which only takes place in transcendental reflection, or philosophical inquiry.

> Transcendental reflection on categories only registers as "form character" what the material "is in itself" (LP 69), and so brings out the meaning character of the object as a whole.[28]

The categories are "not forms of thought but forms of meaning".[29] For Lask, then, "[c]ategorial validity *is* the objectivity of objects, the being of beings, the thinghood of things, etc.",[30] and objects are "unities of meaning", where meaning is the difference between an object

> taken in non-philosophical contexts (both everyday and scientific) and the same object as it is known through the transcendental reflection which clarifies its truth structure, the *Urverhältnis* of categorial form and material.[31]

Form is thus "the intelligibility of the object *qua* meaningful whole".[32]

Heidegger, following Lask, aims at articulating this through an explication of meaningfulness. As Crowell puts it, "[m]eaning becomes the basic theme of a philosophy of logic which attempts to criticise Kantian representationalism without falling into metaphysics."[33] Hence Heidegger's formulation in BT of the task of philosophy as the investigation of "the question of the meaning [or sense, *Sinn*] of being" (SZ 1).

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26. Lask, *op. cit.*, pg. 32, cited in Crowell, "Aletheiology", *op. cit.*, pg. 79.
27. Crowell, "Aletheiology", *op. cit.*, pg. 80.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Steven Galt Crowell, "Making Logic Philosophical Again (1912-1916)", in Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, eds., *Reading Heidegger from the start: essays in his earliest thought*, SUNY Press, Albany, 1994, pg. 62.
30. Crowell, "Aletheiology", *op. cit.*, pg. 76.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.
32. *Ibid.*, pg. 80.
33. Crowell, "Homelessness", *op. cit.*, pg. 228.

Lask's aletheiology maintains that there is no distinction between object and truth.

> The Copernican turn is taken to mean that there is no "metalogical" (and so no sceptical) abyss between the thing and the "truth" of the thing, that "truth extends to the object itself, is identical to it" (LP 109).[34]

Transcendental philosophy, for Lask, is thus the investigation of the conditions of the possibility of the positive sciences. Whereas the latter investigate empirical features of domains of entities,

> transcendental philosophy...thematises all objects in terms of their validity structure or intelligibility (truth). Such investigation reveals in empirical objects a transcendental predicate (LP 123)—viz., "meaning"—which is not found in any empirical catalogue of "what is". Thus, as Lask continues, "the objects are identical to theoretical meaning"...For philosophy, objects are "in truth" *meanings*.[35]

Although Heidegger adopts Lask's conception of transcendental philosophy, he sought to go beyond Lask by including the investigation of the grounds of subjectivity in the task of transcendental philosophy. For Heidegger, Lask's inquiries remained one-sided, focused only on the constitution of objects by validity, and thus fails to take into account the reflective moment in such constitution, "the Kantian side of the equation".[36] In the conclusion to his *Habilitationsschrift*, he writes:

> These contexts of problems can be understood to be ultimately decisive for the problem of categories only if we recognize a second basic task of any theory of categories: *situating the problem of categories within the problems of judgment and the subject*.[37]

The problem of the categories had to be situated within these latter problems, Heidegger argued, because "only through judgment does [consciousness] become conscious of it as true, valid meaning" (FS 285). To this end, Heidegger adopts and transforms Husserl's notion of intentionality as a way of accessing and expressing "how such an object is 'there' for reflection, what it means to say that ontological truth is

34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*
36. Crowell, *op. cit.*, pg. 230.
37. Martin Heidegger, "The Theory of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus", in *Supplements*, ed. John Van Buren, SUNY Press, Albany, 2002, pg. 63.

'given' ".[38] Because validity is intentional, i.e., it holds *of* or is valid *for*, the analysis of intentionality is necessary "if Lask's theory of material determination of form is itself to be made intelligible or clarified 'logically' ".[39]

For Heidegger, then, the crucial aspect missing from Lask's account of meaning is how this is meaningful for the subject. Heidegger's subsequent inquiries are oriented towards elucidating how meaningfulness, concreteness and subjectivity belong together and can be brought to expression in the phenomenological inquiry into pretheoretical life, in the form of fundamental ontology.

Husserl and Phenomenology

Heidegger's appropriation of Husserl's phenomenology is a complex issue, which cannot be examined in detail here. Instead, I simply discuss some of the notions that Heidegger himself indicates are the central discoveries of phenomenology.

Intentionality

As mentioned above, in the conclusion of his *Habilitationsschrift*, Heidegger indicates how Lask's transcendental logic needs to be related to the problems of judgment and the subject. Heidegger appropriates Husserl's analysis of intentionality as a way to get at the givenness of meaning in factical life (cf. GBT 30-33). Unlike the neo-Kantians, who followed Fichte in arguing that facticity was brute, irrational reality, about which nothing can be said, Heidegger agrees with Lask and Husserl that the immediacy of the factic already involves categorial intuition, which can be read off from facticities, although not defined (cf. GBT 26-28).[40] Thus, facticity is *already* intentional.

38. Crowell, *op. cit.*, pg. 231.
39. *Ibid.*
40. See also Kisiel, "Heidegger-Lask-Fichte", *op. cit.*

The structure of intentionality, as "directing-itself-towards" (HCT pg. 29), grounds the validity of the categories found in factic life experience, as valid-for. For Heidegger, then, the importance of intentionality is that it "is a structure of lived experiences [*Erlebnisse*] as such and not a coordination relative to other realities, something added to the experiences taken as psychic states" (HCT pg. 29). For this reason, Heidegger argues that the theoretical attitude towards consciousness as an "inner sphere" that must go "outside" in order to encounter and grasp beings is phenomenologically unsound. The human situation is always already structured by intentionality, i.e., in being in the world it is already "outside" (SZ 62). The discovery of intentionality, he argues, shows that the philosophy of consciousness "[s]ince Descartes" rests on metaphysical presuppositions about the psychic and the physical (HCT pp. 30-31). Such presuppositions are not faithful to the "matter itself", because they hold that intentionality is something added on to perception or experience (HCT pp. 31, 35).

What is particularly important with the discovery of intentionality is the way what is intended provides evidence for the intending. In intentionality, intending and the intended belong together, although for Heidegger, this belonging-together remains unclarified in Husserl.

> We thus have an inherent affinity between the way something is intended, the *intentio*, and the *intentum*, whereby *intentum*, the intended, is to be understood in the sense just developed, not the perceived as an entity, but the entity in the how of its being-perceived, the *intentum* in the how of its being-intended. Only with the how of the being-intended belonging to every *intentio*, as such does the basic constitution of intentionality come into view at all, even though only provisionally. (HCT pg. 45)

In this belonging-together, the intended provides intuitive fulfilment for the intending, where "intuition" means "simply apprehending the bodily given as it shows itself" (HCT pg. 47). Such apprehension involves categorial intuition, i.e., the intuition of the perceived as categorially structured.

Categorial Intuition

> ...categorial intuition is just a concretion of the basic constitution of intentionality. (HCT pg. 72)

Husserl's phenomenology provided another component, along with intentionality, that Heidegger appropriated methodologically in his pursuit of facticity.[41] This was the notion of *categorial intuition*. Husserl had argued that in our experience of a phenomenon such as a green book, although we perceive the book and green, nowhere do we perceive the book's *being* green (or its green*ness*), i.e., the category of 'green' (LUII §43, pg. 277; §44, pg. 280). Then how do I intend the green book? Husserl's answer was that along with perception there must also be categorial *intuition*. That is, I intuit "being green", rather than perceiving it. Husserl argued that this distinction meant that the categories are not *real* objects, but are *ideal* (LUII §46, pg. 282). Heidegger appropriates this as a way to get at the meaning of being itself. For if I categorially intuit "being green", then what I am intuiting is the *being* of it, i.e., that the category 'green' applies in the phenomenon. Heidegger's appropriation of categorial intuition is thus intimately connected with his appropriation of Lask's analysis of validities and existents. Against Lask's objectivist position, however, Heidegger argues that the distinction between validities and existents is founded in intentionality.

Thus, Heidegger argues that I intuit the being of the book, i.e., that *this* book, here and now, is or exists, in the same way that I intuit its greenness. The intentional relation to this individual thing involves the intuition of its concrete individuality, i.e., that it is *this* being and not another. Although concrete individuality (or facticity) may be *theoretically* inaccessible, it is not experientially inaccessible. (How could it be,

41. Cf. Heidegger's letter to Karl Löwith, August 1927, in Karl Löwith, *Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism*, ed. R. Wolin, trans. G. Steiner, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, pg. 242.

since my *experience* is *my* experience, i.e., is always concretely individual?) This means, Heidegger argues, that being is quite the opposite of the most universal and hence empty concept. It is the most singular and determinate concept, yet a concept of a peculiar sort, because it has no determinate *content*. Being holds of beings, yet does not pertain to their determinate characteristics (their whatness) but rather to their thatness. Of course, there is no thatness *without* whatness (the implication of the formal), but equally thatness does not determine the whatness.

The original sense of the a priori

Another aspect of Husserl's phenomenology that Heidegger appropriates is the sense of the *a priori* that it discloses. This is based in categorial intuition, in that the categories intuited in experience are *a priori* to their instantiation in a given phenomenon. This indicates, argues Heidegger, that there is a "specific indifference of the *a priori* to subjectivity" (HCT pg. 74), contrary to the views of the philosophers of consciousness. This aprioricity, which is "[i]n the ideal as in the real", thus indicates that the *a priori* is neither immanent nor transcendent, i.e., belongs neither to subjectivity nor to objectivity (reality). Yet since the *a priori* has "universal scope", Heidegger argues, "the *a priori* phenomenologically understood is not a title for a comportment [of the subject] but a *title for being*" (HCT pg. 74). Furthermore, phenomenology also shows that "the way of access to the *a priori*" is through "a simple intuition", and not an *inference*. That is, it is neither hypothetical nor posited:

> It is not inferred indirectly, surmised from some symptoms in the real, hypothetically reckoned, as one infers, from the presence of certain disturbances in the movements of a body, the presence of other bodies that are not seen at all. It is absurd to transpose this approach, which makes sense in the realm of the physical, to philosophy too... (HCT pg. 74)

Contrary to positivism (and particularly psychologism), the *a priori* cannot be grasped by induction or by hypothesis, as Mill, for example, maintained.

Thus, for Heidegger, the "original sense of the *a priori*" cannot be grasped either by the philosophy of consciousness or by positivism, since both are determined theoretically. A proper clarification of the *a priori* is still lacking, however, since this "really presupposes the understanding of what we are seeking: *time*" (HCT pg. 72). In BT, Heidegger articulates this as the "factical *a priori*", i.e., the "always alreadiness" of the human situation.

Destructing the Theoretical Attitude with Formal Indication

Heidegger's approach, variously called "formally indicating hermeneutics" (ZBP), "hermeneutics of facticity" (OHF) and "fundamental ontology" (BT), is a *pretheoretical*, nonobjectifying inquiry into the human situation. Whereas the theoretical attitude objectifies what it inquires into, Heidegger argues that the human situation is not an object, and cannot be understood as such. An object is a particular instance, subsumed under general or formal categories. But *my* situation, Heidegger argues, is not an instance of anything. Rather, it is concretely individual and this is constituted by its differentiation from every other real being. However, this makes the question of *expressing* the human situation problematic, since expressing anything requires language, and language is constituted by general terms. Yet the human situation in its concrete historical individuality is such that it is both heterogeneous (i.e., never an instance) *and* a continuum (i.e., related to, or continuous with, all of history).

For Heidegger, the import of the claim that the concrete individual is inexpressible showed that there is a problem with the theoretical attitude itself. The neo-Kantian constructivist attempt to resolve the conflict between positivism and historicism about the objectivity of historical knowledge led to the conclusion that the human situation is unknowable and ultimately irrational. Yet the theoretical attitude

itself arises from, or belongs to, the human situation. On what basis is this attitude capable of judging the condition that makes it possible? At the very least, the relationship between the theoretical attitude and the human situation needs clarification.[42] But how is this relation to be clarified, if not theoretically? What other way of inquiring can inquire into the conditions of inquiry itself? To put this another way, how is it that we can transcend our situation so as to express it, if we are completely immanent in it?[43] And conversely, if we *can* transcend it, then how can we be completely immanent in it?

In the philosophy of consciousness, this problem manifests itself in the presupposition that knowledge concerns the *contents* of consciousness. Objectivity then pertains to the way that such contents are combined in consciousness through subsumption under concepts. But the status of these concepts is left undetermined. They are neither perceptions nor objects. Then how do we have knowledge of them?

Heidegger seeks a way of expressing the human situation that avoids theoretical prejudices. Expressions such as *Da-sein* and *Verstehen* are what Heidegger calls "formal indications" [*formale Anzeige*].[44] These are used deliberately so as to have a twofold effect. First, they are intended to ward off or warn us away from both everyday concepts and the concepts of the philosophical tradition. Second, they are intended to effect a transformation in thinking, through transforming the understanding of, and *in*, the human situation. Such formal indications are fundamentally *provisional*, and only as such can they formally indicate.

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42. Nevertheless, even though neo-Kantian constructivism was unable to offer any satisfactory account of the historical individuality of the human situation, it still had value. As Bambach states, "for all its problems, Neo-Kantian thinking served a positive function. For it was only in this hypostatized form, Heidegger claimed, that the aporias of subject/object metaphysics could genuinely reveal themselves" (Bambach, *op. cit.*, pg. 109).
43. In Dilthey's terms, "knowledge cannot go behind life" (Dilthey, *Selected Works Vol. I*, *op. cit.*, pg. 489).
44. About which, see below.

Phenomenology and de-concealment

Phenomenology is anti-metaphysical and empirical, although anti-naturalistic as well. Phenomenological inquiry is not oriented to the disclosure of a reality "behind" the phenomena it investigates, but to what can be made evident in the phenomena as they show themselves. Phenomenology concerns the way that beings show themselves, i.e., what it means for them to *be* phenomena.

> Nothing else essentially stands "behind" the phenomena of phenomenology, although what is to become a phenomenon can be concealed. And exactly for the reason that phenomena firstly and mostly are *not* given, phenomenology is needed. Covered-up-ness is the counterconcept to "phenomenon". (SZ 36)

For Heidegger, phenomenology is hermeneutic ontology, or "a productive logic" that discloses the pre-theoretical constitution of the beings that the positive disciplines investigate (HCT pg. 2). This method enables us to elucidate or clarify the hermeneutical character of the human situation and show its interpretativeness (and interpretedness), as well as the interpretativeness that constitutes the method (cf. SZ 37). Both in everydayness and in theoretical constructivism, Heidegger argues, this hermeneutic character is concealed.

The structures of the human situation that Heidegger seeks to lay bare in BT are there in, and as, everyday experiences. However, both the philosophical tradition and everydayness make such structures almost unrecognizable, because they do not correspond to the usual concepts. This is most evident in the notion of the self, against which Heidegger counterposes being-situate [*Da-sein*],[45] a formal indication that does not "eclipse" the self, so much as decentre it.[46] The philosophical tradition, he argues, has privileged the self or the knowing consciousness, especially with the modern emphasis on certainty traceable to Descartes, *vis-à-vis* its own experience, thus

45. Here, *Da-sein* is translated as either "being-situate" or "the human situation", depending on context.
46. Cf. Michael Zimmerman, *The Eclipse of the Self*, Ohio University Press, Athens, 1981.

dichotomizing subject and objects, which are always *for* the subject (SZ 59). Similarly, in everyday experience, we think of ourselves as persons, egos, selves or 'I's, in opposition to others, natural beings, etc. But where in experience, Heidegger asks, is the radical differentiation between self and things found? Where is the self supposed to encounter it? Can experience be properly characterized in such a way?

Heidegger's approach is to ask about the experiencing of the human situation as a phenomenon. Inquiring in this way shows that the phenomenon is always already being-in-the-world. The human situation is a unitary phenomenon that includes things encountered, others who are there, and something 'I'-like. The more attention we pay to this phenomenon (the phenomenon that we ourselves are), Heidegger argues, the more it becomes evident that it is not divided into different domains or objects, and that the 'I' is not some object that we encounter in the phenomenon. Rather, the 'I' is a way of being *of* the phenomenon, and inquiry about a way of being cannot proceed epistemologically, i.e., in terms of how knowledge about it is possible.

The concept of philosophy and philosophical concepts

Heidegger argues that intuition and expression of the concrete individuality of the human situation must be an ontological issue concerning the question of the meaning of being, rather than an epistemological issue concerning the conditions of objective validity, since objectivity already involves abstraction. Heidegger appropriates Rickert's notion of "the heterogeneity of everything real",[47] i.e., that everything real is only such in differing from everything else. Whereas Rickert argued that this meant that the individual could not be expressed, Heidegger argues on the contrary that as the most *individuating* concept,[48] the way to uncover or disclose the

47. Rickert, *Science and History*, *op. cit.*, pg. 34.
48. I.e., 'being' as a *distributive*, rather than a *subsumptive*, universal (cf. GBT 318, 397).

sense of being is to elucidate it *in* its individuating. This happens in being the concrete individual that I am, which concrete individuality is fundamental to the human situation. And because one of my ways to be—my possibilities—is to ask *about* my being, such inquiry itself is a mode of individuating. Thus, Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutics aims to "listen in" on the individuating that constitutes the human situation, by showing how such questioning itself brings the questioner into question.

Fundamental ontology of being-situate

Heidegger argues that we have to start with the being that is nearest to us, which means starting with the being that we ourselves are (SZ 7). His early inquiries are thus directed towards expressing the singularity of what he variously calls the "historical 'I' ", the "situation 'I' ", and "the human situation" or "being-situate" (GBT 16-17, 493). Fundamental ontology aims to clarify the characteristics (in BT called "existentials" [*Existentiale*]) of our way of being such that being is meaningful.

Object and inquiry

In Heidegger's earliest extant lecture-course (KNS1919), he focusses on the way the theoretical attitude takes its object in advance as an object for the subject or knowing consciousness. But what is the status of consciousness itself? Both the neo-Kantians and Husserl denied that consciousness is an object (in contrast to positivism).[49] The problem then becomes, what to make of the judgments *about* consciousness found in philosophy. To what do these refer? If the aim of philosophical inquiry is to explicate or clarify the characteristics of consciousness or knowing, then it must take such inquiry itself into account as an aspect of knowing. In taking its object

49. Cf. Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, "Two Idealisms: Lask and Husserl", *Kant-Studien*, vol. 83, 1993, pg. 457.

as given, and thus available for contemplative beholding (or θεωρεῖν [*theorein*]), the theoretical attitude denies that *inquiring* belongs to the way objects are encountered, or in other words, to the constitution either of consciousness or object. For this reason, it is unable to take into account the *enactment* of the relation of consciousness to its object, yet it depends upon such enactment in order for it to *have* an object at all. The object is taken as given, whereas in the relating of subject to object, givenness becomes problematic.

Intentionality

Heidegger's method of formal indication is an appropriation of Husserl's analysis of intentionality that aims to express the "giving" that constitutes the givenness of objects. As such, this giving cannot itself be an object, since it is prior to all objectification. To the theoretical attitude, this appears either circular or self-contradictory, since for this attitude whatever can be grasped—including the giving of the given—must be an object. Any endeavour to determine what constitutes object-hood would thus involve "[t]he circularity of self-presupposition and self-grounding" (ZBP 16/14). Heidegger argues, however, that the problem of circularity pertains only to the theoretical attitude itself:

> Precisely that which first is to be *posited* must be *presupposed*. Circularity is an eminently theoretical phenomenon, it is really the most refined expression of a purely theoretical difficulty. (ZBP 95/80)

Overcoming the problem of circularity cannot be achieved theoretically. Rather, a different approach altogether is required, which allows us to express the fundamental relat*ing* of knower and known, or how experiencing and experienced belong together.[50] Such an inquiry cannot presuppose the division into knower and known, however.

50. This sense of belonging together, or the intimate familiarity of experience with itself, is what Heidegger subsequently refers to as "understanding" [*Verstehen*] (cf. GBT 507).

Instead, Heidegger argues, it has to inquire into the human situation as the phenomenon in which such a division can first arise. But inquiry itself arises in the human situation. Thus, the inquiry encompasses two "directions" or "vectors", that of being "in" and based "upon" life or the human situation and that of being "out" "towards" it (J 82; cf. GBT 141-142). The question, then, is how to express this. To do so, Heidegger appropriates Husserl's analysis of intentionality.

Husserl articulated intentionality as comprising the intending and the intended (or meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment). Heidegger reinterprets these as "senses" that express factical life experience or the human situation, namely the relational sense [*Bezugssinn*] (the intending) and the content (or containment) sense [*Gehaltssinn*] (the intended) of the phenomenon, to which he adds a third sense, the enactment or actualization sense [*Vollzugssinn*] (GA59:10, 37; J 87). This tripled-sensed intentionality belongs to the "fundamental structure of factical life experience" (GA59:10), and constitutes it as "context of sense" (GA59:37). The theoretical attitude fastens on the relational sense. It thus fails to see that every relation to a content must be enacted or *happen* in experience, and so destroys the situational context of factic life experience (ZBP 174). Experience is not simply a static correlation of subject and object, or concept and content, but rather the *happening* of this correlation, which itself gives rise to the theoretical attitude, and therefore is not itself theoretically determinable. The theoretical attempt to determine experience denies this happening and thus *de-vivifies* or *de-lives* [*entlebt*] life and experience (ZBP 89-90/75-6). This is why, Heidegger argues, the accusation of circularity pertains to the theoretical itself:

> We now see also that the sphere in which there is circularity, precisely because it is *theoretical, de-vivified, and thus derivative, cannot be the sphere of primordiality.* (ZBP 96/81)

De-vivification fails to see the enactment or livedness of experience, and thus cannot

see that there must be an enacting that makes the relation that constitutes the theoretical attitude possible. The "sphere of primordiality" can only be attained by

> a science that is pre-theoretical or supra-theoretical, at any rate non-theoretical, a genuinely *primordial* science from which the theoretical itself originates. (ZBP 96/81)

Philosophy as phenomenological hermeneutics, or fundamental ontology, is the genuinely primordial science that Heidegger seeks to explicate. However, a science (or way of inquiring) that aims to express the pretheoretical concretely individual needs a different, non-theoretical method or approach. Heidegger calls this "formal indication".

Formal indication

The aim of philosophy is to grasp the *enactment* of the relation of concepts to contents, i.e., to show the *origin* of concept-formation in the inquiry itself, which requires a way to *express* this enactment without thereby objectifying it. How is this possible? *Is* it even possible? In KNS, Heidegger considers Paul Natorp's double objection to phenomenology, i.e., that in phenomenological description, too, life is "de-lived" (cf. GBT 47-49). First, Natorp argued, phenomenology is reflective and therefore "stills the stream" of experience (ZBP 100-101/85; cf. J 84). Phenomenology, too, is a generalizing science or approach, and thus is equally unable to express the flow of experience or the concrete individual. Particular experiences are extracted from the context of the experiential flow and are transformed into objects for investigation:

> The reflection makes something which was previously unexamined, something merely unreflectively experienced, into something '*looked at*'. We look at it. In reflection it stands before us as an object of reflection, we are directed towards it and make it into an object as such, standing over against us. Thus, in reflection we are theoretically orientated. All theoretical comportment, we said, is de-vivifying. This now shows itself in the case of life-experiences, for in reflection they are no longer lived but looked at. We set the experiences *out* before us *out of* immediate experience; we intrude so to speak into the flowing stream of experiences and pull one or more of them out, we 'still the stream' as Natorp says. (ZBP 100-101/84-5)

Second, Natorp argued that phenomenology is descriptive, and because description is subsumptive, it therefore destroys the individuality of the lived-

experience. Description must use language, and language is always *generalizing*; it subsumes particulars under general concepts. As Heidegger puts it,

> All description is a 'grasping-in-words'—'verbal expression' is generalizing. This objection rests on the opinion that all language is itself already objectifying, i.e. that living in meaning implies a theoretical grasping of what is meant, that the fulfilment of meaning is without further ado *only* object-giving. (ZBP 111/93)

The theoretical identification of meaning with objectivity is one of the targets of Heidegger's destruction.

Heidegger argues that Natorp's objection to phenomenological description presupposes that philosophical concepts are like other concepts, i.e., that they are subsumptive or ordering concepts (GA59:40). This view fails to recognize that philosophical concepts are not bound to objects, either as generalizing (GA59:35-36) or as formalizing (GA58:262). The concepts of positive disciplines are determined by the objects that they investigate (for instance, species and genus in taxonomy), and thus remain bound to those objects as the "form" of such "contents" (GA59:248-249). In contrast, Heidegger argues, philosophical concepts *refer* us to the happening of experience, and in doing so *ward off* any dependence on, or relation to, specific, fixed meanings or contents (GA58:143). Rather than being bound to contents, they refer us to how the relation to such content *comes about* in experience. They are therefore *non*-objectifying or *non*-reifying (GA58:198). Philosophy, Heidegger says, "has no *object* [*Objekte*] before it" (GA58:235).

Heidegger's notion of *formal indications* as concepts that express sense rather than order objects (GA58:143) is one way of characterizing philosophical concepts. These concepts, precisely because they are formal, enable the expression of concrete individuality. They are both "re-cepts" or "retro-cepts" [*Rückgriffe*] and "pre-cepts" [*Vor-griffe*],[51] and

51. Cf. Kisiel, GBT 55.

> go together (experiencing and experiencing experienced) with experience itself, they live in life itself and, going along with life, they are at once originating and carry their provenance in themselves. They are at once preceptive and retroceptive, i.e. they express life in its motivated tendency or tending motivation. (ZBP 117/99)

Such concepts are directional, rather than ordering. That is, they indicate or point us in the direction of something (cf. GA61:107). They call our attention to something, which is a fundamental characteristic of philosophy (J 75). This notion of directing or indicating concepts is closely connected to the directionality of "sense" in BT, and also the kinetic sense of existence that Heidegger seeks to express.

Heidegger's innovation is not simply methodological or conceptual, however. It is a reorientation of philosophy away from epistemology, towards (fundamental) ontology, where being is now understood as "life as such", rather than objectivity (GBT 223-4). Thus, for Heidegger, the *topic* we want to approach *is* the method of approaching it (GBT 21). The comportment that constitutes philosophy is

> not a mere attitude toward grasping, a mere discussion, but a relation that even and precisely through the grasping "is" what it grasps and grasps what it "is". (GA61 pg. 46)

Philosophy aims to grasp life in its concrete individuality or *facticity*, and this can only be done by grasping the way that factical life expresses *itself*. Such grasping, too, is an expression of factical life; it is life's self-expression, philosophically formalized.[52] We cannot have a fully determinate concept in advance of what we are trying to investigate, for this would not allow for the very expressiveness we are trying to grasp. However, we must have *some* concept of what we are investigating. Such a preliminary concept is *in*determinate, and can only become determinate in (or *as*) the inquiring itself. Formal indication is a way to get at the facticity of experience, i.e., that experience is never "experience in general", but is always "mine" or concretely individual. Formality

52. The formality of formal indication therefore avoids Rickert's objection to life-philosophy, that it has no way of "to distinguish between *living* life and *thinking* about it" (Crowell, "Heidegger's Phenomenological Decade", *op. cit.*, pg. 444-445). Heidegger refers to this objection in his Jaspers' review (J 80).

indicates facticity.

Objectifying, generalizing concepts cannot express the "mineness" of experience, because this is never an *instance* of something:

> In the archontic sense belonging to the actualizing of our basic experience of the "I am", an experience that concerns precisely me myself in a radical manner, we find that this experience does not experience the "I" as something located in a region, as an individuation of a "universal", or as an *instance* of something. (J 92)

Whenever we attempt to grasp experience by means of objectifying concepts (such as those that determine object-domains like psychology or physiology), we eliminate precisely that which we are trying to grasp: the concrete individuality of experience.

> We see that each time we attempt to give a regional definition of the "I" (a definition that arises from a foreconception about such things as a stream of consciousness, a context of experience), we thereby "efface" the sense of the "am" and turn the "I" into an object able to be ascertained and *classified* by inserting it into a region. (J 92)

Then how is the concrete individual to be grasped *without* objectifying it? Formal indication, Heidegger suggests, allows for such nonobjectifying access by explicitly warding off or prohibiting the *contents* of experience (i.e., objects) so as to allow the conceptualizing itself to be grasped. Objectification arises, Heidegger suggests, by fixation on the contents of experience (the experience*d*), rather than its happening (experienc*ing*). By staying strictly with *how* experience expresses itself, rather than *what* it expresses, formally indicative concepts allow the expression of the "am" to be brought into relief. Such concepts draw our attention to the *contextualizing* sense of the "(I) am". Thus, the "I" is not so much a noun as a "verbal indicator" (i.e., it indicates the context for a verb-to-come).

Occasional Expressions

For his notion of philosophical concepts as formal indications, Heidegger draws in particular on Husserl's analysis in *Logical Investigations* of essentially occasional expressions such as "here", "now", "this" and, most importantly, "I".[53]

Unlike expressions such as “hair”, “noun” and “thesis”, such expressions do not immediately present an object, because they require a context in which to do so. Devoid of context, “here” does not present a place, nor does “I” present a speaker. Yet nor are such expressions *universal*, in the sense of applying to every possible place or every possible speaker equally. The general sense of such expressions, their “indicating meaning”, is *directive*. They direct the hearer or reader towards the specific context in which the expression has its particular meaning, the “meaning indicated”. Thus, such expressions are not subsumptive, but indicative or directive. Rather than subsuming generally, they indicate the individual. When I say “here” to you, I have a *meaning indicated* (I know I am referring to an area on the floor beside the fridge, say), but you do not have access to this. You have access to the meaning indicated only *in* the context, i.e., from the indicating meaning. That is, you do not know in advance what I might mean by “here”, but can only know it from the context of its occurrence. Abstracted from its context, “here” has no *determinate* meaning, but neither is it meaningless. The expression itself contextualizes, by drawing attention to the context of its utterance. In this way, it differs from objectifying, general expressions such as “electron” or “sandwich”.

Intentionality and Enactment

Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s analysis of intentionality is that it neglected the being of the intentional (i.e., that the intentional relation happens or takes place), and thus had overlooked the *enactment* sense of experience (HCT pp. 108-109). Husserl had distinguished the relational and content senses of intentionality, i.e., that in every intentional act there is a correlation between intending and the intended, that differs

53. Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations I*, Routledge, London, 2001, pp. 217-220; *Logical Investigations II*, pp. 199-200. Cf. Streeter, *op. cit*.

from the relation posited between consciousness and object, neither of which are found in intentional experience. Rather, experience is constituted by contents and the relations to these. The content is the experience*d*, i.e., what is "had" *in* the experience, whereas the relation is the experienc*ing*, i.e., the "having" *of* the experienced. Husserl argued that content and relation always go together, to constitute any experience *as* an experience. His analysis depended on bracketing ontological commitments about beings or what exists, so as to draw out the constitution of the intentional. However, Heidegger argues that such bracketing itself presupposes the being of intentionality, and therefore cannot be used to investigate it.

Husserl's view that the relational sense of the intentional is something given in experience is questionable, Heidegger argues, because it overlooks the correlat*ing* or "belonging together" of intending and what is intended, i.e., of experience and experienced (HCT pg. 47). "The being of life, of lived-experiences [*Erlebnisse*] do not signify occurring but rather *enactment*..." (GA58:156). In Husserl's analysis, intentional acts are ultimately static, rather than enacted, correlations. "For Husserl, there is no special correlation, since it is given with *noema* and *noesis* and included in them" (HCT pg. 94). Husserl had provided a *theoretical* analysis of intentionality, and had neglected the inquiry into the *being* of intentionality. Therefore, he had neglected to pay attention to "any particular individuation of lived experiences" (HCT pg. 109). The intentional act of Husserl's analysis was a theoretical object, not an individuated phenomenon. The phenomenological reduction or bracketing thus "regards the what, the structure of the acts, but as a result does not thematize their *way to be*, their being an act as such" (HCT pg. 109). And only in the *being* of intentional acts is individuation determinable.

Heidegger argues that the sense of experience is not given in the *content* of

experience (the experience*d*), but rather in the relation of experienc*ing*. Furthermore, experience is something that I am implicitly intimately familiar with *as* my experience.[54] To articulate this, the implicit must be made explicit, through paying attention to the way life expresses itself. In order that the enactment of the relating not be concealed by *what* is experienced, the specific contents of experience must be kept at bay. This is the aim of formal indication: to direct us towards the very directing-towards of experience, in this sense "repeating" experience. Unlike with the theoretical attitude (and the everyday attitude), it aims neither to tell us what experience *is*, nor to tell us *what* we experience.

Formal indication, then, is Heidegger's method for grasping experience as it is in itself. But the immediacy, individuality, and situationality of experience means that it can never be directly expressed. Formal indications are direct*ing*, not direct; they point to the enactment of experience without trying to directly specify it. All expression involves generalizing or universalizing, and therefore cannot directly express experience as individual or in its "mineness" [*Jemeinigkeit*] (SZ 41-42; cf. ZBP 69/58). Formal indications only function, then, by warding off the identification of experience with content, i.e., *what* is experienced. This is the first of the functions of formal indications, the "prohibitive-referring function":[55]

> The formal indication...possesses, along with its referential character, a prohibiting (deterring, preventing) one at the same time...the formal indication functions both...to guide as well as to deter in various ways. (PIA/GA61:105)

Heidegger illustrates this in his argument that philosophy itself can only be defined in a formally indicative way:

> It is characteristic of an indicative definition that it precisely does not present fully and properly the object which is to be determined. Indeed, it merely indicates, but,

54. This, too, is what Heidegger means by "understanding", which he appropriates from Dilthey (cf. Bambach, *op. cit.*, pp. 158, 168).
55. Daniel O. Dahlstrom, "Heidegger's Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal Indications", *Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 47, June 1994, pp. 783.

> as genuinely indicative, it does give in advance the principle of the object. An indicative definition includes the sense that concretion is not to be possessed there without further ado but that the concrete instead presents a task of its own kind and a peculiarly constituted task of actualization. (PIA/GA61:26)[56]

In directing or indicating in this "improper" way, then, formal indications are *determinately indeterminate*. Therefore, they require an enactment on the part of the reader or hearer. To return to the analysis of occasional expressions, with these we find different indicating meanings for different expressions ("here" compared to "now" or "I", say). Each gives a direction as to how the meaning is to be fulfilled (by looking for some location, by noting the time, or by regarding the speaker, *in the specific context*). Similarly, formal indications refer to how the meaning-fulfilment is to be enacted:

> The term, "formally indicated", does not mean merely represented, meant, or intimated in some way or other, such that it would remain completely open how and where we are to gain possession of the object itself...
>
> There resides in the formal indication a very definite bond; this bond says that I stand in a quite definite direction of approach, and it points out the only way of arriving at what is proper, namely, by exhausting and fulfilling what is improperly indicated, by following the indication. (PIA/GA61:26)

For Heidegger, then, every philosophical concept has this prohibitive-referring character, and points out how to arrive at its fulfilment as "what is proper" or appropriate to it: by following in the direction that the concept itself points. In doing so, the way objects are usually conceptually grasped is reversed. Instead of being *presented* with a determinate content or meaning by the concept, we have to enact or actively bring about the relation that the concept points to. So doing, however, transforms our way of understanding. This "reversing-transforming" function is the second function of formal indication.[57]

Formal indication is thus quite different from the universalization found in

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56. See also ZBP 13-14/11-12.
57. Dahlstrom explains this as follows: "The second function of a philosophical concept as a formal indication is to reverse the customary way of objectifying whatever is entertained, a reversal that transforms the individual who philosophizes. Accordingly, this second function is referred to as the 'reversing-transforming' function." (Dalhstrom, *op. cit.*, pg. 783.)

both generalization and formalization. Generalization consists in the hierarchical ordering of the material domain by general concepts, as in the schema (red, green, brown) —> (**colour**, sound, taste) —> (**sense quality**, idea). In each case of generalization, the contents of one level are bound to a universal or general concept at the next level, and *vice versa*. Particulars are grasped by means of genera and species. This constitutes one form of the theoretical attitude. Determination of the particular remains bound to the material content of what is universalized. "*Generalization* is in its enactment bound to a *material region*" (GA61:58). What is determined (e.g., red) and what does the determining (e.g., colour) belong to the same material region. Such concepts order the material to which they apply:

> Generalizing determination is always determination of a counterstance [*eines Gegenstands*] by another, according to its material content, such that the determining, for its part, itself belongs in the same material region that the What to be determined stands in. Generalizing is therefore ordering, the determining by another, such that this other as *encompassing* belongs to the same material region as that to be determined. (GA60:61)

Formalization, on the other hand, does not refer to material contents, but to the relations that obtain between such contents.[58] Thus, it "is matter-free. It is also free from any sequence of levels" (GA60:58). In contrast to generalization, formalization "is *not* bound to the determined What of the counterstance to be determined" (GA60:61). Formal determinations such as "something", "other", "and" and "or" apply equally to every level of generalization and to every material domain. "Red" is a "something" and blue is an "other" for it, "colour" is a "something" and "smell" is an "other" for it, and so on. Every phenomenon can be formalized in this way, since each is *constituted* in such relations. In the experience of a phenomenon, or the concept of an object, the former relates to the latter in one or more of these senses. But such formal relations are not determined by particular material contents. The "something" that formalizes this

58. Cf. Husserl, LU II, pp. 39-40.

red sock is not bound to the redness (it could be a blue something), the sock (it could be a red something else), or even to "this" (it could be *that* something). Formalization universalizes the *relational* sense of the phenomenon, free of its content sense. The relational sense as the *how* of experiencing is thus also given in a theoretical attitude:

> formal predication is not materially content bound, but it must somehow be motivated...It arises from the sense of the attitudinal relation [*Einstellungsbezugs*] itself. (GA60:58)

Thus, whereas generalization concerns contents, formalization concerns forms, which are relations to contents.

Neither generalization nor formalization concern the *enactment* of the relational sense of the phenomenon, i.e., the way that the how of being experienced happens. How is it that the object is a something? Or that it is "in addition to" something else? In generalization, such enactment is taken to arise from the material region itself. In formalization, it arises in "the inappropriate theoretical attitude in its *relational* sense" (GA60:59), i.e., as an ideal, formal-logical relation. Formal theorization therefore *conceals* the enactment sense:

> precisely because the formal determination is completely indifferent to the content, it is all the more fateful for the relational and enactment sides of the phenomenon—because it prescribes or at least implies a theoretical relational sense. It completely conceals the aspect of enactment... (GA60:63)

By disregarding the contents of experience, formalization determines the relational sense in advance, rather than taking it in its arising with the phenomenon. Thus, where the positive sciences focus on generalization of material contents, theoretical philosophy isolates the formal-logical relations taken to constitute all such contents. Neither is capable of grasping enactment, because of its concrete individuality. Neither positivism nor the various epistemologically-oriented philosophical approaches can therefore grasp and express the enactment sense fundamental to concrete individuality.

"Philosophizing," Heidegger argues, "must...be considered in its originary

attitudinal *enactment* [*Einstellungsvollzug*]" (GA60:59). Formal indication is directed towards precisely this enactment-sense, and therefore must ward off or prohibit the theoretical relational sense, in which the enactment is predetermined or taken as a given, in order to let the enactment-sense itself be grasped:

> The formal is something relational-like. The indication should indicate beforehand the relation of the phenomenon—above all, in a negative sense, just like a warning! A phenomenon must be pregiven such that its relational sense is held in suspense. The relation and enactment of the phenomenon are *not* determined in advance, they are held in suspense...the formal indication is a defence, a preceding protection such that the enactment character stays free. (GA60:63-64).

Heidegger's aim is to bring this predetermination of givenness into question, and this is what the method of formal indication is to accomplish.

Thus, formal indication is intended to problematize the theoretical attitude itself, in order to allow the phenomenon (e.g., being-in-the-world) to show itself *from* itself. Heidegger's interest is the show*ing* or encounter*ing* of phenomena, and not *what* is show*n* or encounter*ed*. To let this enactment be seen *as* a problem, however, the relational sense cannot be predetermined. The method of inquiry must itself ward off the theoretical attitude and the way it orders phenomena in advance. "In the 'formal indication'...it is not a matter of an order" (GA60:64).

For Heidegger, then, philosophical inquiry does not aim to secure the foundation for inquiry into experience. Indeed, he denies that this is even a genuine problem (cf. ZBP 78-79/66-67). Philosophizing always has its basis in factic life-experience as enactment, he argues, and it is this basis that phenomenology seeks to articulate. Philosophy does not come *ex nihilo* but arises in, and out of, experience (or, in BT, in the ontic).

> Philosophy is not an attitude towards a content that is fastened on in the enactment of philosophizing; not a material domain that represents an objective context; not objectivity in a theoretical relation whose enactment character is only co-present [*mitvorhanden*] but doesn't seriously come into question. (GA59:171)

The tendency in philosophy to assume a perspective not rooted in the ontic, and hence

untroubled by contingency and facticity, comes *from* the factical itself. Life as such is *already* expressive, otherwise it would not be a "problem" for us. The real questions, according to Heidegger, are how life *has* itself and how it *expresses* that having (i.e., its motivation and tendency).

Hermeneutics of facticity

As mentioned previously, the formally indicative approach aims to "repeat" or go along with life or experience (GA58:23). Rather than a theoretical approach that purports to stand "outside" experience or the human situation and thus to be able to grasp it objectively, formal indication is found *in* experience, in the directedness of the relational sense of experience towards the content-sense. For this reason, it is hermeneutical. Heidegger therefore also refers to his topical method as a "hermeneutical intuition" (ZBP 117/99, 219/187) and as a "hermeneutics of facticity" (OHF).

The most intriguing and puzzling aspect of the human situation is its circular, recursive, or self-referential aspect. Being-situate is a way of being which involves *awareness* of, or intimate familiarity with, being-situate. The human situation is not just one of immersion in the pure flow of experience, but involves experience *of* this experience. To put this another way, the human situation is one in which 'I' happen (however that might be), and one aspect of the happening of my 'I' is that it is an awareness of this happening itself. This is not simply *self*-awareness, because it includes *all* the phenomenal aspects that constitute being-situate. That is, being-situate "includes" an 'I', but this 'I' also includes being-situate.[59] Such a relation cannot be grasped by subsumptive concepts, because these either reduce being-situate to an aspect

59. The meaning of "includes" here is, of course, one of the things Heidegger is attempting to express.

of the 'I', as in the philosophy of consciousness, or they reduce the 'I' to an aspect of being-situate, as in materialism and positivism. Heidegger appropriates Dilthey's insights in arguing that this can only be appropriately grasped hermeneutically, i.e., in a way that shows how the 'I' belongs to being-situate and being-situate belongs to the 'I'. In an early lecture-course, Heidegger expresses this as the "remarkable concentration upon the self-world" (GA58:59). This is one way in which he tries to express the hermeneutical structure of being-situate, which includes in itself the distress, worry or care about the whole of being-situate as the *movedness* of being-situate (GA59:173; J 87; PIA 115).

Dilthey and history

This brings us, in a roundabout fashion, to the question of history. The transformation in thinking that Heidegger aims to effect through formal indication is one that wards off the theoretical attitude towards history, i.e., the attitude that regards history as an object (the "object-historical" [*Objekts-Historischen*], as he calls it (GA60:36)). This attitude is readily evident in positivism, for which history is simply one empirical object (or domain of objects) among others, to be investigated by the same methods with the same aim, i.e., to ascertain the general laws that pertain to it. It is also evident in historicism, Heidegger argues, despite its historicization of history and human being. Finally, it can be seen in the work of Windelband and Rickert, who despite their rejection of the positivist naturalization of history, argued that history was just as much an object as natural beings. Neo-Kantianism shared with historicism the idea of worldview [*Weltanschauung*].

According to Heidegger, it is only Dilthey who takes a non-theoretical attitude towards history. Rather than approach history as an object, Dilthey's concern is with life as historical being:

> The struggle for a historical worldview is not played out in debates about the historical conception of the world but rather in those about the sense of historical being itself. And here we are speaking of the labors of Dilthey's research. (K 150)

In Dilthey's thinking, history is seen in relation to "the phenomenon of life" (K 155), which he sought to conceptualize by way of descriptive (rather than empirical) psychology. What was central for Dilthey was "the psychical context", i.e., life as always there and as a whole:

> Context was for him what is primary; it was the whole of life itself. It is always already there and is not first constructed out of elements. It is to be grasped first, and its component parts are to be loosened free from it...Psychical life is originally always given in its wholeness... (K 157)

Dilthey's *aim*, however, was to understand the reality of historical being. And on this point, Heidegger argues, Dilthey did not see that inquiry into life as historical being requires inquiry into the being of the historical, in connection with the ontological inquiry into the meaning of being:

> What is important is to work out the being of the historical, i.e., historicalness rather than the historical, being rather than beings, reality rather than the real...Dilthey penetrated into that reality, namely, human being-situate which, in the authentic sense, is in the sense of historical being...But he did not pose the question of historicalness itself... (K 159, trans. altered)

In §77 of BT, Heidegger examines the correspondence between Count Yorck and Dilthey, as a way of summarizing how his own inquiry into historicalness "is resolved to cultivate the spirit of Count Yorck in the service of Dilthey's work" (SZ 404). Count Yorck took issue with Dilthey's psychology, which, according to Heidegger,

> ...is supposed to understand "life" in the historical developmental context and effective contexts as the *way* in which the human *is*, as the possible *object* of the human sciences and *especially* the *root* of these sciences. (SZ 398)

Yorck argued instead for "a logic striding ahead of the sciences and guiding them," which "includes the task of working out, positively and radically, the various categorial structures of the being that *is* nature and the being that *is* history (Da-sein)" (SZ 399). He argued that the "historical school" was "antiquarian...construing things

aesthetically" in opposition to "the great, dominating movement" that "was one of mechanical construction." The historical school merely added "feeling" to rational method, and thus could not achieve any "vitality." To be vital, history must be critique, not mere enumeration of instances. In this he argues against the "purely ocular determinations," typical of those such as Ranke, in which history is construed as a spectacle—in Ranke's case, of political events. (SZ 400). For Yorck, the character of history is not scientific observation, but rather the character of human existence itself. "That the entire psycho-physical condition *is* not...but rather lives, is the embryonic point of historicalness" (SZ 401). That is, the "psycho-physical condition," the "fullness of my self," is not an objective presence, but rather is existence; being-situate is historical. From this he draws the conclusion that philosophy must be done historically. "For that reason there is no longer any actual philosophizing which would not be historial [*historisch*]. The separation between systematic philosophy and historial presentation is incorrect according to its essence" (SZ 402).

For Heidegger, Yorck's demand that "the generic difference between the ontical and the historial" be developed is not radical enough (SZ 403). It fails to recognize that both are areas of *beings*, and thus the question of *being* needs to be clarified first, so that these regional ontologies may be securely founded.

Theory, Skill and Insight

If we want to inquire into the human situation as the *phenomenon* it is, without objectifying it, a non-theoretical approach must be found. In articulating this approach, Heidegger draws upon Aristotle's distinction in *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. VI between theory, skill and insight as different ways of knowing (or "deconcealing").[60] Theory

60. See, for example, PIA 128-137 and the "Introductory Part" of PS (especially pp. 15-113).

concerns what is unchanging, whereas skill is concerned with what can be otherwise through making or producing it. Insight concerns the kind of doing that has its end in itself, and thus is self-referential.

Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle

Another central aspect of Heidegger's thinking in his phenomenological decade is his appropriation of Aristotle. Whilst this appropriation is a complex issue, one of the fundamental aspects is the relation of knowing, acting and being that Heidegger discerns in Aristotle's discussion of the intellectual virtues. The difference between skill (τέχνη, *techne*) and insight (φρόνησις, *phronesis*) that Heidegger focusses on has to do with how they are related to the end to be achieved (the principle or origin (ἀρχή, *arche*) of action). In skill, the end is an idea or ideal type (εἶδος, *eidos*) that is to be made or produced. As such, it is external to the skillful making and what is produced. The principle is grasped as an idea in a discursive manner, i.e., *as* something different from the work to be produced. Such discursiveness is assertoric, and involves diairesis and synthesis, i.e., setting apart what is asserted and what it is asserted of so as to connect the two (e.g., the predicate is separated from the subject, to be connected by way of predication) (PS pg. 99).

The principle of *insight*, however, does not involve this kind of discursiveness, because the end is not the production of something different from either the action or the principle, but rather action (or a way of being) that manifests the principle as its end. Insight is *deliberative*, but this means that what is to be done (the principle) is determined through the deliberation that constitutes the insight, rather than through a theoretical contemplation of the principle in the abstract. This relates to the idea of a principle as such: "[a]n ἀρχή can only be grasped for itself and not as something else" (PS pg. 100). To grasp it as something else would mean that the ἀρχή is not complete in

itself, which would deny what is characteristic of an ἀρχή ("beginning" or "origin"). "Accordingly, φρόνησις includes the possibility of a sheer grasp of the ἀρχή as such, i.e., a mode of disclosure transcending λόγος" (PS pg. 100).

Insight is not theoretical, because what it regards is not unchanging. Instead, the "regarding" or observation is part of the activity in which the what (the aim or end) comes about. To act with insight is to be insightful, which is the aim of such action. Insight does not "as such have in view the beings it discloses" (PS pg. 100), but rather is *itself* the disclosing of the beings that pertain to it, including itself (PS pg. 98).

> Τέχνη has to do with things which first have to be made and which are not yet what they will be. Φρόνησις makes the situation accessible; and the circumstances are always different in every action. (PS pg. 20)

The circumstances of the situation that insight discloses include (i) that of which it is an action, (ii) that which must be taken up as ways and means of accomplishing the action (the things involved), (iii) a determinate possibility of the use of such things, (iv) a determinate time for action, and (v) the others involved. Because insight is deliberative, i.e., involves clarification of the situation, it also involves being with others. Insightful action "is carried out vis-à-vis one or another definite person" (PS pg. 101). Because in action, "[t]he situation is in each case different" (PS pg. 101), insight cannot be theoretical. Nor can it be *static* in the sense of being oriented towards the unchanging substrate (ὑποκείμενον, *hypokeimenon*) of that which moves or changes (PS pg. 410). The substantialist ontology that Heidegger seeks to destruct by showing that science and theory have their foundation in situational being (i.e., that these, too, are "existential" ways of knowing (cf. GBT 154)) has its origin in Aristotle's discovery of the ὑποκείμενον:

> Aristotle was the first to discover the ὑποκείμενον—in connection with his uncovering of κίνησις, i.e., on the basis of the new foundation he gave to the question of Being, a foundation in κίνησις...Aristotle was thus the first to see in regard to the κινούμενον that there is something in movement that remains, that has στάσις, that is already there from the very outset. (PS:410)

Insight does not involve something "that is already there from the very outset", because it is the actualization of *itself*. The aim of insight is the practical activity (πρᾶξις, *praxis*) itself. "For an action is a being that in each case can be otherwise; correspondingly, φρόνησις is co-present, such that it co-constitutes the πρᾶξις itself" (PS pg. 101).

In his analysis of acting, then Heidegger finds the distinction between skill and insight to lie in the relationship between origin and aim. Neither skill nor insight are theoretical, in the sense that they investigate the principles of action. Rather, they aim to *realize* the principle through action. With skill, however, the principle is separate from what is produced, whereas in insight, the principle is what is to be acted out.

> Φρόνησις is not a speculation about the ἀρχή and the τέλος of acting as such; it is not an ethics and not a science...According to its proper sense, it is what it can be when it is a view of a concrete action and decision. (PS pg. 40)

Thus, insight involves its origin and end in itself, unlike the other forms of knowing. The origin of action is the anticipation of that action: "what is anticipated is nothing else than the action itself" (PS pg. 101). But equally, the end of action is action itself:

> ...in φρόνησις the action itself is anticipated; and the τέλος of the action is nothing else than the action itself, to which φρόνησις belongs as προαίρεσις ["anticipation" or "choice in advance"]. (PS pg. 101-2)

In the anticipation of action "the circumstances are characteristically not given, nor is that which belongs to the carrying out of the action...the concrete situation of the action is still...covered over" (PS pg. 102). This is what insight makes transparent, by disclosing "the human situation as acting now in the full situation within which it acts and in which it is in each case different" (PS pg. 100, trans. modified). This is the characteristic of insight: it appropriates the concrete situation of action in the way that the human situation itself is appropriated *by* the concrete situation.

> In every step of the action, φρόνησις is co-constitutive. That means therefore that φρόνησις must make the action transparent from its ἀρχή up to its τέλος. For the

> action is a being that can in each case be otherwise; correspondingly, φρόνησις is co-present, such that it co-constitutes the πρᾶξις itself. (PS:100)

This analysis of φρόνησις, which Heidegger identifies with conscience [*Gewissen*], also provides the guideline for his reformulation of hermeneutics as a way of being, rather than as a scientific method (as found in Droysen and Dilthey, for instance).

In PS §8c, Heidegger discusses the difference between insight and skill in terms of the significance of *failure*. With skill, the possibility of failure is an advantage, because only through failure can the certitude of production be assured. Failure is the possibility of improving one's skill (PS pg. 38). Only by risking failure, and having to start over again, do we acquire the ability to realize the principle in producing beings. In such failure, however, the principle itself is not affected. That is, the *production* is different from the *work produced*. In failure, the work is produced negatively, so to speak, in that it is produced inadequately, improperly, or incompletely. But through this failure, skill is enhanced. We can learn from our mistakes, and produce a better, more satisfactory product the next time.

With insight, however, the significance of failure is quite different, because the principle is also the aim. Failure to act in the appropriate way is a failure to have grasped the principle:

> But in the case of φρόνησις, on the contrary, where it is a matter of a deliberation whose theme is the proper being of being-situate, every mistake is a shortcoming. This shortcoming with regard to oneself is not a higher possibility...but precisely its corruption. Other than failure, the only possibility open to φρόνησις is to genuinely hit the mark. Φρόνησις is not oriented toward trial and error; in moral action I cannot experiment with myself. (PS:38, translation altered)

When action is directed towards *itself* as its end, rather than towards something external to it, the failure to act in the correct or appropriate manner does not mean the possibility of better achievement next time, because the actor is and has to be the one who has failed to act correctly. This flaw or failure is constitutive of myself as the actor I *am*

already. Of course, I may learn from my mistake, and "genuinely hit the mark" when the situation next arises, but this does not negate the previous failure. In the failed action, it was my insight that failed, and failed *throughout* that action. That is, it is a failure of self-understanding. It is not that I grasp the principle perfectly well, but yet somehow fail to bring it about. Rather, I do not grasp the situation *at all*.

Such grasping of the situation also involves a sense of time other than the chronological. In the clarification of the situation, it is grasped as "of its time" or in a timely fashion. That is, insight is kairological. "Our interpretation of φρόνησις shows how these kinds of beings (actions) are constituted in it, namely, in terms of the καιρός [*kairos*, timeliness, the moment]" (PIA 134). Insight concerns "those dealings that human life has with itself" (PIA 134). Practical actions have to do with *how* we go about our being, rather than *what* we produce. The insight is into the goal or "toward-which" of the dealings which constitute living. "φρόνησις is the illumination of dealings that co-temporalizes and unfolds life in its *being*" (PIA 134).

Heidegger explicitly identifies insight with conscience. "φρόνησις is nothing other than conscience set into motion, making an action transparent" (PS pg. 39). As a way of knowing, insight is unlike theory. In the latter, what is learnt can also be forgotten, and thus can be learnt again.

> In the case of φρόνησις things are different. This is manifest in the fact that I can experience, notice, and learn what has already been experienced, noted, and learned, whereas φρόνησις is in each case new. (PS pg. 38)

This is not insight into situations as *instances* of existing, but rather the disclosure of the situation as temporally particular or "of its while" [*jeweilig*], i.e., as it is at the moment in its concreteness, and how this concreteness appropriates me (cf. GBT 225). Such insight illuminates the singularity of each situation, and thus illuminates my situation as mine in each case at each while.

Finally, the difference between theory, skill and insight must also be understood in terms of the modalities of necessity, actuality and possibility. Theory, in regarding that which cannot change or be otherwise, aims at the necessary. Skill aims at the actual that is to be produced and can be compared with the (necessary) ideal. In contrast to both, insight always involves the *possibility* of being in one way or another, not as something to be produced, but as hermeneutically constitutive of this way of being itself. This has implications for how history can be understood, because the historical is not actual. Instead, it must be made actual in coming back to it or in "repetition" [*Wiederholung*], since this is the only in this way that we can actually *have* the historical (cf. GBT 304). Being historical, then, or historicalness, is not the theoretical activity of the science of history, but a way of being towards that which is only actual in such being towards it.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined Heidegger's appropriation of aspects of neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, Dilthey and life-philosophy, and Aristotle, in his aim of expressing the immediacy of factic life experience and concrete individuality. Heidegger's topical method of formal indication destructs the theoretical attitude that prevents the expression of this immediacy. In the next chapter, I turn to Heidegger's presentation of this in *Being and Time*.

Chapter 5: Mortal Finitude and Meaning in *Being and Time*

> Since philosophizing is essentially an affair of finitude, every concretion of factical philosophy must in its turn fall victim to this facticity.
>
> — Martin Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*

Introduction

Being and Time (BT) presents Heidegger's most complete articulation of the import of formal indication and the hermeneutics of facticity for grasping be*ing*-historical as both immanence in, and transcendence of, the history that constitutes us.[1] Arguably, Heidegger's central aim is to articulate subjectivity in a non-theoretical, non-objectifying way, through a hermeneutic ontology of insightful doing that is contrasted with the objectification found in skillful making (or dealing with things) and the intersubjectivization of meaning that constitutes being-with-one-another. Here I examine aspects of Heidegger's thinking in BT that suggest a way the subject of development can be approached to take into account the moment of subjectivity in the intersubjective constitution of the meaning of historical context.

Being-situate, existence, and being-in-the-world

The inquiry in BT is initially expressed in terms of "the question of the sense [*Sinn*] of being" (SZ 1), but this can only be investigated by inquiring into beings (SZ 6). The preliminary question is, which beings should be so interrogated? Heidegger argues that to approach this question in a non-presuppositional way, the inquiry must

1. Formal indication is largely recessive in this text (cf. GBT 152), and the hermeneutics of facticity is overshadowed by Heidegger's adoption of existentialist terminology (cf. GBT 7, 397).

begin with those beings that inquire as their way of being, i.e., with the human situation. Inquiring about the meaning of being is itself a way of being, and therefore is an "exemplary" being to inquire into (SZ 7). In other words, this inquiry is one that puts the questioner in question. Heidegger designates this being, "that we ourselves in each case are...terminologically as being-situate" (SZ 7). Being-situate is a formal indication of the being that each of us is, and thus expresses the enactment of the *how* of this being, i.e., how it is related to its own being. What is distinctive about being-situate, he argues, is that in being, it "goes about [*geht um*]" its being (SZ 12).[2] That is, as the being [*Seiende*] we are, we do not simply "have" our being, but are directed towards, or concerned with, who and how we are. In such "going about", we always already have some kind of understanding of being, whether this is explicit or not.

Existence [*Existenz*] and mineness [*Jemeinigkeit*] are the two formal indications in BT that characterize the human situation (SZ 42). First, existence formally indicates the being that being-situate goes about, which is also indicated as "(having)-to-be" [*Zu-sein*] (SZ 42).[3] As such, it indicates both the obligatory or necessary sense that the human situation *has* to be its being, as well as the sense of possibility that it is *able* to be or *can be* it.[4] Second, the being of the human situation is always *mine*. That is, as the concrete individual that being-situate formally indicates, it is always *my* being that I go about, am concerned with, or care about. But this is not individualistic in either an ontological or ethical sense. Rather, it is an ontological indication that only I can live my life, and that the only life I can live is my own. As a

2. On the translation of *geht um* as "goes about", see Theodore Kisiel, "The new translation of *Sein and Zeit*: A grammatological lexicographer's commentary", *Man and World*, vol. 30, 1997, pp. 244, 247.
3. *Zu-sein* is the formal indication that Heidegger used in 1925-26 prior to writing BT, in which it is almost completely replaced with *Existenz* (GBT 397, 511).
4. The tension between necessity and possibility is fundamental to the analytic, as will be shown below.

formal indication, what is left open for enactment is *how* life or existence belongs to, and constitutes, the human situation, and *how* it is mine, i.e., how it is lived. That is, the formal indication of mineness does not presuppose the concrete determination of these aspects of the human situation, but rather refers to them as issues or questions for us, which can only be approached by enacting the indication, i.e., by "re-living" and "pre-living" life in the inquiry. What *is* prohibited, however, is the immediate identification of the human situation with some determinate content, such as particular facts about me, or with some formal sense, such as the self, personality, ego, etc. Such objective determinations are prohibited, because they occlude how the human situation is constituted by *ways of being*. Finally, "being-in-the-world" [*In-der-Welt-sein*] is a formal indication for "a fundamental structure of being-situate" (SZ 41; cf. OHF pg. 62). Existence and mineness are based on, or grounded in, being-in-the-world (SZ 53). Through the analytic of this structure Heidegger aims to phenomenologically elucidate the meaning of being in terms of time.

Therefore, the analytic in BT does not aim to present "a complete ontology of being-situate" (SZ 17). Rather, it is oriented throughout towards elucidating the enactment-character or movedness of the human situation as concretely individual. This is the concrete timeliness of being-situate that Heidegger calls "historicalness" [*Geschichtlichkeit*], which, as a formal indication, must be kept distinct from the theoretical conception of history, as found for example in the science of history. Nevertheless, as Heidegger aims to show, the possibility of the science of history itself attests to historicalness as a fundamental way of being of the human situation. The destruction of the ontological tradition by which concrete individuality is to be disclosed as constitutive of the human situation therefore also involves a destruction of the object-historical, i.e., showing how historiography has its basis in an originary

relationship to the historical:

> the questioning about being that was indicated with respect to its ontic-ontological necessity is itself characterized by historicalness. The working out of the question of being must therefore, out of the most proper sense of being of the questioning itself as a historical questioning, receive the direction to inquire about its own history, i.e., to become historiographical [*historisch*], in order to bring itself, in the positive appropriation of the past, into the full possession of the most proper possibilities of inquiry. The question about the sense of being is brought from itself to understand itself as historiographical, according to the manner of enactment that belongs to it, i.e., as the preliminary explication of being-situate in its timeliness and historicalness. (SZ 20-21)

Being-in-the-world

To elucidate concrete individuality, the analytic focuses on the "constitutive structural moments" of being-in-the-world, which Heidegger articulates as: (i) "in-the-world"; (ii) "the being that in each case is in the way of being-in-the-world" or the "who"; and (iii) "being-in as such" (SZ 53). This focus, as argued above, is motivated by Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle, whereby the movedness of the human situation is to be elucidated in two respects. First, in terms of circumspective caretaking [*umsichtige Besorgen*] (or in the Aristotelian sense, *skillful making*) (SZ 76), being-in-the-world is elucidated in terms of dealing with things. This elucidation discloses that things are encountered in a context of references, and that this referentiality is *significant* for the human situation. Furthermore, it discloses that things are encountered in a shared world, and indeed can only be so encountered, since the articulation of things *as* the things they are depends on discursive discrimination.

Second, the elucidation of skillful making shows that it is not sufficient in itself to characterize the way that being-situate goes about its being. This pertains to mineness. Skillful making elucidates several respects in which the human situation moves/is moved in taking care of things or matters, and in giving care to others. But such movedness cannot itself be understood in terms of things or others. That is, being-in-the-world cannot be reduced to objective properties or intersubjective norms or

meanings. In both cases, there is an "other-directedness" to the movement that is fundamental to the human situation, which cannot be constituted without a shared world (SZ 71). But this "other-directedness", or 3rd-person perspective,[5] cannot be originative of the movement of "going about being" *per se*, because this is always mine. To put this another way, the structural incompleteness that makes the human situation dependent on things and others—i.e., its *finitude*—cannot originate *with* those things and others. The attempt to locate such finitude *in* things (e.g., positivism) or *from* others (e.g., historicism) destroys finitude itself, by turning the incompleteness into an objectified completeness. The analysis of skillful making indicates that the incompleteness which makes meaningfulness possible originates in another aspect of the human situation, i.e., its directedness towards itself and the enactment (or movedness) of such directedness as originary timeliness or *insightful doing*.

World

Heidegger's formally indicative concept of "world" indicates the *context* whereby beings are encountered. World itself is not a being, thing, or object, nor a category pertaining to objects, as with Descartes' notion of *extensio* (SZ 89), but an ontological characteristic of being-situate.[6] Heidegger calls such characteristics that pertain to existence *existentials* [*Existentiale*], to distinguish them from categories, which pertain to beings unlike being-situate (i.e., things) (SZ54). Thus, "world" is an existential rather than a being. However, since its ontic sense refers to something like the familiar surroundings in which we live, Heidegger uses the term "worldishness" [*Weltlichkeit*] for the existential (SZ 64-65). He refers to those beings unlike being-

5. Cf. Steven Galt Crowell, "Subjectivity: Locating the First-Person in *Being and Time*", *Inquiry*, vol. 44, pp. 433-454.
6. World is the openness of being-situate to encounter. Heidegger sometimes makes this explicit. "World is what encounters" (OHF pg. 65). Cf. Sheehan, "A paradigm shift", *op. cit.*

situate as "innerworldish" [*innerweltliche*] (SZ 64).

The structure of being-in-the-world, then, formally indicates the context of being-situate as encounter with things, others, *and self*. Indeed, "world" is one of Heidegger's early terms for this context. In his early lecture-courses, he uses the expressions "around-world" or environment [*Umwelt*], "with-world" or contemporaries [*Mitwelt*] and "self-world" [*Selbstwelt*] to indicate the specific characteristics that in BT he calls being near (things), being-with (others), and being-self (e.g., GA58 §§7c, 10). However, world is a *unitary* phenomenon, as is being-in-the-world. Thus, these three worlds have to be understood as equioriginary [*gleichursprüngliche*] moments of the context of being-situate, i.e., *as* I find myself and *how* I find myself.

Structural incompleteness and skillful making

Around-world and being near gear

The phenomenological elucidation of encountering things, or "being near" [*Sein bei*] them, aims to show the encountering itself, rather than the constitution of such "innerworldish" [*innerweltliche*] beings as objects. It aims to bring out the "worldishness of the world" [*Weltlichkeit der Welt*], as the context of such encountering in the double genitive sense, i.e., encountering *in* context and *as* that context. Heidegger formally indicates this as "significance" or "meaningfulness" [*Bedeutsamkeit*] (SZ 87).[7]

In the elucidation of the worldishness of the world, Heidegger's aim is to show how the stuff or gear [*Zeug*] (SZ68) of use in everyday life always appears in a context

7. In HCT, Heidegger states his lack of satisfaction with this term because of its association both with notions of value (as found in neo-Kantianism, for example) and notions of the meaning of words. "And I frankly admit that this expression is not the best, but for years I have found nothing better..." (HCT pg. 202).

of references and relations that constitute a totality, rather than as isolated objects. Gear is encountered in the human situation in various ways: trying to get things done; dealing with obstacles; ignoring things that do not concern us; and so on. Such gear is not encountered as bare objects or things that are just there or "on hand". Rather, they are things "with which one has to do, in caretaking dealings (πρᾶξις)" (SZ 68) and thus their way of being is "handiness" [*Zuhandenheit*] (SZ 69). They are to-hand in encountering them, as when we reach for a pen to jot down a note, a cup to sip coffee, and so on. Handiness does not mean "always useful", however, since an empty pen or broken cup also shows this way of being, albeit privatively. Handy beings are encountered (as helpful, hindering, etc.) in taking care of circumstances. Heidegger indicates the way gear is encountered as "dealings" [*Umgang*] (SZ 66), whereas the movedness or activity of such encountering is indicated as "caretaking" [*Besorgen*] (SZ 57).

Furthermore, handy beings encounter in a way that involves references to one another, to others, and to the 'I' of the human situation. They encounter as already contextualized, i.e., as *referential* beings. They refer to other things that they fit together with, to those who made them, those who provided them for me, to the tasks to which they are suited and those to which they are not (my iBook makes a lousy hammer), and so on. All of these references together make up a referential context [*Verweisungs-zusammenhang*], which appears as a totality (SZ 70).

Reference

Different kinds of reference pertain to gear, such as what they are good for, what they consist of, and so on. Heidegger indicates such reference most formally as the "in order to" [*das Um-zu*] that relates one gear to another and to various tasks or things to be produced (SZ 63). For example, the kettle is in order to boil water, the teapot in

order to make tea, and the cup in order to hold the tea. Each gear refers to the others in the referential context of making tea, which makes up a totality of reference. Heidegger calls this reference "appliance" [*Bewandtnis*] (SZ 84),[8] which is a category. However, the referential context itself points beyond the "in order to" of gear. In skillful making, Heidegger argues, what is made (e.g., tea) is not made for its own sake.[9] Being near gear is not an end in itself, but rather has a reference to some way of being of the human situation. For example, making tea refers to the need to stay alert. This kind of reference is quite different from appliance, because it involves ways of being that do not pertain to gear themselves.[10] Although I may drink tea in order to help me work on my thesis, this is not the appliance of one gear (tea) to another (thesis). I have tea so that I can be alert, less thirsty, etc. But this is for the sake of my own way of being, not for some other gear. Heidegger calls this relation the "for-the-sake-of-which" [*Worum-willen*] (SZ 84).

Encountering "as"

Gear encounters as helpful, hindering, or as a matter of indifference. Such encountering is characterized by the "as", which Heidegger calls the existential-hermeneutical "as" (SZ 158).[11] Gear is the gear it encounters as precisely in the way it is taken as, e.g., *as* helpful, *as* hindering, etc., or more concretely, *as* a hammer (e.g., in hammering a nail), *as* a text (in reading it), *as* a sandwich, and so on. Such "taking as"

8. A term of Lask's that Heidegger appropriates (cf. GBT 388-392). On the translation of *Bewandtnis* as "appliance", see also Kisiel, "The new translation", *op. cit.*, pp. 245-249.
9. Heidegger later comes to recognize that the distinctive thing about art is precisely that it is made for its own sake, and thus differs from gear. Cf. "The Origin of the Work of Art", in *Off the Beaten Track*, ed. and trans. J. Young and K. Haynes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 1-56.
10. Again, this is a form of the ontological difference: gear is not handy for its own sake. Later, Heidegger will make the same point about language, i.e, that it doesn't speak.
11. He distinguishes this from the apophantical "as" of the assertion, which communicatively points something out through predication (SZ 154-155, 158).

is not something added on to gear, as if it were first found on hand and then subsequently given significance. In each case, Heidegger argues, gear is encountered as *something*, even if this is as an "I don't know what it's for" (cf. ZBP 71-72/60-61). Fundamental to Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutics is the notion that experience is always already meaningful (cf. GBT 49). For example, in the discussion of exposition or interpretation [*Auslegung*] in BT §32, Heidegger argues that this does not *determine* meaning, but rather discloses it explicitly. Exposition, in other words, is pre-structured; with gear, this pre-structure of meaning is its appliance, i.e., how it belongs to its referential context:

> [Exposition] does not, as it were, throw a "meaning" [*Bedeutung*] over the nakedly on hand and does not stick a value on it, but rather with the innerworldish encountering as such, in each case it already has a disclosed appliance in world-understanding, which is made explicit by the exposition. (SZ 150)

In KNS, Heidegger illustrates such significant encountering in terms of the encounter with the foreign (ZBP 71-72/60). In everydayness, we may suppose that the significance of gear comes about from familiarity with them, drawn from past experience. Whilst this might be the case for *specific* significations, it cannot be the case for significance *per se*. If it were, then encountering foreign or unfamiliar things would have a *non*-environmental or *non*-significant character. We would not take them *as* anything at all. But Heidegger argues that this cannot be the case. With the unfamiliar, we encounter it *as* unfamiliar. *We* do not know the referential context of such gear, but this does not mean that they are simply non-referential. Things are encountered as meaningful in the very encounter of them *as* strange.

The elucidation of skillful making shows that gear always encounters as relational. They are constituted as the gear they are by the relations they have to one another. However, the relational *totality* itself does not pertain to gear, but rather to being-situate. World is an existential that constitutes our way of being. This context of

reference, which Heidegger calls “significance” [*Bedeutsamkeit*], constitutes the “worldishness” [*Weltlichkeit*] of the world. Things in the world are relational, but their *relational totality* is an aspect of the being of being-situate.

Genesis of the theoretical

The constitutive referentiality of innerworldish gear is how such beings are *discovered* [*entdeckt*] (SZ 69), i.e., how they show themselves. However, Heidegger argues that this does not entail an *a priori* referential context into which we “slot” beings that initially are on hand. Such a conception presupposes that gear is constituted “in itself” without such reference, and thus is conceived of as self-contained, i.e., substantialistically. Such substantialism, Heidegger argues, depends on the cognitive comportment of the theoretical attitude. Heidegger’s elucidation aims to show that this substantialist ontology fails to articulate *how* gear can be meaningful, and thus that the theoretical attitude itself cannot account for meaning. The theoretical attitude supposes that cognitive comportment is a kind of *looking* at objects, in which regard (!) meaningfulness needs a “location”, either in the object (positivism) or in intersubjectivity (historicism).

Heidegger points out that gear encounter in use, in dealings, in caretaking, and so on. Primarily, such beings encounter “pragmatically” (SZ 68). For example, when I open the door, I do not first *observe* the doorknob, *think* about the referential context (inside the room/outside the room, openings in the wall, thresholds, movable barriers, ways of grasping and manipulating, etc.), and *then* conceive that the doorknob functions in such-and-such a way. Rather, I simply grasp the doorknob and open the door. I may not even be explicitly aware of the doorknob, perhaps because my concern is to find out who is knocking on the door. The appliance of the doorknob (to the door) and its significance (for the sake of answering) are mostly recessive in everyday

dealings. "Natural" beings (as opposed to artefacts) are also appliant and significant, as when a cloud indicates rain, or a red sky means that a storm is coming.

How does this theoretical attitude arise? In terms of skillful making, it involves abstraction from everyday dealings. Instead of caretakingly dealing with the pen in jotting down a note as an *aide-mémoire* (for the sake of remembering something), the pen is abstracted from its referential context (its "in-order to" write the note, etc.) and regarded in isolation from it. The theoretical attitude thus looks for properties *in* the pen that define it *as* a pen. It involves a "rigid staring at something purely on hand" (SZ 61) which becomes a "looking at" [*Hinsehen*], rather than the circumspection [*Umsicht*] involved in caretaking dealings with gear.[12] In such looking, beings are encountered "solely in their purely outward appearance" (SZ 61), which is then taken to be how they are, in being found "just there" or on hand. The relation between knower and known, or subject and (on-hand) object, appears to be such that the subject "goes out" of her inner sphere to encounter an external thing. But this notion of inner and outer is a theoretical presupposition rather than a description of the phenomenon:

> In directing itself toward . . . and grasping, being-situate does not first go out from its inner sphere, in which it is initially encapsulated, but rather it is, according to its primary way of being, always already "outside" near some encountering being of the world in each case already discovered. (SZ 62)

In experience, there is no "gap" between the supposedly external thing that is experienced and my supposed internal experienc*ing* of it. Experiencing is itself experienced. There is a relational *continuity* or mutual implication in experience.

The disclosure of significance

In everyday caretaking of gear, the referential totality is mostly recessive.

12. We should note here that the distinction Heidegger makes between theoretical seeing and circumspective seeing indicates that the "theoretical" and the "practical" are not distinguished from one another as seeing (or contemplating) and doing. Rather, it is a distinction between two kinds of seeing and doing, i.e., making and knowing.

Skillful making does not primarily concern the significance and appliance *per se*, but the task at hand. And because such dealings tend to absorb us, the referential totality remains recessive. Nevertheless, skillful making is possible only if the gear that encounters is already significant, i.e., is already taken as something *prior* to what it is taken as in caretaking (e.g., as a doorknob). How then does the referential context come to show itself? Heidegger illustrates two ways in which the referential/relational totality of gear becomes manifest. It can come to appear with the *un*handiness of gear, such as when it breaks down, is unsuitable, or goes missing for the task at hand. When gear is unhandy, it no longer fits into its context. It is *in*appliant, and this makes appliance manifest. The gear shows its references to other gear, in a privative way. "Handiness shows itself yet again, and precisely hereby the world-accordance [*Weltmäßigkeit*] of the handy also shows itself" (SZ 74).

The referential totality is disrupted and thus "the reference becomes explicit" (SZ 74). The totality "lights up," and in this way "world announces itself" (SZ 75). The reference becomes circumspectly seen in the light of the absence of handiness, which shows that world is always disclosed in *circumspection*, although not explicitly *for* circumspection. Such disclosedness makes the significance of gear possible, in circumspective encounter.

> If, however, the world can light up in a certain way, it must be disclosed in general. With the accessibility of innerworldish handy beings for circumspective caretaking, world is in each case pre-disclosed. It is therefore something "wherein" the human situation as a being in each case already *was*, to which it can always return, in every somehow explicit getting to something. (SZ 76)

Thus, with breakdown in skillful making, the appliance and significance of gear becomes evident, such that gear is discovered *as* the gear it is. This involves the *prior*, *implicit* disclosedness of world. It also involves a prior "being in" or belonging to this pre-disclosed world on the part of the human situation. In this way, the appliance that characterizes handy beings is disclosed in skillful making by way of an *a priori* that

pertains to world and being-situate. Heidegger explicates this as a "releasing" or "freeing" [*freigeben*] of the handy to allow it to apply in the totality of appliance. This "in-each-case-to-have-let-apply" [*Je-schon-haben-bewendenlassen*] is thus "an *a priori perfect* that characterizes the way of being of the human situation" (SZ 85). Encountering the handy as appliant thus involves the "discoveredness" [*Entdecktheit*] of such beings as belonging to a totality of appliance. The significance of the gear that is freed for its appliance, however, is not itself a characteristic of the handy. Instead, it characterizes a way of being of the human situation, which Heidegger formally indicates as "understanding" [*Verstehen*] (SZ 85-86). In this way, then, Heidegger argues, skillful making shows that it is insufficient in itself, and depends on the human situation's being towards itself, as was suggested by the "for the sake of which" of the referential totality.

The second way referentiality and world become disclosed is through *signs*. Signs are also handy beings, but are distinctive because their in-order-to is to *explicitly* direct us towards, or to orient us to, something that does *not* show itself. They make the inconspicuous conspicuous, and thus bring to light the referential context in which we encounter that which hides its reference.

Heidegger's phenomenological description of this aspect of the human situation, then, shows that it is always related, in one way or another, to handy beings. The human situation is structurally incomplete, because such encountering constitutes it. Furthermore, useful things also refer to other beings that are unlike them, i.e., the *others* encountered in the human situation. The referential contexts of the useful things we encounter include others who we use them with (as with a telephone) or against (as with a handgun), others who made them, others we make things for, and so on. Others, too, are encountered in a variety of ways, which can even include encountering them as

beings like hammers and nails, i.e., when they are encountered only as they satisfy purposes in the human situation. The standard example of this is slavery, but it can occur in many other ways as well, such as the way employees are treated as "human resources", the way soldiers have been deployed as "cannon fodder", and in everyday ways of manipulative behaviour.[13] Nevertheless, these are privative ways of encountering others, because they disregard the ways such beings differ from things like hammers.

With-world and being-with

Encountering others shows another aspect of the structural incompleteness of the human situation, which is that it is always related to others and is constituted in this relatedness. In many ways, this aspect is primary, since it manifests itself in *language*. The human situation is linguistic, in the sense that it is characterized by discrimination between different beings, which gets expressed in different words for things. But such discrimination (the separating of things which at the same time gathers them together[14]) can only take place with others. This aspect of the human situation thus pertains to the way beings such as hammers and nails are encountered, because these are always discriminated from one another. Thus, to encounter anything like a hammer, there must also be encounter with others.

Who is in-the-world

The second constitutive structure of being-in-the-world is the being that is "doing" the being-in-the-world. Who exactly is it that is in-the-world? Or, as Heidegger also expresses this, "How does being-in-the-world appear?" (OHF 68). This question

13. In English, this is often expressed by saying of someone that "he *uses* people".
14. This is how Heidegger articulates λόγος (PS pg. 99; SZ 159). Cf. Thomas Sheehan, "A paradigm shift", *op. cit.*, pp. 191-193.

indicates that the immediate identification of that which appears as the self or the "I" is a presupposition of interpretation, which the formal indication of concrete individuality puts in question. Although existence is formally indicated as *mine*, this does not mean that this mineness *appears* in the world in the way that either the naive or theoretical attitude suggests. For this reason, the way that being-in-the-world appears—the "who"—is also in question.

The analysis of the "who" in BT is made more complex because Heidegger addresses two separate aspects of this. First, there is the question of being-with [*Mitsein*] with others, i.e., how being-situate is with others, and how others are there as being-situate-with [*Mitda-sein*]. Second, there is the issue of the distinction of being-situate from others. With this second issue, Heidegger's argument is that the human situation cannot be adequately or appropriately understood in terms of being an "other" or being Everyman [*das Man*], i.e., in terms of ("objective") 3rd-person descriptions or intersubjectivity. Although the adequate or appropriate way of understanding the human situation—as the equioriginariness of objectivity, intersubjectivity *and* subjectivity—does not "add" content to the Everyman-self, it shows how being-a-self involves having and being had by the factical aspects that constitute us. That is, it shows *how* objectivity can *be* valid and intersubjective practises can *be* normative, but not *what* these are.

The analysis of the "who" seeks to elucidate this with respect to meaning, i.e., to show that significance or meaning—the sense of being-situate—is not appropriately characterized by reference to *intersubjectivity.* Although being-situate is *formally* indicated with a personal pronoun, what is at issue here is the sense or meaning of this *as* personal. "Speaking of being-situate must, in accordance with the character of *mineness* of this being, continually say with the *personal* pronoun: 'I am,' 'you are' "

(SZ 42). In referring to being-situate we cannot properly use occasional expressions such as "this" or "that". However, "I" is *also* an occasional expression, and thus for Heidegger is a formal indication:

> Being-situate is a being which in each case I myself am, its being is in each case mine. This determination *indicates* an *ontological* constitution, but no more than that. At the same time, it contains an *ontic* indication—although rough— that in each case an I is this being and not others. (SZ 114)

Thus, *what* is indicated is not determinately given. The sense of this indication must be enacted, because the concrete individual is an enactment, not a discovered being. However, the question here is whether concrete individuality is intersubjectively constituted.[15] This is addressed in the analysis of being-with [*Mitsein*] and being-self (or "selving") [*Selbstsein*].[16] The formal indication of mineness prohibits the usual sense of "I", in order to allow its relat*ing* or enactment-sense to be brought into relief. Therefore, in the phenomenological elucidation of being-situate, there can be no presupposition regarding how this "I" appears:

> The "I" must be understood only in the sense of a non-binding *formal indication* of something which perhaps reveals itself in the temporally particular [*jeweilig*] phenomenal context of being as its "opposite." Moreover, "not I" by no means signifies something like a being which essentially lacks "I-hood," but means a determinate way of being of the "I" itself, for example, self-lostness. (SZ 116)

When we describe the phenomenon of being-in-the-world, then, we cannot *presuppose* that the characteristics explicated are constitutive of being-self. Rather, we must let the phenomenon show who this being is and how. How is it in being-with-one-another? Is being-self differentiated from being-with, and if so, how?

Being with others and being an other

The elucidation of the who first focusses on the "others" that are disclosed in being near gear and circumspectly taking care of handy things. This is usually

15. Heidegger returns to this question in MFL pp. 187-188.
16. The sense of "self" in Heidegger's analytic is adverbial or perhaps even prepositional, i.e., as a *way* of being or a direction (sense) of being, rather than nominal.

considered as the issue of *intersubjectivity* or *sociality*, but Heidegger's formally indicative approach is intended to put into question what is presupposed by "intersubjectivity" or "sociality" to show that being-with-one-another and being-an-Everyman-self do not by themselves determine the constitution of meaning, although they are equioriginary with it. The analysis of being-with with others does not concern a subsumptive relation between objects, e.g., "individual" and "social". Heidegger avoids those terms *precisely* to prohibit such identification.[17] The formal indications of "who", "being-with", "being-situate-with", and "being-with-one-another" are intended to ward off content-senses such as "I", "society", "self", etc., and refer us instead to how being-situate enacts being-an-other. Heidegger's aim is to show that being-an-other or being Everyman [*das Man*], in skillful making in the with-world, cannot elucidate being-in-the-world. The apparent "completion" of the human situation in being-with-one-another [*Miteinandersein*] also depends on the openness of encountering grounded in the structural incompleteness of the human situation.

However, being-an-other is not simply encountered *in* the human situation. It is also one of the ways being-situate encounters *as*. The human situation involves being-an-other *for* others, as well (i.e., being-with [*Mitsein*] their being-situate-with [*Mitda-sein*]). The analysis of the Everyman-self clarifies that the existentials ascribed to others, and thus to being-situate *as* an other (i.e., 3rd-person descriptions), are

17. However, in the debate about the compatibility between Everyman and appropriately being-self (in II.I-III), this formally indicative prohibition is often missed. For example, in Edgar Boedeker's contribution to the debate between Dreyfus and Olafson he makes the following claims: (i) "Heidegger's term for the social horizon of human life is '*das Man*' " (pg. 64); (ii) "*das Man* has something to do with sociality and an individual's conformity to social norms" (pg. 64); (iii) "Heidegger refers to human beings with an ordinary German term for existence, 'Dasein' " (pg. 66); and (iv) "Heideggerian possibilities are thus much like what we might call someone's *capacities*" (*ibid.*) (Edgar C. Boedeker, Jr., "Individual and Community in Early Heidegger", *Inquiry*, vol. 44, 2001, pp. 63-100). Such interpretation not only "domesticates" Heidegger, it proceeds in a diametrically opposite direction. The same is true with Hubert Dreyfus, as with many other American interpreters of Heidegger. For a critique of Dreyfus's "American" interpretation, see Carlton B. Christensen, "Getting Heidegger off the West Coast", *Inquiry*, vol. 41, 1998, pp. 65-87.

inappropriate for elucidating concrete individuality. Thus, when Heidegger refers to the "domination" of being-situate by the "others", this does *not* mean conformity to social norms (whether implicit or explicit). Rather, it suggests how being-with or being an other comes to be taken *as* determinative of the human situation.

The way in which we encounter gear has been shown to always include reference to others. I am at my iBook, which refers to those who made it, those who sold it, other Mac users, and others who might use my iBook. Just as other gear are given in encountering this particular gear through reference, so too are others. Being-situate is never alone in the world, but always there with others. This is evident with public gear such as bus shelters and airports, which refer explicitly to users other than myself, or with the Botanic Gardens, where the path along the lakes refers to *all* those who walk along it. Just as encountering gear in the world is constitutive of being-in-the-world, so is encountering others. A second aspect of the structural incompleteness of the human situation, then, is the "sharedness" of the world.

Being-with is the *condition* for encountering others. It is *a priori* to the others so encountered. It has nothing to do with physical proximity or the presence of others, but is an existential:

> The phenomenological statement: being-situate is essentially being-with has an existential-ontological sense. It does not want to ontically ascertain that I am factically not just there alone, and rather that others of my kind also appear...Being-with existentially determines being-situate even when an other is not factically present and perceived. The being-alone of being-situate, too, is being-with in the world. The other can be *lacking* only *in* and *for* a being-with. (SZ 120).

Heidegger formally indicates the (transitive) way of being-with-one-another as "caregiving" [*Fürsorge*, "welfare" or, literally, "care-for"] (SZ 121). The enactment of being-with with others is in care *for* them. Others matter in terms of their own being-situate, i.e., the way they go about their own being, although insofar as I fail to recognize this about myself, it is questionable whether I can recognize it in others.

Everydayness is characterized by being occupied with taking care of things in dealing with gear. Such occupation involves others also, in the reference of gear and work. For example, in taking care of grocery shopping, the locality could be a supermarket, which is a public gear where others also take care of their shopping in a variety of dealings, such as walking the aisles, choosing products, searching for items, queueing for the cashier, paying the bill. This public gear refers to each of us equally as consumers or customers, and to our dealings in indifference to their mineness. In this way, the supermarket is a shared locality or gear. This sharedness is *a priori* for the concrete factical sharing that happens. That is, it is not through the factical sharing of caretaking in the supermarket that its sharedness arises; rather, *a priori* sharedness is what makes the sharing of caretaking *possible*.

The world is ontically shared in the way being-situate is being like the others, acting as they do, and so on, i.e., in being an other. Particular caretakings (e.g., grocery shopping) are not determinative of the individuality of the human situation. In such dealings, this is what Everyman [*das Man*] does (SZ 114). Being-situate *is* Everyman in engaging in this activity. Even the privative senses (acting *un*like the others) remain determined by the others (e.g., going "back to the land" rather than grocery shopping). Heidegger's point is that this is a case of being-self that is not individuated, but is being-self in *terms* of others (or being-an-other). Everyman is an existential, and is thus a constitutive moment of being-situate, but not *determinative* of it. Being-situate *is* for the most part being-Everyman-self, which is therefore not something that can be avoided.

The ontological characteristic of others is not determinative of being-situate, nor *vice versa*. Others belong to (or in) the human situation, but do not solely constitute it themselves. Furthermore, *being* an other is also a characteristic of being-situation.

However, being-situate is always *mine*. Therefore, others *as* others are not being-situate. Their being is not mine. Rather, they are *being-situate-with* [*Mitda-sein*] for being-situate. Others are there not as the human situation that *I* am, but as human situations that are *with* me. As a happening, enactment, or event, then, happening is what is proper [*eigen*] to me. Others co-happen with my being-situate, but are not *my* happening. For example, playing a team sport such as football requires a team. As a member of the team, I play football along with my team-mates and opponents. They are there with my football playing, and indeed are co-constitutive of it. Were there no team, I could not play. Nevertheless, they are not *my* football playing, and neither am I theirs. In each case "I" am the one playing football, and "the others" are co-players with me.

Self-world and being-in

Being-self in an appropriate rather than inappropriate way involves the moment of the constitution of being-in-the-world that makes the sharedness of the world possible. What makes the shared world both possible and necessary is structural incompleteness. What holds the human situation open and incomplete, in the face of its constant tendency to be dispersed into absorption by things and "subservience" [*Botmäßigkeit*] to others, is the tension between *facticity*, that and how the human situation always already is, and *existentiality*, being-situate's ability-to-be [*Seinkönnen*] itself. This co-constitutive element of our being-in-the-world is *being-in* [*In-sein*], the final structural moment of being-in-the-world.

Being-in does not indicate a *spatial* containment of this being by world. In-ness [*Inheit*] has a non-spatial sense. If we look at the etymology of "in", Heidegger argues, we find that it stems from *innan-* which means "to live, dwell". Being-in, then, means "I dwell, I stay near . . . the world as the intimate in such and such a way" (SZ 54). In-ness thus means the *correlatedness* of being-situate and world, neither of which

is something on hand (SZ 54-56). In-ness is *how* the human situation is, and can *only* be, "there" in, with and toward what encounters. In-ness is the *correlation* of these that the human situation actively, transitively is, as discovering innerworldish beings in disclosedness. In-ness has nothing to do with the "interiority" of the subject in "inner consciousness", nor with the subject's enclosure by the surrounding world. "[I]n its primary kind of being" being-situate is "always 'outside' together with some being encountered in the world already discovered" (SZ 62).

With the analysis of being-in, Heidegger aims to elucidate how the human situation is the "there" [*Da*] that it has to be. Being the "there" is formally indicated as "disclosedness" or "opened-up-ness" [*Erschlossenheit*] (SZ 132-133). This is a fundamental way of being of the human situation, such that "[t]he human situation is its disclosedness" (SZ 133). This also means that "(having) to be its 'there' " is the being that the human situation goes about, i.e., its existence (SZ 133). Heidegger elucidates the structure of being-in as having four constitutive moments: "the equioriginary constitutive ways to be the there" of disposedness [*Befindlichkeit*][18] and understanding [*Verstehen*] (SZ 133); these existentials are articulated through discourse [*Rede*], in which being-with-one-another reappears in its equioriginariness as constitutive for the expression of the human situation (SZ 161-162); and lapsing [*Verfallen*] as the disclosedness of the possibilities of Everyman, which manifest "an essential tendency of being of everydayness" (SZ 167).

18. *Befindlichkeit* is Heidegger's nominalization of the verb *befinden*, which is used to inquire about the "state" of a person's being. *Wie befinden sie sich?* (literally, "how do you find yourself?") asks the same as "how are you?". It asks about the mood or frame of mind someone is in, her disposition, hence "disposedness." The reflexive verb *sich befinden* is in the middle voice (cf. Kisiel, GBT 378-9). *Befindlichkeit* is Heidegger's translation for the Greek word διάθεσις (GBT pg. 293).

Disposedness

Disposedness is associated with the facticity of the human situation, i.e., that there always belongs to it a way that it has become and continues to be. Disposedness formally indicates how the human situation is disclosed or opened up to itself *as* this "that it is". The phenomenal or ontic aspect of this existential is *temper* [*Stimmung*] (SZ 134). Tempers disclose us to ourselves in particular ways, and equally disclose the world (e.g., as bored/boring, tired/tiring, fascinated/fascinating). Tempers are a way that the world "gets to me", yet they also reveal that I (currently) am a certain way, and have to be it. We cannot *choose* our tempers, Heidegger points out. Rather, "[t]he temper befalls [*überfällt*]" (SZ 136). But nor do tempers come from "without" or "within". Rather, they arise with being-in-the-world itself (SZ 136). Thus, we have to endure or withstand them. However, this is often occluded by absorption in caretaking and caregiving. Thus, the human situation always involves *finding itself* in a temper without it being disclosed whence this came and whither it goes (SZ 135). In this way, the disclosedness of the "that it is" is something the human situation is "thrown" into and "cast" [*geworfene*] as. It is a kind of movedness that is always (in the) there (SZ 135). Phenomenally, a temper discloses in a factical way, and thus discloses facticity, i.e., discloses disposedness to being-situate. In this way, tempers disclose being-in-the-world as a whole, in disclosing the "there" (SZ 137).

Here Heidegger is clarifying the incompleteness of the human situation, i.e., how it always involves an opened-up-ness, not just to worldish encountering, but to *itself* as well. Such disclosedness *to* self means that the human situation is not complete "in itself". Just as significance is only made evident in encountering the handy, and being-with in being-(with-one-an)-other, so too do I first encounter my self in being cast. As disclosed in disposedness, then, the human situation involves *having to be* [*zu*

sein] its there, i.e., as it in each case factically is (SZ 135). Thus, there is a necessity found in disposedness. With this necessity, however, comes an awareness of the ability to be, or possibility of being, that way, because how being-situate is cast is no other than it already *is*.

As disclosive, tempers make directedness towards innerworldish beings, to others, and to ourselves possible. "The temper has in each case already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible a to-be-directed-towards . . ." (SZ 137). As an existential, then, disposedness is an "*equioriginary disclosedness* of world, being-situate-with, and existence, because this itself is essentially being-in-the-world" (SZ 137).

Understanding

As disposed, being-situate is disclosed as the "that it is" that it has to be. In having-to-be it, however, what is also disclosed is that being-situate *can* be the "there". The "there" is disclosed as what being-situate *goes about*, and thus is already familiar with as what it *can be*. This familiarity is formally indicated by "understanding" (SZ 142).[19] Thus, this disclosedness includes understanding, since this too belongs to the human situation as a fundamental way of being. However, understanding is *also* disclosive, and so discloses disposedness. Disposedness and understanding always go together (SZ 142-143). "Disposedness in each case has its understoodness [*Verständnis*], even if it only suppresses it. Understanding is always tempered" (SZ 142). Whereas disposedness discloses being-in-the-world in terms of the *necessity* of

19. "Understanding" can all too easily be taken to suggest some kind of cognition, which is not what Heidegger intends. The sense of this formal indication is the intimate familiarity of the human situation (or life) with itself, as Heidegger's gloss on *innan-* indicates (SZ 54; GBT 377). Kisiel explicates this sense as a non-objectifying equiprimordiality of "having myself" and "having" the world (GBT 378), such that "I am" is taken as "I can" (GBT 380). Understanding thus means something like "being *au fait* with" (cf. SZ 143). On *Verstehen*, see also Schnädelbach, *op. cit.*, ch. 4.

the "that it is", understanding discloses it in terms of the possibility of (actively, transitively) *being it*. One gloss that Heidegger gives of understanding is "being able to be" (SZ 143). Ability-to-be thus points to possibility as constitutive of the being of the human situation. "The human situation...is primarily being-possible [*Möglichsein*]", which means "what it can be and how it is its possibility" (SZ 143).

This has already been shown in the analysis of worldishness, in that the significance of the handy refers to the for-the-sake-of-which as some possible way for the human situation to be. The disclosedness of significance is at the same time the disclosedness of the for-the-sake-of-which, and therefore of being-in-the-world itself:

> In the for-the-sake-of-which, existingly being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, which disclosedness is called understanding. In the understanding of the for-the-sake-of-which, the significance grounded in it is co-disclosed. The disclosedness of the understanding, as the equioriginary [disclosedness] of the for-the-sake-of-which and significance, concerns the entirety of being-in-the-world. Significance is that towards-which-upon-which [*woraufhin*] world as such is disclosed. For-the-sake-of-which *and* significance are disclosed in being-situate, means: being-situate is a being, which as being-in-the-world goes about itself. (SZ 143)

Without world there is no being-situate, and hence no going about my being. This is why significance is co-disclosed in understanding.

In understanding, then, disposedness is also disclosed as a way of being of the human situation. Whereas disposedness concerns the necessity of "having to be", rather than simply the actuality of *what* the human situation is, understanding concerns the *possibility* of being. Understanding discloses being-situate as going about its being, i.e., as the possibilities of its existence. "Going about its being" is the enactment of the relation to the being it already is, disclosed in disposedness. That is, it means enacting possibilities. Understanding is the disclosedness of the how of such enactment, i.e., that I *can* be my possibilities, and therefore indicates the *transitive transcendence* of being-self whereby being-situate is towards itself *as* itself, i.e., as the necessity of its factical constitution. But facticity is not *completeness*, because it must include being it as a *way*

to be, i.e., as a possibility of being-situate. The human situation understands itself both *as*, and *from*, the being it already is.

Possibility is an existential, and thus is different from logical and contingent possibility (SZ 143). Facticity means that the human situation always has definite ways to be. Being-it thus means being (factical) possibilities. What I can be is the possibilities that factically constitute me at the particular while. This is the real innovation in Heidegger's thinking: constitutive possibility, that is higher than actuality.[20] Yet "having" possibilities is not fully determinative of the human situation, because there is also the how of their enactment. This is where the hermeneutics of human existence comes to the fore, because the *taking as* involved in being-possible is *constitutive* of being-situate, just as the possibilities disclosed in disposedness are. In contrast to usual views of human agency (particularly that on which the contemporary canon of economics is based), in which the actor is conceived as something different from the choices, decisions, and actions she or he enacts,[21] Heidegger's analytic of being-situate argues that the actor (or exister) is constituted as how she takes herself to be, which is likewise *how* she *finds* herself to be. I find myself with the energy and motivation to finish editing this chapter today, and thus I am constituted as this possibility in *being* it. The possibility is only "there" for me insofar as I take it *as* a possibility of my being, but conversely I can only take it as such insofar as I find it a way I *can* be.

Ontically, this means disclosing a concrete possibility for my existence, such as the possibility of becoming a Ph.D. holder, a Spanish speaker, an accountant, etc. *Ontologically*, however, it means disclosing the very structure of being-in itself.

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20. Cf. Thomas Sheehan, "Geschichtlichkeit/Ereignis/Kehre", *Existentia (Meletai Sophias)*, vol. XI, no. 3-4, 2001, pp. 241-251.
21. As found in Sen's analysis of capabilities, for example.

Heidegger's central claim is that being-in *is* this disclosed disclosiveness, and that this ontological constitution is disclosed *in* the being-situate of being-in-the-world. This is why the analytic of being-situate exhibits hermeneutic circularity. In the Introduction to BT, Heidegger characterizes the analytic as a "remarkable 'backward- and forward-relatedness' of the asked about (being) upon/toward [*auf*] the asking as a mode of being of a being" (SZ 8). Being-possible as a way of being is not simply having *logical* possibilities. An object "has" logical possibilities, but cannot *be* them. Enacting possibilities of my self means *being* my possibilities.

Thus, understanding indicates "the being of such ability-to-be" (SZ 144). How is the ability-to-be enacted, i.e., what is the movedness found in understanding? Heidegger calls this "the frame" [*der Entwurf*], which is an "existential structure" of the understanding (SZ 145). Framing [*entwerfen*] discloses the there of being-in-the-world as ability-to-be. Whereas disposedness discloses the "there" as the "that it is and has to be (it)" of castness, understanding discloses that being-situate *can* be its "that it is" in framing its being as possibilities. Whereas disposedness indicates the modality of *necessity*—the factical *a priori* or the perfective aspect of our way of being—understanding indicates the modality of *possibility*—the imperfective aspect of our way of being:

> [Understanding] frames the being of being-situate as its for-the-sake-of-which, just as originarily as [it does] significance as the worldishness of its particular whilish world. The frame-character of understanding constitutes being-in-the-world with regard to the disclosedness of its there as *the there of an ability-to-be*. The frame is the existential constitution of being of the leeway [*Spielraums*] of the factical ability-to-be. And as cast [*geworfenes*], being-situate is cast in the way of being of framing [*Entwerfens*]. (SZ 145)

As with being near and being-with, a "sight" belongs to being-in as understanding, "transparentness" [*Durchsichtigkeit*], which indicates seeing "itself" in seeing being near and being-with as constitutive of being-in-the-world (SZ 146).

Exposition

Understanding can be further clarified by elucidating exposition [*Auslegung*] (SZ 148). Understanding is the implicit familiarity that being-situate has with itself, which is made explicit in exposition.[22] As Heidegger clarifies in HCT,

> this means that exposition as such does not actually disclose, for that is what understanding or being-situate itself takes care of. Exposition always only takes care of *bringing out what is disclosed* as a cultivation of the possibilities inherent in an understanding. (HCT pg. 260, trans. altered)[23]

The elucidation of the human situation's primary way of being as being-possible (in framing its being *as* possibilities) leads to a further clarification regarding exposition and assertion. Understanding discloses being-in-the-world (the structure of the human situation) as a whole. This means that it also discloses being towards possibilities *itself* as an ability-to-be (SZ 148). Being-possible is disclosive of being my possibilities. As such, then, being-possible can itself be made thematic. It can be made explicit through exposition, which is a concretion of the intimately familiar, and hence implicit, understanding.

In being near the handy, for example, caretaking circumspectly discovers the encountering handy being in terms of the appliance it can have, as the significance that is disclosed in "world-understanding". Such discovery makes the handy explicit. "Circumspection discovers means the already understood world is expounded" (SZ 148). The in-order-to of the handy becomes explicit. As a response to the implicit question "what for?" that is directed towards the handy being, what is asked about is what this being is taken *as*. The explicitly understood has the structure of "something as something" (SZ 149). Such exposition is not assertoric, however. It does not ascribe an

22. Much of Heidegger's work in the years preceding BT is concerned with the elucidation of exposition (or interpretation) (cf. OHF, PIA, etc.). Understanding is only first thematized in SS1925 (cf. GBT 376, 507), as the prestructure of exposition.
23. In HCT, Heidegger's use of "discoveredness" and "disclosedness" is the reverse of their use in BT (cf. HCT pg. 253 trans./ed. n. 1; GBT 494).

"as" to the circumspectly caretaken being. Rather, it makes explicit what is *already* understood in the encountering. The "as" constitutes the structure of explicitness, but this is *a priori* in understanding, which is always *already* expository (SZ 149). Nor is the "as" first given in an *assertion*, although this can present a certain "as", i.e., the apophantic "as" that refers to beings on hand and that derives from the originary hermeneutical "as" (SZ 158). The apophantic "as" of the assertion, however, involves a transformation in the way that innerworldish beings are encountered, such that they are pointed out *as* on hand. In assertion, one thing is simply predicated of another in pointing something out. There is no longer a reference to the totality of appliance.

Heidegger further elucidates the relation between understanding and exposition in terms of the pre-structure [*Vor-struktur*] of exposition that lies in the understanding (SZ150-151). This consists of (i) a "pre-having" [*Vorhabe*] in which what is to be expounded is already implicitly understood, (ii) a "preview" [*Vorsicht*] in which this is seen *as* something, and *as* how it is to be expounded, and (iii) a "pre-conception" of the concepts the exposition applies (SZ 150). This pre-structure is the *a priori* character of the hermeneutical "as". Thus, understanding involves an *a priori* relation to the *sense* [*Sinn*] of the handy being understandingly encountered. Such sense is the upon-which-towards-which [*das Woraufhin*] of the frame in terms of which something becomes intelligible. The pre-structure is made explicit in, and as, exposition, which thus brings the pre-structure to light. This is precisely what BT itself consists in, i.e., bringing the pre-structure of understanding (of *and* in the human situation) to light through the exposition. For this reason, too, the inquiry of BT differs from the assertoric nature of philosophy when understood as concerning beings that are on hand, i.e., self-contained, isolated *substances*. In his review of Jaspers, Heidegger elucidates the "appropriate factor that comes to light" in phenomenological elucidation

itself.

> ...this appropriate factor itself is to be understood precisely as a kind of "prestruction" of one's own existence. Such prestruction is in each case enacted in the current facticity of one's life in the form of a self-appropriation. It discloses and holds open a concrete horizon of expectation characterized by worrying and is developed and worked out in each particular context of enacting it. (J 87, translation altered)

Being-in-the-world involves being in a world of always already *articulated* beings. It is implicit and pre-theoretical. Exposition makes the implicit explicit, by bringing what we already encounter to a kind of full determinateness. For example, I encounter *Being and Time* as a book, as written by Heidegger, as a difficult text, and so on, but in a way that is implicit in the encounter itself. I can subsequently make this explicit, say by bringing out the characteristics of books, and how *Being and Time* exhibits these, or by philological research into Heidegger, or by taking passages of the text and showing how hard they are to understand. All this is expository, which requires its own types of articulation that are different from those of encountering.

In the caretaking and caregiving encounter of innerworldish beings, they always encounter *as* something. They are never bare objects whose determinate characteristics must subsequently be theoretically ascertained. Rather, as we encounter them, they are always the particular, determinate beings they are. For example, in the kitchen, the knife encounters *as* sharp, *as* it is good for chopping, *as* it is serviceable, *as* it encounters in the enactment of the possibility of making dinner. It encounters *as* a knife in its referential context (it refers to chopping board, vegetables, sink, bowl, pot, etc.), in its appliance (it is serviceable for chopping), and in its significance (it will let me go about making dinner to keep me from being hungry). At school I encounter others *as* lecturers, *as* fellow graduate students, *as* my students, *as* librarians, and so on. This "taking as" is how these beings are disclosed to me in understanding them. I do not assign properties to them on the basis of having already encountered them as some indeterminate kind of beings.

Discourse

The existential of discourse [*Rede*] formally indicates that which makes language possible (i.e., it is not language itself), and involves the pretheoretical articulation of beings. Discourse sets beings apart from one another and "gathers" each into the being it is in its discoveredness.[24] It belongs to being-in in the articulation of the factical existentiality of being-in-the-world that encounters beings. Discourse refers fundamentally to being-with-one-another:

> Discoursing is the "signifying" articulating of the intelligibility of being-in-the-world, to which being-with belongs, and that maintains itself in each case in a determinate way of caretaking being-with-one-another. (SZ 161)

Because being-situate is not the interiority of a "self", its disclosedness is always also co-disclosedness. I am only disclosed to myself as who I am in being-with with others. This is further demonstrated in the phenomenon of communication or imparting [*Mitteilung*]:

> The phenomenon of *imparting* must...be understood in an ontologically broad sense...It enacts the "partition" of the co-disposedness and the understoodness of being-with. Imparting is never something like a transport of lived-through experiences [*Erlebnissen*], for example, opinions and wishes, out of the interior of one subject into the interior of another. (SZ 162)

Being-with-one-another is articulated in communication, but this is not conveyance of internal experiences. Rather, it is the co-establishment and co-articulation of the meaning of our ways of being-in-the-world as being-with-one-another.

The tendency of theoretical objectification arises, Heidegger argues, out of our everyday dealings with things in the world. In theorizing about things, as in the natural sciences, for example, they are taken to be just there or on hand to be encountered. The theoretical attitude holds that in such encountering, the essential properties of such beings can then be determined. Heidegger argues that this overlooks the encountering itself. The theoretical attitude explains such encountering on the basis of what is

24. This is the sense of λόγος that Heidegger explicates in PS (pg. 99).

encountered, i.e., of on-hand things in the world. This leads to the theoretical question of how consciousness is able to encounter anything at all. The "problem of knowledge" arises for the theoretical attitude because it fails to see the *pretheoretical* encountering on which (theoretical) knowledge depends. That is, as Heidegger says, knowing is a "founded mode" (SZ §13).

Lapsing

In §§35-38, Heidegger examines the phenomenon of lapsing [*Verfallen*]. Lapsing is a kind of "movement" in which being-situate gets entangled [*verfängt*] in caretaking and caregiving. In this movement, being-situate does *not* go about its being in an appropriate way, but rather in an inappropriate way. Existential facticity is occluded by everyday ways of being, such that being comes to be understood in terms of the beings encountered. Heidegger's account of lapsing is an account of how the theoretical attitude comes to predominate in our understanding of the human situation. Because we lose sight of our ontological constitution in this entanglement, how we go about our being is no longer apparent to us. Instead, we come to take it in terms of taking care of things and giving care to others. Thus, we come to understand being-possible *as* the possibilities that are available to us in everydayness.

The issue that now arises in the analytic is how being-situate can be a *unitary* phenomenon, i.e., how existentiality, facticity, discourse and lapsing belong together. Being-situate, Heidegger argues, is itself the equioriginary unity of these existentials; it is the way they constitute a totality. The unity in question is not an aggregation of these elements; what must be shown, then, is the mutual implication of existentiality and facticity, and how this makes lapsing possible. "Being-situate exists factically. What is asked about is the ontological unity of existentiality and facticity, or the essential belonging of the one to the other" (SZ 181). Being my possibilities as framing means

that being-situate exists for the sake of itself. It exists for the sake of how it is at each instant, i.e., for the sake of its castness, which is being-situate itself, as disclosed in disposedness.

> On the basis of its essentially belonging disposedness, being-situate has a way of being in which it is brought before itself and is disclosed in its castness. But castness is the way of being of a being that in each case *is* its possibilities itself, such that it understands itself in and out of them (lays itself out as them). (SZ 181)

For the most part, however, the "itself" that is so understood is the inappropriate Everyman-self, which is constituted in lapsing into understanding the human situation in terms of others and framing its possibilities in a way which is not its own. In everydayness, possibilities are understood in terms of their content-sense and the relation to these contents. Understanding comes to take its ability-to-be so predominantly in terms of Everyman that it no longer "sees" the enactment of its relations to things and others. Thus, lapsing is an opposite kind of movedness to that of disclosedness, similar to the opposite movednesses of castness and framing. As with the relation of the latter, lapsing and disclosedness are a unitary phenomenon:

> The self, however, is initially and mostly inappropriate, the Everyman-self. Being-in-the-world is always already lapsing. *The average everydayness of being-situate* can accordingly be determined as *lapsing-disclosed, cast-laying-out being-in-the-world, which in its being at the "world" and in being-with with others goes about its most proper ability-to-be itself*. (SZ 181)

Lapsing, or absorption in the world that is caretaken and caregiven, can be thought of as an immanence in the world such that it "has" (or holds) being-situate. Being-situate is captivated by the contents discovered in the world, such that it no longer sees the enactment of the relation to them, i.e., be*ing* them. Disclosedness, on the other hand, is transcendence of the world such that world is "had" by being-situate. The "most proper ability-to-be-a-self" is thus the belonging together of immanence and transcendence.

Fundamental disposedness and individuation

The movedness of lapsing is akin to a "total" absorption in the world. In entanglement with everyday ways of being, the structural incompleteness of the human situation gets covered up and thus it appears to be complete and self-contained. However, this "self-satisfaction" [*Selbstgenügsamkeit*] (GA58:41) can never *be* complete, because of our fundamental incompleteness. Since understanding and disposedness constitute the disclosedness of being-situate, just as there are understanding tempers that disclose innerworldish beings in certain ways (such as fear and the fearsome, or delight and the delightful), so should there be an understanding mode of disposedness that discloses this unified totality of care. Such modes are what Heidegger in BT calls "fundamental disposedness" [*Grundbefindlichkeit*].[25] They do not concern beings that encounter, but the encountering itself, i.e., the disclosedness of being-in-the-world. Such modes of disposedness disclose being-in-the-world as such, but as it is cast. That is, the individuation is in terms of disposedness or facticity, not understanding or existentiality. It is the disclosedness of having-to-be-it, which includes ability-to-be but is not itself ability-to-be. In BT, the fundamental disposedness that Heidegger analyzes is dread [*Angst*].

Lapsing is "something like a flight [*Flucht*] of being-situate in the face of itself as the appropriate ability-to-be-itself" (SZ 184). Being-situate flees from this towards absorption in Everyman and the "world" it takes care of. It lapses from itself towards the innerworldish. This flight, then, does disclose being-situate to itself as disclosed, but in a privative way as how it is trying *not* to be. The characteristics of lapsing, such as trying not to be its disclosedness, turning away from it and so on, *are* ways of being

25. In later texts, such as FCM and WiM, Heidegger refers to these as "fundamental tempers" [*Grundstimmungen*], and indicates that there are several (FCM pg. 59). These include homesickness, profound boredom and joy (FCM pp. 7, 77; WiM 8/87).

toward disclosedness. In trying to avoid facing its proper ability-to-be, i.e., having to be itself as what it can be, being-situate thereby shows that this way to be *is* constitutive for it. Lapsing has to be understood here in existential-ontological terms, rather than as a value judgment. That is, lapsing is a kind of inattention or preoccupation that distracts us from the questionableness of the human situation.

Fundamental disposedness discloses the very disclosedness of being-in that makes lapsing itself possible. It is about the "completely indeterminate", in which definite innerworldish beings are no longer "appliant" (SZ 186). Innerworldish beings become a kind of totality with which I am not involved. Far from being absorbed by them, I become "outside" of them, and they become insignificant. The character of insignificance itself, in which a fundamental disposedness is about "nothing and nowhere [*Nichts und Nirgends*]" (SZ 186), becomes significant. As insignificant, then, these beings are not what dread is about. Rather, it is about "being-in-the-world as such" (SZ 186). The world comes to obtrude in its worldishness. The "before-which [*Wovor*] of dread is the world as such" (SZ 187), but because world *belongs* to being-situate, the before-which of dread is *being-in-the-world* itself. What I act towards and who I act with no longer absorb my possibilities as my ability-to-be. I am brought back to my appropriate ability-to-be, and in this sense I am *individuated*.

> [Dread] casts being-situate back upon that about which dreads, its appropriate ability-to-be-in-the-world. Dread individuates [*vereinzelt*] being-situate upon its most proper being-in-the-world, which understandingly lays itself out essentially as possibilities. With the about-which of dreading, therefore, dread discloses being-situate *as being-possible* and indeed as that which it can solely be of its own accord, as individuated in individuation. (SZ 187-188)

Thus, dread does not disclose the world in some way or other, but discloses the *disclosing* of world that is the human situation. This disclosedness is nothing that can be identified as an instance; it has no content that could be ascribed to others.

In such disclosing, being-situate is disclosed as "*being-free for* the freedom of

choosing-and-grasping-itself" (SZ 188). But this is just what being-possible means. Dread discloses being-situate *as* being-possible. This is why there is a sense of strength or power that comes with a fundamental disposedness, which Heidegger calls "the quiet power of the possible" (SZ 394). It is the strength of being *able* to be my possibilities, or being able to frame my being *as* possibilities.

It is the coincidence of the two "vectors" of fundamental disposedness, the before-which and the about-which, on being-in-the-world that makes it distinctive, for it discloses in such a way that "being-in as individuated, pure, cast ability-to-be is disclosed" (SZ 188). In §12, being-in is characterized as dwelling in familiarity, or being at home. This is how we are in the world for the most part. Dread, however, is *un*homely. It is a disposedness in which we are not at home, because we are pulled away from absorption in the world. "Everyday familiarity collapses. Being-situate is individuated, but *as* being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential 'mode' of *not-at-home* [*Un-zuhause*]" (SZ 189). Such individuation is not a *separation* of the human situation from its world, which is structurally impossible. Rather, it is the disclosedness of *finitude* or *structural incompleteness*, i.e., that the human situation is concretely individual only in relation to things and others that encounter, and that these only encounter for concrete individuality. It is the opposite of the movement of lapsing. Fundamental disposedness discloses the enactment of "self-relation", whereby being-situate takes itself as *always* having to be in the world, and as *able* to be in the world. In lapsing, the flight from not-being-at-home tries to become homely in the world but can never entirely escape its unhomeliness. This is why such a mode of disposedness can surface at any time.

> Dread individuates and so discloses being-situate as a "solus ipse". But this existential "solipsism" so little transposes an isolated subject-thing into the innocuous void of a worldless occurrence, that in an extreme sense it brings being-situate precisely

> before its world as world and with that brings itself before itself as being-in-the-world. (SZ 188)

Thus, dread discloses that the concrete individuality of the human situation is its structural incompleteness. Being-situate is being-in-the-world as its appropriate factical ability-to-be. It would not be being-situate without world, and thus lapsing always belongs to it. In everydayness, we do not even "see" the lapsing, because we take being-possible in terms of the innerworldish. What fundamental disposedness shows is that lapsing is only possible insofar as we are always individuated cast ability-to-be, i.e., existential-factical.

Care

We are finally in a position to grasp the structure of the being of being-situate as a totality, which Heidegger calls *care* [*Sorge*]. This is the final aspect of structural incompleteness that Heidegger articulates. Care is the way the human situation is towards what it "makes of" itself. In encountering useful things, they are dealt with or taken care of, in dealing with the matters at hand. In encountering others, they are *given* care (in both positive and negative, or privative, senses). The care for itself of the human situation encompasses caretaking and caregiving, but is not exhausted by them in being concerned with how it itself is and is "getting along". As Heidegger reiterates throughout BT, "the human situation is a being that in its being goes about its being" (e.g., SZ 12, 42). The point of the analytic, then, is to get at how being-situate "has" access to its own being, in being it, and from this to work out the question of the meaning of being as *phronetic*, rather than technical, epistemic, or contemplative. This is possible because of the hermeneutic relation of philosophy to *life*. Up to this point, it has been a matter of framing the component parts of the being of being-situate in a way sufficient for fundamental ontology. Yet Heidegger's aim is not to provide a complete

ontology of the human being. Thus, the analysis has been working towards an explication of the ways of being of being-situate that make being-in-the-world itself *intelligible*, rather than complete. What needs to be shown, then, is how this totality *is* a unified structure.

The analysis of dread elucidates the totality of being-situate as existing, factical and lapsing. Thus the structural whole of being-situate is constituted by these moments.

> Dreading [*Das Sichängsten*] as disposedness is a way of being-in-the-world; the before-which of dread is cast being-in-the-world; the about-which of dread is ability-to-be-in-the-world. The complete phenomenon of dread thereby shows being-situate as factically existing being-in-the-world. The fundamental ontological characteristics of this being [*Seienden*] are existentiality, facticity, and to-be-lapsing [*Verfallensein*]. (SZ 191)

Dread discloses that existentiality, facticity and lapsing belong together as the unity of the being of the human situation. None of these existentials can be reduced to any of the others, nor can each be the existential it is without the others. They are co-dependent or equioriginary. There is no existentiality without factical lapsing. There is no lapsing without existential facticity.

The analysis of being-in shows how our situational immanence (the "facts" that constitute us) *is* our transcendence of the situation (in being-towards those very facts). As transcendent, I am always "beyond" or "ahead" of my factical immanence:

> Being-situate in its being is *ahead of* [*vorweg*] itself in each case. Being-situate is always already "beyond itself," not as a comportment towards other beings that it is *not*, but rather as being towards ability-to-be, which it itself is. We grasp this structure of being of the essential "it goes about" as the *being-ahead-of-itself* of being-situate. (SZ 191-192)

"Being ahead of itself" is not a *theoretical* comportment towards the "empirical" self, for this would be a comportment towards a being that the theoretical comportment itself is not. Rather, it is a phronetic or insightful comportment that is self-referential or recursive. In being-possible, I am directed towards the possibilities of myself that constitute me as I *already* am. My ability-to-be discloses that and how I already am.

Thus, "[b]eing-ahead of itself means, completely grasped: *ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world*" (SZ 192). Correlatively, however, my facticity—that and how I already am—makes existentiality possible. I can only exist—be directed towards my possibilities, in being some way or other. "Existing is always factical. Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity" (SZ 192). Being-ahead, then, indicates the movedness of the human situation in relation to, and as constitutive of, what it already *is*.

Care, as the being of being-situate, is articulated as: "ahead-of-itself-already-being-in-(the-world) as being near (innerworldishly encountering beings)" (SZ 192). This is the "formal existential totality of the ontological structure of the human situation" that is the *sense* of care (SZ 192). Care is the movedness of being-in-the-world, i.e., *how* it goes about its being. It articulates the structural incompleteness of the human situation, in terms of the skillful making involved in being the kind of being that encounters beings in the world, i.e., through the movedness of caretaking and caregiving.

Skillful making points to insightful doing

Despite this formal indication of the structure of the human situation, it is not evident how this is a unitary totality, i.e., how the equioriginary moments are *cohesive*. Such cohesion cannot be found in skillful making, i.e., in caretaking and caregiving, because in such cases the end is not a part of the movedness. Rather, they are "technical" in the sense that they refer to what is to be produced (i.e., a certain state of affairs). But caretaking and caregiving always refer to a way to be of the human situation itself. The cohesiveness of the human situation lies not in skillful making, but rather in *insightful doing*. The end or goal of insightful doing is part of the doing itself, and therefore always involves a *dynamic incompleteness* of the human situation as the

way it enacts its finitude. This involves being-towards-death as the disclosedness of understanding towards being-in-the-world as such. That is, whereas understanding in everydayness concerns factical possibilities that are not individuating (e.g., finishing *one's* thesis, getting *one's* Ph.D.), understanding that corresponds to dread as fundamental disposedness does concern individuation. It concerns the possibility that radically individuates me, namely the possibility of death.

Dynamic incompleteness and insightful doing

The cohesion of the human situation in being towards death

With the being of the human situation phenomenologically elucidated as care, the cohesion of the human situation becomes problematic. As concretely individual, the human situation (that each of us is) is a totality. But the structure of its *way* to be, i.e., its movedness as care, has been elucidated as fundamentally incomplete, since it consists primarily in possibilities rather than *actualities*.

> Care, which forms the totality of the structural whole of being-situate, evidently contradicts, according to its ontological sense, a possible being-a-whole of this being. (SZ 236)

How is the human situation to be grasped *as* a totality, if what is "ahead" is not *actual*? It seems that there is something that both constitutes being-situate yet is always "outstanding" (SZ 236). In each case, at each particular instant, being-situate is not complete. "In the essence of being-situate lies...a *constant incompleteness* [*ständige Unabgeschlossenheit*]" (SZ 236). Constant incompleteness, as the constant enactment of possibilities, characterizes the human situation. When being-situate can no longer enact possibilities of itself, it has ceased to exist (SZ 243). The resolution to this apparent contradiction lies in the (existential) understanding of *death* as pure possibility (which does not, of course, mean explicit *cognition* thereof).

Death is not an "end" in the sense of completion or fulfilment. The human situation is not completed in death, but rather negated. Death as existential is a way of being. As "being towards the end" [*Sein zum Ende*] rather than "being-*at*-an-end" [*Zu-Ende-sein*], death is always a possibility (SZ 246). In each particular while there is the possibility of *not* being. The existential analysis of death concerns this most extreme possibility. It pertains to *dying* [*Sterben*] as constitutive of being-situate, rather than death as an occurrence. Ontologically, dying is "the *way of being* in which being-situate *is toward* its death" (SZ 247), which is different from the end of life. Living things *perish* [*Verenden*], but only being-situate dies in an ontological sense (SZ 247).

Death is distinctive as a possibility because it is the possibility of *impossibility.* Enactment of this possibility means the end of all possibilities. It is "the possibility of the impossibility of existence in general" (SZ 262), which thus belongs to, and is *constitutive* of, existence. "Death is a way to be that being-situate takes over as soon as it is" (SZ 245). This is quite different from the everyday representation of death, i.e., that "one also dies sometime, but for the present not yet" (SZ 255). Such representation takes death as if it were *not yet* a possibility, and will only be so at some future time.

In the enactment of a factical possibility, such as reading a book, some other possibility becomes impossible, such as *not* reading that book. Nevertheless, there are other factical possibilities that still constitute being-situate. With death, however, there are no more possibilities. Furthermore, death is not a possibility that we *might* enact one day, but perhaps will never do so. Although indeterminate, death is ontologically certain. This is not the *empirical* certainty that being-situate has always been observed to die eventually, because there is no such empirical observation of being-situate. Being-situate is not an object, or an instance of something. Others are not being-situate, but rather being-situate-with. Therefore, the death of others cannot serve as a way to

grasp my own death, because the death of others is a matter of being-with, not of existence, which is always *mine*. Others also die, which affects my possibilities, since I can no longer encounter them. But their death does not disclose to me the impossibility of *my own* existence.

In everydayness, Everyman says that death is certain. "Death is an undeniable 'fact of experience' " (SZ 257). Yet the death referred to by Everyman is not *my* death, but the death of others. "All human beings 'die,' so far as one knows" (SZ 257). This kind of certainty is not the ontological certainty of death as *my* death, which no one can take away from me by standing in for me, and which is therefore unsurpassable [*unüberholbar*]. If death is a possibility of being-situate, then it is a way of being which is in each case mine. And as the most extreme possibility, as the possibility of the impossibility of existence, in no way can it be surpassed or outstripped, i.e., got round or gone beyond. For being-situate, then, "being toward death [is] the most proper, nonrelational and unsurpassable ability-to-be" (SZ 255).

Death is distinctive in yet another way. Being toward possibilities as our ability-to-be concerns the enactment of the possible, in which the possibility is "annihilated" (SZ 259). However, if being toward death meant enacting death as a possibility, it would entail the annihilation of the ground of being toward death, i.e., the human situation itself. Thus, being toward death must be a way of being towards the possibility of death as pure possibility, *not* as the enactment of it. The way the human situation is its death is unlike the way it frames its being as possibilities it can enact. Rather, "the possibility must not be weakened, must be understood *as possibility*, must be cultivated *as possibility*, and must be endured *as possibility* in the comportment towards it" (SZ 261). Death is the pure possibility of being-situate, which discloses that, as the being it is, it is always being-possible.

In being towards possibilities in skillful making, we expect [*erwarten*] their realization. The attitude or relation we have to these possibilities is to expect them in their actuality. For example, when I am considering the possibility of purchasing a new synthesizer next month, I do not dwell on the possibility *as* a possibility, but instead imagine the actuality of having the instrument, using it, how it will change the music I play with others, and so on. I look forward to it in the sense of it being real for me.

> All expecting understands and "has" its possible things with regard to if and when and how it will be fully actually on hand. Expecting is not only occasionally a looking away from the possible to its possible actualization, but rather is essentially *a waiting for this*. Even in expecting lies a leaping from the possible and gaining a footing in the actual, for which the expected is expected. (SZ 262)

However, death as a possibility cannot be expected as an actuality. The relation to death is not expecting, but "*fore-running the possibility* [*Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit*]" of it (SZ 262). In fore-running, death is held open in its possibility *as* possibility. Because there is no realization of death, we stand in relation to it as pure possibility, rather than to something possible which will one day be replaced by its actuality (or not). Expecting covers up the character of possibility itself, and thus how being-situate *is* being-possible. With the possibility of death, however, there are no "details" of its actualization to be had. Embracing this possibility brings us face-to-face with being-possible.

> According to its essence, this possibility offers no support for being intent on something, "depicting" its possible actuality and on that account forgetting the possibility. Being toward death as fore-running the possibility first and foremost *makes* this possibility *possible* and makes it free as such. (SZ 262)

Being-situate fore-runs because it has the structure of being-ahead-of-itself, i.e., being-possible, which both makes fore-running possible and is brought to light *in* fore-running.

> Being toward death is fore-running an ability-to-be *of that* being whose way of being is itself fore-running. In the fore-run unveiling of this ability-to-be, being-situate discloses itself to itself with regard to its most extreme possibility. (SZ 262)

To fore-run the possibility of my death means to understand myself in and as my most

extreme possibility, which can *only* be mine. Although others die, no-one can do *my* dying *for* me. This ability-to-be discloses that the human situation can only go about its being *as* itself, i.e., as concretely individual. Thus, death as a possibility discloses "the possibility of *appropriate existence* [*eigentlicher Existenz*]" (SZ 263). In everydayness, possibilities are understood in terms of caretaking and caregiving, just as they are by others. Such possibilities and their enactment do not disclose that being-situate has to be them, nor that it *can* be them. Rather, they cover this up by concealing being-possible.

Thus, the possibility of impossibility discloses being-situate as equioriginarily existential, factical and lapsing. The cohesion of the human situation lies in the nonrelational possibility of death, which discloses the "there".

> The nonrelationalness of death understood in fore-running individuates being-situate upon itself. This individuation is a way of the disclosing of the "there" for existence. (SZ 263)

Forerunning death, as a way of understanding, discloses how the human situation is individuated as being-possible, i.e., in existing. In such individuation, we are pulled out of absorption in everydayness and understanding possibilities in terms of Everyman.

> [Individuation] makes evident that every being at the caretaken and each being-with with others breaks down when going about the most proper ability-to-be. Being-situate can only be itself as appropriate, then, when it makes that possible for itself of its own accord. (SZ 263)

Individuation does not mean isolation from things taken care of and others given care. Rather, individuation discloses relatedness to things and others. It *is* the disclosedness of this incompleteness. Only as concretely individual is being-situate constituted as a cohesive incompleteness.

> The break-down of caretaking and caregiving, however, in no way means a cutting off of these ways of being-situate from its appropriate being-self. As essential structures of the constitution of being-situate they are part of the condition of the possibility for existence in general. Being-situate is itself as appropriate only insofar as it fore-casts itself *as* caretaking being near . . . and caregiving being with . . . primarily upon its most proper ability-to-be, rather than upon the possibility of the Everyman-self. (SZ 263)

Being towards death discloses this possibility of being-situate, that it can (actively, transitively) *be* its possibilities, which constitutes being-situate as being-a-whole. The analysis of death is aimed at showing how being-situate discloses itself to itself as being-possible, rather than simply taking itself in terms of the factical possibilities which in each case it has. In this disclosedness, the human situation is "being free" for its possibilities (SZ 191, 193), in *becoming* free for them in being-possible.

> The fore-running becoming-free *for* one's own death frees from lostness in the possibilities which push themselves forward by chance, so that it first lets the factical possibilities that lie before the unsurpassable possibility be appropriately understood and chosen. (SZ 264)

So long as we exist in a way which occludes our being-possible, we are not free for possibilities. Although factical possibilities always constitute the human situation, what is in question is the *way* we *have* them, i.e., how we *are* our possibilities. With the occlusion of being-possible in everydayness, possibilities are had as not-yet actualities that pertain to Everyman. Such possibilities get taken as *external*, i.e., as already actual but just not yet, and therefore as something that does not constitute me. The difference between appropriate and inappropriate being-itself lies in how we are our possibilities:

> Fore-running discloses to existence that its most extreme possibility is giving itself up, and shatters every insistence upon the existence attained in each case. Being-situate preserves itself, in fore-running, from falling back behind itself and its understood ability-to-be, and from "becoming too old for its victories" (Nietzsche). (SZ 264)

In lapsing, not only do I misunderstand myself, I also fail to recognize that others too are being their possibilities in being-situate-with with me, i.e., that others are also beings that go about their being in their ability-to-be. The freedom of the finitude of my existence is also being free for others in the freedom of their finitude. "As nonrelational possibility death individuates, but only, as unsurpassable, in order to make being-situate as being-with understanding of the ability-to-be of others" (SZ 264).

Being-towards-death is the dynamic incompleteness of *mortality*. Mortal existence is the how of being-situate that discloses it *as* its possibilities, rather than its actuality at the particular while. As mortal, we are disclosers. The ability-to-be the there as which we encounter things, others, and ourselves is our mortal finitude, in which concrete individuality arises.

Conscience and resolvedness

Being towards death is insight into being-possible. However, because death is the possibility of impossibility, it cannot be enacted *as* a possibility. What kind of movedness belongs to being towards death, then? That is, what is the enactment character of the annihilation of possibilities? Heidegger argues that this can be phenomenally shown by *conscience*, which is the phronetic insight into the enactment of possibilities as the movedness of the human situation, i.e., as care. Whereas the analysis of being toward death demonstrates the totality of being-situate as the unified structure of care (i.e., the ability-to-be-a-whole [*Ganzseinkönnen*]), the analysis of conscience aims to show how this is not a "fantastical demand" (SZ 266) or a construction, but something that we *can* be, i.e., that it is an *appropriate* ability-to-be. It aims to show that being-possible is something that we can enact. That is, conscience attests to the "existentiell modification of Everyman" (SZ 267) (the inappropriate way of being-self) to being myself as being-possible (the appropriate way of being-self). Conscience can also be understood as the discursive articulation of individuation.[26]

The call of conscience

Is there a phenomenal aspect of the human situation that shows how being-situate *can be* a self in an appropriate way, rather than the inappropriate way of being-

26. Cf. Crowell, "Subjectivity", *op. cit.*, pp. 442-446.

an-Everyman-self? That is, is there a phenomenal aspect that attests to "an appropriate *ability-to-be-itself* [*Selbstseinkönnen*]" (SZ 267)? Can this be brought to expression? That is, is there a discursive articulation of mortal finitude that the analytic can "repeat"? Mostly, being-situate is not "I myself" but the Everyman-self. "Self", however, does not indicate an object on hand, the properties of which can be ascertained by just looking at it. Rather, the "selfhood [*Selbstheit*] of being-situate was formally determined as a *way of existing*" (SZ 267). What is at issue here is how being-possible as a way of being can be elucidated. The Everyman-self showed how being-possible becomes occluded:

> Everyman has always removed the grasping of these possibilities-of-being from the human situation. Everyman conceals even the silently enacted disburdening from it, of the explicit *choice* of these possibilities. (SZ 268)

An appropriate ability-to-be-itself in explicitly choosing possibilities does not mean that *all* factical possibilities must be chosen, however, for this would mean that lapsing is *not* constitutive of the human situation. It would mean that being-situate could be *complete in itself*. And as has been discussed, constitutive possibility means that being-situate is always incomplete.

The phenomenon of conscience shows just such an appropriate ability-to-be, Heidegger argues. Heidegger's elucidation of conscience draws upon his analysis of φρόνησις (as discussed in ch. 4). Conscience discloses an ontological "fault" [*Schuld*] in being-situate, i.e., that it is not the *ground* of its castness. And because castness always also involves framing its being as possibilities, possibilities are therefore enacted on the basis of *not being* the ground for them. The determinateness of our worldish possibilities comes from our castness, i.e., I have the possibilities that I do in being cast as I am. But such castness is not something I can "produce" or enact, but is always how I *already* find myself to be. In lapsing, this indebtedness is occluded,

because possibilities are understood in terms of matters taken care of (making lunch, doing the laundry, writing a thesis), which arise in being open to them and so becoming absorbed by them.

Heidegger's argument is that I can only be a self insofar as I can be my possibilities in an appropriate way, which means having to be the cast being I always already am, i.e., having to frame possibilities on the basis of the factical. In lapsing, this self-relation is covered up, because the possibilities I frame are given to me. The ontological basis of being-possible is that in being the there which discloses world I am my facticity, the "that it is and has to be (it)". If I only take my possibilities as mine "circumstantially", i.e., from the world, I do not *grasp* my individuality, but see myself as "just like the others". Conscience is the counter-movement to such lapsing, and "manifests itself as the call of care" (SZ 277), or the insight that belongs to the movedness of being-situate as a whole. It brings me out of lapsing, in which I understand my possibilities as an Everyman-self, back to my facticity, which is not something that I can choose, yet have to be. *Being* my facticity means choosing it as what has *not* been chosen. It means "[t]o make up for a choice [*Nachholen einer Wahl*]" (SZ 268).

In this ontological sense, conscience is not a "court of judgement", or a voice that reprimands and warns by providing information about past or future actions in an "interior dialogue" we have with ourselves. The call of conscience says nothing. It is a form of discourse in the mode of reticence or keeping silent, which silently calls back to facticity. The "that it is and has to be it" is something being-situate cannot ground by being it, because the "that it is" is *a priori* for *all* enactment. Having to be it, however, means that it is a possibility and can be framed as appropriate ability-to-be. It is existentiality that "hears" the silent call of conscience, and is brought back to facticity,

such that it *can be* the "that" which it in each case is. Conscience discloses the incompleteness of the human situation *as* the situation in which I always have to act. That is, it discloses what Heidegger formally indicates as "resolvedness" [*Entschlossenheit*], which is "a distinguished mode of the disclosedness of being-situate" (SZ 297). Resolvedness is a gathering up of what is dis-closed [*er-schlossen*]. The transcendence of the resolvedness of conscience is the immanence of disclosedness.

Heidegger articulates resolvedness as "the reticent, ready for dread framing itself as the most proper being-faulty [*Schuldigsein*]" (SZ 297). Being-faulty involves two ways of being: (i) not being the ground of facticity, and (ii) being the ground for not choosing some possibilities by choosing others. These are fundamental forms of our essential incompleteness, i.e., that in each case we have to be as we are already cast, and that we lay ourselves out *on* this basis. This ontological fault, therefore, does not mean a lack of something or a failure to attain some ideal as a way of being that could be rectified (SZ 285). Rather, it is constitutive of the human situation. Only because of this "fault" is there an ability-to-be, because only as cast can we frame possibilities.

Resolvedness is constituted by "readiness for dread" because dread discloses "the uncanniness of [being-situate's] individuation" in framing possibilities (SZ 295-296). Resolvedness is "reticent" because the call of conscience does not give any determinate content about the possibilities to be enacted. That is, conscience does not supply possibilities for existence from some autonomous source. Conscience, understood ontologically, is *formal*. Ontologically, what is at issue is being-possible, not determinate, factical possibilities.

Resolvedness, then, is not *decisionistic*. It is rather the insight in which possibilities first become manifest *as* the possibilities they are, i.e., as determinate ways

of being in the particular situation.

> It would be a complete misunderstanding of the phenomenon of resolvedness if one wanted to suppose that it were simply a receptive grasping of presented and recommended possibilities. *The resolution is precisely the disclosing framing and determining of the factical possibility of the particular while. Indeterminateness*, which characterises each factical-cast ability-to-be of Da-sein, *belongs* necessarily to resolvedness. Resolvedness is sure of itself only as a resolution. But the *existentiell indeterminateness* of resolvedness, that at any time first determines itself in the resolution, nevertheless has its *existential determinateness*. (SZ 298)

Resolvedness is how factical possibilities are seen *as* possibilities. In resolvedness the situation comes into "focus" in terms of framing our possibilities as a resolution. Only insofar as we frame disclosively *are* there factical possibilities. But only in being resolved are we our ability-to-be as cast framing. Resolvedness not only focuses the "external" situation, but also brings *me* into focus, to be the being that I am and have to be in being towards my possibilities.

Furthermore, resolvedness is the "sight" in which we see ourselves as the beings that we are. Understanding is the existential constituent of our being such that we take our being as possibilities. In understanding, we frame [*entwerfen auf*] our being in terms of the concrete possibilities we have. Resolvedness articulates disposed understanding itself. In making possibilities manifest, it makes manifest to me that: (i) I have to be these possibilities; (ii) I cannot choose not to have these possibilities; (iii) in choosing, I have to choose some possibilities and not others; and (iv) this is what constitutes my being. Phronetic insight into the human situation discloses the sense of the being of this being as it always already *is*. It does not disclose being-itself in terms of *another* set of possibilities hitherto concealed.

The counter-concept to resolvedness is unresolvedness [*Unentschlossenheit*], which "only expresses the phenomenon that was interpreted as being-surrendered to the prevailing expositedness of Everyman" (SZ 299), i.e., to everyday being-an-other. In the unresolvedness of the Everyman-self, no-one resolves, because possibilities are pre-

given in a public way. Such possibilities are somehow always already decided (e.g., as "what is done" or "the done thing"). And we are always lapsing into unresolvedness in caretaking and caregiving. Resolvedness is not a permanent change in our way of being, like a technical achievement or product that can be actualized once and for all. The resolvedness of conscience is not the realization of a predetermined self, but rather the phronetic insight that we are always ever "selving". "Being-situate is in each case already and soon perhaps again in unresolvedness" (SZ 299). Resolvedness is a way of being-itself in be*ing* the incompleteness of the human situation, which is for the most part covered up. Being unresolved, then, does not mean indecision or "a being-burdened with inhibitions" (SZ 299).

As phronetic insight, resolvedness attests that the human situation *can be* a totality. Lapsing occludes the disclosedness of incompleteness, i.e., *being* the "there", which is only possible as being-possible. Being-possible, in turn, is the way of being of finitude or incompleteness, which is constituted by the fault of having to be what we already are. This is the "situation" [*Situation*] resolvedness brings us into as "a distinctive mode of the disclosedness of being-situate" (SZ 297). "The situation is the there [*Da*], in each case disclosed in resolvedness, as which the existing being is there [*da*]" (SZ 299). That is, the situation is factical existence. Heidegger echoes Dilthey in arguing that we cannot "get behind" our facticity to make it something which we produce or cause.

> Existingly [being-situate] never comes back behind its castness such that it could first release this "that it is and has to be" in each case expressly from *its being-itself* and lead it into the there. (SZ 284)

In conclusion, what Heidegger wants to demonstrate with the analysis of conscience is that there is a way of being which shows that we *can* be our possibilities, that is, we can be as being-possible, and that being-possible manifests itself to us in an

ontic-existentiell way. In being-possible, we are ourselves in an appropriate way, rather than in the inappropriate understanding of our possibilities in terms of the caretaken and caregiven. This does not mean, however, that in the resolvedness which conscience occasions we are "interiorized" or separated in some way from the world. Being-situate *is* being-in-the-world, and thus to be this being is in each case also always to be caretaking and caregiving. What conscience attests to, rather, is that we are also appropriate selves. Appropriately being-itself does not mean finding a set of factical possibilities different from those we find as Everyman. Instead, it means grasping being-possible. This is what unifies the factical-existentially lapsing constitution of our being as care. Being resolved to have a conscience means being our ontological fault or incompleteness.

Being-itself as appropriately being-a-whole

Forerunning concerns ability-to-be-a-whole, whereas resolvedness concerns appropriate ability-to-be. It has not yet been clarified how and why these two are connected. "How should both phenomena be brought together?" (SZ 302). There seem to be two different senses of incompleteness at issue here. Simply putting the two together runs the risk of "an intolerable, completely unphenomenological construction" (SZ 302), i.e., one which has no phenomenal basis. What phenomenon shows that dynamic and structural incompleteness belong together?

With every ability-to-be of being-situate, death is *also* always a possibility. Therefore, being resolved for any factical possibility involves being resolved for this most proper possibility. This possibility "lies in the offing [*vorgelagert ist*] for every factical ability-to-be of being-situate and as such enters more or less undisguisedly into each factically seized ability-to-be of being-situate" (SZ 302). Factical possibilities always vary in enactment, and therefore do not themselves allow for the *certainty* of

appropriately being-itself. Only in resolvedness towards the possibility of death can I be certain of appropriateness. The "most proper, appropriate possibility" of resolvedness is to be found in "forerunning resolvedness" [*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*] (SZ 302). Forerunning resolvedness, then, is the ontological sense of the "self-constancy" [*Selbst-ständigkeit*] (SZ 322) of being-situate. Being-situate is not constant as a substance or an object, which is self-contained and thus (constantly) self-identical. The movedness of the human situation is to change its "identity" in the enactment of possibilities that then are how we are cast. Constancy thus arises in and from existing. In being resolved for the concrete situation of acting, I am also in each case implicitly resolved for the possibility of my impossibility. Being-possible in this way, which cannot be expected but has to be forerun, is how the human situation is a whole. Thus, being-itself is an appropriate ability-to-be-a-whole, which is what care fundamentally means. As a dynamically and structurally incomplete being, being-situate is a unified totality not as a substance, but in *being-itself* in the enactment of its mortal finitude. Being it, i.e., existing, unifies the structural moments of care. Mortal finitude is how being-situate can be related to things and others; being-itself discloses being-situate to what encounters.

Thus, what Heidegger elucidates in his phenomenological investigation is an inversion of the priority traditionally accorded to the self. The self is not the ground of the factical possibilities which pertain to me, but is *grounded in* them. Rather than grounding the constancy of the human situation, the self arises *as* the constancy of being-possible:

> Care does not need a foundation in a self, but rather existentiality as constitutive of care gives the ontological constitution of the self-constancy of being-situate, to which, corresponding to the complete structural content of care, factical being-lapsing in unself-constancy belongs. (SZ 323)

The worldless I, self, or subject of the metaphysical tradition has no phenomenal basis,

i.e., it is not found in experience. As such, it is an ontologically inadequate construction. The lapsing constitutive of being-situate gives rise to this inadequate ontology, because it covers up the existential facticity that makes lapsing possible. And the genesis of the theoretical attitude lies in lapsing (SZ 356).

Sense

Although the being of the human situation has been elucidated as care, it is unclear what makes the totality of care possible. How are the equioriginary structural moments of care a whole? This question refers to the *sense* [*Sinn*] of care.

> Sense signifies the upon-which-toward-which [*das Woraufhin*] of the primary frame, from out of which something, as that which it is, can be conceived in its possibility. (SZ 324)

Taking something *as* something means grasping it as its possibilities, e.g., what it is good for or what can be done with it (for handy things) and how someone is and how to be with her (for others). The sense of a handy thing is its significance, as the referential totality of its appliance for some sake of myself. For example, the sense of an egg is its referential totality (in the kitchen, say) in which it is appliant (to the frying pan) for the sake of my feeding myself. The upon-which-toward-which is my hunger, which discloses the egg in its possibility to feed me. The egg can be taken as what it is (a source of nourishment) *because* of its sense, which need not be explicit. Indeed, the sense of the handy is mostly recessive. That is, if I am hungry and decide to make an omelette, that which makes it possible for me to take the egg as "good for making omelettes" (i.e., its appliance) is not explicit. However, it is possible to inquire into the sense of this egg. This involves "[e]xposing the upon-which-toward-which of a frame", which "means disclosing what makes the framed possible" (SZ 324).

The ontological sense of care, then, is what is framed *upon* and *toward* in the originary frame that is care. Sense is what makes care *possible*, both as the being of

being-situate and as the existential interpretation of this being as care:

> Setting out the sense of care then says: following up the underlying and guiding frame [*Entwurf*] of the originary existential interpretation of being-situate so that its upon-which-toward-which becomes visible in what is framed. (SZ 324)

To expose the sense of care is to show what makes possible (or possibilizes) care *as* this existential interpretation of the being of the human situation:

> The framed is the being of the human situation and is disclosed in what constitutes it as an appropriate ability-to-be-a-whole. The upon-which-toward-which of this frame, of this disclosed being [*Sein*] so constituted, is that which itself possibilizes this constitution of being as care itself. (SZ 324)

Timeliness as the ontological sense of care

If the self-constancy of care happens in forerunning resolvedness, what is the ontological sense of care? In the articulation of the equioriginary moments of disposedness, understanding and lapsing, the disclosedness that is being-situate was elucidated as *already* being-in-the-world in disposedness, and being *ahead* of itself in understanding. In lapsing, being-situate gets caught up in everyday caretaking and caregiving, in which things and others encounter in their *presence*. Being already, being ahead, and the presence of beings encountered, all of which are equioriginarily constitutive of being-in, indicate that the ontological sense of care has to do with *time*. Forerunning resolvedness discloses timeliness [*Zeitlichkeit*] as the sense of care. "Timeliness is experienced as phenomenally originary in the appropriate being-a-whole of being-situate, in the phenomenon of forerunning resolvedness" (SZ 304).

As the sense of care, timeliness "does not correspond to what is accessible to the vulgar understanding as 'time' " (SZ 304), i.e., the linear sequence of nows dated as past (no longer now), present (now), and future (not yet now). Rather, originary timeliness is the way that being-situate *happens* or *is* itself actively and transitively. In the phenomenon of forerunning resolvedness, what is revealed is "a distinctive mode" of timeliness that is covered up in everydayness. In forerunning resolvedness,

timeliness gets revealed as originary (or originative), as that which "can *generate* [or "bring about", *zeitigen*] itself in various possibilities and various ways" (SZ 304).

Timeliness is neither objective nor subjective. It is not something on hand that we encounter like an innerworldish being, nor is it a product or construct of an isolated self. Heidegger's de-substantialization of the self means that the self is originat*ed* rather than originat*ing*. The focus is on *being* a self, rather than being a *self*. And, concomitantly, it is *possibility*, rather than actuality, which has ontological priority. The generative power of timeliness, then, has to be understood in terms of possibility. Timeliness *possibilizes*, and does so in the form of various possibilities of itself. These possibilities are the ontological ground for the possibilities of being-situate.

The sense of care, then, is what makes care possible as the movedness of being-situate. This is equally what makes "the originary existential interpretation of the human situation" possible (SZ 324). Insofar as this elucidation has expounded the human situation, the sense of this being is not something external to it, but is the understanding which belongs to the exposition itself. "The sense of being of the human situation is not a free-floating other and 'outside' of itself, but rather the self-understanding human situation itself" (SZ 325).

Expounding the sense of the being of being-situate requires interpreting forerunning resolvedness in terms of what makes it possible. Forerunning resolvedness is "the *being toward* the most proper distinctive ability-to-be" (SZ 325), which is only possible in that "being-situate *can* approach itself *at all* in its most proper possibility and endure the possibility in this being-able-to-approach-itself [*Sich-auf-sich-zukommen-lassen*] as possibility" (SZ 326), i.e., in that it "exists". Forerunning in an appropriate way means at each particular while being toward myself as *being* this most proper possibility. I can never "rid" myself of this possibility, in the way that I can

release myself from a factical possibility (e.g., by enacting some other possibility).

As long as I exist, I have to endure the possibility of my death *as* a possibility, because this is the only way in which I *can* be towards death, no matter how imminent it is. Mortality is an *approaching* myself, rather than a coinciding with myself. Wholeness and self-constancy are constituted by this never-self-coincident approaching. Thus, in being able to approach myself, I am in each case ever towards the possibility that I simply have to endure. Approaching myself *is* enduring this possibility, and thus makes possible the ability-to-be. That is, ability-to-be does not have to do primarily with *what* I have achieved and thus already am, but with *how* I go about my being and thus keep on becoming what I am.[27] Whatever my factical possibilities are, they are mine only insofar as I can approach myself, i.e., can be toward myself as being-possible. Being-possible itself, however, does not have to do with what is factical (as what I have done, become, been, etc.), but with how I can enact my possibilities.

Heidegger formally indicates the sense of "being-able-to-approach-itself" (in enduring the possibility of death) as *Zukunft* and *zukünftig* (usually inadequately translated as "future" and "futural"), but originary timeliness and its moments have nothing to do with time as ordinarily understood. *Zukunft* means what makes possible being towards ourselves as the incompleteness that constitutes us, i.e., the modality of *possibility* rather than actuality. Being incomplete means being toward what I am not but can be, i.e., towards the dynamics of my own, ever ongoing transformation. This is the sense of "being-able-to-approach-myself": becoming what I already am. *Zu-kunft* means the "coming to" that I ever am, i.e., it means "becoming."[28]

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27. Graeme Nicholson has explored this issue with great clarity. Cf. *Illustrations of Being: Drawing upon Heidegger and Metaphysics*, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, 1992, and "The constitution of our being", *American Philosophical Quarterly* , vol. 36, no. 3, 1999, pp. 165-187.

> The being-able-*to-approach* itself in the distinctive possibility is the originary phenomenon of *becoming* [*Zukunft*]..."Future" [»*Zukunft*«] here does not mean a Now, that, *not yet* become "actual," at one time first will be, but rather the coming [*Kunft*] in which being-situate approaches itself in its most proper ability-to-be. (SZ 325)

Zukunft, then, is not a state of affairs that is not yet actual, but rather the *way* in which being-situate approaches itself, i.e., the way it is toward itself *as* its ability-to-be. Ability-to-be means how the human situation goes about its being. Going about its being is not a state of affairs, but is rather the *movedness* of being-situate. It is the way that being-situate activates, enacts, or actualizes itself, out of and towards its factical possibilities. Such enacting is in each case a becoming, and it is only because being-situate *is* becoming (i.e., is ever incomplete) that forerunning is a possibility.

> The "in front of" [»*vor*«] and "ahead of" [»*vorweg*«] indicates becoming, as what in general first makes it possible that being-situate can so be that it goes *about* its ability-to-be. The self-forecasting upon the "for the sake of itself" grounded in becoming is an essential characteristic of *existentiality. Its primary sense is becoming*. (SZ 327)

Yet forerunning "makes being-situate *appropriately* becoming" (SZ 235), since forerunning is the way of being toward that which it is ever becoming, i.e., death.

Resolvedness, as the complement of forerunning in the appropriate ability-to-be-a-whole, indicates being-situate's way of being towards its ontological fault, i.e., that it can never be the ground (or origin) of its facticity. The way that I factically ever am is not something I can determine, but rather how I *find* myself to be. It is sheerly how I find myself, how I am ever cast into being who I am and have to be. My castness is something I have to "take over" without being the ground of it (i.e., without being able to choose otherwise). "Taking over of castness" means "appropriately *being* the human situation *as it in each case already was*" (SZ 325). Yet *being* the human

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28. This has been argued in great detail by Thomas Sheehan in various essays. Cf. Thomas Sheehan, "Time and Being", in C. Macann, ed., *Heidegger: Critical Assessments*, vol. 1, Routledge, London, 1992, pp. 29-67; "Heidegger's New Aspect: On *In-Sein*, *Zeitlichkeit*, and *The Genesis of Being and Time*", *Research in Phenomenology*, vol. 25, 1995, pp. 207-225; "*Das Gewesen*", in B. Babich, ed., *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire*, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1995, pp. 157-177; "Geschichtlichkeit/Ereignis/ Kehre", *Existentia (Meletai Sophias)*, vol. XI, no. 3-4, 2001, pp. 241-251.

situation means approaching oneself, which means becoming. Approaching oneself "as it in each case already was" means being able to be one's "been" [»*Gewesen*«] (SZ 326). My "been" is how I already ever am, i.e., it is my "alreadiness" [*Gewesenheit*]. In order to take over my castness I have to be able to approach myself as cast, i.e., become my alreadiness.

> The taking over of castness is only so possible, however, that the becoming being-situate can *be* its most proper "as it in each case was," that is, its "been" [»*Gewesen*«]. Only provided that being-situate in general *is* as I *am*-already [***bin***-*gewesen*], can it becomingly so approach itself, so that it comes-*back*. Appropriately becoming, being-situate *is* appropriately *already* [*Gewesen*]. Forerunning the most extreme and most proper possibility is the understandingly coming-back to the most proper alreadiness. Being-situate can only appropriately *be* already provided that it is becoming. Alreadiness arises in a certain way from becoming. (SZ 325-326)

Alreadiness arises from becoming, because it is something that I can only be in an appropriate way in approaching myself. Approaching myself means being my self in becoming it, i.e., as what I can and have to be. What I have to be is what I already am, i.e., my alreadiness. As becoming, I cannot avoid my alreadiness, as if it were "over and done with". Nor do I simply carry it around with me, as something that I cannot do anything with (and might rather like to forget). It is who and how I ever am, although not as a determinative set of "facts" about me. In becoming, my alreadiness is dynamic, too.

Alreadiness-becoming that makes possible forerunning resolvedness is therefore what makes possible the disclosedness of "the situation of the there at the particular while" (SZ 326). The disclosedness of the there is the disclosedness of being-situate *as* being-in-the-world, encountering the things it takes care of. We take care of things in the way we encounter them, i.e., *as* the things that they are. Caretaking is always characterized by significance, such that the things that encounter are encountered *as* the things they are in reference to a "for-the-sake-of". As significant, handy things are related to my factical possibilities. I can become in this or that way

according to the factical possibilities which I already am. Thus, alreadiness-becoming *brings* the handy things to encounter as the things they are. Heidegger calls this "a *making present* [*Gegenwärtigen*]" of handy beings (SZ 326). All caretaking is an encountering that makes present. "Only as the *present* [*Gegenwart*] in the sense of making present can resolvedness be what it is: the undisguised letting-encounter of that which it actingly grasps" (SZ 326).

The three components of originary timeliness, then, are alreadiness, becoming, and making present, which are the sense of the existentials of facticity, existentiality, and lapsing. Alreadiness and becoming are mutually implicated dimensions or "ecstasies" [*Ekstasen*] (SZ 329) of originary timeliness that make possible the encounter with innerworldish beings. These ecstasies are the sense of being the disclosedness of the there, as which innerworldish beings encounter or come-to-presence [*anwest*]. The encountering of the innerworldish, then, is not the confrontation of the isolated subject by an isolated object as hitherto unrelated. Being-situate is the *site* or *locale* for encountering, and thus always already in relation to what encounters, even if this is in the form of "not knowing what to make of something". Our originary timeliness, as self-relatedness in the back-and-forth of alreadiness-becoming, gives the possibility of encounter, in making present what encounters. And this is what resolvedness clarifies:

> Becomingly coming back to itself, resolvedness brings itself making-presently into the situation. Alreadiness arises from becoming, such that becoming that is already (better, is being already) releases the present from itself. This phenomenon that is unitary in such a way as being-already-making-present becoming we call *timeliness*. Only if being-situate is determined as timeliness does it make possible for itself the characterized appropriate ability-to-be-a-whole of forerunning resolvedness. *Timeliness reveals itself as the sense of appropriate care*. (SZ 326)

Timeliness is the unifying sense of the structure of care. That structure was articulated as ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as being near (innerworldishly encountering beings). The sense of this structure (i.e., what makes it possible) is the

grounding of being-ahead-of-itself in becoming, of already-being-in in alreadiness, and of being near in making present. None of these indications have the meanings found in the ordinary understanding of time. "Ahead" does not mean "not-yet-now, but later," and "already" does not mean "no-longer-now, but earlier" (SZ 327). Understood in this way, "care would then be conceived as a being that occurs and runs off 'in time'," which would mean that being-situate's way of being would "turn into something *on hand*" (SZ 327). That is, the chronological or chronometrical sense of time refers to *objects* that are conceptualized as being "in" time.

The human situation is not an object, because in its being it goes about its being, i.e., goes about *being* its being. *Being* the human situation is *relating* to my being. It is this self-relation, formally indicated as "being-in", that constitutes being the there. The sense of self-relation is quite different from the sense of on-handness, for it *constitutes* itself in becoming, or approaching itself as, how it already is. In approaching myself, I am not coming to myself "from the future" as the being which I am not yet, and the self which I approach is not "in the past," as the being which I am no longer. These two moments of originary timeliness, i.e., becoming and alreadiness, are not separate moments "in time," but are unitary. They are not *tenses* of our way of being, but *aspects*.

Timeliness and Aspect

As Heidegger indicates (SZ 85, 326, 349), "timeliness" does not refer to what is commonly understood by time at all.

> The terminological use of this expression must firstly be kept away from [or "shielded from," *fernhalten*] all meanings of "future," "past," and "present" that crowd in from the vulgar concept of time. (SZ 326)

Originary timeliness has nothing to do with the "before and after" or "earlier and later" of linear time. Rather, it pertains to the aprioricity inherent to being-situate. As

Heidegger indicates in his analysis of worldishness, this has to do with *aspect* and not tense.[29] "The in-each-case-already-having-let-apply that sets free for appliance is an *apriori* [*present*] *perfect*, that characterizes the manner of being of being-situate itself" (SZ 85). Heidegger further glosses this in a marginal note in which he refers to Aristotle's "τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, 'that which already was—being', 'the ever already beforehand holding sway [*Wesende*]', the been [*Gewesen*], the perfect" (SZ 85fn). This gloss indicates that being-situate's way to be involves a perfective *aspect*, not the present perfect *tense*.[30] The facticity of being-situate is not something completed in the past and lasting into the present, as the *present* perfect would indicate (and as *Gewesen* has usually been translated, i.e., as "having-been"). Rather, it is ever in a state of wholeness, so long as it is. That is, there may be a time before which being-situate was not, but there is no time when being-situate is, yet is not whole.[31] This wholeness is what Heidegger indicates with the term "*apriori* perfect". In each particular while I am already how I am, even though in going about my being I am *also* framing possibilities and thus becoming otherwise. The *apriori* perfect is not a static state, but a dynamic or kinetic wholeness. It is the wholeness or alreadiness which I am always, insofar as I exist, engaged in becoming.

The ordinary concept of time misleads us into conceiving timeliness in this tensed way, but this is simply to fail to grasp the phenomenon that Heidegger is laying bare. The ecstasies of originary timeliness have to be understood aspectually, for they refer to being-situate as it *ever* is. Alreadiness-becoming is the perfective-imperfective

29. Cf. Sheehan, "Heidegger's New Aspect", pp. 216-221; GBT 392-393, 417. The new translation of *Being and Time* completely misses this element of Heidegger's thinking at 349/320, where the German word for aspect, *Aktionsart*, is translated as "kinds of action".
30. As Sheehan points out, Greek has no perfect tense for "to be" [εἰμί] ("Heidegger's New Aspect", pp. 217-218).
31. Kisiel discusses the proliferation in BT of suffixes that indicate this perfective aspect (e.g., *-heit, -keit, -igkeit*) in the terms for the different existentials (e.g., significantness [*Bedeutsamkeit*], timeliness [*Zeitlichkeit*], movedness [*Bewegtheit*]), GBT 413-414.

sense of being-situate's being, as *both* complete and incomplete at each instant. It is in the tension between the perfective and the imperfective that the there arises, such that being-situate can encounter innerworldish beings. The perfective aspect of being-situate, its alreadiness, does not mean, then, how it *has been* (the present perfect *tense*), but rather how it is *always* its "beenness". The present perfect is a location in linear time. But the "beenness" of being-situate is a perfect aspect which obtains *at every instant* so long as being-situate exists. Thus it is *a priori* for becoming and making present. Alreadiness is the *a priori* perfect of the being of being-situate. It is the factical *a priori*.

The "ahead" and "already" that featured in the delineation of the structural moments of care indicate the timely sense of existentiality and facticity as becoming and alreadiness. However, there is no such indication given for lapsing, the other constitutive moment of care. The "near" [*bei*] of being near innerworldishly encountering things taken care of does not clearly have a timely sense, because making present arises from the alreadiness-becoming of timeliness. In becoming, being-situate comes back to its alreadiness, such that it can *be* its alreadiness as the factical possibilities it can frame in its ability-to-be. Only as already, however, can being-situate become, for without factical possibilities there is nothing to be able to be. Even though becoming has priority, it does not generate itself without alreadiness. Nor does alreadiness generate itself apart from becoming.

The generative timeliness of alreadiness-becoming, which corresponds to the essential structure of being-in as being the there, does not generate in a vacuum. Because being-situate is in each case "in the world", being-in, as the ontological-existential structure of *how* being-situate is in the world, always refers to the world. It is through being-in that being-situate *is* in its world as the there in which the encounter of

innerworldish beings takes place. Being-in is the structure which allows for encounter, yet there is no being-in without the world. Heidegger's non-substantialist, kinetic conception of being-situate subverts the conception of the self as an isolated entity. Thus, the sense of being-in as timeliness, i.e., alreadiness-becoming, is not separate from the world and the encounter of innerworldish beings. Rather, it is what makes such encounter possible, in that being-situate goes about its being in the becoming that brings it to its alreadiness by way of the things that encounter. In order to enact possibilities of myself, I must have the "means" to do so, such as a computer on which to write my thesis, an internet connection to exchange emails and look up information, the books and articles to which I refer (Heidegger's texts and secondary sources), and so on. But such innerworldish handy things are only encountered as the beings they are *in* this enacting, i.e., only in the becoming (writing that thesis, getting that Ph.D.) in which I approach or come to my alreadiness (having done this much research, not having fully understood §65 of BT, already in my fifth year as a Ph.D. student, and so on). Without the timeliness that makes possible cast framing, innerworldish beings cannot be encountered in such a way. Thus the third moment of timeliness, making present, does not generate itself in quite the same way as the other two. Instead,

> *making present*, in which *lapsing* into the caretaken handy and on hand is *primarily* grounded, stays *included* [*eingeschlossen*] in becoming and alreadiness in the mode of originary timeliness (SZ 328).

Because making present is dependent on alreadiness and becoming, it can no longer have priority for the sense of being-situate's being, and thus for the question of the sense of being in general. Against the philosophical tradition, Heidegger argues that the present is *not* the most fundamental temporal sense of being. Being cannot simply be understood as actuality, i.e., as what is present in the present, because what is present to us (innerworldishly encountering beings *and* being-situate itself) is neither self-

coincident nor self-present. The things we encounter are only such *as* they are encountered, which means, they are significant only *in the way* they encounter.

It is this aspect of timeliness—alreadiness-becoming as what "encloses" making present—that situates us essentially as able to be absorbed by the things we take care of, on the one hand, and yet, on the other, "fetched back" from them so as "to have to be all the more appropriately 'there' for the disclosed situation in the 'glance' [*Augen**blick***]" (SZ 328). Alreadiness-becoming makes present both handy and on hand things that we lapse into in caretaking and theorizing, and also makes possible the retrieval of ourselves from such absorption in things. Originary timeliness, which enables us to be ourselves (i.e., to be self-related), is also what occludes us from being ourselves (in making present those things we get absorbed by or lapse into). The very condition for appropriateness, i.e., originary timeliness, is the condition for inappropriateness as well. Or, in other words, our dynamic incompleteness occludes itself.

Timeliness and historicalness

In GA59, Heidegger argues that history is "the most obtrusive phenomenon... that endangers the apriori or the absolute validity that is the counterstance [*Gegenstand*] of philosophy" (GA59:44). History here does not mean *historia rerum gestarum*, i.e., history as determined by the methods of historiography, but rather the singularity of happening that challenges the universal apriori. This challenge manifests itself ontically, and it is the task of fundamental ontology to determine in what sense history and the apriori are opposed.

I cannot examine here Heidegger's repetition in Div. II Ch. III of the analysis of everydayness in terms of timeliness. His purpose there is to show how timeliness generates itself in an inappropriate way in our preoccupation with the things we take

care of. The ecstasies of inappropriate timeliness are homologous to those of originary, appropriate timeliness, since they are modifications of the latter. However, because they generate themselves in terms of what is taken care of, they pertain to our being at the caretaken, and how our ability-to-be comes to be taken in terms of the caretaken. Thus, we *await* the caretaken, rather than becoming it, we *forget* ourselves in caretaking, rather than coming back to our alreadiness, and we *make* it *present* rather than being the there in the glance.[32] The timeliness of everydayness generates itself as a "forgetting-making-present awaiting" [*vergessend-gegenwärtigende Gewärtigen*] (SZ 339), rather than alreadiness-becoming that discloses the there in the glance.

What is important for my purposes is the transition from the analysis of everyday timeliness to historicalness.[33] It seems evident, Heidegger says, that everydayness has to do with timeliness, since it "means *the* manner of existing, in which the human situation holds itself 'every day' " (SZ 370). But are we as yet clear about the "every day"? For it "does not signify the sum of the 'days' that are allotted to being-situate in its 'lifetime' " (SZ 370). That is, everydayness does not refer to the *duration* of being-situate. Rather, it signifies a "how" of being-situate, i.e., the way that

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32. Oddly, Heidegger discusses the glance first in this chapter, rather than in the previous one. The discussion of the ecstasies of originary timeliness thus refers to the alreadiness-becoming which makes present, which "maps" it onto the structure of care as facticity, existentiality and lapsing. In Div. II Ch. IV, however, the focus is on inappropriate timeliness, and as such the way in which it is distinct from originary timeliness needs to be made clear. Since the ecstasies generate equioriginally, Heidegger's architectonic requires a different designation for the appropriate present. It is obvious from his characterization of the glance (SZ 338-339, 347), however, that it is the sense of the situation that conscience pertains to.
33. In *Time and Narrative Vol. 3*, Paul Ricoeur questions Heidegger's reduction of everyday timeliness to originary timeliness, and suggests that these are constituted by "two irreconcilable determinations in principle", i.e., movement and care (pg. 89). He argues that Heidegger "never tries to vie with contemporary science in its own debate over time", simply assuming that the scientific concepts have all "been tacitly borrowed from metaphysics" (pg. 88). This leads Ricoeur to argue that mortal time, historical time and cosmic time are perhaps irreducible, and that the phenomenology of time and cosmological time always "surreptitiously" appeal to one another (pp. 94-96). (Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative Vol. 3*, trans. K. Blamey and D. Pellauer, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988.)

being-situate firstly and mostly is. "Everydayness is a way *of having to be*..." (SZ 371). What is missing, then, from the analysis of timeliness as presented so far is the sense of the duration of being-situate, "that being-situate, in living into its days, *stretches* itself *out* 'timewise' [*"zeitlich"*] in the sequence of its days" (SZ 371). Being-situate is not a point-phenomenon that can be characterized atemporally. The whole thrust of the analytic of being-situate is to elucidate our way of being as identity in change without locating this in a substance. That is, it is intended to show how it is that we can be *historical*, in the sense of undergoing changes of who and how we are *in* staying who we are. Although originary timeliness provides the basic frame for understanding this, in that it is only as becoming that we can be our alreadiness, there are lacunae in the account as it stands. In particular, given the priority of possibility, the issue of the historical involves the question of why the past has priority.

Heidegger's aim in the analysis of historicalness [*Geschichtlichkeit*] is twofold. First, the interpretation of historicalness is "a more concrete working out of timeliness" (SZ 382) that will show how being historical—i.e., having a history in the sense of being "stretched out" between birth and death rather than being in an isolated now—is possible. Second, he aims to show how history [*Geschichte*] is not a chronology of past events that are the subject matter of a science (i.e., historiography or historiology [*Historie*]), but is our way of being-with-one-another. History is not what has happened and is now past or gone, but rather is our *co-happening*. It is how we live and work together, in the openness of being-with-one-another to the possibilities that we inherit from our traditions, and that are always there for us as the very issue of our being-with. History is the way in which we come to be who we are. The structure of alreadiness-becoming indicates the retrieval or repetition involved in being historical, such that we have to be what we already ever are. At each instant we are brought to our

castness in framing possibilities of ourselves, because these *are* how we are cast. Happening or "historical living" [*Geschehen*][34] involves a co-retrieval, whereby we become who we already are only in the co-becoming or co-happening of being-with-one-another, in a way which always calls into question the "social" possibilities (the co-possibilities) which have been handed down as tradition, and for which we can, in conjunction with others, free ourselves up for.

The stretching out of ourselves "between" birth and death that characterizes historicalness is how originary timeliness generates itself in being-with. Whereas I "come towards" my alreadiness in becoming, such that I can be situational, I cannot be towards my inherited possibilities *as* these belong to a tradition (e.g., of being a Canadian or a Briton, of being a native English speaker, or of being a Ph.D. student) without reference to the others whom I am with. Historicalness is not a way of being towards myself *simpliciter*, but is a way of being towards myself in terms of how I am with others.

How is the timeliness that generates itself in being-with-one-another different from everyday, inappropriate timeliness, i.e., the forgetting-awaiting that makes present? Heidegger argues that there is an inappropriate historicalness which is an aspect of everydayness (SZ 376). This has to do with the publicness of inner-timishness [*Innerzeitigkeit*] as this pertains to time-reckoning and the use of clocks, on the one hand, and to chronology and the use of calendars on the other (SZ 404, 418). Such "chronicity" is a modification of historicalness, which turns it into a way of "reckoning" with dates in which history gets taken as the linear sequence of events in the past. Such date-reckoning requires "public time," i.e., the inappropriate time that is reckoned with in everyday being-with with others, because only in the public sharing of

34. Sheehan, G/E/K, pg. 248. In later texts such as *Contributions* Heidegger calls this "being-historical" [*Seinsgeschichtlich*] and "being-history" [*Seinsgeschichte*].

time can it become "dated". Inappropriate historicalness, then, is the way that being-situate is "publicly" towards its being-historical. This manifests itself, Heidegger argues, in the science of history.

In being-historical, or our "historical living" [*Geschehen*], we are always *co*-historical. This is just as much the case in the inappropriate chronicity of chronicling and sequencing the past. At one level, we do this (as historians, say) by being-with with others who are no longer there, i.e., the others who constituted a world which has ceased to be there for us. At another level, we do this in the shared community of fellow historians, other scientists, and people in general. Chronicity is a way of being towards things and others, and as such, involves the articulatedness of discourse, which itself is made possible in our being-with and being-situate-with. Our shared world is what makes it possible to chronologize (just as it makes it possible to "technicize" our everyday being near things).

Heidegger's analysis of historicalness aims to show not just that the analysis of originary timeliness *per se* does not account for how being-situate is "stretched out" in its being, but also that this stretching out is essentially a co-happening. Being historical does not mean being a chronologized being, in the sense that I can say of myself "I was born in 1963, moved to Canada in 1971, finished my B.A. in philosophy in 1989", and so on. Such biographical chronologizing does belong to history, but it is not the way we are towards ourselves as historical beings. What Heidegger wants to show is how these "time-points" are connected in self-constancy. Originary timeliness showed that my alreadiness, which in some sense includes these temporally punctuated moments of my history, is only possible in that I go about my being in becoming, i.e., as coming towards myself as I already ever am. It is only in becoming that I can *be* my alreadiness, and thus can be *as* alreadiness. But this doesn't show how my alreadiness is coherent,

i.e., how it unifies the apparently separate moments of my history. Alreadiness-becoming generates the glance in which I am situational, that is, in which I can act in being the ontological fault inherent to every enactment of factical possibilities. But the glance does not unify the moments of my alreadiness. It only clarifies or resolves me for the situation.

What originary timeliness *does* show is how a non-substantial being can be self-constant, i.e., can *be* a self in its becoming or can remain constant in self-change. Concretely, self-constancy implies that timeliness does generate itself in such a way as to unify the moments of my being as a stretching out of myself. My alreadiness is not stretched out, because it is an apriori perfectiveness of my being, i.e., it is how I ever am, not how I have been. The "repetition" or "retrieval" [*Wiederholung*] of originary timeliness is not a retrieval of my "past" as my factical possibilities. Originary timeliness does not concern these concrete aspects of who I am. It is how we are generated as unified, self-constant beings in becoming, but does not refer to *what* we are becoming. Originary timeliness concerns the possibility *that* we are becoming, to show how this is possible in the ecstatic unity of alreadiness-becoming which makes ourselves present to ourselves in the glance.

It is with historicalness, then, that the factical possibilities—the concreteness of our alreadiness—come to the fore. The primacy of factical contents means that historicalness is concerned with the *who* of being-situate, rather than the how. The question of the who is a question about the self and its constancy, as we have seen, and thus what is of concern in historicalness is to make clear how being-situate is factically self-constant, i.e., how its factical possibilities are constituted in the generation of originary timeliness (SZ 375). The analysis of originary timeliness involved forerunning in being towards death, and thus interpreted being-situate as being toward

this "end" of its being. However, the being of being-situate as a totality also involves the other "end", i.e., birth. Mortality implies natality. Thus, in grasping being-situate as a totality, what we want to bring to light is "the *stretching out* of being-situate *between* birth and death" (SZ 373). This stretching out is the "continuity [*Zusammenhang*] of life" (another Diltheyan notion that Heidegger appropriates), without which being-situate cannot be a whole. But this continuity is usually understood (in everydayness and in the philosophical tradition) as "*consist*[*ing*] *of* a succession of lived experiences [*Erlebnissen*] 'in time' " (SZ 373). This is problematic, Heidegger argues, because it implies that neither "past" experiences nor those "in the future" are actual. Only present experience is actual. Yet, if this is so, then the continuity that is aimed at falls apart into a sequence of nows that being-situate "jumps" through. Being-situate would only be in the now and through the lived experience belonging to the now. The non-actual experiences of the past and future would not be part of its being. Thus there could not be any stretchedness, for there would be nothing to stretch back to (birth, as a lived experience, is past and thus not actual) nor to stretch out towards (death as a future event is not actual).

Heidegger argues that, if we are asking after the continuity of being-situate in being between birth and death, because we are concerned with how it is self-constant and thus *who* the self is that is constant, then we cannot rest the analysis on a way of understanding being-situate that takes it to be something isolated in the present actuality of the now. Yet the interpretation of continuity as a sequence of lived experiences does precisely that. It entails that the only lived experience that is actual is the one I am having in the present. This is the experience of the "solitary now". As such, it precludes the possibility of continuity. The problem with approaching the issue in this way is that it depends upon taking lived experiences as something that occur "in time". But being-

situate is not "*in* time", because it is not something on hand. Rather, it is a way of being, and a way of being is not "in" time, but rather "of" time, or timely.

Therefore, the continuity that we are after cannot be understood as a connection of two "events" in time, birth and death, which themselves are both non-actual but the connection of which somehow "passes through" the actuality of the present situation. Rather, this continuity has to be understood as a way that being-situate *is*. In going about its being, being-situate is coming towards itself in being historical as it *has been* (not, as in the generation of originary timeliness, as it already is). In its being, it "stretches *itself* out in such a way that its own being is constituted in advance as stretching [*Erstreckung*]" (SZ 374). That is, it is not the "endpoints" of birth and death that determine the stretching itself out of being-situate, but the other way around. The "endpoints" of being-situate only are in the way that it is the "between" of these "endpoints". "The 'between' relating to birth and death already lies *in the being* of being-situate" (SZ 374). To be being-situate is to be the between of birth and death, because these are constituted by factical existentiality. Just as death is not an event which has not yet happened, neither is birth an event which has already happened and is no longer.

> Existentially understood, birth is not and never is a past thing [*ein Vergangenes*] in the sense of the no-longer-on-hand, as little as death has the manner of being of the outstanding debt that is not yet on hand, but is approaching. Factical being-situate exists as born, and born it also already dies in the sense of being towards death. Both "ends" and their "between" *are*, so long as being-situate factically exists, and they *are* in a way that is solely possible on the basis of the being of being-situate as *care*...As care, being-situate *is* the "between". (SZ 374)

Both birth and death, then, are conditions of the possibility of factical existence. Whereas death is the most extreme or outermost possibility of being-situate that makes being its facticity possible, birth is, so to speak, the "innermost" fact of the human situation, the condition of everything factical. Birth, understood existentially, is not a possibility of being-situate, just as death can never be factical. "Bornly" dying is

rather the between of facticity and existentiality, the continuity of the movedness [*Bewegtheit*] of the human situation. Heidegger calls this "specific movedness of the *stretched out stretching-itself-out*" the "*happening* [*Geschehen*] of being-situate" (SZ 375).

Thus, understanding the being of historicalness means "[*l*]*aying bare* the *structure of happening* and its existential-timely conditions of possibility" (SZ 375). The "problem of history," which in its contingency and singularity makes the *a priori* problematic, cannot be addressed from analyses within the science of history, because this mode of inquiry, as a way of being of being-situate (like all sciences), has its origin in being-situate. We *do* historiography because we *are* historical, although we can be historical without doing historiography at all, Heidegger argues (GA59:45-6; SZ 396). Thus, historicalness is the condition for the possibility of there being anything like a science of history. "How history [*Geschichte*] can become a possible *object* of historiography [*Historie*] can be gathered only from the manner of being of the historical, from historicalness and its deep rooting in timeliness" (SZ 375).

What guidelines for understanding historicalness can be found in "the vulgar interpretation of the history of being-situate", as that which is conditioned by historicalness? Independently of the sense of "science of history", Heidegger notes four meanings:

(I) History is what is past [*Vergangenes*] in the sense of "no longer on hand" or no longer effectual on the present (SZ 378). This meaning can be readily found underlying certain positions in international relations, such as the irrelevance of Saddam Hussein's non-existent weapons of mass destruction to the legality of the war against Iraq, or the dismissal of colonialism as an issue of contemporary relevance. This attitude argues that that was then, this is now, events have moved on, we have to deal with the situation

in the present, etc. This meaning of history is also inherent to neoclassical economics, since for any economic situation, all that matters is the equilibrium, not the pathway to equilibrium.

(II) History is that which is past but *is* still effectual in the present, such as the significance of the Parthenon, Borobudur, or Stonehenge. Such monuments are historical because they continue to have an effect on us today as, say, tourist attractions. They are present now, but "a bit of the past" is present in them (SZ 378).[35] In this sense, Heidegger argues, the past does not have particular priority, because what is significant is not something which is no longer just there, but the connection of events in the past, present and future, the rise and fall of epochs and cultures, and the like. The primary significance of history in this sense is how it connects events, such as the introduction of the Euro as specie, the end of apartheid in South Africa, or the forced resignation of Indonesia's General Suharto (all "historic moments"). Such events are held to be of historic significance even *as* they occur. Thus, history has nothing to do with the past. "Herewith the past has no particular priority" (SZ 379).

(III) A third sense of history is the distinction drawn between nature and culture.[36] Although both are understood as changing "in time," the way in which this occurs is different for each domain. Human historical change is meaningful and teleological, whereas natural historical change is meaningless and causal. This distinction serves to demarcate these two regions of beings.

(IV) Finally, history is understood as what is inherited from tradition, as that which is freed up [*überliefert*] for us, whether by the science of history or in a way which takes

35. This view can be found in Droysen.
36. Rickert used this distinction to demarcate the different domains of the sciences (Heinrich Rickert, *The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science*, trans. G. Oakes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 134-135).

traditional possibilities as self-evident, thereby covering up historicalness.[37]

> The central meaning of history as ordinarily understood, then, is
>
> > the specific happening of existing being-situate proceeding in time, such that the happening in being-with-one-another, as "past" and at the same time "freed up" and continually effecting is taken to be history in the sense emphasized. (SZ 379)

History is the happening of being-situate, yet in the ordinary understanding of happening, it is conceptualized as the *occurrences* being-situate experiences or undergoes. The phenomenological question is how being-situate can *be* its happening, since it is not a thing that is "in time". Originary timeliness, Heidegger argues, gives rise to within-time-ness, and thus cannot itself be understood on the basis of within-time-ness. Historicalness, therefore, cannot be understood on this basis either. The "circumstances, occurrences and destiny" that are taken to be constitutive of history are determined by the historicalness of being-situate, i.e., its happening, rather than the other way around. This raises the question of why the past has a "remarkable priority in the concept of history" (SZ 379). The past does not enter into originary timeliness at all. How then does it become predominant in historicalness?

The historial [*historisch*] objects with which the science of history concerns itself (such as antiquities, monuments, heirlooms, records, and the like) are not historical because they are the objects for such a science. Nor are they historical as that which is no longer there, i.e., which is past and gone. Such objects are historical precisely in the way that they *continue* to be present *in* the present.[38] Even when such things are past and gone, such as the Bamiyan statues, the Colossus at Rhodes, or the original Library at Alexandria, they are still present in some way in the records and documents which refer to them. How is it that we can be near such things as historical, then? That is, how are these world-historical beings different from the iBook I am

37. Heidegger gives further characterizations of history as ordinarily understood in GA59 §6.
38. A point that Droysen makes in his *Outline of the Principles of History*, *op. cit.*.

working on, a newly erected mosque, or a recreation of the Bamiyan statues in China, since they seem to encounter in the same way? The difference lies, Heidegger argues, not in the *encountering* of them, but in their *significance*, i.e., what we encounter them *as*. With my iBook or with recreated Bamiyan statues, we encounter them as innerworldish, and thus as having significance in the context of the world that gives rise to them. The world that is the context of their discoveredness is co-disclosed by those who created them. Their significance as discovered is the significance of the co-disclosedness of the world that we are in as being-with-one-another, which involves the creators and users of such handy beings. However, the world which gave rise to the Parthenon or Chichen Itza is not one we co-disclose. Those who built and used such edifices are no longer there with us, and thus the significance is different. They are no longer co-disclosive in the sense of contesting the significance of these creations. A temple which has become just a tourist attraction no longer encounters as a temple, in which gods are propitiated, honours are given, and so on. The for-the-sake-of-which of such monuments no longer exists.

> What is "past"? Nothing other than the *world*, within which, belonging to a context of useful things, they were encountered as handy and were used by a care-taking, being-in-the-world [*in-der-Welt-seienden*] being-situate. The *world* is no more. (SZ 380)

Yet this seems extreme, for there are things that are world-historical which hardly seem to belong to a world that is no more. For example, the French franc was replaced as specie only three years ago, therefore surely *that* world cannot be said to be "no more". The vast majority of those who were alive then are still co-disclosing the world, and so on. Nevertheless, despite the recency of its disappearance, that world *has* disappeared and is no more, because a French franc coin can no longer be used as payment. Although it may well have a different significance as a collector's item or as a shim, such a coin is no longer money, for it cannot, generally, buy anything in France.

The world in which the French franc and the other eleven currencies unified into the Euro were significant as forms of payment indeed is no longer. Such handy beings cannot be significant *as* a means of payment. They cannot appear *as* such beings.

Heidegger's point is that the historical character of things does not come from their datedness or temporal longevity. Rather, it is being-situate that is historical. The historical character of caretaken things is a derivative or secondary historicalness. Such things are historical in "belonging-to-the-world" (SZ 381). That is, they are world-historical [*Weltgeschichtliche*]. In everydayness, it is this world-historical character which gives rise to the sense of "world history" [*Welt-geschichte*]. The concept of world history arises because we encounter such beings (the French franc, the Ford Model T) as belonging to a world that cannot be co-disclosed, not because such things are thematized and objectified by the science of history. However, we can only encounter beings in this way because *we* are historical. Indeed, it is only because we are historical that the science of history is possible at all. The science of history, like all other sciences, thematizes a region of beings that are encountered, unthematically, in advance. One need not be a historian to encounter beings as historical, and being a historian, Heidegger argues, can in fact cover up historicalness, as is evident with those historians, such as Ranke, who denied that the historian brings historicalness to what is interpreted historiographically.

How is being-situate historical, then? The argument so far has been that neither the ordinary understanding of history nor the scientific concept of history are fundamental to historicalness, although both are suggestive of it. Understanding how being-situate is historical involves showing how historicalness relates to originary timeliness. With originary timeliness, the issue was how being-situate can *be* its alreadiness. However, what is not shown with originary timeliness is how being-situate

is its being-in-the-world, which means, its being-with with others. Even though the generation of originary timeliness is directed towards the concrete individuality of the human situation, it is misunderstood when taken to be the way that being-situate "truly" happens. We are *always* happening in a world near things with others. Although this firstly and mostly takes place in everydayness, the modification of everydayness to appropriate existence is not a disseverance of *my* being from that of everyone else. The human situation is fundamentally incomplete, and therefore cannot be more appropriate in isolation from what it is open to, i.e., things and others. I am not "more appropriate" the more I reject the context of my being, in the way, for instance, that teenagers sometimes try to affirm their own existence by rebelling against everything they think their parents stand for. Appropriateness has nothing to do with being for or against others. Rather, it has to do with how we are individuated as happening, which is always a way of being that is inherently *co*-happening.

Factical being-situate has its "history" and can do so because it is essentially historical. Forerunning resolvedness allows me to be my possibilities, but where do they come from? They cannot come from death, since death is the limit-case of the impossibility of all possibilities. In resolvedness, being-situate takes over, from everydayness, its heritage [*Erbe*] as its own, i.e., as possibilities that it *can* be or can choose as its own. Forerunning resolvedness is the grasping of mortal finitude that enables the freeing up [*überliefern*] of the possibilities of tradition, such that they become appropriate possibilities. Heidegger indicates this as "fate" [*Shicksal*] (SZ 384), in which the human situation happens in the freeing up of being-towards-death that enables *choosing* inherited possibilities.[39] Furthermore, as being-situate-with, being-situate happens as co-happening, in which fate becomes "destiny" [*Geschick*] (SZ 384).

39. Cf. Thomas Sheehan and Corinne Painter, "Choosing one's fate: A re-reading of *Sein und Zeit* §74," *Research in Phenomenology*, vol. XXVIII, 1999, pp. 63-83.

Destiny is not additive of fates, but is rather the communication and contention about the meaning of inherited possibilities. The full appropriate happening of being-situate is fateful destiny.

Inappropriate historicalness conceals the originary stretching along of fate. Whereas appropriate historicalness grasps alreadiness in terms of becoming, inappropriate historicalness grasps the past in terms of the present. "Unconstantly as the Everyman-self, being-situate makes present its 'today'. Awaiting the next new thing it has already forgotten what is old" (SZ 391). Unable to repeat fatefully, the Everyman-self only

> ...retains and receives the left-over 'actual' of the world-historical that has been, the remnants and the on hand information about them. Lost in the making present of the "today," it understands the "past" in terms of the "present." (SZ 391)

Appropriate historicalness works against the inappropriate in a "*counter-presentation* [*Entgegenwärtigung*] of the today and a weaning from the conventionalities of Everyman" (SZ 391). As appropriately historical, being-situate makes its heritage its own, whereas "inappropriate historical existence, burdened with the legacy of a 'past' that has become unrecognizable to itself, seeks the modern" (SZ 391).

The science of history has its existential origin in historicalness. Although every science has its history, the science of history depends on historicalness in a special way, because it thematizes the historical. It delimits its objects and methodologically predetermines how they are disclosed. For this science, its objects are "the past", which implies that the past is already somehow disclosed. Because only being-situate is originarily historical, the objects thematized by the science of history must have the kind of being of the "was-situate being-situate [*dagewesenem Da-sein*]" (SZ 393), and so too must the world so disclosed. Artefacts that are still on hand, then, have this kind of being. They have an "innerworldishness" that makes them disclosive

of the was-situate *because* of the historicalness of the historian. The historicalness of the historian's existence is interpretative "historical being towards" the was-situate. That is, taking something *as* an artefact involves a framing on the part of the historian, which is possible only because the historian exists historically. The historian "chooses the fate" of grasping the possibility to understand the was-situate. As such, the science of history must conform to appropriate repetition, i.e., understanding the was-situate in terms of its own appropriate possibilities of existence. In this way the science of history discloses the possibility of the "having-been-in-the-world [*In-der-Welt-gewesensein*]" (SZ 394).

This manifests the "universal" in the "once-only" [*einmalig*], the "happening only once," or the unique. Thus the question whether the aim of the science of history is to articulate a series of unique, "individual" events or to determine historical "laws" is mistaken. It is neither (or both). "[T]he central theme of the science of history in each case is the *possibility* of was-situate existence [*dagewesenen Existenz*]" (SZ 395). Historiography is a freeing-up that has an interpretedness and a history of its own, i.e., its own traditions. Traditional history allows historiography to penetrate to the was-situate itself.

However, although historiography attests to how we can be towards the history that we are, it does not in itself provide the *meaning* of the historical. History is neither an object on hand (although it can be investigated as such), nor is it simply a cultural inheritance that determines how we understand ourselves (although it is part of how we are constituted). Heidegger's elucidation of historicalness shows that the historical, too, is determinately indeterminate, and is so because we are fundamentally constituted as incomplete.

Transcendence and immanence

In being-historical, the human situation is one of transcendence and immanence. The radical innovation in Heidegger's approach is to argue that such immanence is itself a transcendence. Being-historical indicates both the transitive and intransitive senses of being (the history we are; the history we are directed *towards*), formally indicated as "the upon-which-towards-which" [*das Woraufhin*] (PIA 112; SZ 365). Heidegger argues that our facticity itself is the basis of our ability to be directed towards ourselves, and further, that this can only be understood as our happening in a world. But happening cannot be understood purely as the realization of present possibilities. That is, against historicism, life-philosophy (and present-day postmodernism), Heidegger argues that our way of being is *not* pure becoming. As the beings we are, we *necessarily* are the way that we have already become, i.e., our historical actuality or facticity. Facticity—the condition of *being* factical—necessarily constitutes our way of being. Yet against positivism and the claims of the natural and social sciences to provide *explanations* of our way of being, Heidegger argues that we are not purely determined by this necessity either.[40] We are bound by, and to, our facticity, in terms of the possibilities this allows us to become. That is, we can only determine ourselves in light of who we already are. This is not simply a "backdrop" for who we are becoming, Heidegger argues, but is constitutive of becoming itself. Our facticity *is* necessity because we must appropriate it in being-possible. But we can only *be* our possibilities insofar as we are factical. Our historical actuality—our presence in the present situation—is the making-present that transpires in being our factical possibilities.

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40. Heidegger is arguing against historicism and positivism, *not* against the historical and natural sciences, which are entirely appropriate for investigating beings as they are encountered.

Heidegger's critique of the theoretical attitude implies that the privilege accorded by historicism to actuality in determining the human situation fails to recognise that actuality arises from the dynamic relation between necessity and possibility. With regard to positivism, on the other hand, it implies that the privilege accorded to necessity in the form of general laws fails to recognise that what is actual does not simply result from necessity, but rather is primarily determined by possibility. Thus both historicism and positivism are based on the relation between necessity and actuality, and both overlook the third modality of possibility. Thus, they both overlook the dynamic incompleteness of the human situation, because the theoretical attitude always tries to get a "total view" of what it inquires into. Without attention to inquiry itself as phenomenally attesting to incompleteness, the human situation gets taken as objectively or intersubjectively determined, and thus fully determinate in terms of *what* it is. In the theoretical attitude, these is no room for the radical incompleteness of mortal finitude, or for the moment of subjectivity that holds open objectivity and intersubjectivity *as* possibilities.

Chapter 6: Formal Indications to the Subject of Development

Out of the situation, towards the situation

Introduction

Heidegger's analytic of the human situation, examined in chapter 5, suggests a number of questions that can be raised about positivist and historicist development. The questioning involved, however, must also put the questioner in question, if we hope to inquire about the relation between the human situation and conceptions of development. The most fundamental question has to do with meaning and development. Can development be articulated in terms of meaning? What would this involve?

Initially, it would seem to have to do with the relation between meaningfulness and the questions that appear in the critiques of positivist development (e.g., regarding transitivity, agency, process and end-state, history and progress, novelty and order, and so on). The primary question for a phenomenological hermeneutical inquiry, however, has to do with the relation between the standards or values of development and their history. Do these standards themselves develop, or are they timeless and universal? Is knowledge of such standards *itself* one of the standards? If so, how? In what way can ahistorical, acultural standards or values be valid or hold for historical contexts and the individuals who are historically contextualized? These questions lead to a number of others, such as: what is it that is supposed to develop? who does the developing? who ascertains whether development has occurred?

These are not empirical questions, however, but philosophical, or formally indicative ones. In the way it pertains to the human situation, the subject of development cannot simply or immediately be taken as an object. How it can be taken is the question this chapter aims to explore.

In this chapter, then, I suggest some ways that a formally indicative approach might clarify the subject of development. I have used this phrase previously, without comment. Therefore, one of the tasks in this chapter will be to explicate this phrase, so as to show how it indicates the constellation of issues surrounding the question of whether development *is* in fact a phenomenon and, if so, how it shows itself. In order to do so, however, it will be useful to review the trajectory of the previous chapters.

Review

As was discussed in chapter 1, the 19th-century philosophical debate in Germany was concerned particularly with the question of historical knowledge: whether this was simply another form of empirical knowledge and thus subordinate to the same explanatory methods of inquiry and standards of objectivity (positivism); or whether history (or the historical), in its individuality and intendedness, required an interpretative or hermeneutic method, and therefore had to be measured by different, intersubjective standards (historicism). A central question, which many late 19th century and early 20th-century German philosophers sought to address, was about the essence or character of the subject of the science of history [*Historie*]. What sort of object was history? Was it an object at all? How could the historical be objective, and yet be unique? The neo-Kantian interpretation of the historical (or the cultural) was that, like nature, it was the subsumption of irrational reality under concepts particular to the values of the inquiry, and thus simply another kind of empirical object. Philosophy, the neo-Kantians argued, could assist the different sciences by bringing epistemological and especially *methodological* clarification to the debate, so as to show that both types of sciences were equally objective.

Dilthey, whom the neo-Kantians took to have helped in this clarification, agreed that history was an empirical discipline, as were the other human studies.

Nevertheless, he rejected the tenets of *empiricism* that were predominant in the natural sciences (and, arguably, remain so), because of the need for interpretation or understanding in the human studies. In the study of society, unlike that of nature, Dilthey argued,

> the uniformities which can be established about society fall far short of the laws which can be established about nature based on the certainty of spatial relations and of the properties of motion.[1]

However, because we can know the socio-historical from the inside, in terms of how it constitutes us, and in terms of how we are a part of it and so constitute it, the human studies have an advantage over the study of nature.

> ...all of this is more than outweighed by the fact that I myself, who experience and know myself from within, am a constituent of this social body and that the other constituents are similar to me and are thus for me likewise comprehensible in their inner being. I understand the life of society.[2]

Despite their lack of exactness, the human studies are not inferior to the natural sciences, but rather far outstrip them, because they study a "boundless" complex or nexus of interactions, in which we participate and thus come to know ourselves. The nexus of the individual is both participant and observer:

> The individual is on the one hand an element in the interactions of society, a point of intersection of the various systems of these interactions, reacting to the influences of that society with conscious intentions and actions; but on the other hand he is an intellect contemplating and investigating all of this. Accordingly, the play of causes which operate blindly is replaced by the play of representations, feelings, and motives. The individuality and profusion of interactions that emerges here is boundless.[3]

In my experience as a participant in the social world, I come to understand both myself and that world in the only way possible:

> we can only know ourselves thoroughly through understanding; but we cannot understand ourselves and others except by projecting what we have actually experienced into every expression of our own and others' lives.[4]

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1. Dilthey, *Selected Writings Vol. I*, *op. cit.*, pg. 88.
2. *Ibid.*, pg. 89.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*, pg. 176.

This triad of experience, expression and understanding constitute us as human beings, and also as social beings. Furthermore, the continuity between the individual and the social (or their mutual implication) is what allows for, and provides the structure of, the human studies. "A discipline only belongs to the human studies when we can approach its subject-matter through the connection between life, expression and understanding."[5]

Dilthey's notion of worldviews as different and incommensurable ways in which the totality of life is grasped and understood, as "a system in which questions about the meaning and significance of the world are answered in terms of a conception of the world", appeared to Husserl simply as a historicization of consciousness that resulted in skeptical relativism. Husserl argued that philosophy concerns the objective *in* experience, which can be elucidated by phenomenological investigation of the invariant in intentionality. As such, however, the phenomenological method was not oriented towards the singular and unique, but towards the *a priori*. Only knowledge of the *a priori*, Husserl argued, could be grounded as strict or rigorous philosophical knowledge.

Thus, whereas Dilthey argued that it is only through experience, expression and understanding that we can study the historical world that constitutes us, Husserl denied that this was a legitimate task for philosophy. The question of historical *development*, then, was also not amenable to phenomenological inquiry. The individuality and uniqueness of the historical "threatens" the *a priori*, as Heidegger put it, and thus the very rigour of philosophy itself. For Husserl, philosophy had its own object-domain, and was not simply a handmaiden to the sciences, as the neo-Kantians seemed to suggest. But this object-domain—the structure and constitution of consciousness—excluded the very aspect of human existence that was the focus of the

5. *Ibid.*

conflict between positivism and historicism. The invariant structures of pure consciousness cannot be the material of historical change.

In chapter 2, I examined the discipline of economics, to show how the conflict between positivist and historicist views of history and social existence manifested itself in the formal-deductive approach of political economy and its successors, and the interpretative, historically-oriented approach that was prevalent in Germany throughout the 19th century. My aim there was to clarify the way in which the formalism of positivist economics came to subordinate the historical and empirical, to such an extent that attempts have been made to subject history to testing so as to confirm contemporary economic theory. The significance of this trend in positivist economics is that it disconnects or dissevers economic *inquiry* from both the historical context that it arises in *and* the historical contexts that it studies. In naturalizing economic interaction it suggests that all economic systems can be explained by the same general laws, and thus are simply instances of an ideal or abstract form of "the" economy.

Historicist economists, in contrast, argued that economic interaction can only be understood in its historical context and, furthermore, must be understood as essentially creative. For these economists, economic inquiry itself was historically contextual, reflecting and contributing to the experience, expression and understanding of the economic aspects of contemporary life, which themselves were not analytically isolable from the totality of social life. Whatever development or change in economic interaction might occur was not simply the result of the ineluctable operation of general laws, but a matter of the meaning of social interactions, policy, politics, and so on.

The basic conflict between these two schools of thought was over whether economy ordered society, or whether it had to be understood in its socio-historical context. For intellectual and historical reasons, including the devastation of two major

wars and the malign influence of the National Socialists on intellectual inquiry, German influence in economics went into a decline. Present-day economics is thus dominated by a formalism that abstracts from all historical specificity, a trend that can be traced back to Adam Smith, who clearly argued that the economic history of Europe after the fall of the Western Roman empire was "unnatural" according to the formal analysis of economic behaviour. For Smith, as for positivist economics since his time, theory trumps history, and this allowed for the idea that society ought to be brought into harmony with the general laws of economic behaviour that economic theory claimed to have discovered. However, positivist economics has proved less than adequate in the positivist endeavour of prediction and control of economic behaviour, despite its influence in policy circles of government.

In chapter 3, I sought to show how the U.N.-era concept of development has its roots in the rise to prominence of positivist economics, and how this is evident in various theoretical attitudes oriented towards the explanation of poverty or surplus population. The objectification of the poor, and the attempt to determine what is required in order to bring about the economic development that has failed to occur, has its basis in positivist economics, as the World Bank clearly shows. The central problem of positivist development, as the postdevelopment critics argue, is that it abstracts from historical context, and therefore fails to take into account not only how the situation of today's hard-working countries does not simply map onto the situation of the early developers, but also the way that the policy prescriptions of development agencies and experts are themselves part of the history of such countries. This problem cannot even be articulated in the conceptual edifice of positivist development, which presupposes the naturalization of development. Thus, every new approach, such as the World Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework, is predicated on the notion that development

can be made to occur. Yet what is supposed to occur is precisely that which has *not* occurred, i.e., the *self*-development of the subjects of development.

The inherent contradiction in positivist development has as yet gone largely unrecognized by the institutions and agencies which embody it, for a variety of reasons, not least of which is that it puts in question the reason for their own existence. Cowen and Shenton's analysis shows how the contradiction of positivist development arose in the 19th century, and has persisted to this day. Yet in their immanent critique, they pay insufficient attention to the historicist critique that also arose in the 19th century, and that has reappeared in postdevelopment. That critique seeks to historically contextualize positivist development itself, as do Cowen and Shenton, but unlike the latter, historicist development focusses on the socio-historical contextualization of meaning, and how it undermines the claim of positivist development to universality. However, just as with the 19th-century historicist approach to historical inquiry, postdevelopment encounters a difficulty in the relation between theory and practice, and correlatively, between the role of theorists and the culturally specific contexts they seek to articulate. That difficulty turns on the question of whether cultural meanings are incommensurable and, if so, how they can properly be the subject of theory at all. For this reason, postdevelopment all too often tends towards the type of suspicion and "unmasking" that has become prevalent in various "post-" movements or attitudes, which has the appearance of negativity and a refusal to recognize that their analyses also have positive import.

Chapters 4 and 5 turned from the examination of the conflict between positivism and historicism to present Heidegger's approach to the human situation in terms of his appropriation of the philosophical tradition, and the analytic of the human situation found in *Being and Time*. In Heidegger, I argued, we find an attempt to

articulate the concrete individuality of the human situation in a way that reduces it neither to an object that can be theoretically studied, nor to an intersubjective (or conventional) construction. Heidegger appropriates Dilthey's investigations into how experience, expression and understanding belong together in the nexus of the individual and her context, but instead of approaching this through the descriptive psychology that Dilthey attempted to articulate, takes a phenomenological approach. However, unlike Husserl, Heidegger's aim is to express concrete individuality, which therefore has to take into account the historical. Heidegger's resolution of the conflict between the historical and the *a priori* is to approach this as an ontological question, rather than an epistemological one. He argues that what is most in question is not the objectivity of knowledge, but rather how our way of being includes our understanding of our way of being. Through a complex set of appropriations, from Dilthey, Rickert, Lask, Husserl, and Aristotle (among others!), he attempts to elucidate the human situation in its concreteness.

Doing so, Heidegger recognizes, cannot be a matter of trying to completely express the concreteness of the human situation, because such expression would require the differentiation of my situation from everything that I am not. The human situation is *heterothetical*, he argues, appropriating this notion from Rickert. But if it were absolutely inexpressible, then how is it that I can *be* it? Furthermore, how is it that, in being it, I have an understanding of it—I understand myself, in some sense, as the concrete individual I am—yet cannot articulate this? Heidegger argues that the problem lies not in the inexpressibility of concrete individuality *per se*, but in what expression itself is supposed to be.[6] This is a problem of *theoreticism*, he argues. The theoretical attitude supposes that expression or articulation means complete specification, or at

6. A point he makes in his 1920 review of Jaspers' *Psychology of Worldviews* (J pg. 100).

least the specification of what is *essential* to what is theorized. Heidegger points out that what is essential to the human situation is precisely what *cannot* properly be expressed, i.e., that it is incomplete. I cannot fully and completely express myself to you, because in doing so, who I am—what I am trying to express—is changing in the very act of expression. The essential aspect of the human situation, Heidegger argues, is that it is dynamically incomplete. It is always becoming something, and yet how it becomes is always part of how it is already.

In order to elucidate this, then, we cannot do so directly and completely. Rather, we can only do so *indirectly.* We can articulate it in a way which points us towards our concreteness, and thus shows us how it is that we are concrete. But we cannot ever properly express our concreteness. This is not a cause for worry, however, although it can be unsettling and make us feel "unhomely". It is not a cause for worry because it is the very source of our freedom, and thus for how our lives can be meaningful to us. Being incomplete, or "on the way", is how we are open to the meaningfulness that is involved in being human. But meaningfulness is not a purely subjective phenomenon. That is, our incompleteness does not itself provide meaning. Rather, it is the way that meaning is *disclosed* to us as the concrete individuals we are, in our heterothetical relation to everything that we encounter.

The theoretical attitude, which Windelband and Rickert argued enabled us to form the concepts that constitute natural science (the nomothetic or the homogeneous continuum) and historical science (the idiographic or the heterogeneous discretum) in terms of transcendental values, was "death" to philosophy, Heidegger argued, because it did not allow for the articulation of the *being* of the theoretical knower. In objectifying the world theoretically, it also objectified itself, as consciousness or the subject. Such an objectified world made it impossible to explain the way in which knower and known

belong together, i.e., how there cannot be the known without the knower, and vice versa. It did not allow for the co-constitution of self and other by their mutual encounter. In the transcendental value philosophy of the neo-Kantians, as in positivism and historicism, the ultimate recourse was to the *ahistorical* (i.e., transcendental values, causal necessity, or actuality, respectively), as the unchanging source of the possibility of knowledge about history. The theoretical isolation of the knowing subject from history makes the dynamic of history itself incomprehensible. Heidegger "synthesizes" these aporetic positions by way of a phenomenology directed towards grasping the dynamic happening of life as such, as the matter of concern for the inquiry itself.

The subject of development

We encounter an immediate difficulty once we turn from the analysis of positivist and historicist development thinking to ask about what these refer to. Here I indicate this as the "subject of development", which as a formal indication tries to point to a nexus of problems that are evident in attempts to define development (as discussed previously). Although both positivist and historicist development thinkers take conceptions of development to give determinations about an aspect of the human situation, it is far from clear that they do so in a way that can be coherently understood. For example, not only is it unclear what development is supposed to consist in (is it GDP growth? reduction of poverty? reduction of inequality? improvement in quantifiable conditions? cultural self-expression? cultural coherence? some combination of these?), it is also unclear who it is that develops (is it only hard-working countries? or development experts? do leisured countries develop? if so, in the same way?), who it is that determines what counts as development, how this relates to history, where the standards by which development is determined come from, whether

these standards are part of what develops, if development always means improvement, and so on.

Whereas in development agencies, departments of development studies, NGOs and so forth, the meaning of development may be stipulatively defined (e.g., reduction of poverty) or ostensively defined (e.g., what needs to happen in poor countries), the question of how this can be meaningful is less often raised. Indeed, although the question of the meaning of development is usually considered briefly at the beginning of standard textbooks and agency or NGO reports, it is also usually answered by appeal to other concepts that are taken to be less problematic, such as poverty. As we have seen, however, such concepts are objectifying, and thus lead to the notion that development concerns some objects or other, and is a process which itself can be objectively ascertained (has it occurred? how is it measured? how can we bring it about?)

Even more rare is the question of how the development thinker stands in relation to the subject. Whether understood as expert or dominating knowledge, the relation is taken as given. Yet, if the subject of development is *questionable*, then this also asks about the relation of the questioner to what is questioned. If we raise this issue, we see that there is already a relation to some phenomena or other, which includes a relation to other people. In asking about the subject of development, then, we cannot simply presuppose that this is an object.

Development is not an object

A central point in understanding the subject of development is that it is not an object that we observe, about which we can gain knowledge, but something that belongs to our experience, and thus is constitutive of self-understanding. This is because the subject of development involves *happening*. It is a temporal phenomenon,

and thus cannot be grasped in a way that occludes or denies its temporality. Yet this does not mean that it is a process, either, for it involves people and their ways of being, and these cannot be reduced to objective processes without occluding how it is that they belong to the subject of development. If we approach this as a possible phenomenon, then it must show itself in its concreteness, not as a theoretical abstraction.

The subject of development is therefore not about *knowledge*. It is not knowledge or awareness of development issues that determines how we make sense of who we are and our possible relation to the phenomenon. The subject of development is part of how the world is interpreted, which rests on understanding, or "taking as", as a way of being rather than having knowledge about something. And such interpretation is articulate and thus occurs in "communication and contest" with others (SZ 385), that both preserves and transforms the world. It is preserved in that what is interpreted is the world as it already is, yet this is transformed by the interpreting itself. The world does not stand outside our interpretations of it, but is constituted in those interpretations. Yet our interpretations themselves *belong* to the world and, as such, are constituted *by* it. They are not "free-floating", in the sense that we could simply decide to interpret the world differently if we so chose, because such choosing is an interpretative act itself that has its basis in how we are already, i.e., how the world has already become. The world is the context for all acting, and as such has an *a priori* character to such acting, but this is indeterminate, because it does not determine the possibilities that are actualized in acting.

Finding the subject of development

In order to explicate further what I mean by the "subject of development", I recount here a story about the situation of development in the latter decades of the 20th century, and my own involvement in development as a volunteer (rather grandly called

a "development worker") in Indonesia. In doing so, I hope to make clear how the subject of development cannot be simply thought of as an object for empirical investigation, or as the coherence of a worldview, but involves the co-disclosedness of meaning, and thus involves the question of the genesis of meaning.

Commenting in 1969 on what he had observed taking place in the previous decade, Dudley Seers questioned whether the meaning of development was properly understood:

> I am alarmed at the phrase, a "second development decade." Another "development decade" like the 1960's, with unemployment rates and inequality rising by further large steps, would be politically and economically disastrous, whatever the pace of economic growth![7]

Political and commercial interests had always been deeply implicated in foreign aid, affecting the activities of government and non-governmental aid agencies alike. Jonathan Falla has described the situation that aid workers often find themselves in:

> Many workers know their position to be thoroughly ambivalent. The staff of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are often highly motivated, well educated and professionally skilled, inquisitive about, and sympathetic to, the cultures in which they find themselves. They would claim, almost without exception, to be advocates for the poor. But they admit that they are tools of diplomacy, international politics and commercial interests. They know, in other words, that aid is a function of what many would call neo-imperialism.[8]

The colonial trinity of missionaries, merchants and mercenaries has lasted into the post-colonial, foreign aid era. At the World Bank, whose Articles of Agreement specify that political considerations must not enter into its lending decisions,[9] the political and commercial interests of the developed countries are always a factor, because as the biggest contributing members, these countries dominate the Bank's decision-making structure.[10] Nor has the Bank ever clearly defined the meaning of "political" in its

7. Dudley Seers, "The Meaning of Development", *International Development Review*, vol. 2, [1969] 1977, pg. 7. See also Dudley Seers, "The Birth, Life and Death of Development Economics, *Development and Change*, vol. 10, 1979, pp. 707-719.
8. Jonathan Falla, "What do they think they are doing?", *Times Literary Supplement*, July 18, 1997, pg. 15.
9. UNITAR/DFM Online Course on Negotiation of Financial Transactions, Lesson 3, pg. 9.
10. *Ibid.*, pg. 3.

Articles of Agreement.[11]

During the 1980s, a shift occurred in the attitude towards development and particularly to volunteers. The "softer" disciplines of the humanities were no longer welcome, although it was unclear whether this was in response to a change in demand from recipient countries, or because of a change of attitude in donor countries as to what needed to be supplied, or because of a need to justify aid financing by quantifiable, demonstrable results. This in itself raises questions about the meaning of development, because it would seem apparent that disciplines such as philosophy have great potential to foster transcultural understanding. After all, are philosohpers not trained to ask questions about assumptions, most of all our own? As well, the humanities are the disciplines that are centrally concerned with the issue of *meaning*, and if we do not understand the meaning of development, how can we possibly go about it? It may well be true that these disciplines have been deeply complicit in the way the non-Western and underdeveloped worlds have been, and still are, represented, as Edward Said argued:

> the history of fields like comparative literature, English studies, cultural analysis, anthropology can be seen as affiliated with the empire and, in a manner of speaking, even contributing to its methods for maintaining Western ascendancy over non-Western natives...[12]

Although there might be a need for a critical attitude and a "hermeneutics of suspicion" within these disciplines, this does not mean that they have no place in thinking about development. Their exclusion from mainstream development thinking and practice in favour of quantitative disciplines, particularly economics, suggests that the question as to the meaning of development has been eschewed, replaced instead with techniques of measurement and comparison, as if development were simply the process of attaining

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11. *Ibid.*, pg. 10.
12. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, Vintage Books, New York, 1994, pp. 50-51. See also Said's

measurable standards of living. But to leave it to the "development experts" to decide what counts as development is to give up the struggle for historical meaning in favour of a positivistic conception of historical inquiry as causal explanation. Said saw the challenge clearly:

> The central point in all this is, however, as Vico taught us, that human history is made by human beings. Since the struggle for control over territory is part of that history, so too is the struggle over historical and social meaning. The task for the critical scholar is not to separate one struggle from another, but to connect them, despite the contrast between the overpowering materiality of the former and the apparent otherworldly refinements of the latter.[13]

The exile of the humanities from development practice should raise questions about what the "developers" think they are doing and what this signifies about the way in which development is understood. Can it simply mean the transfer of technical knowledge, accompanied on occasion with less than generous financial aid? And if so, how can we be sure that this is really what is required? In other words, how can donor countries and organizations be sure that what they are willing to provide to hard-working countries is in fact what is necessary for development? Might there not be a lack of coherence in asking people to go and share their knowledge with other, less fortunate folk, in order to help those people achieve their full potential? For how could "we" be in a position to know what their full potential (or, as it has become, their best interests) might be? Can the formal analyses of economic theory provide an answer to such questions? Or is the formal-deductive abstraction of "the" economy itself an obstacle to understanding development?

Finding ourselves in Indonesia

We spent two years teaching English at a tertiary institute for Islamic education in Indonesia, which brought home to us the question that Falla asked. What did we think we were doing? We had a vague idea of why the Ministry of Religious

13. "Afterword", in Edward Said, *Orientalism*, Vintage Books, New York, [1979], 1994.

Affairs was cooperating in this particular development project, which was because they wanted to "upgrade" the educational level of the lecturers at these institutes. Since English language proficiency was a requirement in some way (that we didn't quite understand), they seemed to have thought that getting English teachers from Canada was a way forward. So we thought we had an idea of what was wanted, although we had no idea of what the expectations were. And given that *we* hadn't set the goals, it seemed straightforward to us that we were just there to help them go about achieving goals that they had determined for themselves. As is often the case in such projects, however, those who had determined the goals were not exactly those participating in our project. Finding out what the latter's goals and expectations from the project were was, we discovered, part of what constituted the meaning of what we were doing there, and the meaning of the project as a whole for all of us involved. That is, the meaning was determined in the doing, rather than given in advance. It was also determined *as* the doing.

As we began to realize this during the course of the project, it started to problematize how we understood our own roles in it, and indeed our own sense of who we were. Initially, we had been able to adopt the convenient (and arrogant) position that we were not there to tell them that they needed to learn English, but only to show them how to go about doing it. We had thought it irrelevant whether or not *we* thought they should learn English because "it is the international language" (which frankly did not seem like that good a reason, especially as this view tended to be accompanied by the deprecation of their own languages, both national and local). It wasn't up to us, we thought, to determine their *values* for them (although we did deprecate English a fair amount, to try and compensate for what struck us as an overly elevated view of its importance).[14]

But the situation was more complex, partly because of who *we* were and what we represented. Our understanding of who and how we were, prior to our arrival in Indonesia, was only one aspect of the situation, an aspect that was transformed (not without difficulty!) in being a part of the situation. How we appeared to them, how they appeared to us, the negotiations of the meaning of interactions and of the situation as a whole, our understanding of what we were doing and what they were doing, and their understanding of the same—all of these were constitutive of the situation. The situation of becoming who we already were—becoming our alreadiness, as Heidegger suggests—was not at our disposal to determine solely in our understanding of it. But neither was it at anyone else's disposal so to determine. Although we had thought that we were going to Indonesia to find out about development work, about living in a foreign environment, and about the perceptions and reality outside of Canada, what we actually found out about was how it was to find out about ourselves. It was an experience of "homecoming through otherness",[15] in which the cultural distance from our colleagues, students, and friends and acquaintances made it impossible to lapse into everyday understanding of ourselves and of the meaning of events and situations. The situation of being in the foreign brought to our awareness that the human situation always involves making sense of the situation.

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14. In this sense, it turns out that our approach was somewhat in line with Sen's capabilities approach to development, in that we were trying to provide them with the capability to live the kind of life that they had "reason to value", rather than to propose either reasons or values.
15. As Fred Dallmayr calls it (see "Homecoming through Otherness" in Fred Dallmayr, *The Other Heidegger*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993, pp. 149-180). As Dallmayr argues, this is a theme that is strongly evident in Heidegger's lecture courses and other texts on Hölderlin, but also one that can be found in various forms throughout Heidegger's *Denkweg* (pg. 150).

Making sense of development

Culture shock as fundamental disposedness

Culture shock has become a well-recognized phenomenon, and most organizations that send people overseas have some kind of pre-departure training to address the issue, because it has such a large impact on how effectively a person copes with a foreign world. And it is also recognized that people experience culture shock on "re-entry" back home, if they manage to adapt in some way to their foreign surroundings. The analyses of culture shock we were presented with couched it in psychological terms, with graphs showing the various "turning points" of emotional conditions as a function of time. Where the typical analysis of culture shock falls short, it seems to me, is in its psychological or egological focus. The "shock" is considered in terms of the individual's emotional or psychological states; and coping with culture shock, it is argued, is partly or mostly a matter of recognizing its existence (i.e., why am I so depressed? why do I hate this place? why are people so stupid/strange/persistent/ interfering/etc.? and so on).

Less often, if ever, is culture shock interpreted as an *ontological* phenomenon, in which the very sense of the self—of who and how we are—becomes problematic. The psychological interpretation *assumes* the identity of the individual undergoing the experience, and the issue becomes how well she can deal with the emotional and psychological challenge. But there is a more fundamental aspect to culture shock, which is that it problematizes the very sense of the self that does the "dealing with". In our average everydayness, Heidegger argues, we become used not only to the way we deal with things and the way we encounter others, but also with how we encounter ourselves. Since we firstly and mostly encounter ourselves in our encounters with things and others, the way we encounter ourselves gets its everyday significance from

the former. And this is mostly right, because we *are* the things we deal with and the others we encounter, insofar as we are constituted in such encountering. What we don't usually encounter, however, is the encountering itself.

In BT, Heidegger analyzes the phenomenon of dread as a fundamental disposedness that brings encountering into relief. Indeed, it brings it into relief with such force or predominance that we are unable to escape the encounter with encountering. Even the very flight from dread manifests the originary sense of encountering. Arguably, the same phenomenon occurs in culture shock. What happens is not so much that we get worn down by trying to make sense of all the things that are different to such an extent that we are overtaken by frustration and a feeling that we cannot cope. Rather, we are made aware—perhaps for the first time—that making sense of things *is* our way of being. The concrete ways in which we make sense of our situation *is* our identity or what it means to be the selves that we are. Such making sense is not a purely subjective phenomenon, because it involves expression of the sense that is made, or the meaning to be disclosed. Yet the meaning is not had prior to, but rather *in*, its disclosedness. And when this is not articulable to others, it cannot be so disclosed.

Development Aporias

Immanence and Transcendence

The fundamental aspect of the human situation, Heidegger argues, is its indeterminate determinacy or, equally, its determinate indeterminacy. The peculiarity of the human situation is that our understanding of it is both constitutive of and constituted by it. The situation we find ourselves in is also the situation out of which we act. Thus, being-in the situation is always being-out towards it. Our situational immanence is equioriginarily our situational transcendence. We are only in the situation insofar as we

are directed towards it, yet this directedness-towards the situation is only possible insofar as we are in it. Against positivism, which argues that there is no transcendence of the empirical, and thus that self-understanding could be reduced to knowledge of the causal laws that determine behaviour, Heidegger agrees with the historicists that such knowledge itself is at any given time transcendent of its "link" in the causal chain. On the other hand, against historicism, which argues that there is no transcendence of the historical, because every historical era is immanent in its history, Heidegger agrees with the positivists that the historical can only be understood because we transcend it. However, in collapsing transcendence and immanence in this way, he also collapses the distinctions on which positivism and historicism depend, namely, their reliance on the theoretical attitude.

Positivist aporias

Positivist theory and progress

For positivists, knowledge of the causal laws of history is made possible by those laws themselves, as they have determined history. Such knowledge itself is therefore a manifestation of the inevitability of progress. The extension of scientific empirical method to history and society is the result of a necessary sequence of events. Our ability to scientifically analyse and explain this necessary sequence is our fortune, but not our doing. What positivism could not properly account for, however, was why such knowledge itself would not affect progress. Why should progress come to an end with the "positive stage of knowledge", as Comte argued? Why does the arrival of this stage mean that the only task for humanity is to reconcile social order with the causal laws that have been discovered to govern society? Why is such knowledge itself not a link in the causal chain of progress? For positivists, the reason is that theory does not affect what it is about, but rather only reflects it. The theoretical knowledge of social

and historical laws is simply a reflection of social and historical reality that is governed by these laws. The theoretical itself does not properly belong to such reality, although such reality is what makes it possible. The positivist theorist, *qua* theorist, stands outside of the very progress he theorizes about, even though it constitutes his ability to theorize. Just as theories in the natural sciences are considered to be *about* natural objects, but not to be constitutive of them, so are the theories of social behaviour thought to be *about* the social, but not constitutive of it.

Positivism and scientific progress

Yet the progressive view found in positivist development is that freedom is the possibility of change *against* the constraints of the past. Whatever is traditional, historical, etc., must be striven against in order to progress. The freedom of progress is thus identified with possibilities that have not yet been determined, but in the assimilation of progress to scientific and intellectual progress, the mode or method by which possibilities are to be determined becomes pregiven or presupposed. As Franco Ferrarotti argues, "science is the new instrument of social consensus, the new source of legitimacy that is to supplant tradition, the authority of the eternal yesterday".[16] That is, scientific objectivity itself becomes a constraint on possibilities, in that it serves to predetermine standards of what counts *as* a possibility (what is valuable, what is meaningful) and thus purports to determine possibility itself. Science becomes a form of tradition, i.e., a domain of necessity that constrains freedom. Ferrarotti describes positivism in just these terms:

> Free thought, however...will have no meaning after the coming of the positive era in the reorganization of society, just as it has no meaning in all the other sciences that have entered the positive period, wherein the only thought of value is that of the competent person.[17]

16. Franco Ferrarotti, "The Social Character of Science: The Lessons of Positivism", *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, vol. 12, no. 4, 1999, pg. 537.

Modernity and Development

An aporia of positivist development shows itself in the differentiation of the origin of the process from its result, i.e., history from individualistic self-understanding. This is the conception of modernity, in which knowledge of self-transformation (e.g., scientific progress) is given priority over historical inheritance of tradition. This serves to immunize the modern from questionableness. The paradox of modernity is that the claim that history is transcended and therefore no longer determines meaning is supported precisely *by reference* to history and how it has determined meaning. This is the point of Goethe's *Faust*, according to Marshall Berman,[18] a point Cowen and Shenton reiterate: development involves the destruction of the old that gives it purpose, therefore it can only be the sheer negativity of *willing* (DoD 376-377).[19] The movement of Faust's self-development is from (pure) subjectivity to (pure) objectivity, by way of intersubjectivity, stages that Berman characterizes as Faust the Dreamer, the Lover, and the Developer (ASMA 40-41). As the Dreamer, Faust is locked inside his own consciousness. This trajectory, Berman argues, is one of change in both the *scope* of involvement and the *mode* of involvement: "He [Faust] expands the horizon of his being from private to public life, from intimacy to activism, from communism to organization" (ASMA 61). That is, Faust goes from theoretical knowing, to knowing through doing (loving), to knowing through making.

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17. *Ibid.*, pg. 538
18. Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1988, ch. I (hereafter ASMA followed by page number).
19. Therefore the question that development raises is, how do we *retain* the past in the transformation of the present? Transformation without the past is the nihilism of the will; retention without the future is the nihilism of the eternal. The paradox is that transformation *needs* a past to transform; retention *needs* a future in which retaining can occur. The difficulty is in how to think these *together*; i.e., it is the "together" that is so hard to think and to remain open to. This "together", Heidegger argues, is what characterizes the human situation and its "uncanniness". That is, it is a "together" that is a "between".

> His culture has developed by detaching itself from the totality of life...Contemplative vision, whether mystical or mathematical (or both), keeps the visionary in his place, the place of a passive spectator. (ASMA 42)

The development ideal that Faust embodies is an ideal of *production*, both in resource utilization and as self-creation. Yet as Heidegger points out, self-understanding is inappropriately understood if assimilated to making or production, because this cannot properly account for the relation between the actuality and ideality of the self it presupposes. In ontologising phronesis, Heidegger argues that the ideal *is* the actual self, as the upon-which and towards-which of all enactment.[20] Without some such connection, the ideal of action becomes the nihilism of the will

In the third stage, Faust as Developer, it is the sheer facticity of nature that becomes what must be overcome: its meaningless, purposeless activity. Berman argues that in this transformation

> Two radically different historical movements are converging and beginning to flow together...The romantic quest for self-development...is working itself out through a new form of romance, through the titanic work of economic development. (ASMA 62)

This, of course, is the intention to develop being brought to bear on the immanent process of development. For Berman, this is the imperative of development is such that

> under the pressures of the modern world economy the process of development must itself go through perpetual development...Even in the most highly developed parts of the world, all individuals, groups and communities are under constant relentless pressure to reconstruct themselves; if they stop to rest, to be what they are, they will be swept away. (ASMA 78)

This is valorized as modernity and/or modernization (depending on where it is supposed to occur), and purports to represent a disruption of history, whereby ways of becoming no longer make reference to how we already are. However, as Cowen and Shenton argue, it involves a commitment to values themselves posited as timeless and universal, such as increase in productive forces, expansion of capabilities, and so on,

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20. Thus, contrary to Cowen and Shenton, it is not a mind-body problem, but a problem of the *a priori* (cf. DoD 79).

which are quantitative, causally related, and operationalizable. Yet the provenance of these values is occluded in the presuppositions of development. This is further complicated by the narrowing of the scope of this "Eurocentric" term to refer either to subnational areas in the leisured countries or to the hard-working countries as a whole. What Berman refers to as the "tragedy of development" is really a form of nihilism, "the spirit that negates all!" (as Mephisto refers to himself) in the name of absolute values. The conception of positivist development denies that such values can be justified by appeal to tradition, because this conflicts with the ideal of self-creation, or the freedom to determine our own development. Yet this very claim is made on the basis *of* a tradition, only one that denies its history in the name of rationality. That is, positivist development discovers the projected future in the past, but can no longer articulate how these belong together.

Historicist development makes an analogous point. The values or meanings that constitute positivist development *are* traditional, i.e., they belong to the tradition of modernity. But the historicist solution is the denial of the spirit of negation—the projection of universal possibilities—in the name of indigenous, authentic social or cultural change. Thus, historicism denies the very basis of such change itself, i.e., that tradition is understood *as* possibilities and not as actualities to be preserved. Berman points out the paradox of the historicist rejection of "Faustian man" in terms of "the intellectual vacuum that appears when Faust is removed from the scene". Advocacy of the rejection of large-scale technologies, projects, etc., implies "the most radical redistribution of economic and political power", that "would only be a prelude to the most extensive and staggeringly complex reorganization of the whole fabric of everyday life" (ASMA 83).

The problem of positivist development

The positivist objectification of development depends on the notion that the meaning of development is univocal and universal, and thus denies a constitutive role in the determination of meaning not only to those who have not (yet) developed and those who already have, but to the development experts who are held to ascertain what development consists in. The historicalness and concrete individuality of those concerned cannot enter into the conception of development. Development thus takes on the appearance of a mechanical system that unfolds itself according to the laws governing social interactions (particularly economic interactions). Yet this is posted as manifesting itself in the achievement of certain predefined conditions, for instance in the measurement of improvement in indicators such as infant mortality, life expectancy, percent growth in GNP, literacy rate, and so on.[21] This suggests that the meaning of development is the end-state, and *not* how this is brought about.

Such meaning is determined from the conditions found in the developed or "advanced" countries, i.e., those that score highly on the various indicators. But the way that these countries themselves developed is not the way that development is now understood. That is, these countries developed indigenously, in the absence of development experts and agencies. They might have done so by emulating Britain as the first mover, or in different ways, but in either case their development was something that they undertook for themselves in response to the conditions that confronted them.[22]

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21. Tables of such indicators can be found in the UNDP's *Human Development Reports* (for countries) and the World Bank's *World Development Reports* (for economies). The UNDP's Human Development Index attempts to rank countries, whereas the Bank presents the data alphabetized by country.
22. This is not to say that there weren't people who undertook to study the phenomenon and to give advice on it, such as Friedrich List. But such people were not *development experts*. Nor were there agencies whose function was to provide expert advice. Although colonial offices were charged with the development of the colonies, particularly in Britain, there function was not to advise, but to administer (DoD 274-276, 294-296).

Positivist development, in determining the meaning of development from the history of the developed countries, elides this distinction by abstracting from history.

Historicist aporias

With historicism, the theoretical attitude is equally operative, but directed towards understanding the historical meaning of past and present eras. Historicists argue that such understanding *is* constitutive of the present, and indeed, of every era. But in supposing that it allows us to understand the past *as it is for us*, i.e., as it is in the present, the question arises as to what it is that is being understood. How is it possible to speak of "past eras" at all, if the only reality of the past is its presence in the present? In what sense is such understanding *about* the past, rather than simply an interpretation of the present? If there is no immanence because there is *only* immanence, in what sense is it possible to speak of history at all? Only if we can maintain the distinction between past and present can we properly speak of history, which seems to be what historicism denies.

The historicist explanation is that, even though our understanding of the past comes about only insofar as the past is in the present, we are able to distinguish between the two because of the difference of the cultural coherence of past eras from that of the present, as the historical remains, source materials, and so on reveal. We can understand the past in a way that is not simply the present projected onto those historical remains, because they display a coherence of cultural-historical form at odds with that of the present. Such remains are recalcitrant to our understanding, and therefore do not simply fit with the present. Historicism thus argues for the possibility of a theoretical attitude towards history in terms of the interpretation of cultural coherence. Such an attitude is possible because of the very foreignness of the historical artifacts. And it is possible to understand the present, as well, through the same theoretical attitude. Yet this

theoretical attitude and the typological comparison of historical eras it results in do not make it possible to understand how such understanding itself belongs to history as event or happening, and not as an object or as intersubjective meanings or values that predetermined history, thereby foreclosing on its dynamism. There are two orders of understanding at work here: the understanding of the historical, and the historical understanding (captured in the ambiguity of "historical consciousness"). As with positivism, historicism is unable to give an account of how historical understanding and history belong together, and thus how history *happens*. The typology of historical eras turns them into static objects, rather than taking them in a dynamic way as dynamic events. Whereas positivism determines humanity in the necessity of causal laws, historicism binds humanity to the actuality of the present.

Historicism and worldview

Historicism depends on the notion that the coherence of my particular worldview, combined with the incommensurate meanings encountered in other cultures, can reveal that coherence as internal to it and for it. But this fails to address the problem of the coherence of a world-view *as* a world-view. That is, the coherence cannot simply arise in opposition to others. In some respect, the world-view must bind us *because* of its coherence. Yet such binding requires commitment. The positivist argues that the commitment comes from rationality itself, determined as the principle of non-contradiction through the empirical observation that a thing cannot be both itself and not itself. Without such a commitment, we could have no knowledge at all. Yet the positivist argument does not resolve the difficulty, but merely relocates it. For empirical observation always shows that each and every thing we encounter is in the process of becoming what it is not, i.e., undergoing change through time. Positivism argues that the only proper way of explaining the world, and thus establishing the commitment to

non-contradiction and the laws of thought predicated on it, is to grasp things essentially, i.e., *non*-temporally, whether by subsumption under general concepts (species and genus) or by subordination to general laws. But so stated, positivist universalism can no longer account for experience, which is always dynamic or flowing.

For historicism, culturally determined meaning is not disclosive. Rather, meaning is discovered intersubjectively. This seems to lead to an *instability* of meaning. If meaning is culturally determined and thus varies with cultural change, how can I be *sure* that my current understanding of myself or my culture is appropriate? And yet, how else can I understand it *except* appropriately, given that understanding is determined by culture? A further difficulty pertains to the idea that different cultures can be understood as constituted by incommensurable coherent contexts of meaning, for it is not clear how this could be ascertained. On what basis can I understand another culture as meaningfully coherent, if I cannot understand those meanings themselves? Finally, what is the relationship of meaning to cultural change? How is there continuity of meaning throughout such change? The historicist argument is that such change involves cultural individuality becoming more explicit and objectively expressed.[23] This is seen in institutions such as law, politics and commerce, art forms such as music, painting, sculpture and architecture, and most of all in language and literature. In respect to the past, this seems unobjectionable. It is its relation to the present that is problematic. Because the historicist conception also involves the notion of change in values, standards or meanings that determine what counts as development, the latter is

23. As Dilthey put it, the concept of development "means that the subject becomes clearer and more differentiated" (Wilhelm Dilthey, "Construction of the Historical World" in *Selected Writings*, ed. H.P. Rickman, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, pg. 244). Dilthey argues that development was one of the "[t]wo great principles...introduced successively" in 18th century historiography: "With Winkelmann, Justus Möser and Herder a second principle was added—that of development. This attributes a new fundamental characteristic to the historical system of interactions, namely that it traverses, according to its inner nature, a series of changes each of which is only possible on the basis of the previous one." (*ibid.*, pg. 205)

volatilized. This, then, also forecloses on the genesis of meaning, because it supposes that what is actual (whether or patent or latent) is completely determinative of self-understanding, which is determined by inherited traditions, cultural forms, and the history that informs these.

The problem of historicist development

Historicism argues that meaning is always culturally/historically contextual, and thus that the positivist ascription of a univocal meaning to development can only be a self-interpretation of the present by those who are developed, according to objectified standards determined in the sciences of society that themselves arose with the development of the leisured countries. No matter how coherent, such an interpretation cannot in principle exclude other interpretations, without begging the question as to what grounds self-interpretation. The where, when and by whom are integral to the determination of meaning, and thus it cannot be objectively ascertained by recourse to objective measurements or indicators, because these cannot take such specificity into account. Culturally determined meaningfulness is dependent on belonging to the culture, which involves having "grown up" in it (in some sense), and having contributed to it in interactions with other members. In order to understand such meanings, then, I have to be a part of the culture, and it has to be a part of me.

When development experts come to implement a project or to give advice, they do so as foreigners, i.e., as those outside the culture. This status can also attach to those who are originally from the culture but have *become* development experts, because such expertise is already a theorization of culture. The historicist argument is that development cannot have the same meaning for us as for them, because we belong to different cultural and historical contexts. Meanings are not universal, but contextual, and although the development experts may *claim* that the way they understand this

project is in terms of its real or proper meaning, their understanding too is contextualized, by their own culture.

The Problem of Meaning

History and meaning

The question that needs to be raised with respect to the subject of development is about how meaning arises in the human situation. In positing universal and absolute meanings of history and development, positivist development occludes the essential incompleteness of the human situation that makes meaning possible.[24] In effect, it denies meaningfulness in the name of universal meaning, which is an aspect of what Heidegger refers to as lapsing. It presupposes that meaning is already "there" to be empirically determined, and that failure to recognize this itself attests to a lack of development (or, more accurately, progress). This conception of development rests on the 17th and 18th century idea of progress, in which we become ever more complete (or perfect) as human beings.[25] Intellectual progress becomes "ontological progress", in which we overcome or transcend our imperfections, i.e., our lack of knowledge. The comparative method purports to show that some societies are more complete or perfect than others. In linearizing history this way, the meaning of history itself becomes negated, because it can never be disclosed (in new and unforeseen ways) in a way that

24. "Making meaning possible" does not, of course, mean *producing* meaning.
25. The notion of progress that is *infinite* and *limitless* necessarily entails the death of God, of nature, and of death itself, i.e., of all those ways of being that limit the human situation. The notion of progress is thus nihilistic in terms of its ultimate ends. However, it is also nihilistic in another sense, which could be called the "Faustian" sense, and is what the early historicists objected to, namely, that the conception of progress devalues its own status and ideals *as well*. The values and meaning of the present are simply instrumental to a future that is more perfect, and thus lose their absolute character. Paradoxically, then, the ideal of progress cannot sustain itself against itself. As Berman argues, "once this developer has destroyed the pre-modern world, he has destroyed his whole reason for being in the world...Goethe shows us how the category of obsolete persons, so central to modernity, swallows up the man who gave it life and power" (ASMA 70).

is historical itself. The meaning of history has already been discovered. The laws of history or social evolution are taken to *dictate* progress. They have already been discovered (such discovery is *identified* with progress), and any dispute about the meaning of history is simply evidence of lack of knowledge (i.e., lack of development, or "backwardness").

The historicist critique of this position is that the absolute or universal meaning it ascribes to history is a result of, and abstraction from, the *particular* history of the leisured countries, which serves as a self-justification for the command they enjoy over the world's resources. The historicization of history and humanity entails that the meaning of history *cannot* be determined by reference to some ahistorical or supra-historical values or standards, and therefore different societies or countries cannot be determined as *instances* of such values or standards. The consequence of this in positivist development is a destructive engagement with other cultures so as to subordinate them to this ideal. A key factor in this has been the promulgation of notions of deficiency, lack, incompleteness, backwardness, etc., a message that has colonised the minds of others to such an extent that they have come to understand themselves in such terms. For historicists, all cultures are "immediate to God", i.e., are equally (in)complete and (in)coherently constituted. The problems of the hard-working countries are not due to deficiency or backwardness, but to the destructive effect of the attempted universalization of the particular histories of the leisured countries, which cannot be universalized because they are, in fact, particular.[26]

Yet the historicist critique is open to the problem that all forms of relativism face. The argument requires a standpoint that can take an overview of all cultures. But if all standpoints are culturally determined, how is it even *possible* to articulate the notion

26. As Cowen and Shenton point out, this is the notion of "corruption" or "false development" found in Newman, as the counterpoint to development (DoD 59).

of different standpoints, without that notion, too, being culturally determined? The historicist response is that it does not claim that there are *no* standards by which to judge and compare cultures, but rather that such standards themselves are always historically determined and therefore particular. That is, culturally or historically contextual meaning necessarily *includes* such standards as an aspect of the constitution of cultural meaning itself. The universalist argument not only denies that there can be historically determined meaning; it denies that there can be historical *individuality.*

The problem of meaning in both positivist and historicist development arises in the way they dissever what is understood from the understanding thereof. Positivism argues that meaning is given, regardless of whether or not it is explained, because there is only one way in which it can be determined, i.e., through empirical observation leading to the comprehension of general laws. We may not have knowledge of this at the present, but through further investigation it can be discovered. Therefore, the enactment of understanding does not play a constitutive role in the genesis of meaning. This is the positivist justification for the view that the meaning of development can be determined in an objective sense. As so determined, then, it can be provided for those unable to determine it for themselves so that they can come to understand themselves and their situation. For positivist development, such self-understanding need not involve any inquiry, because acknowledgement is sufficient.

Historicism argues that the meaning of the historical *is* its understanding by those who share this history. The genesis of meaning takes place in the sharing of history, or in its inheritance. Thus, only those who are involved in this genesis (i.e., by growing up in and sharing a culture, by inheriting traditions, etc.) can properly understand it. The cultural "content" that can be transmitted to others does not properly constitute its meaningfulness. No matter how much I may *study* a culture from outside,

as in ethnography, this cannot disclose how it is meaningful to those concerned. Antithetically to the positivist conception, then, historicism holds that historical meaning can never properly be transmitted, but only experienced.

The problem of meaning

The problems encountered with positivist development thinking are not due to malevolence or ill-will based on fully understanding the subject of development, but on the contrary are due to an *inadequate* understanding of it. This also involves an inadequate *self*-understanding, which is usually accompanied by a great deal of good-will and benevolent intentions. In development thinking, this takes the forms of how history can be investigated to show the laws or causal mechanisms governing development, or how it can itself be understood as developmental. In both cases, there is a presupposition that development *has* occurred and therefore that it can either be explained or understood. The difficulty arises in trying to relate the meaning of development to those who are supposed to understand this meaning.

In positivist development, the meaning of development is posited as objective, i.e., discoverable through the investigation of history, predominantly the history of the developed or leisured countries. But such inquiry is only possible because of the scientific progress that has occurred in such countries and thus is part of how they understand themselves. The self-understanding of the leisured involves the very notion of objectivity that is supposed to provide the meaning of development. Positivist development, then, depends on the subordination of history to the notion of objectivity that has arisen *in* history. What remains unclarified, then, is exactly how the leisured countries are supposed to *be* historical. Inherent to the concept of positivist development is the idea of scientific progress as liberation from history (usually formulated in terms of "modern" vs. "traditional" societies). However, this notion of

liberation itself becomes part of the history of the leisured countries in the form of their self-understanding *as* developed. Leisured individuals, too, are historical, but the positivist conception of development cannot take this into account. Thus, the way we have our history—or the way we are historical—cannot enter into the conceptuality of positivist development, and thus cannot enter into the *meaning* of development. Development becomes understood in purely objective terms, as necessary processes that result in the attainment of certain conditions. The development expert's relation to this object becomes that of a theoretical inquirer and a technical implementer. But neither inquiry nor implementation are taken to affect the meaning of development, and thus neither can play a role in what it means to *be* developed. What gets occluded in this conception of development is the co-disclosedness of meaning. Such co-disclosedness cannot figure because the moment of subjectivity, i.e., of *being* our history, is elided.

In historicist development, the meaning of development, as cultural change, is taken to be intersubjectively constituted and expressed in the traditions and institutions of each particular culture. Meaning is explicitly historicized. However, because such traditions and institutions are also understood to determine what subjectivity means—i.e., what it means to be a member of the culture, and what that culture means to its members—subjectivity is subordinated to intersubjectivity. History becomes understood as determining how we are and how we understand ourselves. What becomes problematic, then, is how we have our history, i.e., how we have the necessary distance from it such that we can understand it *as* our history. Without some account of this, there is no way to determine the relationship of events to cultural identity. What gets occluded in historicist development, then, is also the moment of subjectivity.

In the transformative approach of formal indication, what is clarified is the co-constitution of meaning, i.e., what it means to be human. Meaning is neither objective

nor intersubjective. But nor is it simply subjectivized. Each such reduction is a reification of meaning. What needs to be grasped, Heidegger argues, is that meaning arises in being-possible. The meaning of my own life is the factical possibilities that I take myself to be, or understand myself as. In each particular while, I am in some definite way or other, which I cannot "get behind" so as to determine or choose it from some non-factical or ideal standpoint. Furthermore, taking my being as possibilities is not something that happens in the interiority of the ego, consciousness, self, etc. Rather, it is my way of being and has to be expressed *in* being it. Such articulation always binds us to the shared world, as being-with-one-another. 'I' am heterothetically constituted as 'not-you', which cannot be a production or representation of my 'I' itself. That is, my 'I' is constituted by the recalcitrant 'you', to which I must be ever open in order to be the 'I' I am. Being myself means being my possibilities, but in order to *be* these, i.e., in order for them to be *existential* possibilities and not merely logical possibilities, I must express them, which requires a shared world in which such expression can be meaningful.

Meaningfulness is neither objective, conventional, or subjective, Heidegger argues. Rather, it arises in the "between", i.e., in co-happening in an environment or milieu. It is not discovered, agreed upon, or created, but rather co-disclosed. This suggests that meaning is neither fixed nor floating (cf. SZ 87-88). Rather, at each particular while meaning is stable but always in a provisional way. Things and conditions have the meanings they do in the way they currently are, but they may be retrieved as having other meanings, and thus their meaning cannot be determined in advance for once and for all. This does not entail the volatization of all meaning, because there is only meaningfulness insofar as there *are* definite meanings. But such definiteness is only possible insofar as these meanings are provisional, that is, insofar as

we can co-disclose them. In co-disclosedness, there is always the possibility that how things are currently understood will turn out to be otherwise, despite our current certainty about the meaning of something. We can only find this out *through* our co-disclosedness; we cannot have it determinately in advance.

Because we are constituted as finite, the human situation is one of being ever open to encountering, i.e., understanding something as something. Encountering is not the confrontation of the isolated subject with an isolated object, but is essentially communicative, and in such communication we come to understand ourselves differently, because communication always involves interpretation. As finite beings, we are not transparent to ourselves. Rather, we are disclosed to ourselves in being-with-one-another, being engaged in activities with others, encountering things in such activities, and so on. Such disclosedness always involves *moments* of transparency, in which I come to understand myself in a way that I hitherto have not, because what I understand myself to be communicating to others about myself is always subject to what they understand me to be communicating. I have no authority over how I am understood by others, and thus I am disclosed to myself through their understanding of me. But likewise, others have no authority over my understanding of what they communicate. Meaning is always negotiated or contested, but can only be so because we always already share meanings. The world is always already in a certain way for us, because this is what makes it possible for us to contest or negotiate meanings. Thus, what is fundamentally determinative for meaning is not what is actual, nor what is necessary, but is rather what is possible. Meaningfulness *is* possibility.

Development and knowledge

The general point is that the formal indication of the human situation questions the ground on which the concept of development is based, i.e., the notion that

developing means coming to *know* the meaning of development itself. In positivist development, this means acquiring the methods by which to inquire about development and thereby obtain knowledge about it, which, *as* knowledge, is objective and hence universal and univocal. On this presupposed ground, it follows necessarily that to develop means to come to recognize the meaning of development, e.g., to recognize the necessary stages every society must pass through. And this is where the contradiction lies, because the subjective moment of self-discovery is eliminated. Inquiry and discovery by the hard-working is held to be neither possible nor necessary, since the knowledge that they require in order to develop is either beyond their capacity to discover, or has already been discovered (or can be) by development experts and agencies. At the same time, however, research and discovery are considered to be crucial for the latter.[27] Knowledge is thus taken to represent one thing for the hard-working (i.e., a body of information that has been acquired and can be disseminated by experts and agencies) and another for the leisured (i.e., including the activity of discovery through research). In this way, a separation is introduced between knowing and what is known, which allows for the positivist conception that development can be technically implemented for the hard-working, once the goal (i.e., the meaning of development) has been discovered by the leisured.

Historicism appears to consider knower and known as a continuity in the historicization of history and human being. The gap is bridged by regarding consciousness as continuous with its object, i.e., history. We can understand history, the historicists argue, because we are a result of it. That is, history is intelligible *because* it has given rise to us. In this historicization, however, the problem that faces positivism

27. This attitude is clearly expressed in the documents surrounding the World Bank's intention to become the "Knowledge Bank". Cf. James D. Wolfensohn, "People and Development", World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings Address, 1 October 1996 and WDR98, entitled *Knowledge for Development*.

reappears, for historicization is taken to be an objective process and thus the relation of the historian or theorist to this process becomes problematic. If we simply are the results of history, and thus embody it, why is history in need of investigation and interpretation? Why is it not simply transparent and immediate to us? How does it become distant from, and thus foreign to, us? If the answer to this is "cultural change", then we need to ask why cultural change does not *retain* all that has previously been expressed. It is evident that cultures have arisen and have ceased to be what they were, such that they have become difficult for us to understand. How is cultural genesis possible, if humanity is never acultural? That is, if, as Dilthey argued, we can never "find man as he is apart from interactions with society—man as *prior* to society, as it were" (GSI:30/82), then how is it that societies are alien to us?

Formally indicating the subject of development

Heidegger's approach is to elucidate how objectivity, intersubjectivity, and subjectivity are equioriginary and mutually implicated in the human situation. But the moment of subjectivity is not a set of properties of a substance, as the philosophy of consciousness presupposes. This view is simply an object-ontology reformulated, and phenomenological elucidation already problematizes the notion of an "object". This form of subjectivity is really a disguised *objectivity*, i.e., it objectifies the idea of the subject, and is therefore unable to give an appropriate account of the self-world or how it is that there is anything like a self.

What formal indication allows for and, indeed, consists in is the very thing the concept of development occludes, and which the historicist and immanent critiques of development lead up to without being able to articulate: a way to grasp how future and past are discontinuous in the enactment of the continuity of history. This discontinuity

is the human situation, Heidegger argues. It is the openness of dynamic finitude, which never completes itself, but is always out for completion (i.e., is always "ecstatic"). The very condition of this finite, situated openness or incompleteness means that it can never be properly specified, since such specification encloses or closes it up as a determinate object. Through the "improper" specification of the human situation, the inadequacy or inappropriateness of the concept of development can be brought out. Formal indication, then, is a way of getting at how the world gets at me, i.e., the belonging together or coherence of the human situation. It allows us to enter into an engagement with our own ways of belonging, precisely because the approach itself requires that we do so as the being that in each case we are.

A phenomenological approach to the subject of development allows us to understand this more appropriately than the concept of development. The concept of development is an objectification both of history and of historicalness. It seeks to provide an explanation for both history and what it means. This is the positivistic aspect of mainstream development. To put this conception in question is not merely to offer a critique of its "results", but to ask whether such conceptualization is appropriate to the phenomenon. To do so, however, requires some description *of* the phenomenon that does not presuppose (either positively or negatively) the conceptualization in question. That is, it requires a formality that directs us towards the phenomenon without predetermining it. If the fundamental problem of development is the *closure* of historical meaning, then a way of inquiry is needed that does *not* close off the possibilities of meaningfulness by predetermining them.

Development thinking, I have argued, is problematic in terms of the meaningfulness of the human situation, because it entails that meanings are determinately given, whether as universal and absolute (positivism) or as historical and

contextually incommensurable (historicism). The phenomenological approach is a way to understand the genesis of historical meaning, not as something that we discover by the theoretical analysis of causal laws or the traditions that constitutes us, but as active co-disclosedness. As discussed in chapter 5, Heidegger's aim in BT is to argue that "objectivity", "intersubjectivity" and "subjectivity" are equioriginary, i.e., they are irreducibly co-constitutive aspects of the meaningfulness of the human situation. The formal indication of co-disclosedness prohibits the positivist conception of development as an objective process, the meaning of which can be determined in the abstract, or in isolation from others, particularly those whom it involves.[28]

However, this is not an attempt to propose a new "paradigm" of development, as found, for example, in Sen's notion of "development as freedom" or in Latouche's notion of the "informal". Paradigms involve a determinateness that is antithetical to the human situation. The aim is rather to keep the inquiry open to the co-determining that always constitutes us, and in particular to the co-determining that comes about in and as co-happening. This can only be indeterminately expressed, if we are not to foreclose on the framing of possibilities we understand ourselves as. This does not mean that the approach has *no* content, only that its "content" is really a directive suggestion as to how to pay attention to the way the problem-situation is meaningful and how meaning arises in, and for, such a situation.

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28. Positivist development trades on the distinction between those who are development's "subjects", and those whom it concerns (often regarded as mutually exclusive groups). Historicist development accepts the differentiation of peoples or cultures, but maintains that those concerned have to be identified primarily with the "subjects", and not with development experts. In either case, however, given that what is at issue is a transformation of such "subjects", the underlying category is the one that Berman finds appearing in literature for the first time in Goethe's *Faust*: "people who are in the way—in the way of history, of progress, of development; people who are classified, and disposed of, as obsolete" (Berman, *op. cit.*, pg. 67). Phenomenologically, however, such classification can no longer be determinative, since co-happening and co-disclosedness is not a category, but a questioning comportment. That is, it doesn't give a determinate content for "what" co-happening "is" and whom it concerns, but raises it as a question about the enactment of the relation to such content.

In this regard, the phenomenological approach I am articulating here is in accord with Cowen and Shenton's view that "free development" cannot be specified. For Cowen and Shenton, the notion of free development is problematized by the positivist requirement of trusteeship to bridge the gap between the ideal to be produced and the actual as it exists. They argue that trusteeship is essentially "a truly corrupted vision of the future" which perpetually recreates the past (DoD 476). Trusteeship forestalls free development because it has already determined possibilities in advance, with reference to the conditions of the past. The past gives the ideals of development (whether as meanings or values) in such a way that they can never be taken over and enacted in a way different from the past. Every vision of the future in positivist development is thus already infected by the past to the extent that such visions are all that is considered to be development. The identification of agency (the state, the Bank, the NGO—someone who "knows better" and "does better") with knowledge (analysis of the immanent process; construction of the development ideal) thus binds the future to the past from the outset.[29]

It is no surprise that Cowen and Shenton's immanent critique does not suggest any notion of what free development might be, save for an end to the most basic of material wants.[30] The illusion of positivist and historicist development is to think that specification of the future *is* the specification of freedom to come. But Cowen and Shenton do not give us much idea of *how* free development might be understood. The

29. This is another respect in which Cowen and Shenton's analysis differs from postdevelopment. The latter associates knowledge *with* power. For this reason, postdevelopment often appears simply to involve practices of "unmasking" the deployments of discursive power. But once again, there is a repetition of the problem: where do the "unmaskers" (i.e., the postdevelopment thinkers) stand in relation to those who are discursively dominated? And how is it that they are endowed with such agency, whereas others (particularly the hard-working) are not?
30. Cowen and Shenton quote from Adorno: "...that none shall go hungry anymore" (DoD 476).

"renunciation of trusteeship" does not suggest any way in which we can think differently from development thinking. If the only way to think of free development is through the renunciation of trusteeship, then trusteeship remains the determining concept, although in a negative sense.[31]

The formally indicative approach to the human situation aims to keep open to question the unrest or restlessness, i.e., the genesis of meaning that lies at its core, by a repetitive restlessness of questioning that opens up the human situation to its own dynamic incompleteness, thereby prohibiting the static determination of meaning found in theory and worldview, as well as the complacency of everydayness and inherited, socially accepted meaning. What formal indication suggests, then, is a way of thinking tragic situatedness and its tensions, which not only keeps unrest alive—i.e., prohibits the ready reference to values or meanings that would be accepted if only development would take place (or be abandoned)—but also transforms the lapsing tendency towards self-certainty and the self-satisfaction of having found (or inherited) "the truth". It involves a fundamental openness of the human situation to its co-disclosedness, in which our self-understanding becomes a provisional proposal to others, not about how *they* should understand themselves, but as an invitation to correct *our* self-understanding by telling us what we do not, and cannot, see.[32] But this does not mean the achievement of the self-certainty of dialectic synthesis: the new self-understanding is as provisional as the last.

Thus, formal indication makes it possible to see *how* the human situation is plurally constituted: there is no being had by history without having it (contra historicism); there is no having history without being had by it (contra positivism). And

31. It also risks becoming pathological, if every attempt to articulate something about the subject of development gets taken to be a resurrection of trusteeship.
32. Cf. Scharff, "What postmodernists don't get".

finally, most importantly, the way these belong together always involves discursive articulation, which means, in relation *to* and *with* one another, in a way that leaves open how the other (person/culture/society), in being itself, i.e., seeking to understand itself, reflects us back to ourselves.

Philosophy, possibility, development

Possibilities and being-possible

The pivotal aspect of Heidegger's analytic is the argument that we have to understand *possibility* as the central modality of the human situation. Only as being-possible, Heidegger argues, are we able to *be* historical, i.e., to have our history in such a way that it constitutes us. In ontologising *freedom*, Heidegger seeks to elucidate how it is that the naturalization of history and the historicization of nature belong together.[33] Another way of understanding the relation between possibility and concrete individuality is in terms of subjectivity as opposed to objectivity and intersubjectivity. Positivism presupposes that objectivity (determined as the invariance of empirical experience) can explain our way of being, including why we ask "why?" and the historicalness of our being (naturalizing history). Historicism argues that explanation in terms of invariance or positivist objectivity cannot hope to give an appropriate account of the historical, for this is constituted in meaning and not in empirically observed invariance. However, the constitution of meaning is an intersubjective event, and thus historicism attempts to assimilate objectivity to intersubjectivity (historicizing nature). Heidegger argues that neither is sufficient to appropriately account for the genesis of meaning or the meaning of historical individuality, because neither can give an account of how meaning is *normative* or binding. Heidegger argues that possibility is the

33. Cf. Joanna Hodge, *Heidegger and Ethics*, pg. 137.

moment of freedom, by which I am bound to my world as the naturally historical and historically natural being that I am. My history is binding *because* it is the *fons et origo* of the factical possibilities that constitute me. But conversely, my history is only so binding in that I *take* myself as my possibilities, and such "taking myself" is not itself a factical possibility.

> ...the human situation...on the basis of being-in-the-world, is always in its very possibility already beyond all beings. And in this being-beyond it does not come up against absolute nothingness. Rather, on the contrary, in this very being-beyond the human situation holds before itself the binding commitment as world and in this counter-hold first can and even must hold itself to beings. (MFL pp. 196-197, translation altered)

Question and questioner

How does the individual stand in relation to the subject of development, and how can this be incorporated into the question of development, its analysis and critique? The formal indication of the subject of development suggests an approach that is predicated on the *question* itself. For analysis to even begin, there must be a factically prior encountering of the phenomenon in question, which is thus constitutive of the questioner. That is, the questioner is always already in relation to what is inquired about. Formal indication aims to bring into relief this pretheoretical encountering, so as to show how it is involved in the genesis of meaning.

The formally indicative approach to the subject of development aims to show how I, as the inquirer, am *already* part of this subject. It is not an object that I stand outside, but a phenomenon that constitutes me *because* I encounter it. Development and its technical implementation are not "natural" objects and processes that can be studied theoretically, because they are part of what constitutes my lifeworld or my being-situate, and thus, whether I like it or not, they constitute me. I may not be particularly aware of what goes on under the emblem of development, but cognition does not determine how I am constituted. What *is* decisive is the world that I am always in, and

is recalcitrant to the will to either dominate or ignore it. That is, I cannot make the world mean what I want it to mean, no matter how convinced I am that this is the case, because I am immanent to the world or, more saliently, immanent to history. I may wish that my history did not include the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, but I cannot make it otherwise. At the same time, the *meaning* of this occurrence itself is not simply *given*, because it always has to be retrieved, and is so retrieved in terms of other occurrences that have followed. Insofar as events constitute me as the history that I am, I understand myself in relation to them. They do not simply exist "out there" in the world, such that I can be who I am regardless of whether or not they occurred, even though this attitude, too, is always constitutive of the human situation. But I cannot forget that which I have not encountered in some way.

If conceptions of development are put in question, then what is at issue is the meaning of history and our relation to it. This is the interstitial point where Heidegger's notion of formal indication becomes significant. Phenomenological hermeneutical inquiry neither aims to give a complete description of the human situation nor to prescribe to us how the human situation *must* be understood. Instead, it gives an indication of the way we go about understanding what it means to be ourselves, how this can be made explicit, and what this can tell us about how this can be done appropriately, or rather, what doing so appropriately involves. It is indicative, in that it points out something about concrete individuality and being-historical; it is formal because what it points us to is not, in fact, a "what" at all, but rather a *how* of being, which is the formal indicating constitutive of the human situation itself.[34] In this way, it puts into question the issue of how the development expert or critic stands in relation to that which he or she investigates or criticizes, an issue already predetermined in development thinking.

How do we go about thinking of this relation in a way that is not predetermined by the concepts and approaches of development thinking themselves, as characteristic of our own historical context? How can we think outside of development, when this is what allows us to think in the first place, whether this is understood as conformity to the norms of "rationality" (or science) or as the historico-cultural context that makes meaning possible?

Questioning meaning

The phenomenological approach does not ask about *what* development is, but rather about what conceptions of it involve, as determinations of the meaning of history in terms of material well-being, agency, and so on, that close off the disclosedness of meaning as *itself* constitutive in to the subject of development. That is, these conceptions deny that meaning is always co-determined, and thus that meaningfulness involves co-disclosedness.

Questioning meaning is constitutive of the human situation, Heidegger suggests, but the *provision* of determinate meanings always occludes such constitutive questioning, whether this is given in everyday lapsing into the obviousness of what is "commonly" meant, or by theoretical abstraction. The latter, in fact, is more pernicious, because it also supplies a "court of judgment" for keeping questionableness at bay, i.e., systems and doctrines of thought that adjudicate what can be said and thought on the grounds of *rationality.* This excludes questioning of the genesis of meaning itself, which cannot be theorized because it is the non-theoretical basis for all theory. Theory

34. Lest this be regarded as too much "bootstrapping", it can be pointed out that this is no more objectionable than the self-grounding notion of what counts for truth in the natural sciences (for example). What counts as true or valid is what can be observed and can be duplicated by other observers, i.e., is objective. These criteria determine what is true or objective because nature is recalcitrant, i.e., it stand over against us in its sheer facticity, which we simply have to acknowledge. However, acknowledging such sheer facticity is part of what counts as "objectivity". The facticity of the natural is presupposed as that which makes it objective.

cannot address facticity, because facticity is *a priori* for theory. Yet facticity is the condition for all understanding. The inability of theory to address facticity makes meaning *un*questionable, which destroys meaningful*ness* because it can no longer arise as fundamentally constitutive of who I am in questioning.

What is argued for here, then, is a twofold significance to formal indication, corresponding to its two functions. First, thinking the human situation in this way suggests how we can understand the genesis of meaning in a way that does not predetermine it theoretically by dissevering facticity and existentiality. Second, it suggests a way to rethink the phenomenon itself, neither as linear, univocal progress, nor as self-contained cultural development, but as both *together*, i.e., in the dynamic tension between them.

Formally indicative questions

To present the results of this inquiry in a series of assertions *about* development would be to close off the provisional incompleteness that the formally indicative approach requires, and thus would be antithetical to the inquiry. By way of conclusion, then, I suggest instead some questions that the concept of development raises, and which therefore constitute it *as* a way of being, but are occluded *in* that way of being.

Is there such a thing as a "development expert"? A "development agency"?

If development is neither object nor (transitive) activity, but rather a way of being or a comportment, can there be any claim to development expertise? Can there properly be agencies whose *raison d'être* is to study development and operationalize it? If the analysis of economic and political behaviour is coherently constituted as an approach to an object-domain, then it is plausible to hold that there can be expertise in

this approach, just as much as there can be expertise in the natural sciences. But can this be equated to "expertise" in co-happening? What becomes questionable with the recognition of coevalness and co-constitution is that any claim to "expertise" involves the denial that others are equally, and *necessarily*, involved in the determination of possibilities. What the question seeks to hold open is whether this can be considered to be expertise about what is objectified as *development*. What such experts do is to study and advise about ways to change institutions, to engage in technical activities, etc.

The fundamental problem that formal indication adverts to is that objectification as "development" entails that the comportment or self-understanding of the development expert cannot be called into question by the *subject of development*. That is, how does the subject of development include development thinking? Yet development is not an *object*, but a co-happening. Thus, there cannot be "expertise" in it, because this would entail expertise in how others understand us, which presupposes that I can have such understanding *independently* of others.

Formal indication highlights the provisionality of being human, i.e., that we are never fully transparent to ourselves. Since I can neither be the creator of the context I find myself in, nor the creator of the understanding of that context, I cannot have certainty about how I understand myself. The objectivity of knowledge in the positive disciplines (particularly in social sciences such as economics, where theoretical analysis is taken to be more objective than self-understanding, as for example in Marshall), is ultimately grounded in ways we take ourselves to be. But if development thinking presupposes that the self-understanding of "developed" people represents an ideal or end for others who do not and cannot take themselves to be that way, *ex hypothesi*, then the relation between the two is problematic. If developedness is the ideal for both, then we are *all* engaged in the same project of trying to work out who we

are in relation to one another and what it means to be so related. On the other hand, the distinction between developed and underdeveloped implies a difference in self-understanding, which makes the relevance of the self-understanding of the developed to the underdeveloped questionable.

A formally indicative alternative

The positivist conception depends on the notion that history is an object that can be analyzed in terms of general laws, whether or not such knowledge is available to those subject to such laws. In this conception, individuals are alienated from their history, because the posited meaning of history does not include how they understand it. Instead, historical meaning can only be determined by those who have the expertise and analytical tools to do so. Thus, development experts are the only ones in a position to pronounce on what development means, and so to act as "advisors" to those who are incapable of understanding it, so as to instruct them in how to become developed. The positivist conception of development entails that there is a difference between the development expert (who, because of such expertise, is *already* developed) and the subject of development. This difference has to do with a relation to history. The development expert "has" history, in being able to objectify it, scientifically analyze it, determine its meaning, and so on. The underdeveloped people, however, being unable to do this (because the ability to do so is what constitutes being developed) are simply "had" by their history.

The historicists take issue with this, arguing that if development (or cultural change) has to do with meaning, then this has to concern those who belong to the culture. However, because historicism maintains that meaning is culturally determined, it also implies that cultural change is not a matter for individuals, but only for a culture as a whole, in expressing its cultural individuality. This equally problematizes the

relation of the human situation and history, since it suggests that there is no way for an individual to "stand outside" of her culture or history so as to be actively involved in cultural change. Cultural change "happens", but no-one is the agent. Unlike positivism, the historicist conception argues that no-one "has" their history, because we are all determined by our culture and the meaning that our cultural inheritance determines for us. Instead, it is a question of which histories we are "had" by, i.e., that determine who and how we are.

Phenomenologically, neither conception is adequate, because in order to "have" our history, we must be "had" by it, and in order to be "had" by it, we must "have" it. History is neither a possession we have nor a context that constitutes us, but is both, or rather, these are one and the same. The facticity of being human does not simply mean a complete immersion or immanence in our historical context, but always also involves the transcendence of it in understanding ourselves. But similarly, the transcendence of understanding our history is only possible because it refers to facticity, i.e., being historically constituted. History is thus neither simply an object nor a set of shared practices, but is always *also* a way of being an individual, or of being individuated. Objectivity, intersubjectivity and subjectivity are irreducible. They belong together in the human situation, and indeed, are what equioriginarily constitute it. What is difficult to grasp is this equioriginariness itself.

Positivist development, on the basis of abstraction from history, aims to determine courses of action to be implemented concretely. Yet the concrete cannot be derived from the abstract. The operationalization of positivist development is always an attempt to apply abstract principles to concrete contexts, which themselves are not the contexts from which the principles are abstracted. This is once again an example of how the scientific analysis of society is inadequate for the task it sets itself, and in fact

conduces to a misunderstanding of the phenomenon. In implementing a development project to construct infrastructure, advise on policy, reform institutions, etc., the abstract principles must be made concrete. Rather than an abstract power station, it concerns *this* power station, located in *this* region, to built by *these* people, operated by *those* others, and paid for by *these* citizens of *this* particular country. Furthermore, it is being co-funded by *these* international organizations who have sent *those* advisors, and so on. In each case, the meaning of the endeavour depends on all of these contextual factors together, which also includes those who advise on and recommend the project. They, too, are as much a part of the meaning of the project as any of the other factors. However, the positivistic presupposition is that the concrete project has the same meaning as the abstract project, and therefore its meaning *does not* depend on those involved. In particular, it does not depend on the development experts, who are thus always absolved of responsibility if the project is a failure (by their own standards).

The inquirer and the subject

In order for inquiry into the subject of development to be unprejudiced by the theoretical attitude, the preliminary question that needs to be raised concerns the relation between inquirer and subject. How does the development expert or development critic stand in relation to the subject of development? Is this relation and its enactment part of the inquiry, or is it simply presupposed, taken as a correlation given along with the subject matter and expertise about it? Neither positivist nor historicist development raises this question.

Formally indicating development

Referring-prohibitive function

How might the formal indication of co-happening function with regard to the theoretical analyses encountered in positivist and historicist development? One aspect is to prohibit the notion that communication and cooperation between different societies can be understood in terms of knowledge and expertise. The theoretical attitude of positivist development occludes the situatedness of both development expert and hard-working person, although in opposite ways. The situatedness of the development expert is occluded in the presupposition that knowledge of the situation of others equates to transcendence of one's own situation. A development expert's knowledge about the pastoralists of Tunisia, for example, is taken to represent an ability to transcend her own situation as a Texan, say, and this is reinforced by the inability of the Tunisian to transcend her own situation through expert knowledge of Texas. Indeed, the asymmetry in positivist development regarding situatedness runs deeper than this, since expert knowledge about Texas (for example, its oil industry) does *not* count as development expertise, since Texas is (by definition) not developing. As opposed to this, the lack of ability to understand her *own* situation ascribed to the hard-working person occludes situatedness because it implies complete immanence in the situation. There is no possibility of the transcendence that *constitutes* situatedness. In being completely "had" by my situation, I thus do not "have" it at all. This is the converse of the first case, in which the development expert, in "having" the situation of the hard-working person, is no longer "had" by her own situation.

This view of their situational transcendence is not necessarily explicitly articulated by development experts,[35] but it is implied in the conception of development

35. Although the World Bank's attempt to style itself as the Knowledge Bank could be understood in just this light.

itself, which eliminates recognition that the lived-situations of development expert and hard-working "developee" are equally constitutive of the subject of development. Expertise cannot take this into account, because being-situate is not an object *about* which there can be expertise. The development expert does not, and cannot, live the situation of the hard-working people about whom she is an expert.[36] The formal indication of co-happening prohibits this presupposition about expert knowledge. If the phenomenon is one in which different countries, societies, or even individuals co-happen, then it cannot be understood as one that only happens to some, and is only understood by some.

The formal indication of co-happening points to the co-determination of meaning as part of the co-constituting of who we are. Co-determination and co-constitution always involve inherited traditions that constitute us. These inherited traditions are meaningful in terms of the possibilities they are understood as freeing us for. This is how they are co-determined, since such possibilities are disclosed in communication and contention. Traditions, however, are not objects but *ways of being*, and thus always have to be retrieved and repeated. They cannot be determined by empirical observation, nor are they simply had as shared practices. Communication and contention is how they are constituted *as* traditions. Furthermore, the intrinsic incompleteness of the human situation means that we only have traditions in being-with-one-another. Traditions are therefore not self-contained. We inherit them both by

36. The asymmetries involved in the presupposition of expert knowledge can also be detected in the presupposition that development refers to aid or assistance *from* developed countries *to* underdeveloped countries. The equation of development with aid, as expressed, for example, on the CIDA website, follows from the combination of the idea of "international development" and the categorization of countries as "developed", "developing" and "underdeveloped". This categorization implies that there are countries that *do not* (intransitively) develop. Thus, the only involvement they can have in international development is to (transitively) develop others, i.e., to assist or aid the developing/ underdeveloped. The formal indication of co-happening prohibits this presupposition too, since leisured people co-happen just as much as hard-working people.

growing up in them, and in the retrieval of them as they become distant to us. This happens both in "generational" co-happening and in the interaction *between* different traditions, for instance, with migration. Traditions are not self-contained isolates, but nor are they simply "options".

Co-happening formally indicates this structural incompleteness by prohibiting the identification of cultures, societies or countries as complete in themselves, i.e., as atomistic entities that are self-contained and self-constituted. Both positivist and historicist development presuppose such self-containment in the way they identify the meaning of development. That is, both approaches take societies or cultures as particular *instances*, for positivist development instances of a stage in the linear sequence that constitutes progress, for historicist development instances of coeval and equal sociocultural formations.

The possibility of development

Positivist possibilities

For positivist development, the question of the possibilities of development and how these are *had* is determined in advance from the actuality of the leisured countries, which provide the understanding of the development problematic and how this is to be addressed. In positivism, such actualities are taken to demonstrate *necessity* in the form of the general laws or causal regularities responsible for developedness. Development is conceptualized in terms of the necessity of the laws governing it, which are demonstrated by the leisured countries. The (present) actuality of the hard-working countries is conceptualized as the necessity of "past stages" of the development the leisured have experienced. That is, the coevalness of leisured and hard-working is reconfigured in terms of different "historical stages". The ascription of necessity to the unilinear sequence of development stages does not entail that development is

inevitable, however. Hard-working countries may continue working hard (or "stagnating"). Rather, *if* development *does* occur, it will follow the necessary stages determined from the actuality of the leisured countries. The positivist "problem of development" is therefore how change from one stage to another is to be brought about. Here we find another presupposition of positivist development: the leisured countries are considered to be "self-moving".

This problematic, as shown in chapter 2, has three aspects, namely, surplus population (or poverty), quantification, and mechanistic social change. The problem of development becomes codified as the problem of *poverty.* The way to address this problem is by assisting societies on to the path achieved by the leisured countries of economic growth and increasing wealth. The technical recommendations are justified by the identification of past stages of the leisured countries with the present of the hard-working. In this conceptualization, then, the possibilities of the hard-working countries are predetermined *for* them, not *by* them.The experience of the leisured countries shows how to solve the development problem. As such, the possibility that the hard-working countries can determine their own possibilities is denied, and is assigned to those whose experience transcends the immanence of the development problem. In this way, being-possible is denied of the hard-working countries themselves. Because they have not experienced the various transformations that development signifies, they cannot be in a position to determine their own development. They cannot determine the possibilities that constitute them as who they are. They lack the ability to make such determinations, which is what underdevelopment *means*. For positivist development, the process of development is already determined. This denies the notion that possibility is constitutive of *being* the society, country, etc., that it is. It denies that being-possible is what constitutes the human situation.

Historicist possibility

For historicist development, possibilities are seen as indigenously determined, and thus both particular to, and latent in, each particular society. Positivist development and its operationalization on a global scale is seen as suppressing such latent possibilities, imposing instead a universal determination of possibilities. Such possibilities are viewed by historicist development as an illegitimate generalization from the particular conditions of the developed. Despite such hegemonic imposition, however, indigenous possibilities are not completely destroyed. Indeed, historicist development argues that the very failure of positivist development is testimony to both its particularity and its impotence. In drawing attention to "real, existing development", as Serge Latouche calls it,[37] historicist development argues that the *actuality* of development shows that the possibilities determined by positivist development are neither universal nor necessary. Thus, historicist development accords priority to the modality of actuality over both necessity and possibility. It therefore denies that development means being or becoming what the developed countries actually *are*.

The possibility of co-happening

In formally indicating the phenomenon as co-happening, attention is drawn to the way that possibilities are determined in communication and contention about meaning. Communication and contention are also possibilities we take ourselves *as*, and thus attest that the basis for co-happening is always already there. The possibilities that are determined in co-happening cannot, however, be given in advance, because this would simply generalize one particular self-understanding. Rather, they arise out of, and are oriented towards, the contested retrieval of both hard-working and leisured

37. Serge Latouche, *The Westernization of the World*, *op. cit.*, pg. xiv.

countries' traditions. But this does not mean that co-happening is a tendency towards convergence, whether through subordination or hybridization. Although the possibilities of all countries are transformatively retrieved in co-happening, these possibilities, and the understanding of them, are still constitutive of individuation because in their enactment they come to constitute the alreadiness of a country as the country it is, i.e., its history. That is, although the meaning and understanding of possibilities are communicated and contested in co-happening such that one tradition can reveal the possibilities of another to that other itself, this does not entail that these become possibilities for *both* traditions.

The philosophy of possibility

Although Heidegger's analytic is difficult to grasp, it is difficult *because* it tries to express the lived situation that each of us is, not because it claims access to an object that is only available to those adept in certain techniques of inquiry. That is, formally indicating the human situation may strike us as odd and incomprehensible, but this is because it aims to show what gets occluded both in everydayness and in theoretical inquiry. Formal indication does not provide us with an account of how we must understand ourselves and our situatedness. Rather, it indicates how it is that we express that situatedness. It does not determine in advance where we might end up in enacting this for ourselves.

The problematic of the subject of development is also the problematic motivating Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutics: the relation of history and the *a priori*. On the one hand, who we are and how we understand this is historically contextual. On the other hand, the possibility of expressing the notion of historical context seems to require ahistorical concepts. In purely formal terms, the idea of difference necessarily involves the idea of the same, i.e., it is heterothetical.

Heidegger's notion of equioriginariness—i.e., the heterothetical irreducibility of I and other—is a reformulation of Dilthey's notion of the socio-historical context of individuality (GSI:28-31/80-83), to contest the opposition between self and other, or individual and social collective, as inappropriately reductionistic. Given that this is the locus of Heidegger's inquiry, and that his aim is to show that the genesis of meaning lies neither in object, intersubject, nor subject, but rather "between" them all in disclosedness (cf. SZ 132), which ultimately involves being-possible, the question of interest here is how this pertains to development thinking.

The possibility of free development

As has been shown previously, the concept of development involves the determination of possibilities, whether in terms of the objective conditions whereby development can occur, or as the intersubjectively determined sharing of cultural identity. In inquiring about the possibility of free development, the question then is how freedom relates to such possibilities, for if they are given, they seem to stand over against us as constraints.

For historicist development, development and freedom are connected in the flowering or maturation of latent possibilities identified as culturally individual. Freedom means the development of cultural expression, i.e., cultural change that deepens and solidifies cultural identity.

The finitude of the human situation suggests that we are fundamentally constituted by being-possible, because our way of being is to take beings *as* beings. The moment of subjectivity in the human situation is understanding ourselves *as* our factical possibilities. But this can never be properly expressed, because in the very attempt to express this, the factical possibilities that constitute me change. The constitution of our being, Heidegger argues, is such that we can only express our concrete individuality

improperly, i.e., we can only formally indicate it. It is never completely transparent to us, but is how we are always finding ourselves to be, in encountering things in our shared world. Thus, meaning is always provisional. This provisionality of meaning, however, gets occluded in the attempt to specify things properly or determinately. Proper or determinate specification excludes possibility. Recognizing possibility as constitutive of our way of being means that we can only express this indeterminately.

This is precisely the situation of development. In the attempt to determine the meaning of development in the reiteration of history, it takes on the characteristic of necessity. In positivist development, this is effected by abstraction from history by quantification and mechanistic regularization. Development becomes conceptualized as a *necessary* future, rather than a way in which the future is co-disclosed as possibility. As such, we can no longer be involved in, or even capable of, co-determining the future, because it cannot be a possibility for us. Positivist development denies being-possible. However, this applies just as much to the leisured as to the hard-working. And this means that it applies to the development expert herself. Despite the apparent distinction between "traditional" and "modern" peoples or societies, in understanding themselves as creators of their own conditions, positivist development in effect denies that this can be a distinction at all. In substituting for progress and for possibility, development becomes a worldview that reifies and freezes history exactly where it is, because it is only through abstraction from history that the meaning of development can be determined. Despite all its programmatic aspects and the operationalization of social change, as a guiding concept development, it is incapable of taking into account the possibility of the new and unforeseen. That is, it *conceptually* occludes the understanding that constitutes the human situation.

Historicist development similarly forecloses on possibility, because it seeks to counterpose intersubjectivity to the objectivity of positivist development. By making recourse to what is actual in a culture as the shared meanings determined by its history, it thereby occludes the possibility involved in inheriting tradition. Thus, it occludes the moment of subjectivity whereby history and tradition are constituted.

In both cases, the freeing up of possibility as the indeterminately active power of appropriation is available, as long as this is recognized by the theorists themselves. That is, by bringing this approach "home" to theorists and critics of development alike, there is the possibility (!) of a reorientation in thinking. The central aim of the formal indication to the subject of development is to call to the attention of those who claim to be able to speak about development how the theoretical approach to development itself fails to take into account the dynamic finitude of the theorists that makes such theorizing possible. That is, formally indicating the subject of development is aimed at showing how the concept of development itself occludes the self-understanding of development theorists. The theoretical objectification of historicalness as development entails that it can be understood without reference to subjectivity, i.e., that the meaning of development can be articulated in terms of objectivity or intersubjectivity. But this involves the denial that the subjectivity of the development expert or critic is constitutive in this endeavour. Given that the concept of development or cultural change means something other than imposing conditions upon hard-working people, if it cannot take into account the concrete individuality of the development expert or critic herself, it is unclear how it can be oriented towards grasping that this is constitutive of the human situation.

An appropriate account of the phenomenon has to include the enactment of meaning as co-disclosedness, but this shows that development cannot be an object.

Thus, a different way of approaching the subject is needed. The "improper" approach of formal indication involves giving an account of the subject of development that includes the possibility of giving such an account, as part of what it gives an account of. That is, it includes the *inquirer* in the account, not concretely, but formally-indicatively. It thus suggests how each inquirer needs to take herself into account in the inquiry. Unlike the concept of development, then, the formally indicative approach does not presuppose that what is inquired about—the subject of development—remains unchanged in the inquiry. Indeed, the very point of such an inquiry *is* to alter what is inquired into.

What can be shown is that possibility is more central to the subject of development than the concept of development allows for. The predominance of the necessary and the actual in development thinking makes it hard to grasp that what the subject of development really concerns is possibility, i.e., *the possibility of being otherwise*. In representing the future as the implementation of possibilities that have been determined from the history of the leisured countries, positivist development occludes the appropriation of such possibilities by hard-working countries (whether positively or negatively) whereby they are taken to be meaningful in ways that the development expert does not, and indeed cannot, recognize in advance. Only if the development expert herself remains open to the possibility that what she understands by these possibilities is not, and cannot be, how they are understood by others, can she begin to recognize what might be happening, and how she herself is involved in this happening.

In representing the future as a retrieval or regeneration of the traditions and history of an individual culture, historicist development occludes the way in which these come to have different meanings *in* their retrieval and regeneration, which the

historicist development critic does not, and indeed cannot, recognize in advance. Only if the historicist critic himself remains open to the possibility that what he understands these traditions to mean is not, and cannot be, how they are understood by others, can he begin to recognize what might be happening, and how he himself is involved in this happening.

The formal indication of the subject of development suggests further that the appropriation of possibilities presented by the positivist development expert always already involves the retrieval and regeneration of historical traditions, because appropriation can only happen from out of a historical situation. Similarly, it suggests that the retrieval and regeneration of historical traditions suggested by the historicist critic always already involves the appropriation of objective possibilities, because this is how we have our historical traditions. The theoretical disseverance of objectivity and intersubjectivity in terms of abstract scientific inquiry and historical contextualization is always held together in *being* a coeval, co-disclosing culture, because this involves co-disclosing meaning. The concept of development is compromised in its different articulations by the way it attempts to privilege sameness or difference, rather than recognizing that these always already belong together, and that the intellectual and practical challenge lies in grasping how it is that these belong together. This, it seems to me, is how we make our history at the same time as we are made by it, how we have it and are had by it, and how we transcend our historical situation through our immanence in it. Heidegger's phenomenological elucidations of the human situation indicate one way of trying to think this, a way that can help clarify how we find ourselves in our situation. In the final analysis, it seems to me that the possibilities for a country, culture, or society can only be determined in its co-evalness with others. The role that other people might play in this is not to instruct or inform about what to do, but to ask about

how they understand what they are doing, and in trying to understand this, to be an opportunity for them to understand themselves. Such interaction is, of course, reciprocal. Arguably, it would be helpful if we were to come to understand this as the situation out of which our inquiries come, and towards which they are oriented.

Conclusion

Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutics of the human situation suggests that development is too central to the human condition to be the exclusive concern of expert developers or of any positive discipline(s). Co-happening is constitutive of understanding, and as such co-constitutes self-understanding. Because being-with-one-another is constitutive of *being* human in its disclosed disclosiveness, the subject of development belongs to the problematic of human being. Above all, co-happening suggests that positivist development thinking needs to be understood as *belonging* to the phenomenon, rather than being able to determine it theoretically from an external standpoint, and thus is co-determined by the very situation it theorizes. On the other hand, co-happening suggests that historicist development thinking needs to be understood as predicated itself on a situational transcendence that is only made possible by the communication and contest of meaning through the interactions that it eschews.

Discontinuation

Nearness and distance

The relation of distance and nearness to what we are distant from or near to as a way of being means that it is *more originary* than what is so related, i.e., self and thing or self and other. In BT, Heidegger argues that distance is ontological:

> The human situation is of course ontically not only near or even the nearest—we *are* actually it ourselves in each case. Despite this, or precisely for this reason, it is ontologically the farthest. (SZ 15)

Indeed, the "ontological difference" between beings and their being is, in the human situation, an ontological distance between disposedness and understanding, or facticity and existentiality, the ontological sense of which is to be found in the structure of originary timeliness as alreadiness-becoming. This last structure can be deformalized to give a phenomenological elucidation of being-historical, which does not have to do with "the past", but rather with the happening and co-happening of the "stretch" between birth and death in their ontological senses. That is, historicalness does not concern just the past or even alreadiness, but the belonging together of alreadiness and becoming, as the movedness of the human situation in belonging together at things and with others in caretaking and caregiving. Distance and nearness are also, of course, transcendence and immanence.

Heidegger's phenomenological inquiry does not so much conclude as break off with a series of questions that leave us right where we started, wondering, amidst beings as a whole, what it means "to be".

> Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, proceeding from the hermeneutics of the human situation, which all philosophical questioning, as the analytic of *existence*, has fastened the end of the guideline there from where it *arises* and to where it *returns*. (SZ 38, 436)

In one sense, Heidegger's very approach enjoins against doing otherwise. Any attempt to *conclude* a formally indicative inquiry is an attempt to complete it, in which case it would turn out to have been theoretical all along.

For these reasons, to try to provide a conclusion here would be antithetical to the very endeavour. Like the inquiry that is the human situation itself, it cannot conclude, but can only be discontinued. I give the last word to Heidegger:

> The human being is a creature of distance! And only by way of the real primordial distance that the human in his transcendence establishes toward all beings does the

true nearness to things begin to grow in him. And only the capacity to hear into the distance summons forth the awakening of the answer of those humans who should be near. (MFL, “Supplement”)

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Appendix I: Terminology and Lexicon

About the terminology used in this text

Economics

The original Greek sense of "economics" is verbal and refers to an activity or an art, i.e., household or estate management. In English, into the 19th century, "economy" and its cognates referred to a mode of behaviour or a way of being, rather than to an object. It is only towards the end of the 19th century that "economy" acquires its contemporary meaning of an object comprising all the exchange interactions between individuals, consumers and producers, government, etc., as when we talk about "the economy". It is all too easy to read this nominal or substantialized sense back into earlier texts. In doing so, however, misunderstandings can occur. For example, when Adam Smith uses the term "economy", he is referring to a mode of behaviour, and not to a hypostasized object. A phrase such as "the English economy" refers to the way the English behave, and not to the sum total of exchange interactions in England.

In this text, therefore, I have tried to avoid using "economy" in its hypostasized sense (except where the context requires it). Instead, I use "economic behaviour", "economic activity", or other such phrases. Although this can sometimes be ungainly, it has the merit, I believe, of drawing attention to the sense of activity that the earlier economists were concerned to study, and avoids ascribing an anachronistic objectification to them.

Development

The terminological difficulties encountered in discussing "international development" are legion, and are explored in some detail in Chapter 3. In particular, the distinction between the verbal and nominal senses of "development" are problematic, but using it is unavoidable. The same is not true of some of its cognates, however, such as "underdeveloped", "developed", and "developing". One tendency in critiques of development is to use these terms in quotation marks, to indicate the critical distance that the author wishes to establish between her own understanding of what is referred to and the dominant or mainstream understanding. Such orthography soon becomes tedious. Instead, I have used the terms "hard-working country" and "leisure country" to distinguish, in what I hope is a less contentious way, those that development is thought to address from those who are thought of as doing the addressing. My justification for using these terms is that they are, at least to some extent, more neutrally descriptive than other possibilities, such as "low-income" and "high-income" (as used by the World Bank, for example). As with "underdeveloped" and "developed", the meanings of such terms tends to presuppose values whose origin is (predominantly) in the latter countries (or societies).

Heidegger

Translating Heidegger is notoriously difficult, not just because his texts are replete with neologisms that only resonate in German or because he nominalizes adverbs and verbalizes nouns. Rather, it is that the language he uses is *formally indicative*. His concepts do not refer to objects with determinate properties, but to ways of being whose indeterminacy is to be made determinate in following in the direction which those concepts point. Heidegger's language is itself aimed at drawing our attention to the express*ing* of what it tries to express, rather than to *what* is express*ed*.

The difficulty this presents makes it tempting to transpose Heidegger's terms into concepts that are familiar. For example, it is tempting to translate *Miteinandersein* (being-with-one-another) as "sociality" or some other cognate. Similarly, it is tempting to translate *Da-sein* as "human being". To do so is to misunderstand Heidegger's aim from the start. His language and concepts specifically aim to prohibit or direct us away from our usual object-thinking, so as to refer us to the enactment of relat*ing* of what is usually thought of as subject and object.

Miteinandersein, for example, prohibits the identification with "sociality" or "the social" as it is usually conceived, in order to refer us to the way in which we appear in the world as always be*ing*-with-one-another. This is a happening or taking place in which, and as which, each of us is constituted. It is a kinetic co-constituting that is completely specific as to its context and content. The "social", on the other hand, presupposes a static, objective relation between subjects, egos, personalities, etc. It also abstracts from the singular sense of *my* being-with-one-another. The point of Heidegger's terms, then, is in fact to point us *away* from such presuppositions, so as to get us to recognize and understand the concretely singular kinetics of the human situation. My hope is that this aspect of Heidegger's thinking has become clearer in the course of this thesis.

Here, I discuss a few of the more idiosyncratic translations I have attempted. First, I use "being-situate" to translate *Da-sein*. I agree with Thomas Sheehan that leaving this word untranslated has had a deleterious effect on Heidegger interpretation. However, Sheehan's own suggestion ("openness-for-being" or "openness", for short) fails to express both the verbal sense (as indicated by his later hyphenation of the word) and the middle-voiced sense that Heidegger intends, as a happening whereby we are both take our place in the world *and* are placed in it. Kisiel's suggestion of the "human

situation" also fails to express this verbal sense. "Human situating" might work, but strikes me as awkward. I experimented with "taking-place", but this overlaps too much with "happening" [*Geschehen*]. I have settled on "being-situate" for now.

Second, the use of "project" to translate *entwerfen* and "projection" for *Entwurf* has always struck me as highly misleading, since it lends itself all too easily to the decisionist reading of BT that one still occasionally encounters. Although they do have the sense of "throw" found in the root word *werfen*, the prefix "pro-" implies a subject that intentionally does the "throwing". There is no satisfactory word in English to express this. I have tried the cognates "lay out" and "layout". For somewhat similar reasons I have used "cast" and "castness" of *geworfen* and *Geworfenheit*.

Finally, the use of "(in)authentic(ally)" for (*un*)*eigentlich* is also misleading. In ordinary German, *eigentlich* often means "proper(ly)" or "appropriate(ly)". The latter, it seems to me, makes better sense of those passages where Heidegger juxtaposes *uneigentlich* with *echt* ("genuine") (e.g., SZ 146, 148, 326). It seems peculiar, at least in contemporary English, to refer to something as both genuine and inauthentic, whereas to refer to something as genuine yet inappropriate is not. (For example, we recognize certain expressions of emotion or sentiment as being quite genuine, although we may find them inappropriate to a particular situation.) The nominalized form of "(in)appropriateness", for (*Un*)*Eigentlichkeit*, is somewhat cumbersome. However, these cognates work better, it seems to me, than Kisiel's suggestion of "(dis)owned(ly)" and "(dis)ownedness".

Lexicon of Heidegger's terms

Abständigkeit	apartness
Augenblick	twinkling
Befindlichkeit	disposedness (K)
Besorgen	caretaking (K)
Bewandtnis	appliance (K)
Bewegtheit	movedness
Da-sein	being-situate; the human situation
eigentlich	appropriate (*a.*), appropriately (*adv.*); proper; (in quotation marks, "authentic")
Eigentlichkeit	appropriate
eigenste	most appropriate
Entschlossenheit	resolvedness
Entschluß	resolve
Entwerfen	lay out, laying out
Entwurf	layout
existierend	existing, existingly
Fürsorge	caregiving (K)
geschichtlich	historical
Geschichtlichkeit	historicalness
Gestimmtheit	attunement, moodedness
Gestimmtsein	being-attuned
Gewesenheit	alreadiness
geworfene	cast
Geworfenheit	castness

gleichursprünglich	equioriginary; equioriginarily
historisch	historial
innerweltlich(e)	innerworldish (*a.*), innerworldishly (*adv.*)
je	in each case
Jemeinigkeit	mineness
jeweilig	in each instant; at a particular time; at the particular while
das Man	Everyman
Man-selbst	Everyman-self
Mit-da-sein	being-situate-with
Mitwelt	with-world; contemporaries
Rückruf	re-call
Rücksicht	regard
Schuld	debt, insolvency
schuldig	indebted, insolvent
Seinkönnen	ability-to-be
Seinsart	manner of being
sein bei	being at
Selbstsein	being-self
So-sein	being-this-way-or-that; being-such
Stimmung	mood
überantwortet	delivered up
Überlegung	consideration
Umgang	conversement (?)
umgehen	going about
Umwelt	around-world; environment

umweltlich	environmental
Umweltlichkeit	environmentalness
uneigentlich	inappropriate, inappropriately
Uneigentlichkeit	inappropriate
ursprünglich	originary, original; originarily
vereinzelte	individuated; singularized
Vereinzelung	individuation; singularization
Verfallen	lapsing
Verständnis	understoodness
vorhanden	on hand; just there (S)
Vorhandenheit	on-handness; just-there-ness (S)
Vorlaufen	forerunning (K, S)
Woraufhin	toward-which-according-to-which (K)
zeitigen	generate; mature
Zeitlichkeit	timeliness
zeitlich	timely
Zeug	implement (S)
Zu-sein	having-to-be; can-be
zuhandene	handy
Zuhandenheit	handiness

K = Kisiel; S = Sheehan